Parliamentary immunity : a comprehensive study of the systems of parliamentary immunity of the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands in a European context by Hardt, S.
  
 
Parliamentary immunity : a comprehensive study of
the systems of parliamentary immunity of the United
Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands in a European
context
Citation for published version (APA):
Hardt, S. (2013). Parliamentary immunity : a comprehensive study of the systems of parliamentary
immunity of the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands in a European context. Maastricht:
Maastricht University.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2013
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parliamentary Immunity  
 
A Comprehensive Study of the Systems of 
Parliamentary Immunity of the United Kingdom, 
France, and the Netherlands in a European 
Context 

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parliamentary Immunity  
 
A Comprehensive Study of the Systems of Parliamentary 
Immunity of the United Kingdom, France, and  
the Netherlands in a European Context 
DISSERTATION 
to obtain the degree of Doctor 
at the Maastricht University, 
on the authority of the Rector Magnificus, 
Prof. dr. L.L.G. Soete 
in accordance with the decision of the Board of Deans, 
to be defended in public 
on Thursday 26 September 2013, at 16.00 hours 
by 
Sascha Hardt 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: 
Prof. mr. L.F.M. Verhey (Leiden University, formerly Maastricht University) 
 
Co-Supervisor: 
 Dr. Ph. Kiiver 
Assessment Committee: 
Prof. dr. J.Th.J. van den Berg 
Prof. dr. M. Claes (Chair) 
Prof. dr. C. Guérin-Bargues (Université d’Orléans) 
 Prof. mr. A.W. Heringa 
Prof. D. Oliver, MA, PhD, LLD Barrister, FBA (Univeristy College London) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover photograph © Andreas Altenburger - Dreamstime.com 
 
 
Layout by Marina Jodogne. 
 
 
 
 
A commercial edition of this PhD-thesis will be published by Intersentia in the Ius 
Commune Europaeum Series, No. 119 under ISBN 978-1-78068-191-7. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Für Danielle 
 
 

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
vii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
As I have been told, the idea that I could write a doctoral dissertation first occurred 
to Philipp Kiiver when he was supervising my bachelor thesis in 2007. At that time, 
I may well have dreamed of a PhD position, but I was far from having any actual 
plans, let alone actively pursuing them. Yet, not a year later, Luc Verhey and 
Philipp Kiiver asked me whether I was interested to join the newly founded 
Montesquieu Institute Maastricht as a PhD researcher. I was more than interested 
but nevertheless declined the offer, instead choosing to embark on the six-month 
trip around the world I had planned for years. I was certain that this would be the 
end of my academic aspirations, but thanks to the persistence of my two 
supervisors it turned out differently: sitting in a little boat between two islands in 
the Indian Ocean, I received a phone call from Maastricht and was offered to start 
my PhD half a year later than initially planned.  
I am most thankful to Luc Verhey and Philipp Kiiver for this second chance, 
for their far-sightedness, their great patience before and during the time of my 
appointment as a PhD candidate, and their sustained faith in my potential. I am also 
particularly grateful for their style of supervision: both were never indifferent, 
always interested and constantly ready to offer constructive criticism. At the same 
time, their supervision was never ‘intrusive’. From the initial research proposal to 
the very last pages I was given – and greatly enjoyed! – the freedom to conduct my 
research completely independently, approach my subject in the way I pleased and 
write this book when and where I saw fit – mostly during unorthodox nocturnal 
working hours. In short, I could not have been luckier with my supervisors. 
I also extend my warmest thanks and appreciation to my (former) colleagues 
at the Montesquieu Institute Maastricht and the capaciteitsgroep publiekrecht. Without 
the many extended lunch breaks, research meetings and discussions over coffee 
with Mira Scholten, Christian Syrier, Wytze van der Woude, Danielle Wenders, Rob 
van de Westelaken, Sandor Loeffen and Joop van den Berg, writing this book would 
have been a much more difficult and all too solitary exercise. I always particularly 
enjoyed working with my colleague and friend Mariolina Eliantonio, whose energy 
and drive remain a continuous source of awe and inspiration. Many others at the 
Faculty of Law have also contributed to making the past four years the good time 
that they were. Tanja van der Meer, Mark Seitter, Antonia Waltermann, as well as 
 viii 
Acknowledgements 
Jaap Hage and his (though he would probably oppose the use of the possessive 
pronoun) philosophy group played no insignificant part in this. 
While a PhD researcher is of course supposed to focus on completing his 
thesis, I took tremendous pleasure in teaching – certainly a trait I inherited from my 
parents – and I always found it an extremely rewarding distraction from my 
research. I would like to thank my students for the good time I had as a tutor and 
lecturer. 
Despite all due and necessary romanticisation with which I can now finally 
look back, my PhD time has not only been nice and easy. For all their help and 
support whenever it was not, I am grateful beyond words to my friends, in 
particular to Jule Winkler and Laura Brehmer.  
Finally and most importantly, I would never have been able to complete my 
doctorate without the love, patience, continuous support and ceaseless 
encouragement of my fiancée, Danielle. Thank you! 
 
Sascha Hardt 
Maastricht, July 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
ix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................................vii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....................................................................................................xv 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 
1. Parliamentary Immunity....................................................................................... 1 
1.1. The Relevance of Parliamentary Immunity........................................................ 1 
1.2. A Definition ............................................................................................................ 3 
1.3. Two Forms of Immunity: Non-accountability and Inviolability ..................... 4 
1.4. The Immunity Dilemma........................................................................................ 6 
 
2. Methodology .......................................................................................................... 7 
2.1. Objectives ................................................................................................................ 8 
2.1.1. Understanding Parliamentary Immunity in Context........................................ 8 
2.1.2. Differences and Commonalities........................................................................... 9 
2.1.3. Trends and Developments.................................................................................... 9 
2.2. Methodological Challenges and Choices.......................................................... 10 
2.2.1. The Problem of Comparison............................................................................... 10 
2.2.2. The Problem of Selection..................................................................................... 11 
2.2.3. The Choice of the UK, France and the Netherlands as Case Studies ............ 12 
2.2.3.1. The United Kingdom........................................................................................... 12 
2.2.3.2. France .................................................................................................................... 12 
2.2.3.3. The Netherlands................................................................................................... 14 
 
 
 
 x 
Table of Contents 
CHAPTER 2: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY .................... 17 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 17 
 
2. Parliamentary Immunity and the ECHR .......................................................... 18 
2.1. The Relevance of ECtHR Case Law: Interpretative Effects ............................ 18 
2.2. ECtHR Case Law on Parliamentary Immunity................................................ 19 
2.2.1. Article 6 of the Convention: Access to Court ................................................... 20 
2.2.1.1. Non-accountability under Article 6 ECHR....................................................... 20 
2.2.1.2. Inviolability under Article 6 ECHR ................................................................... 27 
2.2.1.3. Article 6 ECHR and the Penal Powers of Parliament...................................... 33 
2.2.2. Parliamentary Immunity and Freedom of Expression: Article 10 ECHR..... 35 
2.2.2.1. Freedom of Expression for Parliamentarians outside Parliament................. 36 
2.2.2.2. Freedom of Expression: Speaking about Parliamentarians............................ 39 
2.3. ECtHR Case Law on Parliamentary Immunity: Conclusions ........................ 41 
 
3. The Immunity Regime of the European Parliament ....................................... 43 
3.1. A Combined Immunity Regime: 27+1 .............................................................. 43 
3.2. A Discriminatory System.................................................................................... 44 
3.3. Waiving or Defending European Inviolability ................................................ 46 
3.4. The CJEU and the Scope of European Non-accountability ............................ 49 
3.5. The Immunity System of the European Parliament: Conclusion .................. 53 
 
4. Concluding Remarks on Parliamentary Immunity in Europe....................... 53 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM ............................. 55 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 55 
1.1. Structure of this Case Study ............................................................................... 55 
1.2. Parliamentary Privilege in the UK..................................................................... 55 
1.3. Delineation............................................................................................................ 57 
 
2. The History of Parliamentary Privilege ............................................................ 58 
2.1. The Origins of Parliament................................................................................... 58 
2.2. Historical Origins and Development of Privilege ........................................... 61 
2.2.1. The Privilege of Freedom of Speech .................................................................. 63 
2.2.2. The Privilege of Freedom from Arrest and Molestation................................. 65 
2.2.3. The Privilege of Access to Her Majesty............................................................. 67 
2.2.4. The Privilege of Favourable Construction........................................................ 68 
2.2.5. The Privilege of the House of Commons to Provide for its own  
Constitution .......................................................................................................... 68 
2.2.6. The Principle of Exclusive Cognisance ............................................................. 69 
2.3. The House of Lords and the Privileges of the Commons............................... 72 
 
 xi 
Table of Contents 
3. Demarcating Exclusive Cognisance: Lex Parliamenti and Lex Terrae ............. 74 
3.1. A Categorisation .................................................................................................. 75 
3.2. The Evolution of the Relationship between Lex Parliamenti and Lex  
Terrae in Case Law .............................................................................................. 77 
3.3. The Defamation Act 1996.................................................................................... 87 
3.4. The Parliamentary Expenses Scandal and R v. Chaytor: The End of 
Exclusive Cognisance? ........................................................................................ 91 
3.5. Lex Parliamenti and Lex Terrae: Conclusions.................................................. 95 
 
4. Parliamentary Privilege Today .......................................................................... 97 
4.1. The Modern Perception of Privilege.................................................................. 97 
4.2. Flexibility vs. Legal Certainty............................................................................. 99 
4.3. The Modern Privileges: The Law..................................................................... 101 
4.3.1. The Privileges ex Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 ..................................... 102 
4.3.1.1. Freedom of Speech and Debate........................................................................ 102 
4.3.1.2. Proceedings in Parliament ................................................................................ 103 
4.3.1.3. ‘Questioned’........................................................................................................ 109 
4.3.1.4. ‘Place Out of Parliament’ .................................................................................. 111 
4.3.1.5. Recent Developments and the Future of the Article 9 Privileges ................ 113 
4.3.2. The Privilege of Freedom from Arrest ............................................................ 119 
4.3.3. The Enforcement of Privilege: Penal Powers of Parliament......................... 121 
 
5. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 125 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY IN FRANCE ..................................................... 129 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 129 
1.1. Structure of this Case Study ............................................................................. 129 
1.2. Parliamentary Immunity in France ................................................................. 129 
1.3. Delineation.......................................................................................................... 131 
 
2. The History of Parliamentary Immunity in France ....................................... 132 
2.1. The Concept of Parliament in Pre-revolutionary France .............................. 133 
2.1.1. Representative and consultative assemblies in pre-revolutionary France . 133 
2.1.1.1. The Curia Regis .................................................................................................. 133 
2.1.1.2. The Conseil du Roi............................................................................................. 134 
2.1.1.3. Parlement ............................................................................................................ 134 
2.1.1.4. Les États Généraux ............................................................................................ 135 
2.1.2. The États Généraux as a Proto-parliament....................................................... 136 
2.2. The Emergence of Immunity in the Revolution............................................. 138 
2.2.1. Minimal Privilege under the Ancien Régime ................................................... 138 
2.2.2. The National Assembly..................................................................................... 139 
2.2.3. The Earliest Immunity Provisions ................................................................... 139 
2.2.4. Two Possible Interpretations of the Emergence of Immunity ..................... 144 
 xii 
Table of Contents 
2.3. The ‘Waltz of Constitutions’ ............................................................................. 147 
2.3.1. The Period of the National Convention .......................................................... 147 
2.3.2. The Constitution of Year III .............................................................................. 150 
2.3.3. The Constitution of Year VIII ........................................................................... 154 
2.3.4. The Constitutional Charters of 1814 and 1830 ............................................... 156 
2.3.5. The Constitution of 1848 ................................................................................... 157 
2.3.6. The Constitutional Laws of 1875...................................................................... 159 
2.3.7. The Vichy Regime .............................................................................................. 161 
2.3.8. The Constitution of 1946 ................................................................................... 162 
2.4. The History of Parliamentary Immunity in France: A Summary Picture .. 164 
 
3. Theoretical Foundations of Parliamentary Immunity .................................. 165 
3.1. The Significance of Constitutional Theory ..................................................... 165 
3.2. The Justification of Parliamentary Immunity in Classical Theory after  
Carré de Malberg ............................................................................................... 167 
3.2.1. National Sovereignty and Representation...................................................... 167 
3.2.2. Parliamentary Immunity as a Corollary of the Representative Mandate... 172 
3.2.3. Popular vs. National Sovereignty: Constitutional Text and Reality ........... 177 
3.3. Theoretical Foundations: A Summary Picture............................................... 180 
 
4. The Immunity Regime of the Fifth Republic.................................................. 181 
4.1. The Constitutional Amendment of 1995......................................................... 182 
4.2. The Scope of Non-accountability and Inviolability....................................... 183 
4.2.1. The Temporal Scope of the Immunities .......................................................... 184 
4.2.2. The Personal Scope of the Immunities ............................................................ 186 
4.2.3. The Material Scope of Non-accountability ..................................................... 187 
4.2.4. The Material Scope of Inviolability.................................................................. 190 
4.3. Procedures for Lifting Inviolability and for the Suspension of Detention  
or Prosecution..................................................................................................... 192 
4.3.1. The Procedure for Lifting Inviolability ........................................................... 192 
4.3.2. The Procedure for the Suspension of Detention and Measures of 
Prosecution ......................................................................................................... 194 
4.4. The Legal Nature of Parliamentary Immunity .............................................. 195 
4.5. A Justification for Inviolability?....................................................................... 196 
4.6. The Immunity Regime of the Fifth Republic: A Summary Picture ............. 197 
 
5. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 198 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY IN THE NETHERLANDS ................................. 201 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 201 
1.1. Structure .............................................................................................................. 201 
1.2. Terminology ....................................................................................................... 201 
1.3. Parliamentary Immunity in the Netherlands................................................. 202 
 xiii 
Table of Contents 
1.3.1. Issues ................................................................................................................... 204 
1.3.1.1. Historical Reasons for Limited Parliamentary Immunity ............................ 204 
1.3.1.2. How Limited is Dutch Parliamentary Immunity in Reality?....................... 205 
1.3.1.3. Parliamentary vs. Political Immunity ............................................................. 206 
1.4. Delineation.......................................................................................................... 206 
 
2. The History of Parliamentary Immunity in the Netherlands ...................... 207 
2.1. The Republican Period ...................................................................................... 207 
2.1.1. The Republic of the Seven United Netherlands (1579-1795) ........................ 207 
2.1.2. The Earliest Immunity Provisions in Holland ............................................... 210 
2.2. The Batavian and French Period: 1795-1814................................................... 214 
2.2.1. The Batavian Republic....................................................................................... 214 
2.2.1.1. Immunity under the Constitution for the Batavian people of 1798 ............ 215 
2.2.1.2. No Immunity under the Batavian Constitutions of 1801 and 1805 ............. 217 
2.2.2. The Kingdom of 1806 and the French Annexation........................................ 219 
2.3. The Kingdom of the Netherlands 1814/15-1848............................................ 220 
2.3.1. ‘Enlightened Absolutism’ and a Weak Parliament ....................................... 220 
2.3.2. Inviolability for Crimes in Office: Indirect Freedom of Speech? ................. 222 
2.4. Towards the Constitution of 1848.................................................................... 226 
2.4.1. The Abolition of Inviolability ........................................................................... 227 
2.4.2. Inviolability Traded for Non-accountability .................................................. 229 
2.4.3. The Disputed Scope of Non-accountability.................................................... 231 
2.5. More Non-accountability and Less Inviolability: A Negative  
Correlation? ........................................................................................................ 233 
2.6. Developments during the 20th Century........................................................... 234 
 
3. The Dutch Immunity System Today ............................................................... 241 
3.1. The Scope of Non-accountability ex Article 71 of the Constitution ............ 241 
3.1.1. Personal Scope.................................................................................................... 242 
3.1.1.1. Members, Ministers, Secretaries of State......................................................... 242 
3.1.1.2. Other Persons ..................................................................................................... 242 
3.1.1.3. Can the State be Held Liable Instead?............................................................. 246 
3.1.2. Temporal and Spatial Scope ............................................................................. 248 
3.1.2.1. No Spatial Privilege ........................................................................................... 248 
3.1.2.2. Non-accountability for the Duration of the Meeting only............................ 248 
3.1.3. Material Scope .................................................................................................... 249 
3.1.3.1. No Limitations with Regard to the Content of Utterances Covered by  
Non-accountability ............................................................................................ 249 
3.1.3.2. No Immunity for ‘Private’ Publications, even if Identical to Protected 
Utterances ........................................................................................................... 250 
3.1.3.3. All Forms of Legal Action are Barred.............................................................. 252 
3.2. The Disciplinary Powers of the Chambers ..................................................... 253 
3.3. The Immunity Dimension of Article 119 of the Constitution ...................... 254 
3.3.1. A Hypothetical Potential................................................................................... 255 
3.3.1.1. Crimes Committed in Office (Ambtsmisdrijven) .......................................... 255 
3.3.1.2. Does this Procedure Amount to Inviolability?............................................... 257 
 xiv 
Table of Contents 
3.4. Wilders and Beyond: A Case for Broadening Immunity? ............................ 259 
3.4.1. The Prosecution of Geert Wilders.................................................................... 260 
3.4.2. Parliamentary vs. Political Immunity ............................................................. 261 
3.4.2.1. Freedom of Speech for Politicians in Public Political Debate....................... 261 
3.4.2.2. Does Parliamentary Immunity Offer a Solution? .......................................... 264 
 
4. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 266 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS..................................................................... 271 
1. Smallest Common Denominators .................................................................... 271 
 
2. Lessons from History ........................................................................................ 272 
2.1. A Summary of the Historical Origins of Parliamentary Immunity............. 272 
2.2. Freedom of Speech as the Epitome of Parliamentarianism.......................... 275 
2.3. Inviolability as a Secondary Immunity ........................................................... 276 
 
3. Theory and Parliamentary Immunity ............................................................. 278 
3.1. The Justification of Parliamentary Immunity in Constitutional Theory .... 278 
3.2. Constitutional Theory has a Conservative Effect .......................................... 280 
 
4. The State of Material Immunity and Developments ..................................... 281 
4.1. Parliamentary Immunity in the UK, France and the Netherlands:  
Material Similarities and Differences .............................................................. 281 
4.1.1. Non-accountability ............................................................................................ 281 
4.1.2. Inviolability......................................................................................................... 283 
4.1.3. The Case of the Netherlands: Towards Political Immunity? ....................... 284 
4.2. The Immunity of the European Parliament.................................................... 285 
4.3. ECtHR and CJEU: A Functional Approach Towards Parliamentary 
Immunity ............................................................................................................ 286 
4.4. Do National Systems Develop in a ‘Functional’ Direction? ......................... 287 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................... 289 
POLITICAL DOCUMENTS ................................................................................................... 301 
CURRICULUM VITAE.......................................................................................................... 303 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
xv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union  
CSP Standards and Privileges Committee 
CSPL Committee on Standards in Public Life 
ECHR European Convention of Human Rights  
ECJ  European Court of Justice  
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EP European Parliament 
EU European Union 
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of all Racial 
Discrimination  
MeP Member of the European Parliament  
MP Member of Parliament 
TEC Treaty establishing the European Community 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
UK United Kingdom 
 
 

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Parliamentary Immunity 
1.1. The Relevance of Parliamentary Immunity 
Among scholars, law students and laypersons alike, the most common response to 
hearing of the topic of this research project was something in the vein of ‘what an 
obscure topic – but interesting!’. Therefore, it is perhaps in order to explain the 
relevance of parliamentary immunity as a research subject. Why should we want to 
investigate parliamentary immunity? Why is it important? There are essentially two 
reasons, one of a practical nature and one more abstract. First, even though 
parliamentary immunity is only rarely in the spotlight of scholarly – let alone public 
– attention, whenever it is it gives rise to legal and political questions which evade 
an easy, superficial answer. Is it fair and just to make parliamentarians immune? If 
so, to what extent and for which purpose? Individual cases often reveal a conflict of 
rights, since immunity means that the law is not applied to the immune person, 
which may limit the rights of others. A good understanding of parliamentary 
immunity is necessary to assess and solve this conflict. More in the abstract, 
parliamentary immunity touches the very core of constitutional law. Immunity 
rules are intimately linked to the basic setup and the idea of the democratic state, to 
the separation of powers, the concept of representation, the rule of law and human 
rights. Investigating parliamentary immunity therefore both requires and advances 
our understanding of wider constitutional law.  
According to broad consensus, the raison d’être of parliamentary immunity is 
to protect parliament, the central institution of modern representative democracy, 
from undue external influence. Elected representatives, who collectively personify 
the public will and translate it into the laws which govern our lives, need to be able 
to debate freely in parliament and to discharge their mandate independently. They 
must not fear politically motivated prosecution or other forms of obstruction of the 
parliamentary process. This is what immunity tries to achieve by the partial 
exemption of members of parliament from the application of the law and the 
ordinary course of justice. Normally, parliamentarians cannot be prosecuted or tried 
for statements made in parliament. Often, they can only be criminally prosecuted 
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and arrested with the authorisation of parliament. Sometimes, immunity even 
prevents civil action against parliamentarians.  
Though usually met with little appreciation in public opinion, parliamentary 
immunity is deeply engrained in the constitutional systems of most states in the 
world. Virtually all states which have a parliament also provide for a system of 
parliamentary immunity.1 Nevertheless, specific legal research on the matter is 
relatively scarce and in most of the general literature on constitutional law 
parliamentary immunity appears as an obscure and marginal subject. That this is 
regrettable is easily illustrated by looking at concrete cases in which parliamentary 
immunity is at issue. 
In 1996, the British MP Michael Stern delivered a speech in the House of 
Commons in which he addressed certain problems with public housing in his 
constituency. In the course of this speech, he disclosed the full name and address of 
A., one of his constituents, about whom he went on to make the most injurious 
statements. Mr Stern referred to A. and her children as ‘neighbours from hell’ and 
accused them of anti-social behaviour, littering, loitering, even prostitution. The 
parliamentarian had, however, never actually been in personal contact with A.; his 
allegations, which she strongly denied, were merely based on hearsay. Several 
newspapers picked up on this public slur in parliament and reported on the 
‘neighbours from hell’. As a result, A. and her children became the victims of racial 
abuse, hate mail and threats which eventually forced them to leave their home and 
neighbourhood. A. tried to seek legal redress from Mr Stern, but her attempt to sue 
the parliamentarian for defamation failed, since he was protected by parliamentary 
privilege. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), to which A. finally 
complained, found that the absolute protection of statements in parliament, 
however injurious to the applicant, constituted a limitation to the rights of access to 
court that was justified as necessary in a democratic society.2  
Was A v. the UK decided correctly? And if so, how far does the necessity to 
protect parliament go? To what extent is the curtailment of the rights of citizens an 
acceptable price for this protection of parliament? Should the protection of 
immunity extend to statements made outside parliament or even to criminal acts, 
other than utterances? After all, parliamentarians are today not only lawmakers but 
also important public figures with considerable media presence and a decisive 
influence on the course and content of societal debate. In order to be politically 
successful, members of parliament must disseminate and discuss their ideas and 
political agenda in public. What parliamentarians say and do is widely noticed, also 
beyond the immediate context of parliamentary debate and the legislative process. 
But do extra-parliamentary statements deserve equal immunity? 
In 2007, the Dutch right-wing parliamentarian Geert Wilders published a 
newspaper article in which he referred to the Qu’ran as a ‘fascist book’ and 
compared it to Hitler’s Mein Kampf. He also released the anti-Islamic film Fitna and 
 
1 With very few exceptions, cf. Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parliamentary Immunity (draft 
background paper), Geneva, September 2006. For a list and summary of most existing 
systems of immunity, see also Maingot 2010. 
2 A. v. The United Kingdom, ECHR 17 December 2002, App. No. 35373/97. 
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made a number of public statements in which he demanded a stop to Muslim 
immigration to the Netherlands. Since Dutch parliamentary immunity does not 
protect, it was possible for him to be prosecuted and tried for insultation, incitement 
to hatred and incitement to discrimination. Wilders was finally acquitted of all 
charges, but the fact that he, an elected representative of the people, could be 
prosecuted for his public statements sparked some debate as to whether the limited 
Dutch immunity system provides adequate protection to parliamentarians speaking 
outside parliament. Thus, do the Netherlands need a higher level of immunity?  
A v. the UK and Wilders’s case are just two examples of the important legal 
and, not least, political issues which arise in the context of parliamentary immunity. 
This study will show that the line between necessary protection and unjustified 
privilege is rather thin, and that this line is slowly but continuously shifting in the 
course of constitutional and societal development. It is the endeavour of this study 
to trace this shift, to understand its causes and consequences and to develop a 
comprehensive view of parliamentary immunity that cuts across national borders. 
1.2. A Definition 
It is not easy to reach an exhaustive definition of the concept of parliamentary 
immunity that covers all of its possible forms and facets. In a very broad sense, 
parliamentary immunity is a legal instrument which inhibits legal action, measures 
of investigation, and law enforcement in civil or criminal matters against members 
of the legislature.  
In all immunity systems, one or more elements of this definition are 
implemented. Nevertheless, there are large differences between countries as regards 
the individual characteristics and the scope of parliamentary immunity. These 
differences do not only concern the outward effects of immunity – who is protected, 
and from what – but also its legislative design and legal nature. Where a member of 
parliament is ‘immune’ this can be the effect of very diverse causes. For example, a 
constitutional immunity clause may provide that the courts lack jurisdiction to hear 
civil claims or criminal complaints against parliamentarians. This results in a 
procedural bar which prevents the enforcement of the law, but in principle it does 
not affect the validity of a civil claim or take away the criminal nature of an act. 
Another possibility is that parliamentary immunity affects the legal status of the 
acts or utterances of a member of parliament, so that, for instance, statements made 
during a parliamentary debate are generally deemed not to be insulting and 
therefore cannot give rise to criminal proceedings. Often, the distinction between 
these two different avenues through which immunity can be achieved is merely a 
matter of interpretation. A certain ‘immunity effect’ which falls outside the above 
definition can also be reached more indirectly. In an example to which we will later 
return in our discussion of immunity under the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR), the publication of potentially harmful information about a person’s 
private life was a criminal offence, and the fact that the victim was a member of 
parliament constituted a seriously aggravating circumstance. In this case, the 
‘immunity effect’ does not relate to legal action against a parliamentarian, but to his 
general status before the law. 
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While different legislative options are used to achieve immunity, its general 
purpose is always to enable the legislature to carry out its constitutional tasks 
without undue external interference. Historically, parliamentary immunity as a 
legal institution has been introduced to shield the legislature from, in particular, the 
executive. Our historical analyses of three European systems will show that this was 
necessary at times when the role and powers of parliaments was still frequently a 
matter of fierce – and sometimes outright violent – dispute. However, the 
independence of parliament also had to be asserted vis-à-vis the judiciary, which 
often was (and sometimes is) institutionally linked with the executive, or can be 
instrumentalised in politically motivated legal action. It would be wrong to believe 
that all of these struggles are merely a matter for history, even though the nature of 
disputes between the legislature and the other two branches of power has changed 
considerably over time. Today, the possibility of conflict between parliament and 
the media or private parties also adds to the need of the legislature for protection 
through parliamentary immunity. 
1.3. Two Forms of Immunity: Non-accountability and Inviolability 
As explained above, parliamentary immunity can take many different shapes. It 
must therefore be understood as an umbrella term, an overarching concept which 
denotes all legal instruments that have the effect of rendering members of 
parliament immune. For a good understanding of different immunity systems, it is 
indispensable to introduce one very important terminological subdivision within 
this overarching concept: the two main forms of parliamentary immunity are non-
accountability and inviolability. 
‘Non-accountability’ primarily means freedom of the parliamentary vote and 
freedom of speech in parliament or in a parliamentary context. This is the most 
ubiquitous form of parliamentary immunity. Under non-accountability, 
parliamentarians may not be held legally accountable for their utterances and 
voting behaviour in the assembly to which they belong. Usually, non-accountability 
is materially and temporally absolute. This means that any kind of legal action is 
barred and that this bar is perpetual, applicable even after the end of their mandate. 
Lastly, non-accountability usually cannot be lifted by parliament nor renounced by 
an individual member. 
The term ‘inviolability’ denotes immunity from legal action, detention or 
measures of prosecution or investigation outside the immediate scope of a member’s 
activities in parliament. In short, inviolability covers matters which non-
accountability does not. Whereas non-accountability is a virtually universal feature 
of parliamentarianism, inviolability does not exist in all countries, and its exact 
scope differs considerably between systems. At times, inviolability can cover acts 
entirely unrelated to the parliamentary mandate, for instance traffic offences or 
theft. In other systems, a certain connection of an act with parliamentary activity 
must still be present for inviolability to apply. The effects of inviolability also differ: 
they range from the prohibition of arrest and detention to a general prohibition of 
all legal action, civil and criminal, and of all measures of investigation such as home  
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searches or wiretapping. As opposed to non-accountability, inviolability is usually 
limited in time. It often applies only while parliament is in session and usually ends 
with the end of the parliamentary mandate. This means that it only has suspensive 
effect: even where inviolability bars the arrest or prosecution of a parliamentarian 
during the time of his mandate, he can be prosecuted and arrested after his term has 
ended, also for criminal acts committed during the mandate. In addition, 
inviolability may normally be lifted by parliament upon a request by the 
prosecuting authorities.  
The distinction between non-accountability as an immunity for proper 
‘parliamentary affairs’ and inviolability as an extra-professional immunity seems 
reasonably clear. However, one must bear in mind that this distinction remains a 
simplification, since the exact shape which both concepts may take in a given 
system is determined by the definition of specific terms,3 by material qualifications4 
and by procedural factors.5 In effect, non-accountability and inviolability cannot 
always be clearly distinguished, especially if both concepts are not clearly separated 
in legislation, as is the case, for instance, in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the 
differentiation between these two forms of immunity is useful, as it enables us to 
identify two main traditions or models in the design of parliamentary immunity 
systems. 
First, a variety of states (primarily those with a British colonial history) employ 
what may be called the Westminster type of parliamentary immunity, or privilege, 
as it is described in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. For all practical purposes, 
Westminster-type immunity is limited to non-accountability. Members of the British 
Parliament or other parliaments using Westminster-type immunity enjoy the 
privilege of freedom of speech: they may not be held legally accountable for the 
content of their statements in parliament, except, as the case may be, by parliament 
itself (an example being for contempt). Westminster-type systems do not usually 
provide for inviolability. Accordingly, the UK parliamentary privilege does not 
 
3 A good example is Art. 9 of the English Bill of Rights 1689, in which the Lords and Commons 
‘do […] for the vindicating and asserting their ancient rights and liberties declare: […] that 
the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached 
or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament’. Whether Art. 9 provides exclusively 
for non-accountability or also contains a small element of inviolability depends heavily on the 
definition of the phrases ‘proceedings in Parliament’ and ‘any court or place out of 
Parliament’. Our case study of parliamentary privilege in the UK will show that Art. 9 is 
interpreted increasingly narrowly; its effects can therefore be said to be limited to non-
accountability.  
4 One of the most common qualifications of inviolability is the exception of an arrest flagrante 
delicto, contained in most inviolability provisions. Another frequent qualification limits the 
scope of inviolability to acts which have some connection to the parliamentary work of the 
member, for instance in the Austrian Federal Constitutional Act, Art. 57(2) and (3).  
5 The procedure for lifting immunity (inviolability) is particularly important in this respect. 
Depending on the institution competent to lift a member’s immunity, the required majorities, 
and other factors, the lifting procedure makes inviolability de facto impenetrable in some 
systems. In others, the factual degree of protection afforded by immunity is relatively low 
because it is easily lifted. The lifting procedure can also account for different degrees of 
sensitivity to political majorities in the respective assemblies.  
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feature freedom from arrest in criminal matters, whereas freedom from arrest in 
civil matters does formally exist but is of little practical relevance, as imprisonment 
in the civil process has long been abolished.  
The other main model of parliamentary immunity follows what may be called 
the continental parliamentary tradition. It is employed by many states on the 
European continent and in parts of the world formerly dominated by France and 
other continental powers. It is sometimes also referred to as the French type of 
parliamentary immunity. In these systems, inviolability of members of parliament 
adds a second layer of protection to basic non-accountability. In effect, 
parliamentarians who enjoy the continental form of parliamentary immunity benefit 
from both non-accountability and inviolability: they may never be held accountable 
for what they have said in parliament. In addition, they may in principle not be 
deprived of their liberty without the authorisation of parliament. Depending on the 
respective system, and subject to qualifications, they may also not be prosecuted, or 
prosecution must be halted or suspended at the behest of parliament. There are 
(rare) cases of states with a continental legal system which do not grant their 
parliamentarians any form of non-accountability and whose immunity system 
therefore resembles Westminster-type parliamentary privilege. The Netherlands is 
the only such state in Europe.  
1.4. The Immunity Dilemma 
Systems of parliamentary immunity are anything but unchallenged. On the one 
hand, it is generally recognised in scholarly literature and constitutional practice 
that the protection which immunity affords is ‘indispensable to the operation of 
democracy’.6 On the other hand, the scope of this protection is often perceived as 
excessive. Parliamentary immunity is criticised as facilitating corruption among 
parliamentarians and affording undeserved protection to libel and slander coming 
from the ranks of parliament. It is argued that parliamentary immunity enables 
representatives to ‘pursue their own personal and political interests, over and above 
that which is made possible simply by their position of influence’7 – a possibility 
which is seen as highly undemocratic and often leads to calls for immunity to be 
curtailed or even abolished.8  
Case law and the parliamentary history of many states reveal that the legal 
institution of parliamentary immunity gives rise to one basic dilemma. Immunity is 
recognised as necessary to safeguard the proper functioning of parliament. 
Conversely, any legal immunity by definition creates exceptions to the normal 
application of the law and thereby limits the rights of citizens, who are prevented 
from enforcing their rights against members of parliament. This is problematic in 
the light of the principle of equality before the law. Even if we accept that the aim of 
 
6 Observations of the Dutch Government, annexed to the judgment in A. v. The United Kingdom, 
ECHR 17 December 2002, App. No. 35373/97. 
7 Wigley 2003, p. 23. 
8 Such calls are often heard in debates surrounding alleged corruption cases. Cf. Özbudun 
2005; Wigley 2009. 
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parliamentary immunity is not to create a privileged caste of parliamentarians, but 
to protect the legislature as an institution, individual members of parliament are 
nevertheless the immediate beneficiaries of any immunity system. By virtue of 
immunity, their legal position is inevitably unequal to that of an ‘ordinary citizen’. 
It is therefore in the nature of immunity to create exceptions to the principle of 
equality. Since the latter is one of the core constitutional values of any democratic 
society, any such exception is only acceptable insofar as it can be justified by 
another constitutional value, such as the functioning of the democratically elected 
legislator. The drafters of immunity rules are therefore faced with the challenge of 
carefully balancing the adverse effects of parliamentary immunity against the 
necessary protection of parliament which it is meant to afford. 
It must be recognised that the two concerns – guaranteeing the necessary 
protection to parliament while safeguarding the rights of non-parliamentarians and 
preventing abuse of immunity – are not generally diametrically opposed to each 
other. Inequality can be justified in unequal situations and systems of parliamentary 
immunity for the most part are not designed to grant members of parliament 
absolute impunity. With the exception of the basic freedom of speech in parliament, 
which is normally absolute, immunity legislation and corresponding procedural 
rules usually do provide for the possibility to remedy transgressions of the law by 
members, either by lifting immunity and exposing the member to the ordinary 
course of law or by the use of disciplinary and penal powers of the relevant 
assembly itself. However, it is an important characteristic of parliamentary 
immunity that such remedies are at the discretion of parliament. Thus, they are not 
enforceable outside of parliament and against its will. In this sense, parliamentary 
immunity does create a privilege. 
Instances of conflict between immunity and the rights of citizens are not 
insignificantly rare, nor insignificant in their impact: any failure to protect the 
proper functioning of parliament from undue external influence is a threat to a 
democratic constitutional system. Conversely, any failure to protect citizens’ rights 
and parliament, as an institution, from abuse of the parliamentary mandate by its 
members carries the danger of undermining parliament’s credibility and puts its 
legitimacy at jeopardy. This dilemma is therefore likely to persist. The question how 
different systems deal with the immunity dilemma it is the central underlying 
theme of this study. 
2. Methodology 
In short, the methodological approach of this book is to conduct a ‘comprehensive 
comparative analysis’ of the systems of parliamentary immunity of the United 
Kingdom, France and the Netherlands in a European context. It is comprehensive 
because the focus of this study does not lie exclusively on establishing the material 
content of the three immunity regimes and subsequently showing the differences 
and commonalities between them, but rather on understanding each of the three 
systems in depth. This includes the material immunity rules themselves, together 
with their historical origins and the way in which they relate to the constitutional 
setup of the three states and to overarching norms which exist in Europe. 
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This approach results in three largely independent case studies that examine 
the national systems of the UK, France and the Netherlands in detail. These 
independent case studies are encased by an analysis of the ‘European dimension’ of 
parliamentary immunity and a comparative chapter. The latter will identify 
differences and commonalities between the three systems studied and draw 
conclusions with regard to common principles and possible trends in the 
development of parliamentary immunity. 
In the following, an attempt will be made to justify the setup outlined above. 
In particular, the aims of this study will be addressed in more detail in order to 
justify the comprehensive approach. The methodological challenges of selection and 
comparison will also be discussed, with an explanation for the choice of the UK, 
France, and the Netherlands as case studies. 
2.1. Objectives 
At the risk of being accused of bad scientific style, it is useful, first of all, to explain 
what is decidedly not the aim of this study, and why not. A model solution for the 
immunity dilemma is not sought, nor is there an attempt to devise an ideal 
immunity system.  
While better law is certainly the most desirable outcome of any legal research, 
we start this project under the hypothesis – or realisation – that it is impossible to 
draw a blueprint for an ideal system of parliamentary immunity which can be 
transposed from one national constitutional and political framework to another 
offhand. That this is a realisation rather than a mere hypothesis emanates not only 
from common sense, but also from historic experience. The Dutch case study will 
give the example of the Netherlands at the time of the Batavian Republic, whose 
constitution (and system of immunity) was largely taken over without adaptation 
from post-revolutionary France. The French immunity system hardly left any traces 
in the Netherlands and was quickly abandoned when the ‘French period’ came to 
an end. 
While it may be true that all modern democracies share a basic stock of 
constitutional principles – the rule of law, the principle of equality, separation of 
powers and respect for human rights – it must be assumed that these principles 
merely create a rough normative framework for systems of parliamentary 
immunity. Any system of parliamentary immunity is so closely entangled with the 
individual circumstances of a country – its constitutional system, its legal tradition, 
its political culture and its history – that no model solution would be useful beyond 
the borders of one country.  
2.1.1. Understanding Parliamentary Immunity in Context 
It follows from the above that, even though parliamentary immunity as a legal 
institution is near-ubiquitous, its precise rules are by default system-specific. This 
does not only mean that drafting a universal blueprint for parliamentary immunity 
is a futile exercise – it also tells us what to do instead. In order to reach a better 
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general understanding of the concept of parliamentary immunity, different 
immunity systems must be analysed in the context of their respective national 
background, and the similarities and differences which exist between them must be 
evaluated and understood. A thorough understanding of the factors which have 
shaped (and continue to shape) different immunity systems is a necessary first step 
before considering that parliamentary immunity can cross national borders, and 
before we can establish common parameters and potential for optimisation or 
harmonisation. Moreover, a thorough understanding is also a prerequisite for an 
assessment of the general – and not system-specific – criticism which parliamentary 
immunity has at times received9 and for an informed international debate about this 
near-universal component of parliamentarianism. The first aim of this study is 
therefore to arrive at a thorough and comprehensive understanding of the three 
immunity systems which we are going to examine. This means understanding the 
positive legal content of the respective immunity provisions and their application in 
practice, but it also means understating their historical development, their 
background in constitutional theory and the nature of their entanglement with the 
respective constitutional system as a whole. In addition, it is useful for a good 
understanding of parliamentary immunity to establish the existence and content of 
international norms by which the different national systems are bound or 
influenced. Such norms can be expected to exist in the European human rights 
system of the ECHR and within the European Union. Before entering into a close 
examination of national immunity regimes, we will therefore set the stage by 
examining the ‘European dimension’ of parliamentary immunity.  
2.1.2. Differences and Commonalities 
The reason why it is useful to examine several national systems of parliamentary 
immunity at the same time is that this will enable us to explore different legislative 
options and to find out whether, despite all the differences and particularities of the 
national systems, there is a set of common principles of immunity law. We 
hypothesise that this is the case among systems which adhere to the same 
constitutional values of equality, rule of law, separation of powers and human 
rights, as they are all faced with the same immunity dilemma. Identifying such 
principles will help, first of all, to create a benchmark for the critical assessment of 
immunity provisions despite the system-specificity which we have asserted. It can 
also provide the basis for future research and general thought about prospects of 
harmonisation or meeting international standards. 
2.1.3. Trends and Developments 
Finally, a third aim of this study, closely connected with the former two aims, but of 
a more practical nature, is to find out whether different systems of parliamentary 
 
9 Cf. Maingot 2010. Maingot presents ‘a case for the abolition of parliamentary inviolability’ in 
all countries. 
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immunity in Europe are generally developing in a similar direction. It will be 
interesting to see, for instance, whether there is a trend across systems towards a 
greater limitation of parliamentary immunity, and if so, what causes this trend. In 
this context, it will also be necessary to examine the effects of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and of the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) on parliamentary immunity, as well as the immunity 
system of the European Parliament. Both will add a genuine European perspective 
to our juxtaposition of three individual national case studies and thus provide them 
with a broader context. 
2.2. Methodological Challenges and Choices 
2.2.1. The Problem of Comparison 
Why is it useful to compare systems of parliamentary immunity and what exactly 
does it mean to do so? It has already been asserted that a meaningful examination of 
the legal institution of parliamentary immunity – thus not only the positive law of a 
given system – requires comprehensiveness. We have to look into constitutional 
history, inquire into different areas of constitutional law which constitute the 
backgrounds for parliamentary immunity, and be aware of the socio-political 
situation of a country in order to reach the degree of understanding which is 
necessary to make comparison meaningful. This is so wherever the object of 
comparison is as such system-specific, as is clearly the case with parliamentary 
immunity.  
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law describes this need for 
‘background studies’ as the fundamental epistemological problem of comparative 
law. For legal comparison to become meaningful – that is to say more than a mere 
juxtaposition which illuminates material similarities and differences but which fails 
to explain and interpret them – we find it necessary to enter deeply into the ‘partly 
autonomous reality created by the norms, doctrines and concepts of a legal system 
that do not necessarily find exact counterparts in another’.10 This is a slippery slope 
which, almost inevitably, makes it necessary for comparative legal research to study 
history.11 It is freely admitted that this also happens in this research project. 
However, this need not be a worrying concern, as it has been observed elsewhere 
that comparative studies which merely engage in listing similarities and differences 
of positive law are necessarily ‘distinct [from the law itself], marginal and boring’.12 
We try to evade this, by making it the primary object of this study to understand 
how the general theme of parliamentary immunity is implemented in the particular 
 
10 Jansen 2006, p. 307. 
11 Jansen 2006, p. 306. 
12 Glenn 2007, p. 91. Glenn states that comparative law, understood in this way, is distinct 
‘because it [is] constructed as separate from the law itself, as something which follows it (like 
the cigarette after sex, in the old movies’. This analogy is odd, yet clear: comparative law 
should address and understand the law itself, before addressing similarities and differences 
on a meta-level. 
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context of the three individual systems we examine. However, of course the 
epistemological problem has an effect: the three case studies of which this study is 
mainly composed appear, first of all, as stand-alone analyses. An individual 
understanding of the respective systems of parliamentary immunity is built up. But 
we can make use of this characteristic in our comparison, since it enables us to find 
differences and commonalities not only on a material but also on a conceptual level, 
and to extrapolate principles and trends in development from the different national 
systems. 
2.2.2. The Problem of Selection 
It is clear that an examination of three systems of parliamentary immunity, however 
comprehensive, will in principle only produce results which are valid for these 
three systems. This is not problematic as long as we only aim to understand and 
compare these particular systems. However, as stated above, part of the declared 
goal of this study is also to see whether general conclusions can be drawn with 
regard to common principles and trends in the development of immunity 
legislation. Is it possible to reach such general conclusions by comparing only three 
systems? And if so, according to which criteria must these three systems be chosen?  
From a logical point of view, the first question must be answered in the 
negative. However, one has to bear in mind that the findings which we hope to 
achieve can only be ‘general’ in the sense that they apply to states which are 
comparable with regard to some fundamental constitutional concepts, such as 
parliamentarianism, separation of powers, the principle of equality, the rule of law 
and the observance of human rights. As parliamentary immunity is narrowly 
intertwined with these concepts, general findings are of mutual relevance to all (or 
most) comparable states.  
Concerning the choice of immunity systems for comparison, it is important 
that they are sufficiently different to cover the range of legislative options. It is 
therefore advisable to choose as case studies three immunity regimes which mirror 
the variety of existing systems. At the same time, the states in which these immunity 
regimes operate should be sufficiently comparable: they should be subject to the 
same human rights obligations and should not be too divergent with regard to their 
socio-political situation as ‘established democracies’.13 Another important criterion 
for choosing our case studies is the accessibility of information and literature, both 
generally and in terms of language, to the author. This excludes many immunity 
systems which would otherwise certainly be of interest, such as those of the 
Scandinavian countries or Greece. 
 
13 This is a troublesome concept in many ways. However, there is a noticeable difference 
between the scope of the parliamentary immunity of most states in Western Europe and 
states like Russia or Turkey, whose transition to democracy and parliamentarianism has 
either been relatively recent or particularly troubled. Including such systems in our 
comparison would mean that we have to take into account not only the historical differences 
which exist between them and Western European democracies, but also persisting differences 
in the political landscape and constitutional setup which makes them harder to compare.  
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All of the above criteria are fulfilled by the United Kingdom, France and the 
Netherlands. In the following, the motives for this selection will become more 
evident.  
2.2.3. The Choice of the UK, France and the Netherlands as Case Studies 
2.2.3.1. The United Kingdom 
The system of parliamentary privilege in the United Kingdom is a natural starting 
point for a comprehensive study of immunity systems. Not only is the Parliament of 
Westminster considered ‘the mother of all parliaments’,14 but its system of 
privileges dates back almost to the institutional origin of English legislature in the 
Middle Ages. 
Age, however, is not the primary factor which makes the British system of 
parliamentary privilege worth considering in a comparative study. Several reasons 
are more compelling. Firstly, Westminster-type parliamentary immunity is unique 
in Europe in terms of its legal organisation and the legal system (common law and 
no codified constitution) in which it operates.15 In order to capture the variety of 
systems of parliamentary immunity, the United Kingdom is therefore an inevitable 
choice. Secondly, most states with a British colonial history adhere to a form of 
Westminster-type privilege, including the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and India. In some Commonwealth countries, Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 
(which essentially provides for freedom of speech in parliament) is still in force as 
the basis of the most important privilege. Until recently, the British Privy Council 
still functioned as the highest judicial instance for some Commonwealth countries, 
thereby creating precedent and contributing directly to the development of 
parliamentary privilege in those countries. As a result, the British system of 
parliamentary privilege is one of the most important systems of parliamentary 
immunity in the world. 
2.2.3.2. France 
The choice of France as one of the case studies in this comparative project is justified 
by several considerations which, combined, make France a logical and very 
interesting subject in the context of comparative research on parliamentary 
immunity. 
First of all, the level of protection offered to parliamentarians under the French 
system can be said to represent one of the ‘extremes’ on a comparative scale of 
immunity; the inviolability of members of the French National Assembly and Senate 
 
14 This is not to say that it is the oldest existing parliament in the world; this title can probably 
be claimed either by the Icelandic Alþingi, founded in 930, or by the Isle of Man’s Tynwald, 
which was founded a few decades later but has been continuously active ever since. 
15 The Irish system of parliamentary privilege is modelled on the British one, but the powers 
and privileges of the Irish parliament are inscribed into the constitution. The same is true for 
the Maltese system. 
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stands in significant contrast to systems – such as that of the UK or the Netherlands 
– which do not offer this extra-professional layer of immunity for criminal acts 
unrelated to the exercise of the parliamentary mandate.16 For a comparative study 
with the aim of exploring and analysing the different legislative and constitutional 
options in the field of parliamentary immunity it is natural and indispensable to 
include a system which is located near the upper end of a scale of immunity 
protection.  
Second of all, of course there are other countries on the European continent 
which offer similarly high, or even higher, levels of protection to their 
parliamentarians.17 However, France appears to be the most logical choice with a 
view to its comparability to the other case studies considered. As explained earlier, 
it is important that all three case studies are ‘established democracies’ and share a 
comparable socio-political situation – as opposed to countries where the 
precariousness or the general novelty of the current democratic system of 
government would have to be considered in an analysis of parliamentary immunity. 
The choice of France, the UK, and the Netherlands offers the possibility of a 
comparison between states whose socio-political circumstances are broadly similar.  
Finally, like the UK, France has been both one of the historic forerunners in 
developing systems of parliamentary immunity and one of the largest colonial 
powers, with the result that its political and constitutional system has had a 
significant influence on those of many other states in the world, particularly in 
Francophone Africa.18  
Apart from these factors, France’s intrinsic value as a case study is very high, 
particularly in the light of its constitutional history and the extensive body of 
political and legal thought resulting from it. France has been described as a 
‘constitutional laboratory’ in which ‘all kinds of forms of government have been 
 
16 This is still the case after the scope of inviolability has been significantly reduced by the 
amendment of Art. 26 of the constitution in 1995 (Loi constitutionnelle No. 95-880 du 4 août 
1995).  
17 Very high levels of protection under inviolability exist, for instance, in Russia and Turkey. 
Art. 98 of the Russian constitution provides that members of both chambers of the federal 
parliament may not be arrested (except flagrante delicto), detained, searched or personally 
inspected during the entire term of their mandate; while this provision does not bar 
prosecution, the lack of a limitation of inviolability to the duration of the parliamentary 
session makes the Russian inviolability regime appear more protective than its French 
counterpart. Likewise, the degree of protection enjoyed by members of the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly is significantly broader than that provided by the French inviolability 
system in that it even suspends the execution of final criminal sentences for the duration of 
the mandate. Interestingly, while the inviolability of Turkish parliamentarians may be lifted 
by the Assembly, it is explicitly prohibited for political party groups to ‘hold discussions or 
take decisions regarding parliamentary immunity’ (Art. 83 of the Turkish constitution). 
18 In fact it has been argued that the Francophone states of Africa seem much less inclined to 
depart from their colonial constitutional heritage than their Anglophone counterparts, to the 
effect that ‘[m]any Francophone African constitutional draftsmen […] have continued to seek 
inspiration from and rely almost slavishly on what they perceive as the most reliable and 
unassailable constitutional model: the Gaullist Fifth Republic constitution and the timid 
amendments that have been made to it in the last fifty years’; Manga Fombad 2008. 
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tried since 1789’.19 This constitutional volatility and the relative persistence with 
which parliamentary immunity, first introduced in the early days of the Revolution, 
has maintained its place in numerous different constitutional systems make the 
study of French parliamentary immunity worthwhile. However, the number of 
constitutions and forms of government France has known since 178920 also makes 
an in-depth analysis of all the historic immunity regimes impossible within the 
scope of this study. Therefore, the account of French constitutional history and 
historic immunity regimes given in this chapter can only serve as a descriptive 
framework of reference for the analysis of the theory and practice of parliamentary 
immunity in the modern French state of the Fifth Republic. 
2.2.3.3. The Netherlands 
A case study on the Dutch system of parliamentary immunity is a natural 
component of this research project. First, it is not mere coincidence that the idea for 
a comprehensive comparative study of parliamentary immunity was born in the 
Netherlands, where this book was written; nor is the time at which this idea was 
conceived. At first glance, the Netherlands seemed an unlikely country for 
controversy concerning immunity: the immunity of Dutch parliamentarians is very 
limited in comparison to that enjoyed by their counterparts in most other countries. 
As a sort of natural reflex, one would perhaps expect controversy in systems where 
immunity is deemed unfairly broad, where it gives the impression of creating an 
unduly privileged political class and raises politicians above the law. This can 
hardly be said of the immunity regime of the Netherlands, and so it has received 
little attention and sparked even less controversy for the duration of most of its 
history. In recent years, however, the Dutch immunity system has been the object of 
debate and controversy which have for a significant part been stirred by certain 
remarks by the far-right politician Geert Wilders. Wilders was acquitted of 
allegations of, among others, incitement of racial hatred, but the fact that he could 
be prosecuted and tried for such statements in the first place sparked discussion on 
parliamentary immunity: as the utterances in question were made outside 
parliament and thus did not fall within the scope of non-accountability, Wilders 
was not immune. This gave rise to the question whether the Dutch system of 
immunity is adequate, or whether it would be possible and desirable to broaden its 
scope. This question – which in itself distances the Netherlands from most other 
countries, where public opinion barely shows much sympathy for the existing 
immunity regime, let alone for expanding it – has put parliamentary immunity in 
the public and academic spotlight. Important also in inspiring this comparative 
study is the attention which parliamentary immunity recently received in the 
Netherlands after having led ‘a dormant existence’21 for much of the 20th century.  
 
19 Vogel 2008, p. 11. 
20 Vogel notes that, depending on the definition one applies, between 1789 and 1958 France has 
seen 13 or 15 constitutions. Vogel 2008, p. 12. 
21 Nehmelman 2011, p. 355. 
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Apart from this, however, the choice of the Netherlands as one of our three 
case studies is given merit by virtue of the difference of its immunity system from 
those of the other two countries considered. Materially, Dutch parliamentary 
immunity is relatively similar to Westminster-type parliamentary privilege. 
However, it is organised in an entirely different way and follows a different 
rationale which is historically closer to the continental legal systems, in particular 
that of France, by which it was influenced during the Napoleonic period. Yet, the 
Dutch immunity regime is much more limited than the French one because it does 
not feature inviolability – or only in a very rudimentary form, as will be shown. It is 
especially this difference from the immunity regimes found in other, closely related 
continental constitutional systems which makes the Netherlands highly worthy of a 
case study. The institutional setup and constitutional position of the Dutch States-
General today does not differ from that of other parliaments to such a degree that 
would explain, from the outset, a much lesser need for the protection of members of 
parliament than found in the other two states considered in this study. By 
examining the Dutch immunity system, we can therefore hope to learn more about 
the legislative rationale, the practical functioning and the potential pitfalls of a 
system at the lower end of the ‘immunity scale’. 
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Chapter 2 
THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY 
1. Introduction 
Parliamentary immunity belongs to the core of constitutional norms which regulate 
the powers and functioning of the central institutions of a state. This makes 
immunity primarily a national phenomenon. Nevertheless, it also has an 
international dimension, within which we can distinguish two levels. On a general 
international level, immunity systems across the world share certain characteristics 
and mostly follow one of two leading patterns – that of Westminster-type 
parliamentary privilege or that of French parliamentary immunity. In essence, 
systems that follow the former pattern provide for absolute freedom of speech in 
parliament and protect parliamentary proceedings, whereas systems that follow the 
French model also provide for an additional ‘immunity layer’ of freedom from 
arrest or prosecution. In very broad terms, these international commonalities exist 
because the general constitutional structure and legal system of many states have 
been influenced by either the continental European model or the British model.  
There is generally no normative force in recognising similarities between 
immunity regimes on a broad, international level, even though a comparison of the 
positive immunity rules of all or most countries in the world will certainly reveal a 
‘legislative range’ and allow some (careful) conclusions about minimum and 
maximum standards of immunity. These conclusions might be meaningful from an 
empirical point of view, but they will lack any normative character. This is clearly 
different on a European level, due to two factors. On the one hand, the various 
systems of parliamentary immunity which exist in Europe do not only display 
many similarities (along with many differences), they are also subject to common 
binding norms which stem from the European human rights system. All European 
states except Belarus, Kosovo and the Vatican State are contracting parties to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Their immunity systems therefore 
must comply with the provisions of the Convention and with the standards 
developed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. It is therefore 
indispensable to examine this case law in the hope to distil from it a certain 
normative essence for parliamentary immunity in Europe. 
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The second factor through which the systems of parliamentary immunity of 
many European states are linked more closely with each other than they might be in 
a purely international context is the existence of the European Parliament (EP). The 
latter’s own immunity regime combines the systems of all Member States of the 
European Union, as we will see below. While the immunity system of the European 
Parliament does not have a direct normative bearing on those of the Member States, 
it is nevertheless highly interesting to take a closer look at this system: after all, it is 
the immediate result of an attempt (by the six founding members of the European 
Communities) to find a ‘common approach’ to parliamentary immunity and cast it 
in a legislative form. Moreover, the (rare but) relevant case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as the Union’s highest judicial authority may 
allow – again, careful – conclusions about a common European understanding of 
parliamentary immunity.  
2. Parliamentary Immunity and the ECHR 
2.1. The Relevance of ECtHR Case Law: Interpretative Effects 
The majority of cases in which the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
pronounced itself on parliamentary immunity did not directly concern any of the 
selected states of our case studies. In order to determine in how far ECtHR case law 
is nevertheless relevant in these states, and in order to clarify the general 
importance of this case law for all contracting parties to the Convention, it is useful 
to recall the interpretative effect of Strasbourg judgments.  
Pursuant to Article 1 of the ECHR, the High Contracting Parties undertake to 
‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in […] 
this Convention’. Decisions of the Court do not have effect erga omnes and are in 
principle only binding on states which are parties to a particular dispute.1 However, 
the contracting states accept that ECtHR judgments also have general interpretative 
authority with regard to the content of the Convention rights.2 On the occasion of 
the High Level Conference at Interlaken in 2010, the state parties resolved to ‘[take] 
into account the Court’s developing case law, also with a view to considering the 
conclusions to be drawn from a judgment finding a violation of the Convention by 
another state, where the same problem of principle exists within their own legal 
system’.3 The Court itself has also assumed this interpretative authority of its 
rulings on numerous occasions:  
 
1 Art. 46(1) ECHR. 
2 It is assumed that the res interpretata authority of the Court can be construed from Art. 1 in 
conjunction with Art. 19 of the Convention; cf. PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights (AS/Jur) 2010, p. 3. 
3 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken 
Declaration, 19 February 2010, p. 3.  
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The Court’s judgments in fact serve not only to decide those cases brought before the 
Court but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by 
the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the 
engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties.4 
Accordingly, the case law of the ECtHR with regard to parliamentary immunity is 
of general relevance, and its authority covers all parties to the Convention, 
including France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The latter has, 
moreover, stipulated in section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 that its national 
courts must take ECtHR case law into account in the interpretation of Convention 
rights. 
2.2. ECtHR Case Law on Parliamentary Immunity 
There are essentially two categories of cases in the context of parliamentary 
immunity in which Convention rights are at issue.5 The first and most important 
category relates to the right of access to court under Article 6(1) of the Convention: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charges 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. […] 
It is readily apparent that any form of parliamentary immunity bears much 
potential for conflict with this right, since immunity protects parliamentarians from 
legal action and thus bars access to court.  
Within the category of cases relating to Article 6, three sub-categories can be 
found. First, citizens may be denied the possibility of (civil or criminal) legal action 
against a parliamentarian. This may happen, for instance, in defamation cases 
where the statements in question are protected by non-accountability. Second, and 
much less frequently, parliamentarians themselves may not be able to have their 
rights or criminal charges against them determined in court. This can be the case 
where a member of parliament is protected by inviolability without the possibility 
of an individual waiver and where parliament refuses to lift the member’s 
immunity. The third sub-category of cases under Article 6 concerns the penal 
powers of parliament and their potential conflict with the requirement of an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. 
 
4 Ireland v. United Kingdom, ECHR 18 January 1978, App. No. 5310/71, para. 154. The Court 
often reiterated this view, e.g. in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, ECHR 7 January 2010, App. No. 
25965/04, para. 197. 
5 Alternative categorisations have been suggested, notably by M. Kloth in his very informative 
book (Kloth 2010). In his brief discussion of parliamentary immunity, Kloth does not 
distinguish between non-accountability and inviolability and discusses immunity only in the 
light of the right of access to court. He suggests that there are three categories of ECtHR case 
law on this aspect of immunity: (a) cases in which the content of statements in parliament is 
at issue, (b) cases in which the occasion on which the statements in question have been made 
makes it doubtful whether they are covered by immunity, and (c) cases in which parliament 
refuses to lift a member’s immunity on his request. 
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Along with cases concerning the right of access to court under Article 6 of the 
Convention, a second main category of case law in the context of parliamentary 
immunity concerns Article 10 of the Convention on freedom of expression. The 
main issue here is the question whether members of parliament, when speaking 
outside of actual debates in parliament, enjoy a wider freedom of expression than 
‘ordinary’ citizens. We may anticipate at this point that this question is of particular 
interest in the Netherlands, where the prosecution of a right-wing parliamentarian 
for extra-parliamentary hate speech and insult has led to debates on whether the 
special position of politicians in society merits a greater freedom of speech than that 
which other citizens enjoy (see Chapter V). 
The above categorisation will guide us through a discussion of the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights with regard to parliamentary immunity on 
the following pages. Case law which relates to Article 6 of the Convention will be 
addressed first, followed by cases under Article 10. Finally, the standards for 
parliamentary immunity created in ECtHR case law will be presented in a set of 
conclusions. 
2.2.1. Article 6 of the Convention: Access to Court 
2.2.1.1. Non-accountability under Article 6 ECHR 
The issue of access to court was first dealt with by the old European Commission of 
Human Rights in three admissibility decisions on applications complaining that 
parliamentary immunity had violated the applicants’ rights under Article 6 of the 
Convention.6 
The first of these decisions was X v. Austria, in which the Commission decided 
in 1969 that the application was manifestly ill-founded, considering that all 
contracting states regarded parliamentary immunity as an important constitutional 
principle from which they could not have wished to derogate by ratifying the 
Convention.7  
Seven years later in 1976, the applicant in Agee v. UK was a former CIA agent 
who had published a book about his work for the Agency and was planning 
another book on its activities. He was refused re-entry into the UK on grounds of 
having had regular contacts harmful to national security. These allegations, which 
the applicant regarded as defamatory, had also been raised by the Home Secretary 
in the House of Commons. The applicant complained that his right to access to 
court was violated, since he was barred by parliamentary privilege from suing the 
Secretary for defamation. The Commission declared the application inadmissible.8 
Curiously, in Agee v. UK the Commission did not argue that parliamentary privilege 
constituted a justified exception to Article 6. Instead it held that, due to 
parliamentary privilege, the applicant had no ‘civil right’ under UK law to defend 
 
6 Kloth 2010, p. 187-188. 
7 X v. Austria, Commission Decision of 6 February 1969, App. No. 3374/76. 
8 Agee v. the United Kingdom, Commission Decision of 17 December 1976, App. No. 7729/76. 
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his reputation against statements made in parliament, and that Article 6 was 
therefore not applicable. In his recent book about immunities and the right of access 
to court, Matthias Kloth correctly argues that this line of reasoning is flawed, since, 
had it not been for parliamentary privilege, the applicant would certainly have had 
the right to sue. Accordingly, the Commission should have based its decision on the 
justification of privilege, rather than on the non-existence of a civil right to sue for 
defamation.9  
Finally, the Commission’s decision in Young v. Ireland concerned a 
neurosurgeon who had been unable to save a child with severe head injuries. After 
the death of the child, a member of the lower chamber of the Irish parliament made 
certain comments during a parliamentary debate which the doctor regarded as 
defamatory. He wanted to sue the parliamentarian for defamation but was barred 
from doing so by parliamentary privilege. This time, the Commission held that it 
was immaterial whether privilege constituted a procedural bar and therefore had to 
be assessed under Article 6(1) of the Convention or whether it limited a civil right 
and had to be assessed under Article 8: either way, privilege had to stand the test of 
legitimacy of aim and proportionality. Finding that parliamentary privilege aimed 
at facilitating free speech in parliament, and that it was proportional in the 
circumstances of the case, the Commission declared the application inadmissible.  
The ‘leading case’ of the European Court of Human Rights on the issue of 
parliamentary immunity (or privilege) as an impediment to the right of access to 
court is A v. the United Kingdom.10 The case was brought by A., a former resident of a 
building owned by a public housing association in Bristol. In 1996, Michael Stern, 
then member of the Commons for the constituency of Bristol North-West, spoke in 
Parliament on the subject of municipal housing in his constituency. In the course of 
his speech, which was subsequently published in several national newspapers, he 
gave the full name and address of the applicant and made several highly injurious 
statements about the applicant without ever having been in direct contact with her. 
Among others, he referred to A. and her children as ‘neighbours from hell’11 and 
accused them of causing severe nuisances for the whole neighbourhood by their 
‘asocial’ lifestyle which involved littering the area, loitering, alleged ‘drug activity’ 
and, he implied, prostitution. The publication of A.’s name and address in 
conjunction with these allegations had severe adverse consequences for the 
applicant. After receiving threatening hate mail and suffering racial and other 
abuses, she ‘ha[d] been put in considerable danger as a result of her name being 
released to the public’, as was found by a report on racial harassment and attacks in 
her area.12 The applicant sought redress by writing to Mr Stern MP, whereupon she 
was informed by the Speaker’s office that the parliamentary statements in question 
were protected by absolute privilege, ‘however offensive it may be to the feelings or 
injurious to the character of individuals’.13 Further to a letter to the Prime Minister, 
 
9 Kloth 2010, p. 160-161. 
10 A. v. The United Kingdom, ECHR 17 December 2002, App. No. 35373/97. 
11 Ibid., para. 13. 
12 Ibid., para. 18. 
13 Ibid., para. 19. 
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she received a reply affirmative of the Speaker’s assertion of absolute privilege. 
There was thus no avenue of legal recourse open to the applicant to bring charges of 
libel or defamation against her MP.  
Hence, the principal question with which the Court was confronted in A. v. UK 
was whether or not the applicant’s lack of access to legal recourse constituted a 
breach of Article 6(1) of the Convention or whether the necessity, in the public 
interest, of a solid scheme of parliamentary immunity constituted a justification for 
the limitation of the right of access to court. Before turning to this question directly, 
the Court briefly addressed the question of whether the matter at hand touched 
upon Article 6 at all, as UK domestic law does not provide for a civil right to the 
protection of a person’s reputation in so far as it might be affected by statements 
made in Parliament. The Court noted that Article 6 could nonetheless be violated 
since parliamentary privilege constitutes a procedural bar to defamation claims, 
rather than a material defence to such claims. The Court thus dismissed the 
Commission’s argumentation in Agee, which the Commission itself had already 
abandoned in Young. The Court affirmed the Commission’s approach in Young by 
subsequently applying the test of legitimacy of aim and proportionality to the 
principal question of the case:  
The right of access to a court is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations. These 
are permitted by implication since the right of access by its very nature calls for 
regulation by the State. In this respect, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation, although the final decision as to the observance of the Convention’s 
requirements rests with the Court. It must be satisfied that the limitations applied do 
not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent 
that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be 
compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is no 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be achieved.14 
The result of the Court’s examination of whether the UK system of parliamentary 
privilege constitutes a legitimate and proportional limitation of the right to access to 
a court was that, indeed,  
‘[it] cannot in principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the 
right of access to a court as embodied in Article 6 § 1’.15 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered several arguments: First, 
parliamentary immunity appears to be a universal feature of parliamentary law in 
most signatory states and the British model of immunity is comparably narrow.16 
Second, British privilege exists for the protection not of individual members of 
Parliament but of Parliament as a body; this underlines that it is indeed in the 
 
14 Ibid., para. 74. 
15 Ibid., para. 83. 
16 This was confirmed by numerous third-party interventions in A v. the United Kingdom, see 
part IV of the judgment, letters A-H. 
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general interest of democracy. Third, victims of a ‘defamatory misstatement in 
Parliament’ are not entirely without redress, since they can still petition the 
constituent MP for a remedy (as A. did by her letter to Mr Stern).  
The first of these arguments holds true with regard to all states party to the 
Convention. The second argument, that privilege exists for the benefit of the 
institution and not the individual member, is in line with generally accepted 
constitutional doctrine and, to a large extent, with modern practice. Nevertheless, 
our analysis of parliamentary privilege in the UK will show that new statutory law 
on defamation has cast some doubt on this argument. Section 13 of the Defamation 
Act 1996 has created a considerable surplus of procedural options for MPs as 
opposed to non-members in defamation suits by introducing the possibility of a 
personal waiver of parliamentary privilege. This advantage must be held to exist 
solely for the benefit of individual members, since Parliament neither has a 
considerable benefit in it, nor a say in the application of section 13. The court 
mentioned section 13 as relevant law but it did not treat this point in its judgment. 
The third argument which the Court considered seems relatively shallow: it seems 
unreasonable to equate the possibility to petition the parliamentarian who is 
immediately concerned with a true possibility of legal recourse, while no legal 
consequences whatsoever are necessarily attached to such a petition and neither to a 
petition addressed to the Speaker or to the relevant House as a whole. The point 
made by the Court that, in extreme cases, Parliament could punish an MP for 
contempt does not alter the fact that a petition to the grace of Parliament by no 
means amounts to a (legal) ‘means of redres’. 
What remains, therefore, as the only really compelling argument – sustained 
by a variety of signatory state parties to the Convention, is that absolute freedom of 
speech (non-accountability), where it is limited to necessary areas, is in the general 
interest of democracy and thus constitutes a legitimate limitation of the right of 
access to court ex Article 6 ECHR. Consequently, the Court found no violation of 
Article 6 in A. v. UK. Still, the approval by the Court of blanket non-accountability 
appears rigid or, as Kloth puts it, ‘overcautious’17 in accepting the necessity of non-
accountability so readily: while it is true that non-accountability is ubiquitous in 
Europe, it is not entirely absolute in all contracting states. For instance, Article 46(1) 
of the German Constitution provides that it does not apply to ‘defamatory insults’.18 
Also, the Court did not explain in how far the existence of a more formal way of 
redress for victims of abuse in parliament would in fact interfere with the legitimate 
aim of protecting parliament from undue external influence. Even if access to court 
is undesirable, as it is the object of non-accountability to keep the judiciary out of 
the exclusive sphere of the legislature, it might not be irreconcilable with the 
necessary protection of parliament if petitions for redress would at least not be left 
entirely at the mercy of individual MPs or the Speaker (as is the case under British 
law), but at that of a committee. It appears that this would breathe some life into the 
Court’s third argument – that victims of a defamatory statement by a parliamentary 
 
17 Kloth 2010, p. 190. 
18 German: verleumderische Beleidigungen. 
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figure are not left entirely without redress since they may still petition their MP – 
without hampering Parliament’s protection to more than an acceptable degree.  
In A v. the UK, an interesting argument against absolute freedom of speech in 
parliament was put forward in the dissenting opinion of Judge Loucaides, the only 
judge who voted in favour of finding a violation of Article 6. He argued that  
‘[t]he suppression of untrue defamatory statements, apart from protecting the dignity 
of individuals, discourages false speech and improves the overall quality of public 
debate through a chilling effect on irresponsible parliamentarians’.19 
He thus finds that absolute freedom of speech constitutes a disproportionate 
limitation of Article 6 of the Convention. At first sight, this argument appears 
tempting. However, it is clear that Judge Loucaides’ approach must be treated with 
care, since it aims at the very heart of parliamentary non-accountability as an 
emanation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers: according to this 
principle, it should not be for the courts to determine how a responsible 
parliamentarian should behave, or to secure the quality of public debate.  
With regard to absolute non-accountability for utterances in parliament, A v. 
the United Kingdom has so far not been overruled; it has been confirmed in the 
similar case of Zollmann v. the United Kingdom.20 However, in a series of cases against 
Italy, the Court in Strasbourg developed a more differentiated approach to non-
accountability regarding statements made by parliamentarians outside parliament. 
The first of these cases was Cordova v. Italy (No. 1).21 The Court first outlined the 
Italian system of non-accountability,22 based on Article 68(1) of the Italian 
Constitution, which reads as follows:  
‘Members of Parliament shall not be required to account for the opinions they express 
or the votes they cast in the exercise of their functions’.[Emphasis added] 
The Legge Costituzionale No. 3 of 1993 has abolished the need to obtain leave from 
the relevant chamber of parliament to initiate proceedings against a member of 
parliament. However, the chambers of the Italian legislature may decide (by a 
resolution, usually at the request of the parliamentarian concerned) whether 
particular statements made by parliamentarians fall within the scope of this 
provision. Such resolutions may not be quashed by the ordinary courts, but the 
Italian Constitutional Court may review whether the parliamentary chamber in 
question has acted within its constitutional competence in adopting it.  
Traditionally, the chambers have given a broad interpretation to Article 68(1) 
of the Constitution. They take this provision to apply even to statements made 
outside parliament which are not connected to parliamentary activity as such, 
because they constitute ‘an outward projection of parliamentary activity and come 
 
19 A v. the United Kingdom, dissenting Opinion of Judge Loucaides.  
20 Zollmann v. the United Kingdom, ECHR 27 November 2003, App. No. 62902/00. 
21 Cordova v. Italy (No. 1), ECHR 30 January 2003, App. No. 40877/98. 
22 Ibid., paras. 22-28. 
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within the mandate given by the voters to their elected representative’.23 The Italian 
Constitutional Court has adopted a much narrower view, arguing that extending 
the scope of Article 68(1) to all political activities of a member, whether or not 
related to their parliamentary work, would convert parliamentary immunity into a 
personal privilege.24 According to established case law of the Constitutional Court, 
statements made by a parliamentarian outside parliament must at least relate to 
prior parliamentary activity in order to fall within the scope of non-accountability.25 
The Cordova case before the European Court of Human Rights concerned a 
dispute between a public prosecutor and the former President of the Italian 
Republic, Francesco Cossiga, who had become Senator for life after the end of his 
presidential term. The applicant had investigated a person who had certain dealings 
with Mr Cossiga. Thereupon, Mr Cossiga sent the applicant letters in which he ‘said 
he was making him a gift of the copyright in his written, telephone and oral 
communications’ with the person under investigation, ’including for the purposes 
of their stage and film exploitation’. Next to this, Mr Cossiga also sent the 
prosecutor a wooden horse and a tricycle, together with a note that said ‘Have fun, 
dear Prosecutor’.26 
The applicant filed a complaint against Mr Cossiga, whereupon proceedings 
were brought against the former President for the insultation of a public official. 
However, the Senate adopted a resolution in which it held that the letters and parcel 
sent to the applicant fell within the scope of Article 68(1) of the Constitution and 
that Mr Cossiga thus benefitted from parliamentary non-accountability. The district 
court, after having found that the resolution of the Senate was lawfully adopted and 
not manifestly unreasonable, held that it lacked jurisdiction to question the decision 
of the Senate any further. The applicant was also refused leave to appeal against the 
district court’s ruling and thus to bring the matter before the Constitutional Court as 
a conflict of state powers. He therefore complained to the European Court of 
Human Rights, alleging a violation of his right of access to court.  
Before addressing the question whether parliamentary immunity (in this case, 
non-accountability) constituted a disproportionate limitation of the applicant’s 
rights under Article 6 of the Convention, the Court first had to determine whether 
the applicant had in fact been denied access to court – after all, the district court had 
examined the prima facie lawfulness of the Senate’s resolution and had come to the 
conclusion that it was lawful and not manifestly unreasonable. However, the 
ECtHR held that:  
 
23 Ibid., para. 25. 
24 Corte Costituzionale, judgment No. 289 of 18 July 1998. 
25 Cordova v. Italy (No. 1), para. 27, citing judgments Nos. 10, 11, 56, 58 and 82 of 2000; Nos. 137 
and 289 of 2001 and Nos. 50, 51, 52, 79 and 207 of 2002 of the Corte Costituzionale. 
26 Ibid., para. 11.  
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such an examination cannot be equated with a decision on the applicant’s right to the 
protection of his reputation, nor can a degree of access to a court limited to the right to 
ask a preliminary question be considered sufficient to secure the applicant’s ‘right to a 
court’, having regard to the rule of law in democratic society. […] In this connection, it 
should be borne in mind that, in order for the right of access to be effective, an 
individual must have a clear and practical opportunity to challenge an act interfering 
with his rights.27 
Addressing the principal question whether non-accountability constituted a 
proportionate limitation of the right of access to court, the Court gave a dismissive 
answer:  
Although […] Mr Cossiga had criticised the applicant’s investigations in an earlier 
parliamentary question, the Court considers that ironic or derisive letters accompanied 
by toys personally addressed to a prosecutor cannot, by their very nature, be construed 
as falling within the scope of parliamentary functions. […] 
The Court takes the view that the lack of any clear connection with a parliamentary 
activity requires it to adopt a narrow interpretation of the concept of proportionality 
between the aim sought to be achieved and the means employed. This is particularly 
so where the restrictions on the right of access stem from the resolution of a political 
body.28 
Accordingly, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 6(1) 
of the Convention and awarded the applicant non-pecuniary damages. It upheld the 
above line of reasoning in Cordova v. Italy (No. 2),29 in which another 
parliamentarian had insulted the same applicant in two speeches he had given at 
election meetings, and in three cases in which the applicants had been denied access 
to court in defamation proceedings against Italian parliamentarians who had made 
defamatory statements in press interviews.30  
Reading the case law in A, Zollmann, Cordova and the other Italian cases in 
conjunction reveals a consistent pattern in the Court’s approach to non-
accountability. On the one hand, it recognises the absolute freedom of 
parliamentary debates as a constitutional tradition present in all contracting states 
and accepts it as a legitimate and proportionate limitation of the rights ex Article 6 
of the Convention. However, where the statements concerned have not been made 
in parliament, the Court requires a very narrow and material connection to the 
parliamentary work of the member in question in order for non-accountability to be 
proportionate. The fact that the member has referred to the applicant in parliament 
before making the statements concerned outside parliament is insufficient. Also, as 
seen in Cordova (No. 1), the Court takes the view that certain acts of expression are 
 
27 Ibid., para. 52. 
28 Ibid., paras. 62-63. 
29 Cordova v. Italy (No. 2), ECHR 30 January 2003, App. No. 45649/99. 
30 De Jorio v. Italy, ECHR 3 June 2004, App. No. 73936/01; Ielo v. Italy, ECHR 15 March 2005, 
App. No. 23053/02; Patrono, Cascini and Stefanelli v. Italy, ECHR 20 April 2006, App. No. 
10180/04. 
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‘by their very nature’ incapable of being connected with the parliamentary functions 
of a member. 
2.2.1.2. Inviolability under Article 6 ECHR 
With regard to inviolability – the immunity of members of parliament from legal 
action for acts committed outside parliament – the ECtHR has adopted an approach 
very similar to that which it has taken towards non-accountability. In all but one 
case (Kart v. Turkey, see below) it has not even explicitly recognised a formal 
difference between the two forms of immunity. However, we will see in the 
following that the approach of the Court leads to different effects in cases involving 
non-accountability and inviolability, respectively.  
Also in systems where, unlike in Italy, non-accountability does not extend 
beyond the spatial and temporal confines of parliamentary debates proper, extra-
parliamentary utterances may still be protected by inviolability. As opposed to non-
accountability, inviolability is usually temporally limited to the duration of the 
parliamentary mandate. It can also normally be lifted, usually by the chamber of 
parliament to which the member concerned belongs. The degree to which 
parliamentarians are inviolable differs considerably – mostly, they may not be 
detained without the prior authorisation of parliament (except flagrante delicto). 
Often, also investigative measures like searches or wiretapping are prohibited, 
while some states even prohibit the criminal prosecution of members of parliament 
in general (France did so prior to the constitutional amendment of 1995). In order 
for inviolability to apply, most systems do not require that the alleged criminal act 
holds any connection with the parliamentary functions of the member.31 
Despite the temporary nature of inviolability, the ECtHR has been critical of 
this form of immunity. Even though case law with regard to inviolability is 
relatively scarce, it is recognisable that the Court is reluctant to accept a limitation of 
the right of access to court in cases where the object of legal proceedings against the 
parliamentarian concerned is not, or is insufficiently, connected with his 
parliamentary functions. In the case Tsalkitzis v. Greece,32 a construction developer 
wished to bring corruption charges against a member of parliament. The latter had 
previously been the mayor of Kifissia, a suburb of Athens. In this capacity, in 1997, 
he had allegedly caused the building permit for one of the applicant’s projects to be 
revoked and construction works to be halted. According to the applicant, the mayor 
had then demanded a substantial bribe for allowing construction works to resume. 
The applicant had refused to pay and instead successfully challenged the decision 
to revoke the building permit in court. In November 2001, the applicant finally filed 
a complaint of blackmail and abuse of office and joined the action as a civil party, 
claiming damages. Meanwhile, however, the former mayor had been elected to 
parliament in the general elections of 2000 and was now protected by inviolability. 
The trial court requested parliament to lift the inviolability of the member in 
 
31 There are exceptions, see e.g. Art. 57(2) and (3) of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Act. 
32 Tsalkitzis v. Greece, ECHR 16 November 2006, App. No. 11801/04. 
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question but the request was denied in March 2002. After the ECtHR had given its 
ruling in Cordova in early 2003, the applicant filed a new criminal complaint against 
the former mayor, arguing that the Cordova judgment constituted a novel fact which 
merited a re-examination of the case by parliament. The procurator general at the 
Greek Court of Cassation, to whom the case had been transmitted in conformity 
with the Rules of Procedure of parliament, agreed with the applicant and requested 
parliament to reconsider the lifting request. Again, the request was denied.  
In assessing whether parliamentary immunity, in the particular circumstances 
of the case, constituted a proportionate limitation of the applicant’s rights ex Article 
6 of the Convention, the ECtHR first observed that the alleged criminal act had 
taken place almost three years prior to the former mayor’s election to parliament. 
Moreover, the Court noted that a connection between the alleged crime of blackmail 
and corruption with the former mayor’s parliamentary functions could not be 
assumed, since it fell well outside the sphere of normal (read: acceptable) 
parliamentary business and since it was of a particular immoral nature. The Court 
then reiterated what it had held in Cordova: that, lacking a clear connection with the 
parliamentary functions of the member concerned, a narrow interpretation of 
proportionality had to be employed, especially where the restriction of access to 
court followed from the decision of a political body. Finally, the Court addressed 
the argument of the Greek government that the limitation of access to court by 
virtue of inviolability was nonetheless proportionate because it was only temporary 
and would cease with the end of the mandate. The Court dismissed this argument, 
considering that Greek parliamentarians could be re-elected indefinitely. If the 
member in question were to remain a member of parliament for a long time, this 
could create a time lapse which would potentially make it difficult to prove the 
alleged crimes.33  
It follows from Tsalkitzis that the Court applies the same main criterion in its 
assessment of non-accountability and inviolability – the alleged act needs to be 
connected to the parliamentary functions of the member concerned in order for the 
limitation of access to court to be justified. This cannot be the case where the alleged 
crime was committed before the beginning of the mandate. In addition, the 
temporary nature of inviolability does not make the limitation proportionate, at 
least not where the mandate is renewable indefinitely.  
In the light of the Italian cases referred to earlier, the Court’s ruling in Tsalkitzis 
is unsurprising. It is still remarkable, since it calls into question the very concept of 
inviolability, which, after all, explicitly intends to protect parliamentarians of legal 
action relating to activities of members outside their parliamentary mandate. This 
serves the purpose of preventing politically motivated lawsuits against members 
and to safeguard their unimpeded attendance of parliament. Certainly, both of these 
aims were not at stake in this case, since the alleged crime was manifestly unrelated 
to any political activity, and as detention was not at issue. Nevertheless it is evident 
that the generous inviolability enjoyed by Greek parliamentarians – it prohibits not 
only arrests but criminal prosecution in general – can virtually never pass the 
 
33 Ibid., paras. 48-51. 
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Court’s proportionality test unless either the alleged criminal act is manifestly 
connected with parliamentary activities or unless the prosecution is politically 
motivated.  
This was confirmed more recently in Syngelidis v. Greece.34 The applicant in this 
case was the ex-husband of M.A. At the material time, M.A. was a member of the 
Greek parliament. After the end of their marriage, the two had concluded an 
agreement with regard to custody of their son. This agreement, endorsed by a court, 
granted the applicant free access and regular contact with his child. However, on a 
number of occasions the applicant had allegedly been denied contact with the child. 
M.A. had also brought criminal proceedings against the applicant for placing a 
security guard outside her house. These proceedings had been heard in court and 
dismissed in the first instance and appeal courts. Later, the applicant himself had 
brought criminal proceedings against his former spouse for denying him contact 
with his son and joined these proceedings as a civil party, claiming the symbolic 
sum of ten euros in damages. A request to lift M.A.’s inviolability had been made to 
parliament, and was considered by a committee which had assessed whether one of 
the grounds for denying the request was present. According to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Greek parliament, these reasons are (a) that the alleged criminal 
offence relates to the parliamentary activities of the member, (b) that the 
prosecution is politically motivated, or (c) that it undermines the authority of 
parliament or of the MP or obstructs the exercise of their functions. The committee 
had simply advised that one of these reasons applied, but had not specified which 
one. Subsequently, parliament had decided to uphold M.A.’s inviolability, to the 
effect that the criminal case against her could not be heard in court. A later request 
to lift immunity, on the occasion of new charges brought by the applicant, had been 
denied on the ground that it was essentially the same as the first request. 
After the ECtHR declared the application admissible, it was confronted with 
important structural arguments submitted by both the applicant and the Greek 
government. On the one hand, the government argued that the limitation which 
inviolability presented for the right of access to court was proportionate, because 
the Greek inviolability regime prohibited criminal proceedings against members of 
parliament, not civil proceedings. Hence, instead of joining criminal proceedings 
with a merely symbolic claim in damages, the applicant could have lodged a proper 
civil claim against M.A., which could have resulted in a substantial sum of damages 
that constituted an adequate remedy. The applicant, on the other hand, conceded 
that inviolability was in principle capable of being compatible with Article 6(1) 
ECHR, but only if the Greek parliament, in exercising its discretionary power to lift 
inviolability, interpreted and applied the relevant constitutional provisions 
correctly, which it had not done in this case and in many others. According to a 
survey submitted by the applicant, between 1974 and 2003 the Greek parliament 
had granted a mere five out of 800 requests to lift inviolability, thus systematically 
shielding its members from criminal proceedings. In the light of this practice, the 
circumstances of the present case and the Court’s rulings in Cordova and Tsalkitzis, 
 
34 Syngelidis v. Greece, ECHR 11 February 2011, App. No. 24895/07. 
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the applicant was of the opinion that his right of access to court had been breached. 
Moreover, the applicant argued that inviolability created a disproportionate 
imbalance between himself and his ex-wife, as she had remained free to bring 
criminal proceedings against him, but not vice versa.35  
The Court dismissed the government’s argument that the possibility of civil 
proceedings against M.A., of which the applicant had made no use, were sufficient 
to offset or render proportionate the limitation of Article 6 ECHR with regard to 
criminal proceedings. According to the Court, 
where the domestic legal order provides an individual with a remedy, such as a 
criminal complaint with the possibility to join the proceedings as a civil party, the state 
has the duty to ensure that the person using it enjoys the fundamental guarantees of 
Article 6.36 
With regard to the arguments brought forward by the applicant, the Court 
reiterated the principles it had developed in Cordova and subsequent case law: that 
parliamentary immunity was in principle compatible with the ECHR where it 
served the legitimate aim of protecting parliament from undue influence, but that 
proportionality had to be given a narrow interpretation where there was no clear 
connection between the alleged criminal behaviour of the member and his 
parliamentary functions. This was clearly the case here, since M.A.’s behaviour was 
entirely unrelated to her parliamentary work and ‘more consistent with a personal 
quarrel’.37 Accordingly, the Court noted that the parliamentary committee which 
examined the lifting request had stated no particular reason for the decision not to 
lift inviolability, thus denying the applicant even the possibility to know why, 
specifically, he was barred from access to court. Finally, the Court ‘attache[d] some 
significance to the fact that the impugned approach of the Parliament has created an 
imbalance in treatment between the applicant and M.A., since the latter was able to 
bring proceedings against the applicant […]’.38 The Court therefore held that the 
applicant’s right ex Article 6(1) ECHR had been violated. 
With Syngelidis v. Greece, the Court in Strasbourg has consolidated its 
functional approach to parliamentary immunity: it is legitimate in principle for 
contracting states to protect their legislatures by means of an immunity system 
which ensures that parliaments can discharge their constitutional functions free 
from any undue influence. Implicitly, it recognises parliamentary debate – that is to 
say, debate in parliament – as the most essential function of a legislative body. 
Accordingly, the protection of this function by means of an absolute immunity is 
proportionate, as was established in A v. UK. But the further an act of a member is 
removed from this core function, the narrower the concept of proportionality must 
be interpreted. It follows that, where an alleged criminal act of a member is entirely 
unrelated to his parliamentary work, this act must in principle not be protected by 
 
35 Ibid., paras. 37-39. 
36 Ibid., para. 45. 
37 Ibid., para. 46. 
38 Ibid., para. 48. 
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immunity, unless there are good reasons for such protection in addition to the mere 
fact that the defendant is a parliamentarian. For instance, the Court’s judgment in 
Syngelidis does not rule out that the Court would have accepted M.A.’s inviolability 
despite the private nature of her alleged criminal behaviour, if parliament had 
credibly argued that her prosecution was politically motivated. 
Kart v. Turkey39 was the only case to date in which a parliamentarian, thus the 
beneficiary of parliamentary immunity himself, complained that his rights under 
Article 6 of the Convention had been violated as a result of immunity. Before he was 
elected a deputy of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the applicant in this case 
had worked as a lawyer. In this capacity, criminal charges had been brought against 
him for insulting another lawyer and a public official. However, after his election, 
proceedings were stayed in accordance with Turkish inviolability rules. In order to 
be able to defend his reputation in court, the applicant requested his inviolability to 
be lifted, but the request was denied by the competent committee of the Grand 
National Assembly. The applicant appealed the committee’s decision, arguing 
among others that the aim of inviolability was not to render members of parliament 
unaccountable but only to secure the independent and dispassionate discharge of 
their functions. In the view of the applicant, ’the scope of the immunity, the 
procedure for lifting it and the shortcomings in its implementation had undermined 
due respect for the National Assembly’. He also contended that it was 
‘unacceptable, in a society governed by the rule of law, that an institution originally 
meant to help MPs to discharge their duties should be transformed into a personal 
privilege’.40 Nevertheless, his request was denied again. The applicant then 
unsuccessfully challenged the committee’s decision before the plenary assembly. 
After the end of his first term as a deputy, the applicant was re-elected but had still 
not managed to have his inviolability lifted. 
As mentioned earlier, the Court’s judgment in Kart was the first one in which 
it acknowledged that parliamentary immunity usually consists of two component 
parts, non-accountability and inviolability, that the two pursue different aims and 
are of a different legal nature, and that the applicant only challenged the application 
of inviolability. Before assessing the case on the merits, the Court gave a 
comparative account of the immunity systems of the contracting states, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, in 
which it found that most states do provide for an extra-professional immunity 
(inviolability). The Court then ‘[made] it clear at the outset that its role is not to rule 
in an abstract manner on the compatibility of the system of parliamentary immunity 
with the Convention, but to ascertain in concreto whether [its] application in this 
case […] violated Article 6 of the Convention’.41 It went on to hold that inviolability, 
given its aim of securing the unimpeded functioning of parliament and its 
members, is in principle legitimate. The judges held, cautiously, that  
 
39 Kart v. Turkey, ECHR 8 July 2008, App. No. 8917/05. 
40 Ibid., para. 19. 
41 Ibid., para. 72. 
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[although] the Court cannot be used as a means of verifying the relevance of the 
choices made by the national parliaments in the matter, it nonetheless remains that 
parliamentary practice must be in conformity with the imperatives of the rule of law as 
embodied in the Convention.42 
Subsequently, the Court held that Turkish inviolability is unusually broad in that it 
applies to both criminal and civil proceedings and covers acts committed before the 
election of a member. It also observed that under Turkish law the decision whether 
or not inviolability is to be lifted need not – and in this case was not – substantiated 
by any argument, that there is no time limit for this decision and that inviolability, if 
upheld, inevitably leads to a long time lapse before a criminal trial can commence or 
be resumed. Finally, ‘the Court [could not] ignore that parliamentary ‘inviolability’ 
in Turkey is a controversial subject and […] has been identified as one of the main 
problem areas in the context of corruption’.43 For these reasons, the judges found in 
favour of a violation of Article 6(1), even if by a narrow majority of four votes to 
three. 
This judgment was, however, reversed by the Grand Chamber.44 This time, the 
majority (thirteen votes to three) based its decision on the argument that the charges 
against the applicant had been brought before his election, so that he was aware 
that, by becoming a parliamentarian, the determination of his criminal case was 
likely to be delayed.45 In addition, the Grand Chamber also found that the 
temporary nature of inviolability mitigated the limiting effect of inviolability on 
Article 6. It even went so far as to say that 
not only is the obstruction to criminal procedure as a result of parliamentary 
inviolability only temporary, but in principle Parliament does not intervene at all in the 
course of justice as such […] [since] it seems only to have considered whether 
inviolability, as a temporary obstacle to judicial action, should be lifted immediately or 
whether it was preferable to wait until the end of the applicant’s term in Parliament.46 
Both of these arguments appear doubtful and unsound. As Judge Power correctly 
observed in his dissenting Opinion, the first argument means that the applicant’s 
choice to exercise one of his Convention Rights (the right to stand for parliament, 
protected under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention) had already implied 
a waiver of another, namely his right of access to court under Article 6.47 The second 
argument is not only inconsistent with the Court’s own ruling in Tsalkitzis, it also 
does not hold much water with regard to the temporal aspect of Article 6 of the 
Convention, which not only guarantees access to court, but also a hearing within a 
reasonable time.48 Finally, the statement that the decision not to lift inviolability was 
 
42 Ibid., para. 84. 
43 Ibid., para. 92. 
44 Kart v. Turkey (Grand Chamber), ECHR 3 December 2009, App. No. 8917/05. 
45 Ibid., para. 106. 
46 Ibid., para. 109. 
47 See also Kloth 2010, p. 198. 
48 This has also been observed in the dissenting Opinion of Judge Bronello and two others. 
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essentially not about access to court can only be described as judicial pettifoggery 
and sits very oddly with the Court’s earlier case law on inviolability. Kloth has 
noted that the Grand Chamber judgment also failed to take into account the 
interests of the victims of the applicant’s alleged criminal behaviour.49  
The arguments on which the Grand Chamber based its judgment in Kart 
appear laboured and cumbersome; they give a strong impression that the reasoning 
of the Grand Chamber was influenced by the desired result. As a consequence, the 
second judgment in Kart, which predated that in Syngelidis by little more than two 
months, stands out in the otherwise quite consistent case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights with regard to parliamentary immunity and Article 6 of the 
Convention.  
2.2.1.3. Article 6 ECHR and the Penal Powers of Parliament 
So far, we have dealt with the issue of access to court in the context of the possibility 
of filing lawsuits against members of parliament. Next to this, another scenario in 
which Article 6 ECHR is potentially at stake is the exercise of parliament’s penal 
powers. This scenario is not immediately related to the concept of parliamentary 
immunity as defined in Chapter I, but it nevertheless falls within the scope of our 
study, because the power of jurisdiction which many parliaments enjoy over their 
own affairs – and sometimes slightly beyond – is closely intertwined with the idea 
of immunity.  
Legal problems with regard to parliamentary penal powers are very unlikely 
to arise for parliaments in continental Europe because their jurisdiction is usually 
limited to the maintenance of order in the plenary hall. As our British case study 
will show, this is different in Westminster-type parliaments, where parliamentary 
privilege is largely based on the idea of parliament as a court of law (the High Court 
of Parliament). As a result, the penal powers of parliaments based on the British 
model can exceed those of continental parliaments and may extend beyond the 
mere regulation of parliamentary debates. The following is therefore mainly 
relevant to our case study of the United Kingdom.50  
Westminster-type parliaments have the power to punish both members and 
non-members for contempt or breach of privilege. This may give rise to problems 
under Article 6(1) ECHR, which confers upon everyone the right to have criminal 
charges determined in a fair hearing by an independent tribunal. Where a 
parliament or parliamentary chamber chooses to exercise its penal powers, does the 
accusation of a breach of privilege or contempt of parliament constitute a ‘criminal 
charge’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) ECHR? If this is answered in the positive, 
does parliament constitute ‘an independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law’ as Article 6 ECHR requires? These questions were at issue in the case Demicoli 
 
49 Kloth 2010, p. 197-198. 
50 On a side note, the penal powers of parliament are therefore not only relevant to our 
discussion of parliamentary immunity and the ECHR, but they also provide us with very 
helpful entry points for a discussion of the peculiar nature of the law of parliament in the UK 
and of parliament in its capacity as a court with regard to that body of law. 
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v. Malta.51 The penal powers of the Maltese parliament are laid down in statutory 
form. In particular, Maltese law provides definitions of contempt and breach of 
privilege, and of the penalties which parliament can impose. This clearly 
distinguishes Malta from the United Kingdom, where this is not the case. However, 
Malta’s parliamentary privilege and law of contempt has its foundations in British 
law, which was acknowledged and considered by the Court in Demicoli.52 Therefore, 
certain inferences may be drawn from the case for the situation in the United 
Kingdom.  
The applicant in Demicoli had written and published an article in which he 
referred to several members of parliament as ‘clowns’ and ridiculed statements they 
had made during a parliamentary debate. He was thereupon ordered to appear 
before the House of Representatives for a hearing on charges of contempt, allegedly 
committed by having written a defamatory libel. The House subsequently found the 
applicant guilty of contempt of parliament. Before it imposed a punishment on Mr 
Demicoli, he had instituted court proceedings, complaining of a violation of the 
Constitution by the House in denying him the constitutional right to a fair hearing 
by an independent court. The matter was taken up by the Constitutional Court, 
which decided that a procedure in the House for breach of privilege, though 
involving a charge which is also criminal in nature pursuant to Maltese law 
(defamatory libel is a crime under the Maltese criminal code) and despite the fact 
that the possible penalties to be imposed by the House are very similar to criminal 
punishments, the House could not be seen as a criminal court and a declaration of 
guilt of contempt did not therefore equate to a criminal sentence.53 However, the 
Constitutional Court required that the existence of a defamatory libel be established 
by a regular court of law before Parliament could impose a penalty for contempt. 
Later, the House imposed a pecuniary fine on the applicant.  
The judges of the ECtHR, in consideration of the question whether breach of 
privilege constituted in itself a ‘criminal charge’, answered this question in the 
affirmative after applying a test of three criteria, consistently applied in ECtHR case 
law. These are, first, whether the national law in question categorises the offence as 
criminal, second, whether ‘the very nature of the offence’ in question is that of a 
criminal offence, and third, the degree of severity of the punishment which the 
concerned person could possibly incur. Under Maltese law, defamatory libel is a 
criminal offence, but contempt of parliament or breach of privilege is not. However, 
the Court held that ‘the particular breach of privilege is akin to a criminal offence’ 
and that the possible punishment (a fine or a prison sentence) was sufficiently 
severe, so that the House needed to be found to have engaged in criminal 
proceedings against the applicant.  
As regards the question whether the House was an independent and impartial 
court established by law, satisfying the requirement of Article 6 ECHR, the Court 
gave a negative answer. It held that, pursuant to its case law,  
 
51 Demicoli v. Malta, ECHR 27 August 1991, App. No. 13057/87. 
52 Ibid., para. 32. 
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a ‘tribunal’ is characterised in the substantive sense of the term by its judicial function, 
that is to say determining matters within its competence on the basis of rules of law 
and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner ... It must also satisfy a series 
of further requirements – independence, in particular of the executive; impartiality; 
duration of its members’ terms of office; guarantees afforded by its procedure – several 
of which appear in the text of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) itself.54 
Given that the two members of the House allegedly defamed by the applicant were 
participating in the hearing before the House as quasi-judges, the Court argued that 
the impartiality criterion of Article 6 was not fulfilled. Demicoli’s right to a fair trial 
under Article 6 ECHR had accordingly been violated.  
As stated above, this case could not have arisen in continental parliaments, but 
possibly in Westminster Parliament (even though this is highly unlikely, as the 
British Parliament has resolved to apply its penal powers with restraint). The judges 
of the ECtHR held in Demicoli that the penal powers of the House were not at issue 
in the proceedings before them, but rather the manner in which they were applied 
in Mr Demicoli’s particular case. Nonetheless, the answers found by the ECtHR to 
the two questions of whether breach of privilege is (or can be) a criminal offence 
and whether Parliament constitutes an Article 6 ‘tribunal’ are relevant to our 
examination of Westminster Parliament, in which we will assess the concept of 
parliament as a court. Breach of privilege is not a statutory criminal offence in the 
UK (and of course it cannot be one in common law: the point of parliamentary 
privilege is that common law does not apply to parliamentary affairs, as will be 
shown). However, according to the Strasbourg Court, certain particular breaches, 
among which are grave cases of defamatory libel against members of Parliament,55 
qualify as being ‘akin’ to criminal charges. In such a case one needs to determine 
whether the respective House of Parliament fulfils the criteria for being an 
independent and impartial tribunal. If the relevant House does not take certain 
procedural precautions, such as excluding the alleged victims of defamation from a 
hearing before the House and granting the defendant the right to legal counsel, the 
exercise of parliamentary penal powers may constitute an infringement of Article 6 
ECHR. 
2.2.2. Parliamentary Immunity and Freedom of Expression: Article 10 ECHR 
Parliamentary immunity also raises issues under Article 10 of the Convention, 
which guarantees the right of freedom of expression. Article 10 reads as follows:  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. […]  
 
53 Ibid., para. 15. 
54 Ibid., para. 39. 
55 But only as regards matters involving these members in their capacity as members, i.e. where 
the defamation is connected, in some way to ‘proceedings in parliament’. 
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2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national 
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of 
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
It should be noted that Article 10 is the only provision of the Convention which 
explicitly states that the exercise of the right contained in it ‘carries with it duties 
and responsibilities’, which is particularly relevant for elected representatives. 
The relationship between our subject and the right to freedom of expression is 
indirect. Parliamentary immunity itself does not usually have the potential to 
infringe this right,56 but it is useful to determine the exact extent of freedom of 
expression in order to establish the limits of parliamentary immunity, by answering 
two questions. First, do members of parliament (when speaking outside parliament) 
generally enjoy a wider margin of freedom of expression than ‘ordinary’ citizens? If 
so, this could be interpreted as a special privileged status for parliamentarians 
under the ECHR – a form of immunity under the Convention. Second, are there 
special limitations on freedom of expression with regard to remarks about 
parliamentarians? If this question were answered in the positive, this would also 
confer an extra degree of protection on members of parliament. Both of these 
questions have been addressed by the European Court of Human Rights, though 
the body of case law is significantly smaller and much less conclusive than that of 
parliamentary immunity under Article 6 of the Convention. 
2.2.2.1. Freedom of Expression for Parliamentarians outside Parliament 
An important judgment of the European Court of Human Rights with regard to the 
freedom of expression of parliamentarians outside parliament was that in Castells v. 
Spain.57 At the material time, the applicant was a Senator for the Basque political 
group Herri Batasuna,58 and had heavily criticised the Spanish government in a 
magazine article (and not in the Senate, where he would have enjoyed non-
accountability). In his article, he had lamented that numerous violent crimes 
allegedly committed by well-organised fascist groups had gone unpunished while 
hundreds of members of ETA had been imprisoned, and thousands arrested over 
the criminal activities of the Basque secessionist group. The applicant suggested that 
the crimes committed by right-wing groups must have had the backing of the 
Spanish government. He was subsequently charged with insulting the government, 
a crime punishable under Spanish law by a substantial prison sentence or a fine. On 
 
56 An exception might be the law of contempt in Westminster-type systems, where parliament 
can avail itself of its penal powers and sanction individuals who have committed a contempt 
or breach of privilege by their utterances. This may constitute an infringement of these 
individuals’ convention rights; see Demicoli v. Malta, discussed in the previous section. 
57 Castells v. Spain, ECHR 23 April 1992, App. No. 11798/85. 
58 The organisation was prohibited in 2003. 
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trial, the applicant offered to substantiate the truth of his alleged insults, but the 
Supreme Court, which conducted his trial, ruled that a defence of truth was not 
admissible in proceedings for slurs against the government, since the truth of a 
statement was immaterial for its insulting character. The Supreme Court finally 
sentenced the applicant to one year and a day in prison. He was also disqualified 
from public office for the same amount of time, but the execution of both penalties 
was stayed pending the decision of the Constitutional Court, to which the applicant 
had appealed. Two years later, the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal but 
ruled that the prison sentence had already been served.  
The applicant complained of a violation of his right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10 of the Convention. Since Mr Castells was a member of the Spanish 
Senate at the time, the Court not only had to determine whether his conviction had 
violated Article 10, but also whether, as an elected representative, he enjoyed a 
wider freedom of expression than others. First, the Court held in Castells that, in 
general, freedom of expression does not only pertain to ideas which are favourably 
received but also to opinions which ‘offend, shock or disturb’.59 Crucially for our 
purpose of determining that question, the Court remarked that 
[w]hile freedom of expression is important for everybody, it is especially so for an 
elected representative of the people. He represents his electorate, draws the attention 
to their preoccupations and defends their interests. Accordingly, interferences with the 
freedom of expression of an opposition member of parliament, like the applicant, call 
for the closest scrutiny on the part of the Court.60 
But what does this mean? That limitations of the freedom of expression of 
representatives have to be subject to ‘the closest scrutiny’ does not say that such 
limitations are per se less permissible in the case of a parliamentarian, than in other 
cases. On the other hand, it certainly does say that they must be treated with the 
utmost care. However, the Court went on to hold that 
[t]he freedom of political debate is undoubtedly not absolute in nature. A Contracting 
State may make it subject to certain ‘restrictions’ or ‘penalties’, but it is for the Court to 
give a final ruling on the compatibility of such measures with the freedom of 
expression enshrined in Article 10. […] 
The limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the government than in 
relation to a private citizen, or even a politician. In a democratic system, the actions or 
omissions of the Government must be subject to the close scrutiny not only of the 
legislative and judicial authority but also of the press and public opinion.61 
Based on this finding, and on the fact that the applicant had been denied the 
opportunity to prove the truth of his allegations against the Spanish government, 
the Court found a violation of Article 10.  
 
59 Ibid., para. 42. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., para. 46. 
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Can we therefore conclude that parliamentarians enjoy a wider freedom of 
expression than other citizens? It is not certain. More recent ECtHR case law 
suggests that the determining factor for the Court is not so much the status of an 
individual as a parliamentarian or other representative of the people, but the 
relevance of the remark in question for public political debate. In Keller v. Hungary,62 
the applicant, a parliamentarian, had made derogatory statements about the late 
father of a minister. The latter successfully sued the applicant for damages, arguing 
that the parliamentarian had harmed his reputation. The ECtHR found the 
applicant’s complaint under Article 10 of the Convention manifestly ill-founded. 
Apparently, the Court finds non-political statements, even if they come from 
parliamentarians, less worthy of protection than genuine political statements. 
However, in the case of Öllinger v. Austria,63 a member of parliament had made 
certain statements which could not be proven but which, as the ECtHR explicitly 
acknowledged, were important for societal debate. Nevertheless, in this case the 
Court in Strasbourg held that the limitation of the member’s freedom of expression 
by the Austrian court was not disproportionate, and thus justifiable. 
In 2009, the Strasbourg Court delivered its judgment in the case of Féret v. 
Belgium.64 The applicant, Mr Féret, was the head of the extreme-right political party 
Front National and a member of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. He was 
also the editor-in-chief of his party’s publications and the owner of its website. As 
editor-in-chief, he had published and supervised the publication of a number of 
leaflets and other campaign publications which advocated anti-immigrant policies 
and whose content and tone was generally xenophobic and discriminatory. These 
publications led to numerous complaints and, finally, to criminal proceedings 
against Mr Féret for hate speech and incitement to discrimination. After his 
parliamentary immunity had been lifted and two appeals concerning the 
jurisdiction of the trial court had been dismissed, he was elected to the Brussels 
Regional Council and the Parliament of the French Community, both affording him 
new immunity. Nevertheless, he was finally tried by the Brussels Court of Appeal 
and sentenced to 250 hours of community service in the field of the integration of 
foreigners and a suspended prison sentence. In addition, he was declared ineligible 
for a period of 10 years.  
The ECtHR, faced with the question whether the conviction of the applicant 
constituted a violation of his rights under Article 10 of the Convention, first 
reiterated principles that had already been cited in Castells: freedom of expression 
does not solely cover ideas which are considered inoffensive, but also opinions 
which offend, shock or disturb. Moreover, Article 10(2) of the Convention leaves 
little room for restrictions on freedom of expression in the domain of political 
discourse or questions of general interest.65 However, with reference to earlier case 
law, the judges also reiterated that the fight against racial discrimination in all its 
 
62 Keller v. Hungary, ECHR 4 April 2006, App. No. 33352/02. 
63 Öllinger v. Austria, ECHR 13 May 2004, App. No. 74245/01. 
64 Féret v. Belgium, ECHR 16 July 2009, App. No. 15615/07. 
65 Ibid., para. 63. 
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forms and manifestations is of the utmost importance.66 Finally, the Court 
addressed the question whether parliamentarians enjoy a greater degree of freedom 
of expression than others:  
La qualité de parlementaire du requérant ne saurait être considérée comme une 
circonstance atténuant sa responsabilité. A cet égard, la Cour rappelle qu’il est d’une 
importance cruciale que les hommes politiques, dans leurs discours publics, évitent de 
diffuser des propos susceptibles de l’intolérance […]. Elle estime que les politiciens 
devraient être particulièrement attentifs, en termes de défense de la démocratie et de 
ses principes, car leur objectif ultime est la prise même du pouvoir. […] La Cour estime 
que l’incitation à l’exclusion des étrangers constitue une atteinte fondamentale aux 
droits des personnes et devrait par conséquent justifier des précautions particulières de 
tous, y compris des hommes politiques.67 
This adds another interesting facet to the Court’s approach to the question of 
freedom of expression of members of parliament. The quality of being a 
parliamentarian does not attenuate a person’s responsibility – id est, provide him 
with a wider freedom of expression – but even leads to a greater duty of care. 
Politicians (thus also parliamentarians) must be ‘particularly attentive in terms of 
the defence of democracy and its principles’, since their aim is to come into power. 
Incitement to the exclusion of foreigners constitutes a ‘fundamental attack on the 
rights of persons’, so it justifies ‘particular precautions’, including against 
politicians. Consequently, the Court held that the limitation of the applicant’s 
freedom of expression by the Belgian court had not violated the Convention. It 
follows from Féret, therefore, that hate speech and incitement to discrimination, 
even by campaigning politicians, is not protected by Article 10 of the Convention.  
2.2.2.2. Freedom of Expression: Speaking about Parliamentarians 
The second facet of freedom of expression which – though somewhat more 
remotely – relates to parliamentary immunity is the question to what extent a 
person’s status of being a member of parliament limits the freedom of others to 
disseminate information about this person. This question has been at issue in the 
case of Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland.68 The newspaper Iltalehti had reported 
about a case of assault against a police officer. The headline of the relevant article 
had mentioned that the perpetrator was the husband of a member of the Finnish 
parliament. Under Finnish criminal law, dissemination of information about a 
person’s private life is punishable if it is likely to cause that person damage or 
suffering, unless the information in question relates to the person’s position in 
politics, business or public office and affects the evaluation of his activities in this 
position. At the material time, a provision in the Finnish Parliament Act (which was 
later repealed by a constitutional amendment in 2000) provided that, where the 
 
66 Ibid., para. 71, with reference to Jersild v. Denmark, ECHR 23 September 1994, App. No. 
15890/89. 
67 Ibid., para. 75. 
68 Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland, ECHR 16 November 2004, App. No. 53678/00. 
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victim of abuse was a member of parliament, this constituted a seriously 
aggravating circumstance. As the newspaper headline had only mentioned the 
parliamentarian to ‘colour’ the reported events, but who otherwise had nothing to 
do with her husband’s criminal act, the newspaper and its editor-in-chief, Mr 
Karhuvaara, were convicted on the basis of the criminal provision mentioned 
above. They incurred heavy fines, aggravated, as was mandatory under the 
Parliament Act, by the victim’s status as a member of parliament.  
The applicants complained to the European Court of Human Rights that their 
conviction, and in particular the aggravation of their penalty by the victim’s status 
as a parliamentarian, had violated their freedom of expression. Due to the 
agreement by all parties that the applicants’ conviction amounted to a limitation of 
their rights ex Article 10(1) of the Convention and that it was prescribed by law, the 
Court only had to assess whether this limitation was ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’. The Court was of the opinion that it was not. Together with the observation 
that even the national court had found the provision of the Parliament Act 
outdated, it based its decision on an assessment of the ‘immunity effect’ of that 
provision. Once again, the Court’s functional approach can clearly be seen:  
The present case does not raise the issue of parliamentary immunity directly as there 
was no question of Mrs A.’s immunity from civil or criminal action. Parliamentary 
immunity was, however, of indirect relevance as it was Mrs A.’s status as a member of 
parliament that led to more severe convictions and sentences under section 15 of the 
Parliament Act. This indirect protection afforded to parliamentarians by way of 
punitive and deterrent criminal sentences, directed towards third parties, is relevant 
both to the justification and the proportionality of the convictions.  
The Court notes that the offences in question did not have any connection with the 
performance of Mrs A.’s official duties as a member of parliament. No criticism of Mrs 
A. was suggested, and it has not even been claimed that the publication of Mrs A.’s 
name and picture in connection with the account of the criminal proceedings against 
Mr A. in any way affected Mrs A.’s freedom of speech or was capable of limiting free 
parliamentary debate. In the absence of any link with the aims underlying 
parliamentary immunity, the use of Mrs A.’s parliamentary status as an aggravating 
factor of the offences in question is problematic.69 
Similarly to its approach to parliamentary immunity in cases relating to the right of 
access to court, the Court was not ready to accept a greater degree of protection for 
parliamentarians than was necessary in the light of their parliamentary functions. It 
may perhaps be concluded from the assessment of the Court (quoted above) that 
this approach is relevant not only for issues of freedom of expression, but to all 
(hypothetical) cases in which a person’s status as a parliamentarian negatively 
affects the legal position of a third party.  
 
69 Ibid., paras. 51-52. 
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2.3. ECtHR Case Law on Parliamentary Immunity: Conclusions 
Since A v. the United Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights has created a 
body of case law from which some inferences can be drawn with regard to the 
Court’s approach to parliamentary immunity and, hence, to the status of immunity 
under the ECHR. The Court’s approach is very clearly a functional one: it accepts 
that parliamentary immunity is a constitutional norm present in all contracting 
states. This means that although the implementation of parliamentary immunity in 
practice differs considerably between the contracting parties, it must summarily be 
understood as a constitutional principle from which they did not mean to derogate 
by adopting the Convention. However, since parliamentary immunity necessarily 
conflicts with the right of access to court ex Article 6(1) of the Convention, the Court 
treats it as a limitation thereof, which must be assessed according to the well-known 
criteria of legitimate aims and proportionality.  
It is generally accepted – including by the Court in Strasbourg – that 
parliamentary immunity aims at protecting the freedom of parliamentary debate 
and shielding parliament from undue influence. In short, parliamentary immunity 
serves to ensure that parliament can freely discharge its constitutional tasks. It is at 
this point that the Court applies a functional criterion: while the legal institution of 
immunity generally serves a legitimate aim, its application is only proportionate to 
this aim where it actually relates to the functions of parliament – or, since the 
immediate beneficiary of immunity is the individual parliamentarian, to the 
parliamentary functions of the member. The effect of parliamentary immunity is to 
bar judicial action against a parliamentarian, usually criminal or civil proceedings 
for certain acts or utterances. In the Court’s view, where an act or statement has 
occurred as part of the core functions of parliament (for instance, a vote or speech in 
parliament), this merits absolute protection, as in A v. UK. While the Court has 
never contested explicitly that acts or utterances outside actual parliamentary 
debates can also fall within the parliamentary functions of a member, its 
‘proportionality threshold’ becomes higher the further the act or utterance in 
question is removed from the core of parliamentary activity. Hence, statements 
made in newspaper interviews are not necessarily protected, insulting letters and 
gifts to a public prosecutor are by default irreconcilable with parliamentary activity. 
Except in Kart v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights has never 
formally distinguished between non-accountability and inviolability but generally 
refers to ‘parliamentary immunity’ instead. Nevertheless it is clear that its 
functional approach bears different consequences for the two forms of immunity 
because of their very nature: non-accountability explicitly relates only to acts and 
utterances which are part of, or are very closely connected to, a member’s 
parliamentary functions. Under its functional approach, the Court will therefore see 
non-accountability as a disproportionate limitation of Article 6 ECHR only where it 
actually denies this connection, as it did in Cordova and the other Italian cases. 
Inviolability, on the other hand, relates by definition to acts of 
parliamentarians which lie in the extra-parliamentary sphere (as acknowledged by 
the Court in Kart). Therefore, despite the Court’s repeated statement that ‘some 
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restrictions on access to court must be regarded as inherent [in Article 6(1) ECHR], 
an example being those generally accepted by the Contracting States as part of the 
doctrine of parliamentary immunity’,70 we may conclude that the Court has in 
reality adopted a reverse approach to inviolability: in principle it constitutes a 
disproportionate limitation of the right of access to court. The Court will therefore 
find a violation of that right wherever the application of inviolability is not justified 
by additional reasons (such as a manifest relation between the alleged criminal act 
and parliamentary activities or a political motivation for criminal charges). 
Admittedly, case law is still too scarce and the cases insufficiently diverse to be 
absolutely certain about the consistency of the Court’s rejection of inviolability in 
principle. The Grand Chamber judgment in Kart is a point in case against it. 
Nevertheless, cases like Tsalkitzis and Syngelidis clearly support our conclusion of a 
‘reverse approach’. 
This is a highly interesting finding because it questions the legitimacy of an 
important part of the immunity systems of many European states vis-à-vis the 
ECHR. In most states parliament or a parliamentary body has a discretionary power 
to lift inviolability without the possibility to appeal this decision in court, so the 
narrow functional approach of the European Court towards inviolability has 
created a certain judicial inroad into the constitutional powers of parliament in 
many of the contracting states. It surely has done away with the idea (if it ever 
existed) of parliamentary immunity as a personal privilege for parliamentarians. 
Finally, the European Court of Human Rights has also had occasion to 
pronounce on the penal powers of parliament in relation to Article 6 of the 
Convention. It has done so in only one judgment (Demicoli v. Malta) which must be 
deemed to be of relevance only to the power of Westminster-type parliaments to 
punish for contempt and breach of privilege. Nevertheless, one may conclude from 
Demicoli that the ancient view of parliament as a court of law – on which we will 
elaborate in the course of our case study of the UK – is likely to conflict with the 
requirements of the ECHR. 
General conclusions with regard to the extent of freedom of expression 
enjoyed by parliamentarians under the ECHR remains difficult: on the one hand, 
limitations on freedom of expression in political discourse require ‘the closest 
scrutiny’ (Castells). On the other hand, being a parliamentarian alone does not 
confer upon an individual a greater freedom of expression (Keller) and may even 
lead to a greater duty of care. Lastly, the Court does not seem willing to afford any 
protection to hate speech or incitement to discrimination (Féret). We will see in the 
course of our case study of parliamentary immunity in the Netherlands, and 
especially in the account of recent debates, that the inconclusiveness of ECtHR case 
law in this matter is problematic. Politicians, and parliamentarians in particular, are 
caught in a nexus between greater freedom and greater responsibility, between 
being equal citizens before the law and being slightly ‘more equal’ than others due 
to their status.  
 
70 Cordova v. Italy (No. 1), para. 60; Tsalkitzis v. Greece, para. 45; Syngelidis v. Greece, para. 42. 
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Nevertheless, it is safe to conclude that the Court employs a functional 
approach, similar to the one observed in connection with Article 6, to issues 
involving parliamentarians and Article 10 of the Convention. First, where 
parliamentary functions are not at issue, being a member of parliament merits no 
special treatment. A difference can be observed, however, in the definition of 
parliamentary functions: the Court used a relatively conservative, institutional 
definition of ‘parliamentary functions’ in case law relating to Article 6 (Cordova, 
Syngelidis). In issues relating to Article 10, it affords much greater relevance to the 
political nature of utterances, or their being in the general interest, than to the 
institutional aspect of being a member of parliament (Castells, Öllinger, Karhuvaara). 
3. The Immunity Regime of the European Parliament 
3.1. A Combined Immunity Regime: 27+1 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) benefit from a very complex 
immunity system which dates back to an era when the Parliament was not directly 
elected but was composed of delegates from the national parliaments of the 
Member States.71 This system is laid down in Articles 8 and 9 (formerly Articles 9 
and 10) of Protocol No. 7 to the Treaty on European Union. The crucial first 
paragraph of Article 9 has been inspired by the system of immunity for members of 
the Parliamentary Assembly (until 1974: Consultative Assembly) of the Council of 
Europe, and which still reveals its structure as a gathering of delegates from 
national parliamentarians.72 Articles 8 and 9 of Protocol No. 7 read as follows: 
Article 8 
Members of the European Parliament shall not be subject to any form of inquiry, 
detention or legal proceedings in respect of opinions expressed or votes cast by them in 
the performance of their duties.  
Article 9  
During the sessions of the European Parliament, its Members shall enjoy:  
(a) in the territory of their own State, the immunities accorded to members of their 
parliament;  
(b) in the territory of any other Member State, immunity from any measure of 
detention and from legal proceedings.  
Immunity shall likewise apply to Members while they are travelling to and from the 
place of meeting of the European Parliament.  
 
71 This was the case until 1979. 
72 For the immunity system of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, see: 
Statute of the Council of Europe, Art. 40; General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of 
the Council of Europe, Arts. 13-15; Protocol thereto, Arts. 3 and 5. For the historical link 
between the immunity system of the European Parliament and that of the Parliamentary 
Assembly, see Harms 1968. 
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Immunity cannot be claimed when a Member is found in the act of committing an 
offence and shall not prevent the European Parliament from exercising its right to 
waive the immunity of one of its Members. 
Article 8 of the Protocol is relatively straightforward. It provides for absolute non-
accountability in the exercise of a member’s functions. This provision is thus similar 
or identical to non-accountability as it exists in all Member States (although it is 
frequently limited to votes and opinions expressed in parliament proper). 
The complexity of the European Parliament’s (EP) immunity system stems 
from Article 9, which, depending on the location of a member at the relevant time, 
either provides an MEP with inviolability equal to that enjoyed by national 
parliamentarians of his home Member State or with a broad ‘European’ inviolability 
that prohibits ‘any measure of detention’ and ‘legal proceedings’ against him.73 In 
fact, this means that the inviolability system of Article 9 is a combination of the 
systems of all 27 (28 after the accession of Croatia in 2013) Member States of the EU 
and the proper inviolability of the European Parliament. 
In theory, whether and in how far a member of the European Parliament is 
inviolable in a specific case depends on whether the EP is in session. However, it 
follows from case law of the ECJ (now CJEU) that the European Parliament holds 
sessions for a 12 month period74 and the responsible committees have repeatedly 
declared that immunity applies during the entire time of the mandate, starting with 
the declaration of election results.75  
The exact scope of the immunity depends, first, on the nationality of the 
member concerned76 and, second, on the state in which the alleged criminal act or 
the fact to which legal proceedings relate has occurred. Article 9(3) provides for the 
exception of flagrante delicto which can be found in all inviolability provisions of 
European states. Lastly, the European Parliament has a right to waive inviolability 
on request, pursuant to Article 9(3). 
3.2. A Discriminatory System 
Where an MEP’s behaviour gives rise to legal proceedings against him in ‘his own’ 
Member State, Article 9(1)(a) affords him the same immunity as national 
 
73 It has long been doubted whether the term ‘legal proceedings’ had to be interpreted as 
meaning both criminal and civil proceedings, since none of the six founding members of the 
European Communities, which initially adopted the Protocol, provided for inviolability from 
civil proceedings in their national systems. However, since 2003, the European Parliament 
has in several cases asserted inviolability from civil proceedings against its members where it 
was of the opinion that the amount which the members would potentially have to pay in civil 
damages was such that it had to be considered punitive in nature; see Offermann 2007. 
74 Wagner v. Fohrmann and Krier, ECJ 12 May 1964, Case 101/63; Wybot v. Faure, ECJ 10 July 1986, 
Case 149/85.  
75 Offermann 2007, p. 7. 
76 The phrase ‘their own state’ in Art. 9(1)(a) refers to the state in which a member has been 
elected, thus strictly speaking not the state of which he is a national. After all, there may be 
cases of dual nationality or, where election rules permit this, cases in which a national of one 
Member State is elected in another. 
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parliamentarians of that Member State would enjoy in equal circumstances. 
However, if the relevant act is committed in another Member State, the member 
concerned enjoys full immunity from legal proceedings in civil and criminal matters 
– thus a very broad variant of inviolability – by virtue of Article 9(1)(b) of the 
Protocol. Where the act is committed while the member is travelling to or from 
Brussels or Strasbourg, regardless of whether or not he is still on the territory of his 
own Member State at the precise moment of the act, the ‘European’ immunity under 
(b) applies in the same way.  
Since the inviolability rules of the Member States are very diverse – the UK 
and the Netherlands do not provide for inviolability at all – a certain inequality 
between members from different states is inherent in this system. An example may 
make this more evident: imagine an MEP from Poland giving a television interview 
in his home country, in which he makes insulting or defamatory statements about a 
person. In this scenario, he will enjoy the same immunity as do members of the 
Polish Sejm and Senate. Since the Polish Constitution affords members of the 
national parliament broad inviolability, the MEP cannot be held criminally liable. If 
the same Polish member of the European Parliament gives the same interview in the 
Netherlands, he will enjoy full immunity pursuant to Article 9(1)(b) of Protocol No. 
7. However, if a Dutch member of the European Parliament gives the same 
interview in the Netherlands, where no system of inviolability exists, he will be 
criminally liable like any other citizen. This is, again, different, if the Dutch MEP 
gives the interview abroad, or on a train to Brussels or Strasbourg. 
This situation is clearly discriminatory. The European Parliament has therefore 
suggested that changes be made to the system of immunity, to the effect that all 
members would be subject to the same rules. However, to date, the relevant rules of 
Protocol No. 7 have not been amended.77 The immunity rules cannot be changed by 
the European Parliament unilaterally, because the Protocols to the Treaties form an 
integral part, pursuant to Article 51 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
Therefore, any amendment to Protocol no. 7 would require a cumbersome Treaty 
revision procedure under Article 48 TEU. 
 
77 As early as 1983, the EP resolved to propose an amendment of the immunity rules laid down 
in the Protocol (OJ C277, 17 October 1983, p. 135). The Bureau of the EP submitted an initial 
proposal to amend the immunity system to the Commission. After making amendments, the 
Commission forwarded the draft to the Council (Doc. 1-1442/84, COM(84) 666). Having 
received the draft from the Council for consultation, the Legal Affairs Committee of the EP 
drew up a detailed report in which it explained the discriminatory effects of the current 
immunity rules (the Donnez Report, A2-0121/86) and the EP adopted a resolution to suggest 
amendments to the draft (OJ C99, 13 April 1987, p. 43). However, the Council never adopted 
the proposal. Also later calls by the EP to amend the immunity system remained unheard (OJ 
C158, 17 June 1991, p. 258). In 2003, the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market 
drew up a Draft Statute for Members of the European Parliament (see the Rothley Report, A5-
0193/03), which contains provisions for a unified system of non-accountability and limited 
inviolability that only prohibits restrictions on the liberty of members, but not legal action 
against them. The Draft Statute provides that this new system shall enter into force upon the 
repeal of Arts. 9 and 10 (now Arts. 8 and 9) of Protocol No. 7. However, the system contained 
in the Draft Statute was not endorsed by the Commission and later dropped by Parliament.  
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3.3. Waiving or Defending European Inviolability 
According to Article 9(3) of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities, the EP has 
the right to waive a member’s inviolability as long as it concerns a case under 
Article 9 of the Protocol (since the proper ‘European’ non-accountability afforded by 
Article 8 is absolute and cannot be waived). The procedure for waiving inviolability 
is laid down in Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament. 
According to these rules, the competent authority of a Member State may submit to 
the EP a request to waive the immunity of one of its members. This request is 
referred to a committee, which examines the case and draws up a report and a 
proposal for a decision. On the basis of this proposal, the plenary Parliament takes a 
vote on whether or not to waive immunity.  
Over time, a number of principles of parliamentary practice have crystallised. 
Offermann, in his detailed report on the immunities of the EP, summarises these 
principles as follows: First, the immunities are treated as an institutional privilege. 
This means that they are applied so that they protect the independence of 
parliament as a body through the protection of its members. Therefore it is of 
secondary concern whether the act to which legal action against a member relates 
has been committed before the beginning of his mandate.78 From the principle of 
immunity as an institutional privilege, it also follows that individual MEPs do not 
have the right to renounce their immunity. This is also made clear by Article 9(3) of 
Protocol No. 7 itself, which explicitly reserves the right of waiver to the Parliament 
as a whole. Next, as we have already seen, immunity is effective for the duration of 
a member’s mandate, since the EP is deemed to be continuously in session. Finally, 
the most interesting result of parliamentary practice is the way in which the 
European Parliament has tried to remedy the discriminatory effects of the reference 
to national immunity rules in Article 9(1)(a). Offermann explains the approach of 
the EP as follows: 
The fact that letter (a) of Article [9] of the PPI refers to immunities granted to Members 
of national parliaments does not mean that the European Parliament may not establish 
its own rules, its own case law, as it were; as for the waiver of parliamentary 
immunity, the notion of parliamentary immunity itself, which is identical for Members 
of national parliaments and of the European Parliament, must not be confused with the 
procedures for waiver of parliamentary immunity, which are a matter for each 
parliament concerned. These rules, which are the outcome of decisions taken on 
requests for the waiver of immunity, tend to create a coherent notion of parliamentary 
immunity which should, as a matter of principle, be entirely separate from the various 
practices employed in the national parliaments. If that were not the case, the disparities 
between Members of one and the same parliament would be accentuated on the 
grounds of their nationality.79 
Thus, the European Parliament tries to solve the discriminatory situation caused by 
the discrepancy between the material immunity rules of the Member States by 
 
78 Offermann 2007, p. 22. 
79 Ibid., p. 23. 
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asserting the right to decide autonomously, without regard to national rules and 
practice, whether or not to waive immunity. The obvious result of this approach is 
that parliament is not easily inclined to waive a member’s immunity, even where it 
probably would be waived – or deemed not to exist – in cases involving a national 
parliamentarian.  
Offermann lists four essential criteria according to which the EP takes its 
decision in a particular case. First, where legal action against the member relates to 
any form of political activity, immunity must not be waived. Second, immunity is 
also not waived in the presence of fumus persecutionis – the presumption that legal 
action is politically motivated. Third, where a member is charged with particularly 
serious crimes (such as rape or murder), his immunity is to be lifted. Lastly, the 
European Parliament takes into account whether the offence concerned is 
considered equally serious in different Member States. 
Along with the power to waive the immunity of one of its members, the 
European Parliament may also decide to do the opposite, that is, to assert or 
‘defend’ immunity. It can do so with regard to both layers of immunity, non-
accountability ex Article 8 and inviolability ex Article 9 of Protocol No. 7. The 
Parliament usually makes such an assertion upon a request by a member against 
whom legal proceedings have been initiated in a national court.80 The assertion 
takes the form of a resolution which does not have the power to bind the authorities 
of a Member State directly. Nevertheless, solidarity and cooperation with the 
European Parliament is expected from all national judges pursuant to Article 4(3) 
TEU (formerly Article 10 TEC). This means that an assertion of immunity by the 
Parliament has to be taken into account, but, especially with regard to non-
accountability pursuant to Article 8 of the Protocol, such a decision is not legally 
authoritative, since the existence of immunity in a particular case is to be 
established by the trial court itself (see next section). With regard to inviolability 
under Article 9, the decision of the Parliament also has no binding force, but it may 
put a certain ‘interpretative pressure’ on the national courts to afford the MEP 
concerned the protection of the national inviolability rules. However, what if no 
such rules exist? 
Carla Berkhout has recently argued that the approach of the EP with regard to 
its power to waive or defend immunity can be used as a means to circumvent the 
problem of restrictive (or non-existent) national inviolability rules.81 She asked the 
hypothetical question: what would have happened if Geert Wilders, the Dutch 
right-wing populist, had been a member of the EP when he was prosecuted for 
extra-parliamentary hate speech and insult? This raises an interesting yet highly 
speculative issue, since the Dutch immunity system merely provides for free speech 
in parliament and nothing beyond – in particular, there is no inviolability for any 
act or utterance outside parliament. Imagine that Dutch prosecutors wish to bring 
legal proceedings against a Dutch MEP for having committed, in his home Member 
State, a criminal act or utterance which is not covered by non-accountability 
 
80 See Rule (6)(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the EP. 
81 Berkhout 2009, p. 2057 et. seq. 
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pursuant to Article 8 of the Protocol. In such a situation, Article 9(1)(a) provides that 
the MEP concerned enjoys the same immunity as members of the national 
parliament of his home Member State. In the Netherlands, this would mean, strictly 
speaking, that he enjoys no immunity, since inviolability does not exist in the Dutch 
system. Would the prosecutors nevertheless be required to request the lifting of 
immunity (inviolability) under Article 9 of the Protocol in order to launch legal 
proceedings against this MEP?  
On the one hand, this would be paradoxical, since an immunity which does 
not exist cannot be lifted. On the other hand, a decision of the Dutch authority not to 
file a lifting request would potentially undermine the authority of the European 
Parliament to take the decision whether or not to lift immunity autonomously and 
to detach this decision from national rules. Berkhout assumes that the national 
authorities would not be inclined to take the risk to simply ignore the EP. In 
addition, it is likely that the member in question would request the European 
Parliament to assert his immunity. If he does so and the EP decides to follow his 
request, the principle of sincere cooperation ex Article 4(3) TEU would not make it 
easy for national courts to act against its decision.82 
Hence, with regard to the Wilders scenario or other cases which fall under 
national inviolability in some Member States but not in others, it could thus be 
conceivable that that the European Parliament could try to ‘create’ immunity for its 
members by using its prerogative to decide on the lifting of immunity or to assert it 
in a resolution. Berkhout observes that the European Parliament defends the 
immunity of its members ‘with fire and sword’, as evidenced by the fact that it 
agrees to lift it in less than 20 per cent of the cases in which it is requested to do so.83 
But is this way of ‘creating’ immunity where none exists pursuant to national rules 
a realistic possibility? On the one hand, whether the European Parliament would 
actually try to even out the ‘inviolability gap’ caused by systems like the Dutch (or 
British) along this route is open to speculation. What is certain, however, is that this 
would clearly violate both the letter and the spirit of Article 9(1)(a) of Protocol No. 
7, whose intention – however problematic otherwise – is to grant any MEP the same 
inviolability as is enjoyed by national parliamentarians in his home Member State. 
In Berkhout’s scenario of a Dutch MEP who is to be prosecuted in his home Member 
State for a crime which Dutch parliamentary immunity does not cover, the Dutch 
courts would therefore certainly be at liberty to try the member in question. In order 
to do so, they would not be obliged to request the EP to lift the MEP’s inviolability, 
since there is no a priori case for the existence of inviolability in the first place. But 
even if they did make such a request and it would be denied, or if the EP decided to 
assert the (pseudo-)inviolability of its member on his own request, such a decision 
would not have the power to bind the national courts. Finally, where a national 
court is confronted with a decision of the EP to defend the fictitious inviolability of 
an MEP, that court could refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) by means of a preliminary question on the interpretation of Article 9 
 
82 Berkhout 2009, p. 2059. 
83 Ibid. 
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of the Protocol. It appears highly questionable whether the CJEU would be inclined 
to enforce inviolability where it is manifestly incompatible with the wording of 
Article 9(1)(a) of the Protocol. Even though there is no case law yet on inviolability, 
it is clear that the Court of Justice will leave the material decision as to whether 
immunity exists in a particular case to the national courts and will merely provide 
guidance on the correct interpretation of European rules. In doing so, it is likely that 
the CJEU would not go beyond the wording of Article 9(1)(a). This is supported by 
the restrictive interpretation that the Court has given to non-accountability ex 
Article 8 of the Protocol, as the next section will show. 
3.4. The CJEU and the Scope of European Non-accountability 
Thus far, we have primarily been concerned with the combined immunity system of 
Article 9(1)(a) and (b) of Protocol No. 7. Even though this system summarily refers 
to the ‘immunity’ enjoyed by parliamentarians in the Member States – thus to the 
entirety of immunities existing there – it is clear that Article 9 deals with 
inviolability only. Apart from cases in which a parliamentarian holds a dual 
mandate, it is inconceivable how a member of the European Parliament could 
perform an act or make an utterance that is covered by national non-accountability 
which, after all, relates exclusively to the inner dealings of the national parliaments. 
This is different under Article 8 of the Protocol, which grants members of the EP 
absolute non-accountability for ‘opinions expressed […] in the performance of their 
duties’. The obvious question, therefore, is what exactly falls within the scope of 
parliamentary duties?  
It has been observed that the CJEU has, for a very long time, carefully avoided 
this question, and in fact any substantive question with regard to parliamentary 
immunity.84 The only two decisions of interest in this respect are those in Marra85 
and, most recently, Patriciello.86 In the former case, two persons had brought civil 
claims for damages against Mr Marra MEP, who had allegedly insulted them in 
leaflets which he had distributed in his native Italy. While on trial in a local court, 
Mr Marra had requested the EP to defend his immunity and this request was 
granted. However, for unknown reasons, the resolution of the EP had not reached 
the Italian Court. In a preliminary question to the CJEU, this Court therefore asked, 
first, whether it was required to request the lifting of immunity and, in the absence 
of a decision by the European Parliament, whether it was competent to rule on the 
scope of immunity. These questions did not, however, distinguish between the two 
forms of immunity contained in Articles 8 and 9 (then Articles 9 and 10) of the 
Protocol, respectively. With regard to the circumstances of the case, the CJEU 
assumed that the immunity at stake was that of Article 8 (non-accountability for 
opinions expressed in the exercise of a member’s functions).87 It observed that this 
 
84 Mehta 2012, p. 314. 
85 Alfonso Luigi Marra v. Eduardo De Gregorio and Antonio Clemente (preliminary ruling), CJEU 21 
October 2008, joined cases C-200/07 and C-201/07. 
86 Aldo Patriciello, CJEU 6 September 2011, case C-163/10. 
87 Ibid., para. 31. 
 50 
The European Dimension of Parliamentary Immunity 
particular immunity was absolute and could not be waived by the European 
Parliament; neither did the Parliament have the power to determine whether the 
conditions for the application of Article 8 are met in a specific case. This decision 
falls within the exclusive competence of the national court, which is thus not 
obliged to request a waiver.88 However, where the European Parliament has been 
requested to defend its member’s immunity, the duty of sincere cooperation obliges 
the Court to stay proceedings until the EP has reached a decision. However, the 
national judge is not obliged to follow that decision.89  
Accordingly, it is for the national judge to rule on the scope of European non-
accountability. The CJEU’s judgment in Marra did not provide any guidance as to 
the definition of opinions expressed in the performance of an MEP’s duties – this 
issue was not raised by the question of the referring court and it can be assumed 
that the CJEU happily avoided it. However, it was addressed in the Opinion of 
Advocate General Maduro, who suggested a test of two criteria. Since his Opinion is 
one of very few authoritative texts on this important question in an EU context, it 
merits a somewhat lengthy quote:  
First, the opinion at issue in any given case must be about a genuine matter of public 
interest. While a statement on an issue of general concern will be covered by the 
absolute privilege guaranteed by Article 9 regardless of whether it is made inside or 
outside the premises of the European Parliament, this privilege may not be relied upon 
by MEPs in the context of cases or disputes with other individuals that concern them 
personally but have no wider significance for the general public. […] I want to be clear 
in this respect: the question whether or not such a statement contributes to a public 
debate is not to be determined by the style, accuracy or correctness of the statement but 
by the nature of the subject-matter. Even a possibly offensive or inaccurate statement 
may be protected if it is linked to the expression of a particular point of view in 
discussing a matter of public interest. 
Second, a distinction must be drawn between factual allegations against particular 
individuals and opinions or value judgments. As the European Court of Human Rights 
has held ‘while the existence of facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value 
judgments is not susceptible of proof. The requirement to prove the truth of a value 
judgment is impossible to fulfil and infringes freedom of opinion itself, which is a 
fundamental part of the right secured by Article 10 [ECHR]’. When a Member of 
Parliament makes a value judgment about a matter of general importance, no matter 
how upsetting or offensive some people may find it, he should, in principle, be able to 
avail himself of absolute privilege. However, Article 9 of the Protocol, which expressly 
refers to ‘opinions’, does not cover statements made by MEPs which contain factual 
allegations against other individuals.90 
According to Advocate General Maduro, it thus falls within the duties of an MEP to 
make statements and voice opinions about matters of general interest, also where 
this is done in a non-parliamentary context. He further draws a line between ‘value 
 
88 Ibid., paras. 32-33. 
89 Ibid., paras. 42-44. 
90 Opinion of AG Maduro in Marra, joined cases C-200/07 and C-201/07, delivered on 26 June 
2008, paras. 37-38. 
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judgments’ and ‘factual allegations’; the former must fall within the sphere of 
absolute non-accountability, whereas the latter do not because they can be falsified. 
Interestingly, Maduro does not attach any importance to a material link between the 
utterances of an MEP and his specific activity in the Parliament. In this sense, what 
he suggests is actually a form of political immunity detached from parliament as an 
institution, an idea to which we will come back in our Dutch case study. In the 
absence of a larger amount of case law, it is hard to assess the feasibility of this 
approach with certainty.91 It is, however, evident that it would make the scope of 
absolute non-accountability enjoyed by MEPs much broader than it is in all or most 
of the Member States. 
In Patriciello, the only case to date in which the CJEU has considered the 
question what constitutes an opinion expressed in the exercise an MEP’s duties 
directly, Advocate General Jääskinen rejected the test proposed by Maduro and has 
instead suggested an ‘organic’ approach. By this he means  
that the Court should introduce a criterion specific to the nature of the duties of a 
Member of the European Parliament, on the basis of the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. This criterion links substantive immunity not to the content of 
a Member’s comments, but rather to the relationship between the context in which 
those comments are made and the parliamentary work of the Parliament.92 
Thus, the decision whether an opinion has been expressed in the exercise of an 
MEP’s duties should still be taken on the basis of the content of that opinion, but 
this content should be materially linked to the actual work of the EP, and not to the 
concept of public interest. As Jääskinen himself points out, this approach is inspired 
by that taken by the European Court of Human Rights in its case law regarding 
parliamentary immunity.  
The circumstances of the case in Patriciello were the following: an Italian MEP 
had observed a municipal police officer issuing tickets to several drivers who had 
parked their cars in contravention of the relevant regulations on a parking lot close 
to a neurological clinic. The MEP had then accused her of falsifying the relevant 
times, which amounts to the criminal offence of forgery. He was subsequently 
charged with making false accusations against a public official. Upon his request, 
the MEP asserted his immunity under Article 8 of Protocol No. 7. The resolution 
states that  
 
91 Think, for instance of Geert Wilders’ statement that the Quran is a ‘fascist book’. Is calling 
something ‘fascist’ a value judgment or a factual allegation? And in either case, in the context 
of the Quran, which is the basis of a religion whose core dogma is that this book is the word 
of God, can a statement about the book be distinguished from a statement about Muslim 
believers? 
92 Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Patriciello, case C-163/10, delivered on 9 June 2011, para. 89. 
 52 
The European Dimension of Parliamentary Immunity 
[a]s a matter of fact, in his statements, Mr Patriciello merely commented on facts in the 
public domain, the rights of the citizens to have an [sic] easy access to a Hospital and to 
the healthcares [sic], which had an important impact on the daily life of his 
constituents.93 
The trial court submitted to the CJEU the question whether making false 
accusations (in abstracto) constituted an utterance protected by non-accountability ex 
Article 8.  
Even though it is obvious that the accusations which Mr Patriciello had made 
against the Italian police officer would not have passed the test suggested by 
Advocate General Maduro in Marra, since they were of a factual and thus falsifiable 
nature, the Court chose to adopt a more restrictive approach. According to the 
judges in Luxembourg, non-accountability ex Article 8 is ‘in essence intended to 
apply to statements made by those members within the very precincts of the 
European Parliament’. Nevertheless it is possible that it also covers opinions 
expressed outside these precincts, since this depends ‘not on the place where the 
statement was made, but rather on its character and content’.94 However, the Court 
also acknowledges the harsh consequences which absolute inviolability has on 
those who wish to bring legal proceedings against a member. It therefore holds that 
‘the connection between the opinion expressed and parliamentary duties must be 
direct and obvious’.95 This was of course clearly not the case with regard to the 
opinion which Mr Patriciello had expressed at the parking lot. We can thus see that 
the CJEU essentially followed the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen and 
adopted his ‘organic’ test, which strongly resembles the functional test employed by 
the ECtHR.96  
The ruling of the CJEU has been criticised as creating ‘a real danger that the 
European “public space” should become one not of vibrant discussion and 
competing narratives, but one in which expression is chilled for fears of civil or 
criminal prosecution […]’.97 One may or may not agree with this assessment, but in 
any event it should be borne in mind that the factual circumstances of the case were 
such that a ruling which would have obliged the trial court to give Mr Patriciello the 
benefit of non-accountability was virtually unimaginable from a judicial point of 
view, even though the EP was of a different opinion. Since Patriciello was the only 
decision in which the CJEU was called upon to interpret Article 8 of Protocol No. 7, 
it cannot be ruled out that the Court of Justice will refine or alter its definition of an 
‘opinion expressed in the exercise of an MEP’s functions’ on a future occasion, 
where the underlying case offers more room for controversy. For the time being, 
 
93 Aldo Patriciello, CJEU 6 September 2011, case C-163/10, para. 12. 
94 Ibid., paras. 29-30. 
95 Ibid., para. 35. 
96 It should be noted that we referred to the ECHR’s approach as ‘functional’, since the decisive 
factor is the connection between the act that is the basis of proceedings against a 
parliamentarian and his parliamentary functions. AG Jääskinen, however, calls the approach 
suggested by AG Maduro ‘functional’ because it refers to the function of an MEP’s statement 
as a contribution to public debate. He characterises his own approach as ‘organic’. 
97 Mehta 2012, p. 8. 
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however, European non-accountability must be interpreted according to the test 
suggested by Advocate General Jääskinen. 
3.5. The Immunity System of the European Parliament: Conclusion 
Like many national systems of parliamentary immunity, that of the European 
Parliament is composed of two layers: (a) absolute non-accountability pursuant to 
Article 8 of Protocol No. 7 and (b) a combination of the immunity regimes of the 
Member States and a broad ‘European immunity’ pursuant to Article 9 of that 
Protocol. Since not all Member States grant their parliamentarians inviolability, the 
combined system under Article 9 discriminates between MEPs from different 
Member States. The European Parliament tries to remedy this discriminatory effect 
by making use of its discretionary power to waive or assert immunity, but there is 
at least a theoretical possibility that this method would give rise to new problems if 
it were applied so as to grant MEPs inviolability even where it does not exist 
pursuant to the material rules of the Member State concerned. Even though it 
cannot be ruled out that the European Parliament would, in such a case, attempt to 
‘create’ inviolability by asserting it, it must be doubted whether this attempt would 
be successful, both in the national courts and before the CJEU.  
Article 8 of Protocol No. 7 provides MEPs with absolute non-accountability for 
opinions expressed in the exercise of their duties. Whether an utterance falls within 
this category is ultimately for the national trial court to decide. However, the CJEU 
has provided some guidance in this question. It did not adopt the wide 
interpretation suggested by Advocate General Maduro in the case of Marra, which 
would have rendered MEP’s unaccountable for opinions which relate to matters of 
public interest and do not amount to factual accusations. Instead, the Court found 
an approach very similar to that of the European Court of Human Rights: an 
opinion expressed by an MEP must bear a ‘clear and obvious’ connection with the 
actual work of the European Parliament in order to fall within the scope of Article 8 
of the Protocol. At least with regard to non-accountability, the approach of the CJEU 
is thus congruent with that of the ECtHR.  
4. Concluding Remarks on Parliamentary Immunity in Europe 
In the introduction to our analysis, we asserted that the relevance of the European 
dimension of parliamentary immunity lies in its capacity of having a certain 
normative force which can further our understanding of parliamentary immunity as 
a concept. This normative force stems from the authority which in particular the 
decisions of the two European courts have across national borders. To a more 
limited extent, it also derives from the degree of consensus among both national 
and European systems which is revealed in the reflection and argumentation which 
underlies these decisions and the systems themselves.  
In concrete terms, we can draw three basic conclusions which are closely 
interrelated and which apply to all national systems of parliamentary immunity in 
Europe and to that of the European Parliament. First, the purpose of parliamentary 
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immunity is to protect the work of parliament. Its character is that of an institutional 
and decidedly not personal privilege. This seems to be a trite statement, but it is 
central to all reasoning, judicial and otherwise, about the concept of parliamentary 
immunity. Where immunity is applied, it interferes with basic rights (especially 
access to court and the right to an effective legal remedy) and with the fundamental 
principle of equality. However, this interference is accepted by the courts and the 
European states in deference of the higher legal value that lies in the unimpeded 
functioning of parliaments.  
The second conclusion follows directly from the first: rules of parliamentary 
immunity are not sacrosanct. Their validity vitally depends on whether they are 
necessary with regard to their purpose of protecting parliament. This results in the 
functional approach with which both the ECtHR and the CJEU assess and interpret 
immunity. In short, in all cases which raise the question whether an act or utterance 
is protected by immunity or whether the interference with the rights of a third party 
by virtue of immunity is justified, the decisive criterion is the existence of a 
connection between the act, utterance or interference and the work of parliament. 
As a rule, the weaker this connection, the less the application of immunity is 
justified.  
As a third conclusion, it also follows from the institutional nature of 
parliamentary immunity that it is not tantamount to political immunity and must not 
be confused with it. It is true that the European legal order, including the 
Convention on Human Rights, attaches great value to unimpeded political debate 
and free speech in matters of public interest. It is also true that the European Court 
of Human Rights has emphasised the importance of public debate in judgments 
relating to the freedom of expression of parliamentarians. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
established that parliamentary immunity confers on its beneficiaries a higher degree 
of freedom of expression beyond what is necessary for the functioning of 
parliament. Bluntly, if parliamentarians are afforded a wider margin of freedom of 
expression beyond the confines of their parliamentary work, this is not based on 
their status as parliamentarians but on the fact that they habitually engage in 
political speech. In reality, both of these characteristics are of course intimately 
linked with each other. Nevertheless we must differentiate between them for the 
purpose of assessing the concept of parliamentary immunity.  
These three very general conclusions, or rules, form both the common essence 
of all the immunity systems which exist in Europe and what might be called their 
‘normative shell’. Perhaps this merits a hypothesis which can be tested in the three 
case studies which follow: despite the fact that the historical origins, the political 
background and the theoretical scaffold surrounding national systems of 
parliamentary immunity differ considerably between European states, these 
systems are evolving so as to fit this normative shell. For one system, this may mean 
that the scope of parliamentary immunity is gradually reduced, for another, that it 
may be broadened (for example because the interpretation of ‘parliamentary 
functions’ is subject to change). However, no system is likely to display in its 
(recent) development a tendency to exceed the European standard.  
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Chapter 3 
PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Structure of this Case Study 
This introduction (part one) to the first case study will be followed by three 
component parts. The second part will deal with the origins and the historical 
development of parliamentary privilege in Britain, starting with a very concise 
recount of the origins of Westminster Parliament, followed by a brief historical 
discussion of each of the individual privileges, and a discussion of instances of 
conflict between the House of Commons and the House of Lords.  
Part three will discuss the relationship between lex parliamenti and lex terrae 
and thereby explore the theoretical foundations of the law of parliamentary 
privilege, tracing its development up to the current stage, and end with an attempt 
to draw conclusions as to the legal nature of the law of the British Parliament.  
Part four will be devoted to the law of parliamentary privilege as it stands 
today, a discussion of its interpretation and application and of the legal problems 
arising in its modern context. In this part, attention will also be given to the most 
recent developments of parliamentary privilege in the UK.  
The final part of this case study will contain the conclusions which can be 
drawn from our examination of parliamentary privilege in the UK. 
1.2. Parliamentary Privilege in the UK 
This case study is concerned with the system of parliamentary immunity of 
Westminster Parliament, the central parliament of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. In the context of the UK, parliamentary immunity 
comes in the form of parliamentary privilege, a term which in itself hints at the 
peculiar position of the British version of parliamentary immunity vis-à-vis the law. 
Privilege is not simply the British synonym for parliamentary immunity; it also 
bears reference to the special status of Westminster Parliament and the law 
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governing parliamentary affairs within British law. In many respects, this status is 
indeed ‘privileged’, because it is governed by a separate legal system.1 
Parliamentary privilege must hence be understood to carry a somewhat wider 
meaning than merely the exemption from application of the law to Parliament and 
its members. The definition of privilege most commonly referred to is that offered 
by Erskine May’s Treatise on The Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of 
Parliament: 
Parliamentary privilege is the sum of the peculiar rights enjoyed by each House 
collectively as a constituent part of the High Court of Parliament, and by members of 
each House individually, without which they could not discharge their functions, and 
which exceeds those possessed by other bodies or individuals.2 
This broad definition shall serve as the starting point for the examination of 
parliamentary privilege. For all three studies, we will inquire into the origins and 
history, the legal nature and the material content of the system of Parliamentary 
immunity. In addition to these general research questions, it is necessary for a good 
understanding of the UK’s system of parliamentary privilege to examine the 
concept of the High Court of Parliament – of its legislature as a court of law. As will 
be shown, this concept is key to understanding the system – but also to legal 
problems and conflicts which have arisen throughout its long history. 
It will be shown in the course of this case study that privilege is not merely 
one of the features of British Parliamentary law but in fact lies at the very heart of 
the constitutional structure, closely related to the prevailing doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. For the wider purpose of comparing British 
parliamentary privilege to the immunity systems of France and the Netherlands, it 
is therefore crucial not to limit our observation to the positive law of parliamentary 
privilege as we find it today but to also elaborate on the historical roots and 
development of privilege, as well as on its theoretical background. Attention will 
also be paid to legal problems arising in the context of parliamentary immunity. In 
particular, we are interested in the British solution to the fundamental dilemma of 
parliamentary immunity, the balancing act between the potentially opposing needs 
of protecting Parliament and guaranteeing the rule of law. Closely related to this 
theme are on-going attempts to clarify and reform the privilege system, which will 
also be discussed. 
 
1 The word ‘privilege’ derives from the Latin privilegium which is a composition of the words 
privus (meaning separate or apart) and lex (law). This chapter is to show that this is not 
merely a point of semantics but that it is possible to see the lex et consuetudo parliamenti is a 
legal system in its own right. 
2 McKay et al. 2004, p. 75. This standard volume will hereinafter be referred to as ‘Erskine 
May’.  
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1.3. Delineation 
This chapter has a vast territory to cover. It appears necessary, therefore, to make a 
few delineatory remarks in advance. First, this chapter will focus solely on the 
system of privilege of Westminster Parliament. During its long and varied history, 
the political and geographical nature of the realm of the kings of England and their 
Parliament has, of course, changed considerably, and many times – geographically, 
in its administrative structure, and in Parliament’s constitutional position. While 
Westminster Parliament is often taken to be ‘the mother of all parliaments’, it is not 
the only one in that realm. However, it would exceed the scope of this study to 
consider in much detail other parliaments or parliamentary assemblies, such as the 
Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland assembly, or (former) colonial and Crown 
dependency assemblies, nor Commonwealth parliaments. For our purposes it is 
sufficient to limit the examination to Westminster Parliament, since most of the 
peculiarities of Westminster-type parliamentary immunity originate here.3 
Moreover, the devolution parliaments do not have systems of parliamentary 
immunity that are independent of the central parliament at Westminster.4 
Commonwealth parliaments, such as the parliaments of Australia and New 
Zealand, are for the most part designed after the model of Westminster Parliament, 
though of course the respective systems of parliamentary immunity do display 
some differences and peculiarities due to diverging (constitutional) legislation after 
gaining independence, and due to diverging case law. Interestingly, the clause of 
the United States Constitution which grants members of Congress non-
accountability for speech in the legislature5 is in its wording almost identical to 
Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, the most prominent piece of legislation for 
freedom of speech in Westminster Parliament, and had, according to Chafetz, barely 
led to debate during the drafting of the US constitution.6 Thus, while the US system 
of legislative privilege is most certainly worth its own discussion, it is not strictly 
necessary for the purposes of this study.  
While parliamentary privilege in jurisdictions other than the United Kingdom 
is thus not the subject of this chapter, it will be noted that some of the case law and 
statutory legislation that will be considered in its course does originate from other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions. This occurs where the case law or statutes concerned 
have been used, discussed in, or have had a direct impact on the UK’s law on 
privilege. Case law and statutory provisions that do not belong to the UK will 
 
3 For example, Art. 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 is still applicable in some Commonwealth 
jurisdictions and has shaped non-UK privilege law to a considerable degree. 
4 Legal provisions which serve to protect the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland 
Assembly do exist (See sections 40-43 of the Scotland Act 1998; Section 50 of the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998), however, like these assemblies themselves they are entirely dependent 
upon devolution legislation, which Westminster Parliament could hypothetically repeal, thus 
their privileges may be seen as a mere derivative.  
5 Art. I(6), clause 1 of the US constitution. 
6 Chafetz 2007, p. 89 et seq. 
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therefore not be discussed in order to reach conclusions on parliamentary privilege 
in their jurisdictions of origin.  
A second delineatory remark is expedient with regard to the approach of this 
chapter to the history of the British Parliament. For the purposes of this chapter, it is 
necessary to recount at least in part the long history of parliamentary privilege. 
However, it would neither be feasible nor appropriate for this chapter to attempt an 
exhaustive account of this history and the whole body of law and theory of 
Parliament in general. This is to be found in sufficient detail in the sources cited.7 
Rather, the purpose of the present chapter is to trace the cornerstones of the 
development of privilege and touch upon the history of Parliament where it serves 
this purpose.  
2. The History of Parliamentary Privilege 
As briefly outlined in the introduction, it is the aim of this chapter to give an 
account of the positive law of parliamentary privilege as it exists at this moment, 
but to contextualise it by identifying its position within the constitutional system 
and vis-à-vis the law of the land. The following illustrates that it is impossible to do 
so without at least some knowledge of both the historical development of privilege 
and, more broadly, that of the Westminster parliamentary system as a whole. The 
reason for this is that the history of Westminster parliamentary privilege is very 
closely entangled with the concept of parliament as it is understood in British law 
and the role of Parliament within the constitutional structure. The nature and extent 
of privilege, as will be shown, is for a large part attributable to the origins of 
Parliament and to the circumstances under which its two Houses historically had to 
operate, and the theoretical foundation, on which the law of privilege is built, also 
stems from its early days. We will therefore first recount, very concisely, those parts 
of the history of Parliament which are relevant to our purpose, and then proceed to 
the history of privilege. 
2.1. The Origins of Parliament 
The earliest institution which may be recognised as a forebearer of what we know 
today as the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland is the central assembly of highest-ranking feudal lords, or tenants-in-chief, 
and leading clergymen under the Norman Kings, as existed following the Norman 
conquest of 1066. This assembly is generally referred to as the Curia Regis or King’s 
Council.  
The feudal system of government of the Norman era featured a system of 
complex socio-political structures based on, first and foremost, the lord-tenant 
relationship. At the top of what may be called the pyramid of feudal power stood 
 
7 The standard work on all aspects of British Parliament and the body of law pertaining to it is 
Erskine May’s Treatise (McKay et al. 2004), which is also an invaluable source for any 
examination of parliamentary privilege. 
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the King, who, in principle, owned all the land in his realm. However, similar to 
feudal systems all over the European continent at the time, the King did not govern 
the land by direct rule. Instead, the land, divided into fiefdoms, was granted to 
vassals (tenants) in return for an oath of fidelity and their service (for example, in 
the form of military services) and payments (in the form of taxes). The tenants-in-
chief, usually members of the highest-ranking nobility, were direct vassals of the 
King. They in turn would grant (parts of) their fiefdoms to lower-ranking tenants in 
a similar manner, thus continuing and broadening the line of power downwards.  
For our purposes, the most interesting facet of this medieval system of 
government is the mutual interdependence it created between the King and 
nobility: the King largely depended on the fidelity of his tenants both for his 
income, which ultimately originated in the produce of the land, and for his military 
power-base, provided by the tenants. Conversely, the tenants depended on the King 
for their titles and estates which they de iure did not own. It is the result of this 
interdependence that the Curia Regis, in which the highest-ranking tenants were 
convened, must be understood not merely as an advisory body assisting the King at 
his will, but as an institution of its own right, quite central indeed to the feudal 
system.  
The Anglo-Saxon states which existed prior to the Norman conquest bore little 
resemblance to the system established by William the Conqueror and his successors; 
in particular, they lacked the intricate feudal structure of the Norman state. Without 
the background of mutual interdependence between the king and his tenants, the 
Anglo-Saxon Witenagemot (Old English for ‘meeting of wise men’; an advisory 
council to the Anglo-Saxon Kings made up of important noblemen and clergy) is 
unlikely to have played the same role as the Norman feudal council, which may 
well be the direct ancestor of Parliament.8  
Still, it would amount to a great exaggeration to call the Curia Regis a 
parliament proper already. Wittke observes that ‘[t]he central assembly of the 
Normans was a feudal assembly, with powers very vaguely defined, irregular in its 
meetings, and with all the characteristics of feudalism’.9 Undoubtedly, many 
features set the Norman assembly apart from what would be associated with the 
notion of Parliament today:10 the King was not legally required to seek the advice of 
the assembly, and not formally bound by such advice when he did.11 The assembly 
 
8 The Curia Regis in early Norman times consisted of high-ranking nobility and clergymen 
only, while representatives of the counties, and finally of the boroughs, were added later. 
However, it was not until the reign of Edward III (1327-1377) that Parliament was divided 
into two Houses. Therefore, it would be incorrect to see only the House of Lords as a direct 
continuation of the Curia Regis since both originated in a joint early Parliament. 
9 Wittke 1970, p. 18. 
10 In medieval and early modern times, the term had a different and vaguely defined meaning. 
It has been observed that in medieval England, the word ‘parliament’ hardly meant anything 
more than ‘a meeting for speech or conference’. Cf. McIlwain 1910, p. 27. 
11 However true this may be de iure, it was one of the characteristic realities of a feudal system 
that the King was dependant on his tenants, certainly in times of war where they provided 
for the King’s army. It seems therefore to have been de facto impossible to ignore the advice of 
these tenants on important issues of state. 
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was made up of feudal lords and leading clergymen, meeting irregularly upon the 
King’s orders; it must by no means be understood as a body of popular or even 
democratic representation, neither of the people nor, and even less so, of the nation – 
a concept entirely absent in that early period and for a long time to come. However, 
for our purposes the most revealing difference between this early version of 
Parliament and its modern successor lies in its mingling of functions. The Norman 
council and early Parliament acted as an executive body (in that its members, the 
feudal lords, executed decisions and orders in their domains). It also acted as a court 
of law which received petitions of subjects addressed to the King and dispensed 
justice in his name. At the same time, it acted as an advisory body to the King and 
passed legislation. In this sense, the Curia Regis performed tasks of all branches of 
government. It would, however, be misleading to say that the early Parliament 
performed all these functions in combination; rather, the severance of these powers 
as individual tasks was as yet unheard of and would have ‘appeared anomalous’.12 
Hence, while we are used – in Montesquieuvian tradition – to think of the making, 
application and interpretation of laws as separate tasks, it would be utterly 
anachronistic to apply such modern thinking to medieval England.  
The development leap from Curia Regis to Parliament cannot easily be 
pinpointed to one specific point in time. However, the year 1215, in which the 
tenants-in-chief secured Magna Carta from the King, significantly limiting the 
power of the Monarch and strengthening their own, is often thought to be that 
moment. In any event, it is sufficient for us to note the existence of a direct ancestral 
relationship between the ancient Norman assembly and what eventually was to 
become Westminster Parliament.  
Over time, all the separate institutions which today administer the legislative 
and judicial branches of government developed out of the ancient Curia.13 In the 
formation of government and the administration of executive tasks, feudal 
structures have ceased to play a role. Applying functional criteria,14 it is fair to say 
that the United Kingdom currently has an executive government (even though 
members of that government usually do hold a parliamentary mandate), an 
independent court system, and Parliament as a legislator, separate from the former 
two branches. However, despite this development, Parliament retained both 
legislative and judicial functions, even after this functional separation of powers 
had come into being, in that it continued as a ‘Sovereign Law-making Court’15 in 
which ‘The King in his Council in his Parliament’ would give his answers – which 
can be characterised as judicial rulings and laws at the same time. Particularly in 
cases too difficult for the judges of the ordinary courts and in cases raising novel 
 
12 Cf. Dicey 1860, p. 7. 
13 With the exception of the King and the post-civil war Privy Council. 
14 On the basis of a formal, institutional approach this statement would not hold true, at least 
with regard to the government. With regard to the judiciary, the recent establishment of the 
UK Supreme Court and the remodeling of the office of Lord Chancellor have substantially 
added to a formal separation of powers.  
15 Wittke 1970, p. 13. 
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points of law, Parliament would give a ruling, in which it ‘declare’ the law, thus in 
effect making it.  
This persistent lack of a clear dividing line between legislative and judicial 
functions of Parliament deserves particular attention in our context. Wittke notes 
that: 
Parliament, as a ‘sovereign Law-making Court’, ‘legislated’ and ‘adjudicated’, without 
any clear understanding as to when it was doing the one and when the other. Serious 
conflicts with the ordinary courts were therefore inevitable. They were all the more 
severe since both parties could claim jurisdiction because of their common descent 
from the old King’s Council [the Curia Regis]. Both could cite precedents and history to 
support their claims.16 
The fact that, in the Curia Regis, Parliament and the courts share a common 
ancestor,17 and that Parliament never formally abandoned its claim to being itself a 
court of law lies at the root of both the theoretical foundation of the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty and Parliament’s claim to privilege. The rationale behind 
this is essentially the doctrine that lower courts cannot overrule judgments of higher 
courts, therefore they have no authority to invalidate or otherwise overrule 
statutory legislation (judgments of the High Court of Parliament). Hence, they may 
also not intrude into the rules made by this highest court for the regulation of its 
own affairs.  
This is also the starting point of the long history of dispute between 
Parliament and the courts as to which institution has interpretative authority and 
jurisdiction in matters of privilege. It was held, accordingly, that ‘[i]n this common 
ancestry of Parliament, council, and courts […] we have the key to many an 
otherwise confused situation, and the explanation of many a later struggle’.18 The 
nature and cause of these struggles will be discussed in more detail further below, 
following the description of the historical development of privilege.  
2.2. Historical Origins and Development of Privilege 
While in the very early stages of parliamentary history only members of the nobility 
and clergy were summoned to Parliament, the so-called ‘model Parliament’ of 1295 
also included two representatives of each county (knights of the shire) and each 
town or borough (burgesses). These classes of members came to sit as a separate 
chamber of Parliament, the House of Commons,19 from the year 1341.  
 
16 Ibid. 
17 This is not to say that all courts, or the structure of the UK court system, evolved directly out 
of the Curia Regis. However, until the UK Supreme Court took over this function of 
Parliament in 2009, the judicial powers of the King’s Council survived in the House of Lords 
which, as the highest judicial authority superior to other courts, may be taken to represent 
‘the courts’. 
18 McIlwain 1910. 
19 Note that the word ‘Commons’ refers to the counties and boroughs represented; members of 
the House of Commons are therefore accurately referred to as ‘commoners’, though this 
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In discussing the historical development of parliamentary privilege, one has to 
distinguish between the House of Lords and the House of Commons from the point 
of their institutional separation onwards. While the Lords ‘enjoy their privileges 
simply because of their immemorial role in Parliament as advisers of the 
Sovereign’,20 those of the Commons evolved in a gradual and much more complex 
process. This is perhaps logical since the Commoners had not initially been part of 
the feudal chain of interdependences, each of whose members quite naturally 
enjoyed a certain degree of power and freedom vis-à-vis the other (though of course 
never quite uncontested).  
In the discussion that follows, we will focus on the development of the 
privileges of the House of Commons which are also by far the most relevant ones 
from a comparative perspective. However, as a general rule, it should be borne in 
mind that the privileges enjoyed by the Commons can be assumed to accrue a 
fortiori to the Lords. However, they have habitually played a much smaller role in 
the upper House, simply because the privileges of the Lords, as opposed to those of 
the Commons, have rarely been contested.  
The individual privileges cannot always be seen as completely independent 
from each other and could more accurately be termed components of the overall 
privilege of Parliament. Their evolution did not follow entirely parallel lines 
throughout the process. Hence, the individual privileges of freedom of speech, 
freedom from arrest, freedom of access to the monarch, favourable construction, the 
privilege of the Commons to provide for the constitution of the House, and the 
penal jurisdiction of the Commons must be considered separately.21 
It has been a custom of the House of Commons since very early in its history22 
to claim the privileges of the House from the King by means of a petition by the 
Speaker of the House to the King, presented at the commencement of every new 
Parliament, in which he asks the monarch to grant the House, in particular, 
‘freedom of speech in debate, freedom from arrest, freedom of access to His Majesty 
whenever occasion shall require; and that the most favourable construction should 
be placed upon all their proceedings’.23 This practice is still maintained today, but 
merely as a formality. The petition is answered on behalf of the Queen by the Lord 
Chancellor – so commissioned by the monarch under letters patent – in a statement 
that ‘Her Majesty most readily confirms all the rights and privileges which have 
ever been granted to or conferred upon the Commons, by Her Majesty or her royal 
predecessors’.24 Historically, royal assent to privilege was not always given all that 
readily; centuries had to pass before the petition became but a ceremonial part of 
the opening session of a new Parliament.  
 
word originally denotes everyone who is neither the monarch nor a peer, thus also including 
members of the nobility who do not hold a peerage.  
20 Erskine May 2004, p. 77. 
21 In treating the privileges in this order, I gladly follow the order of Erskine May’s Treatise. 
22 The exact time when such a petition was first made is not known, it may have been the 
Parliament of 1377 or 1406. Cf. Erskine May 2004, p. 78 et seq. and Wittke 1970, p. 21. 
23 Erskine May 2004, p. 78. 
24 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, First Report, 1999, HL 43-I, HC 214-I para. 6.  
 63 
Chapter 3 
2.2.1. The Privilege of Freedom of Speech 
The privilege of freedom of speech in parliamentary debate has repeatedly been 
recognised as the single most important one in the range of privileges, since it is not 
doubted that without the opportunity for members of parliament to speak their 
minds freely, they would not be able to discharge their function properly, and so 
the very purpose of a parliament would be undermined.25 In the UK, freedom of 
speech is today seen as ‘inherent in the constitution of Parliament’.26 
Until the late 15th century, however, the Commons’s right to free speech seems 
to have existed in a vague, undefined way, ‘as a matter of tradition rather than by 
virtue of a privilege sought and obtained’.27 Prior to that time, the House tried to 
secure for itself a degree of freedom by petitioning the monarch for ‘permission to 
correct any inadvertent misrepresentations of the House’s view to the King’28 and 
asked that, where the House or Speaker should displease the King or infringe his 
prerogative, this should be regarded as unintentional.29 The earliest case hinting at 
the existence of the privilege was possibly that of Sir Thomas Haxey.30 Haxey was 
not a member of Parliament, but criticised King Richard II in a petition to the 
Commons, and was subsequently sentenced to death for treason by the House of 
Lords. However, he was later rehabilitated under Henry IV and the Commons 
declared that the action against him was against ‘les libertesde lez ditz 
Communes’.31 
According to Erskine May, the first distinct claim to the privilege of freedom 
of speech was made by Speaker Sir Thomas More in 1523, and by the end of the 16th 
century the inclusion of freedom of speech in the Speaker’s petition had become 
regular, justifying the privilege as ‘part of the old ancient order’.32 This does not 
mean, however, that the privilege was always granted or treated as unequivocal by 
the King, and by the House itself. Erskine May notes that ‘[the House] was 
frequently ready to take punitive action […] against those [members] who 
overstepped the mark in debate’.33 Equally, the Crown was not entirely ready yet to 
accept unlimited freedom of speech: 
 
25 This is a general observation valid for all parliaments. Cf. Van der Hulst 2000, p. 63. 
26 Hood Phillips et al. 2001, p. 272. 
27 Erskine May 2004, p. 79 and Hood Phillips et al. 2001, p. 273. 
28 Claim by Speaker Cheney in 1399, 3 Rot. Parl. 424, 425. 
29 Erskine May 2004, p. 79. 
30 (1396-97) Rot. Parl. iii, 434. 
31 See Barnett 2009, p. 430; Erskine May 2004, p. 79. 
32 Erskine May 2004, p. 80. 
33 Ibid. 
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Her Majesty granteth you liberal but not licentious speech, liberty therefore but with 
due limitation... To say yea or no to bills, God forbid that any man should be restrained 
or afraid to answer according to his best liking… which is the very true liberty of the 
House; not, as some suppose, to speak there of all causes as him listeth… No King fit 
for his state will suffer such absurdities.34 
Yet, several instances during the reign of Elizabeth I exemplify the growing 
confidence of the House of Commons vis-à-vis the monarch on the freedom of 
speech. In 1566 the Queen was offended by debates in both Houses regarding 
matters of her succession and forbade further discussion in Parliament, summoning 
several Lords and the Speaker of the Commons. This was regarded as an 
infringement of privilege and the royal command was ignored. The Queen yielded 
and ‘revoke[d] her former commandments; but desired the House to proceed no 
further in the matter at that time’.35 Similarly, the Queen backed down when the 
Commons protested breach of privilege after one of the House’s members, 
Strickland, had been called before the Queen’s Council (the Privy Council) and thus 
was prevented from attending parliament ‘for having moved to reform the 
Common Prayer Book’.36 Though the Crown contended that Strickland had not 
been detained for his speech but for introducing a bill in breach of the royal 
prerogative, the Commons could not be satisfied ‘by such quibbling’ and continued 
to clamour for their privileges. Though the member was released, the Queen 
continued to prevent the Commons from addressing certain matters, especially 
those related to religious affairs.  
Between Elizabeth’s reign (1558-1603) and the English civil war of 1642-1651, 
the House of Commons continued to struggle for complete freedom of speech, 
especially against King Charles I, who once ordered the arrest of Sir John Elliot and 
two other members of the Commons – Holles and Valentine – ‘for seditious words 
spoken in debate and for violence against the Speaker, who had been physically 
restrained in the Chair in order to delay the adjournment of the House’.37 The 
members were sentenced in the Court of King’s Bench under the argument that 
‘privilege did not extend to seditious comments in the Chamber and that King’s 
Bench could properly take notice of day-to-day events in the High Court of 
Parliament, such as the assault of the Speaker’.38 Upon the re-establishment of 
Parliament following the eleven-year personal rule of Charles I, the House of Lords 
reversed the judgment against the three members in 1668 under a writ of error and 
declared their arrests illegal and contrary to privilege. R. v. Elliot, Hollis and 
Valentine was the last example of the Crown taking judicial action against words 
spoken in Parliament.39 
 
34 Lord Keeper Sir Edward Coke in 1593, as quoted by Elton 1982, p. 274. 
35 Wittke 1970, p. 26. 
36 Ibid. 
37 R. v. Elliot, Hollis and Valentine [1629] 3 St. Tr. 294. See also Erskine May 2004, p. 81. 
38 Erskine May 2004, p. 81. 
39 Hood Phillips et al. 2001, p. 273. 
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Freedom of speech in debate has first been recognised in statutory form in 
section VI of the Treason and Seditious Practices Act 166140 which provided that the 
other provisions of this Act should not deny members of either House their 
‘freedom and privilege in debating any matters or business which shall be 
propounded or debated’. The fullest form of statutory recognition of freedom of 
speech to this date was achieved by the Bill of Rights 1689, in which the  
‘Lords spiritual and temporal and Commons […] do […] for the vindicating and 
asserting their ancient rights and liberties declare […] that the freedom of speech and 
debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in ay 
court or place out of Parliament […]’.41 
Article 9 of the Bill of Rights is still the most important statutory provision with 
regard to the privilege of freedom of speech and debate. The privilege as such has 
remained unchallenged as an institution since its enactment, and Article 9 is still in 
force. However, there have been minor implied amendments by statute. 
Controversies have, at times, occurred as to the means, and especially the 
competent authority, of its enforcement and interpretation. These issues will be 
dealt with in detail further below. 
2.2.2. The Privilege of Freedom from Arrest and Molestation 
The historical development of the privilege of freedom from arrest and molestation 
is not entirely congruent with that of other privileges, although its application has 
often been closely linked with them, since arrest was often the consequence of a 
failed assertion of another privilege, for example, freedom of speech.  
It is known that the principle that members of Parliament should not be 
arrested or molested was established relatively early in history. As part of the 
King’s peace,42 it served to ‘[ensure] the attendance of members of the [King’s] 
Council, judicial and other public officers, and members of the royal household’43 
and was understood as an instrument designed to ‘protect the right of the King to 
the services of his advisers’.44 In earlier times, the rationale behind the privilege of 
freedom from arrest and molestation was thus that servants of the monarch must 
not be disturbed in doing their duty, as that would have meant an infringement of 
the rights of the monarch himself.  
After the emergence of Parliament out of the Curia Regis, freedom from arrest 
remained, in theory, a matter of course, while it was later also included in the 
 
40 1661 c1 13 Char. 2 Stat. 1: An Act for Safety and Preservation of His Majesties Person and 
Government against Treasonable and Seditious practices and attempts. The Act was partially 
repealed and altered by the Statute Law Revision Acts 1863, 1888 and 1948 and finally 
completely repealed by the Criminal Law Act 1967. 
41 1688 c2 1 Will. & Mar. 2: Bill of Rights (An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the 
Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown), Art. 9. 
42 Pax regis, the guarantee of the monarch to peace and security to all subjects of the law. 
43 Hood Phillips et al. 2001, p. 270. 
44 Barnett 2009, p. 429. 
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Speaker’s petition mentioned earlier. It was historically of great importance to the 
functioning of Parliament, since the possibility of arrest in civil matters, such as for 
the enforcement of a fine, or to secure a person’s appearance before court, could 
have seriously undermined Parliament’s functioning, which required the 
attendance of its members.45 This may be seen as early evidence for the established 
principle that privilege does not exist for the convenience of members but for the 
corporate interest of Parliament. Further, freedom from arrest may also reflect the 
logic of Parliament as the highest court of the realm, whose members should not be 
accountable to a lower court. Even in 1340, a member was released from prison, 
though with considerable delay, following an assertion of freedom from arrest.46  
According to Erskine May, the House of Commons claimed privilege from 
arrest ‘for debt, contract, or trespass of any kind, according to the custom of the 
realm’ in the early 15th century. The same privilege was claimed for servants of 
members in 1404, following the case of Richard Cheddar.47 A servant of a member of 
the Commons, Cheddar, had been subjected to ‘orible baterie et mal-fait’48 on his 
way to Parliament. The Commons thereupon petitioned the King to have the 
attacker pay double damages in addition to a fine to the King. The penalty was 
imposed accordingly and later became the standard penalty for molestation of 
members and their servants.49 
Whereas the privilege of freedom from arrest seems to have been recognised 
early on, its application, according to Erskine May, has been ‘patchy and often 
beyond the power of the Commons alone to enforce’.50 This is shown, along with 
other examples, by the case of the Speaker of the Commons Thorpe.51 In 1452, 
Thorpe was imprisoned by order of the House of Lords, contrary to the advice of 
judges who pointed out that this would amount to a violation of privilege. His 
release, upon the request of the Commons, was denied despite claims to privilege. 
At the time, the Commons had to accept Thorpe’s imprisonment and elected a new 
Speaker.  
While the existence of a customary privilege of freedom from arrest was 
altogether denied at several points by the courts, but nonetheless by and large 
accepted as being ‘deeply engrained’,52 Parliament soon accepted its limitation to 
civil cases. By resolution of the House of Commons it was declared in 1675 that 
privilege should apply ‘in all cases except treason, felony and breach of the peace’ 
and, in 1697, that it should not apply in cases of ‘forcible entries or forcible 
 
45 In Britain, as opposed to France, the question to what extent the attendance of members is 
necessary for the proper functioning of Parliament was never much at issue as a justification 
of parliamentary privilege, as the High Court of Parliament was assumed to have a right to 
the attendance of its members. 
46 Erskine May 2004, p. 83. 
47 Rot. Parl. 3 541-42. 
48 Erskine May 2004, p. 83, note 3. 
49 Wittke 1970, p. 33. 
50 Erskine May 2004, p. 83. 
51 Rot. Parl. 5 239-40. 
52 Erskine May 2004, p. 83. 
 67 
Chapter 3 
detainers’.53 In the case of John Wilke,54 both Houses jointly resolved that the 
privilege should also not apply to the writing and publication of seditious libel. 
From the mid-18th century onward it was an established principle that freedom of 
arrest should not apply to any indictable offence.55 
Erskine May notes that originally the privilege even exceeded freedom from 
arrest, preventing members from being impleaded, that is, sued (which might have 
resulted in an obligation to attend Court and thus a failure to attend Parliament). 
Thus, no civil action could be brought against them at all upon which they might 
have been arrested or otherwise prevented from attending Parliament. However, 
instances can be found in which members waived their privilege upon petitions 
from the parties to a dispute in order for suits to be able to proceed.56  
In 1770, with the enactment of the Parliamentary Privilege Act57 of that year, 
such practice was brought to an end with the effect that civil suits could be brought 
against members at any time, but which, however, further secured their freedom 
from arrest. As a result, any legal means could be employed to coerce a member of 
Parliament, with the exception of attachment of his body. 
The privilege of freedom from arrest was finally effectively marginalised (at 
least as regards cases of arrest proper) with the enactment of the Judgments Act 
1838,58 which abolished imprisonment in civil cases and with the enactment of the 
Debtors Act 186959 by which imprisonment specifically for debt was abolished. 
Since the privilege is not strictly limited to arrest proper, but also prohibits other 
actions by which members could be prevented from attending Parliament (such as 
an obligation to appear in Court as a witness), the privilege is, however, not wholly 
obsolete. Its modern application will be dealt with further below. It must be noted, 
however, that the role of this privilege is today largely regarded as very limited and 
Committee reports have repeatedly recommended its complete abolition.60 
2.2.3. The Privilege of Access to Her Majesty 
Since medieval times, the Speaker of the House of Commons included the privilege 
of access to the monarch in his traditional petition for privileges. The privilege of 
access does not accrue to individual members of the Commons but to the House as 
a body, usually exercised by the Speaker.61 This is in line with the long-standing 
customary principle that the monarch may not, even as a spectator, be present in the 
 
53 Erskine May 2004, p. 84. 
54 1760-1764. 
55 Erskine May 2004, p. 84. 
56 Erskine May 2004, p. 85, also see note 8 on that page. 
57 1770 10 Geo. 3 c50: An Act for the further preventing Delays of Justice by reason of Privilege 
of Parliament.  
58 1838 1 & 2 Vict. c110. 
59 1869 32 & 33 Vict. c62. 
60 Hood Phillips et al. 2001, p. 280, citing (1967-68) H.C. 34; (1998-99) H.L. 43, H.C. 214. 
61 Erskine May 2004, p. 89. 
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House during debates or take notice of pending matters or individual speeches by 
members.62  
A different privilege of access applies to the Lords. The monarch may freely 
attend debates in the House, and individual Lords (theoretically) enjoy access to 
him or her by virtue of the privilege of peerage.63  
2.2.4. The Privilege of Favourable Construction 
Traditionally, the Speaker of the Commons also included in his petition to the 
monarch the request to apply to all the House’s proceedings the ‘most favourable 
construction’, so that misrepresentations of such proceedings, made especially by 
the Speaker to the monarch, should be regarded as unintentional.  
Mainly due to the continuous and largely uncontested application of the 
privilege of freedom of speech and debate, the importance of the privilege of 
favourable construction must be regarded as less than marginal. It has been so for a 
long time, as in any case the monarch is not allowed to take notice of proceedings in 
Parliament otherwise than by being notified of the House’s decision. Neither is the 
Crown – read: the government – entitled to take any action with regard to 
proceedings in Parliament. In effect, the acceptance of freedom of speech has 
rendered favourable construction obsolete.  
2.2.5. The Privilege of the House of Commons to Provide for its own 
Constitution 
Though materially quite remote from the subject of immunity, the privilege of the 
Commons to provide for its own constitution as prescribed by law, namely, to set 
and enforce the rules governing its own membership and procedure, must be 
regarded as supremely important to the independence of the House from 
interference by the Crown. Without the ability to determine its own constitution, 
including the regulation of elections and the resolution of disputes as to this matter, 
the House would have remained substantially dependent on the Crown (very 
possibly through the Courts) and on the House of Lords.64  
The development of this privilege began in the 16th century. Whereas first 
minor individual powers were granted to the Speaker and House,65 the House, or 
the Committee of Privileges, took full responsibility for the scrutiny of elections in 
 
62 Established after an incident in 1642 during which King Charles I entered the House of 
Commons with an armed party in order to arrest five members for treason. While the arrest 
failed as the members in question were not present, Charles’ intrusion was later considered 
to have been a breach of privilege.  
63 For a short discussion of the privilege of peerage, see below. 
64 As far as elections are regulated by statute, royal assent is of course required. Therefore it 
might seem as though the power to regulate elections by statute does not add much to the 
independence of the Commons from the Crown. It should be borne in mind, however, that 
royal assent to acts of Parliament is never withheld as a matter of constitutional convention.  
65 E.g. in 1515, the Speaker was authorised by the King to grant permission to members to leave 
Parliament before the end of the session. Cf. Erskine May 2004, p. 90 et seq. 
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1593.66 The right of the Commons to decide in cases of disputed elections was 
confirmed in the case of Goodwin v. Fortescue in 1604,67 when the House of Commons 
prevailed in a dispute with the Crown, which had contested the election of Sir 
Francis Goodwin because he was an outlaw.  
Jurisdiction of the House of Commons for questions concerning elections for 
this House was confirmed by statute in 1695 with the enactment of the 
Parliamentary Elections Act.68 It was delegated to the courts in 1868, although 
jurisdiction in cases not provided for by statute were retained. Cases in which the 
House is still exclusively competent involve the filling of casual vacancies,69 the 
determination of legal disqualification of members otherwise properly elected,70 
and the expulsion of members unfit to serve.71 Since the enactment of the 
Parliamentary Elections Act 1868,72 as amended by the Representation of the People 
Act 1983, the determination of disputed elections is only nominally in the hands of 
the House of Commons. In practice, the Commons give effect to the rulings of 
election courts.73  
The privilege of the Commons to provide for its own constitution must be seen 
in the wider context of all other privileges, which would be substantially weakened 
in its absence; for was it not for the House itself to determine, for instance, whether 
a member is fit to serve, this would create a potentially very critical loophole for the 
then competent Crown or courts to circumvent, for example, where freedom of 
speech is concerned.  
2.2.6. The Principle of Exclusive Cognisance 
All individual privileges can be seen as emanations of the wider principle that ‘what 
happens in Parliament is controlled by Parliament’.74 This foundation of 
 
66 Erskine May 2004, p. 90. 
67 2 State Tr. 91. 
68 1695 7 & 8 Will. 3 c25: An Act for the further regulating Elections of members to serve in 
Parliament and for the preventing irregular Proceedings of Sheriffs and other Officers in the 
electing and returning such members. 
69 This is done by means of a warrant from the Speaker, for the issue of a writ for a by-election 
to fill that specific vacancy. Cf. Hood Phillips et al. 2001, p. 281. 
70 In which case the member is not admitted or, if she already took her seat, expelled. Hood 
Phillips et al. 2001, p. 281. 
71 In the absence of a legal ground for disqualification. Cf. Hood Phillips et al. 2001, p. 281. 
72 1868 31 & 32 Vict. c125.  
73 Hood Phillips et al. 2001, p. 281. The procedure for questioning parliamentary election results 
is laid down in Part III, Sections 120-126 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 (c2). 
Election results may be challenged by means of a petition to the High Court, presented 
within 21 days of the election of the member to whom the petition relates. The petition is then 
tried by an election court. This court is not a permanent institution but is set up when the 
need arises. It comprises two judges of the High Court rota. There is no appeal against an 
election court ruling.  
74 Hood Phillips et al. 2001, p. 281. 
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parliamentary privilege is known as the principle of exclusive cognisance.75 It 
follows from this principle that the internal affairs of Parliament may not be 
reviewed by any other institution, body, or person but fall under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the two Houses.76 Exclusive cognisance therefore includes the 
privilege of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, but it is wider than that. How much 
wider will be the subject of a more detailed discussion below.  
The doctrinal foundation of exclusive cognisance has historically been the 
notion of Parliament as a court. In the words of Lord Coke:  
And as every Court of justice hath laws and customs for its direction, some by the 
common law, some by the civill and canon law, some by peculiar lawes and customes, 
&c. So the High Court of Parliament suis propriis legibus et consuetudinibus subsistit. It is 
lex et consuetudo parliamenti, that all weighty matters in any parliament moved 
concerning the peers of the realm, or commons in parliament assembled, ought to be 
determined, adjudged, and discussed by the course of the parliament, and not by the 
civill law, nor yet by the common law of this realm used in more inferior courts.77 
[emphasis added]  
Accordingly, the principle of exclusive cognisance lies at the basis of the notion of 
the law of Parliament as a separate legal system, and hence of Parliament as a place 
or entity which lies outside the realm of the law of the land.  
Throughout parliamentary history, exclusive cognisance has provoked the 
question of what exactly must be considered an ‘internal affair’. Does exclusive 
cognisance only relate to the inherent constitutional tasks of Parliament and matters 
directly connected to these tasks? This would mean that everything relating to the 
legislative process and also, for instance, issues concerning membership of either 
House would be off-limits for the ordinary courts. Or does exclusive cognisance 
extend to anything that happens in Parliament, including matters such as the 
employment of administrative staff, working conditions in parliamentary offices or 
even contracts concerning the supply of catering and stationery?  
Historically, the courts have consistently declined jurisdiction in matters 
which manifestly touched the core activities of Parliament: its constitutional 
functions. One example thereof is the case of Bradlaugh v. Gossett78 of 1884, in which 
the High Court was not ready to interfere with the decision of the House not to 
allow Bradlaugh to take the parliamentary oath because he was an atheist. 
However, exclusive cognisance also led to more contentious decisions, sometimes to 
the effect that statutory legislation made by Parliament was not applied to (bodies 
of) Parliament, even in cases which did not – or only in the widest sense – relate to 
the core business of Parliament. This was the case in R v. Graham-Campbell ex parte 
 
75 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, minutes of evidence to the first report, 1999, 
Memorandum submitted by the Clerk of the House of Commons, para. 18 et seq. 
76 See section 3.1 of this chapter for a discussion of this principle with respect to independent 
review commissions.  
77 Coke 1797, p. 14. 
78 Bradlaugh v. Gossett (1884) 12 QBD 271. 
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Herbert,79 where the refusal of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to try, among 
others, alleged breaches of the Licensing Act by the House of Commons’ kitchen 
committee was upheld by the Divisional Court. One of the issues in Graham-
Campbell was the sale of ‘intoxicating liquor’ at the House of Commons’ bar without 
a licence, as otherwise required by the Licensing Act. In declining jurisdiction, the 
Court reasoned that, were the Court to assume jurisdiction in such matters, this 
‘might conceivably be, after the various stages of […] proceedings had been passed, 
to make the House of Lords the arbiter of the House of Commons’.80 Chafetz notes 
that this view was, at the time of Graham-Campbell, outdated and a mere leftover 
from times when the Commons still had to guard its privileges with much anxiety: 
‘[a]fter all, the fact that the House of Lords might be the final judge of the legality of 
the House of Commons’ refreshment operations hardly bespeaks great power on 
the Lords’ part to interfere in the legislative workings of the Commons’.81  
Thus, a given case either does or does not fall within Parliament’s exclusive 
cognisance, depending on whether a functional link is required between that case 
and the core tasks of Parliament. The question whether such a functional criterion 
exists lies at the heart of the relationship between the law of Parliament and the law 
of the land – the relationship between Parliament and the courts – which has at 
times been fraught with conflict. A final solution to the border conflict between the 
area in which Parliament enjoys exclusive cognisance and that in which the 
ordinary courts exercise jurisdiction according to the law of the land has not yet 
been found. It is possible that such a final solution could only be brought about by 
statutory regulation. Nevertheless, case law and a modernised self-image of 
Parliament have led to a good approximation of the limits of exclusive cognisance. 
We will explore these limits at length in our discussion of the relationship between 
lex parliament and lex terrae further below. 
One important peculiarity of exclusive cognisance, as opposed to other, more 
specific privileges like freedom of speech and debate, is that it can be waived or 
relinquished by Parliament. In other words, the Parliament may explicitly allow the 
courts to refer to certain materials or to try cases which would otherwise fall within 
the range of exclusive cognisance. For instance, in 1980 Parliament resolved to allow 
certain parliamentary papers, which were subject to exclusive cognisance, to be 
used in court.82 More generally, Parliament has never claimed exclusive cognisance 
of ‘ordinary crimes' (crimes unrelated to proceedings in Parliament, such as theft, 
sexual assault, and so on) committed in Parliament. Such a waiver is only possible, 
however, where specific privileges – usually Article 9 of the Bill of Rights – do not 
apply. 
 
79 R v. Graham-Campbell ex parte Herbert (1935) 1 KB 594. 
80 Ibid., at 602. 
81 Chafetz 2007, p. 41. 
82 Erskine May 2004, p. 105. 
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2.3. The House of Lords and the Privileges of the Commons 
The above overview of the varied history of parliamentary privilege, though very 
concise, has shown that the legal structure of parliamentary privilege has 
historically grown alongside the institutions, which today are to a large extent 
divided along the lines which separate the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of government. However, it has also been shown that these institutions 
share a common ancestry in the Curia Regis. Certainly, Britain’s institutional and 
legal history has seen a variety of decisive events. However, there has never been an 
incisive ‘constitutional moment’ to conclusively clarify inter-institutional relations 
between the different organs which have developed from the ancient Curia. The fact 
that, historically, the different branches of government had once been a single body, 
auxiliary to the monarch, is still reflected in what might be called an overlap or a 
grey area in powers and competences between the two Houses of Parliament, the 
courts, and the Crown. Such overlap has long existed, and in part still exists, 
especially between the legislative and judicial branches of government: until 
recently the House of Lords still performed tasks of supreme appellate jurisdiction 
in civil cases originating from the ordinary courts of law83 and both Houses retain 
certain judicial powers with regard to their own privileges, and, in the case of the 
House of Commons, with regard to elections.84  
With regard to parliamentary privilege, the legal relationships between the 
House of Commons, the House of Lords and the courts have for a long time been 
very complicated and utterly vague.85 It is therefore not surprising that the history 
of privilege is riddled with clashes between these institutions.86 This is mainly due 
to two factors.  
On the one hand there was, as Wittke puts it, ‘an absolute lack of 
understanding that existed for so long a time in regard of the judicial functions and 
powers of Parliament’.87 This confusion or controversy which existed on the 
question of which of the Houses should have supreme jurisdiction could not easily 
be resolved, as the House of Lords could lay a just claim to their direct descent (and, 
in its view, a more direct descent than that of the Commons, though this may be 
doubted) from the old Norman Council, reserving supreme judicial powers for 
itself. However, a clear definition of what these powers actually were had never 
been rendered, because in ancient times the concept of different and separate kinds 
of powers did not exist, as has been argued above. Conversely, the House of 
Commons could with the same right claim to be a constituent part of the High 
Court of Parliament. And at least in theory the highest court in the realm is a 
 
83 Of course this is only correct from a strictly institutional point of view. De facto, since the 
enactment of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, only the Law Lords exercised the judicial 
tasks of the House. As of October 2009, the new UK Supreme Court, instituted by Part III of 
the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, has taken over these judicial functions.  
84 See section 2.2.5 above. 
85 Wittke 1970, p. 39. 
86 Cf. Chafetz 2007, introduction. 
87 Wittke 1970, p. 75. 
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singular body at the very top of the legislative and judicial system. Accordingly, 
there was no precedent to show a hierarchical inferiority of the Commons to the 
Lords; certainly not concerning jurisdiction in matters of privilege, which itself 
constitutes a part of the lex et consuetudo parliamenti, the law of parliament. Lastly, 
the courts (with the House of Lords at the top of their hierarchical structure) were 
also able to produce precedents to uphold their claim to a direct descent from the 
old Curia Regis. While legislative power very soon lay firmly in the hands of 
Parliament, this was not so readily accepted for jurisdiction in cases involving 
parliamentary privilege which raised difficult questions as to the position of 
privilege: does that position lie within or outside the legal system of which the 
Lords were the final arbiter? And if it lies outside of that legal system, does that 
separation settle the question of jurisdiction? Today’s greatest authority on this 
question, Erskine May’s Treatise, does not seem to give an all too satisfactory 
answer, even though it does clearly side with those who see the position of privilege 
within the ordinary legal system: ‘[…] privilege, though part of the law of the land, 
is to a certain extent an exemption from the general law’.88 
The other factor responsible for the complications occurring between the two 
Houses and the courts respectively, and especially for disputes over jurisdiction, 
was of a more practical and political, and less of a doctrinal nature. All three 
institutions had reason to guard their powers jealously vis-à-vis the others. This was 
especially true for the House of Commons in late medieval times, when it had not 
yet entirely secured its position in the power continuum of the realm, and had to 
fear interference and the curtailing of its powers by the Crown. It was particularly 
important for the Commons not only to be able to obtain (and later to uphold the 
customary nature of) its privileges from the monarch, but also to retain jurisdiction 
over privilege for itself, as the already established course of appellate jurisdiction 
would evidently have meant that ‘to allow the courts to pass on questions of 
privilege, was to submit those privileges to the final arbitrament of the House of 
Lords’.89 Owing to the greater allegiance of the Lords to the Crown, and to the 
natural tendency of the upper House to guard its own superiority, applying the 
ordinary line of appeal to matters of privilege would have jeopardised the 
independence of the Commons.  
Historical instances of conflict between the Commons and Lords regarding 
privilege are abundant; they most often revolve around the abovementioned 
questions of jurisdiction, as illustrated by the following examples. In the early 17th 
century, the Commons summoned one Edward Floyd to the bar of the House and 
tried him for slanderous remarks about the Elector Palatine Charles III Philip, son-
in-law of King James I. Floyd was not a member of the Commons, nor in any way 
engaged with the affairs of the House, yet it assumed jurisdiction and ‘inflicted […] 
punishment of the most cruel and humiliating nature’ on him.90 The Lords were 
infuriated by this assumption of jurisdiction, jealous of their own judicial powers, 
 
88 Erskine May 2004, p. 75. 
89 Wittke 1970, p. 19. 
90 Wittke 1970, p. 77. 
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and demanded precedents for the course of actions of the Commons. In Floyd’s case, 
the Commons yielded and left Floyd to the jurisdiction of the Lords, where he was 
‘once more cruelly punished’.91  
In the famous and noted case of Skinner and the East India Company, Skinner, 
who had lost certain possessions (including ships and an island) to plundering 
agents of the company, petitioned the King for redress which he believed 
unobtainable in an ordinary court. The King first referred the case to be arbitrated in 
the Privy Council; however, settlement could not be achieved at a sum acceptable to 
Skinner. Thereupon the King asked the House of Lords to deliver justice. Before the 
procedure in the Lords could come to a close, the Company had petitioned the 
Commons (several of the Company’s members in fact happened to also be members 
of the Commons), alleging irregularities in the procedure before the Lords. The 
Upper House subsequently ordered the Company to pay Skinner £5,000, despite 
resolutions issued by the Lower House, stating breach of privilege of several of its 
members. Adopting the position that it was beyond the powers of the Lords to 
assume first instance jurisdiction in cases not involving Peers or the business of the 
House itself, the Commons resolved that anybody who helped to execute the 
Lords’s judgment should be regarded in breach of the privileges of the Commons. 
The Lords, however, fined the deputy-governor of the Company for petitioning the 
Commons and thereby infringing the privilege of the Lords. After some further 
quarrels, involving the ‘mysterious’ relief of the deputy-governor of his fine and 
two rejected bills for the privileges of the Commons to be limited, and, conversely, 
for the Lords to revoke their ‘illegal’ judgment, the King ordered the dispute to end 
and all records of the struggle to be erased. This order was obeyed by both Houses. 
The record book of the Commons shows only the King’s order to delete, and the 
Lords’ record is a blank space. The question as to the right of the Lords to take 
notice of cases in first instance remained, for the time being, unresolved.92 
These, and several other cases, illustrate the jealousy with which both Houses 
tried to secure their powers and their privilege, but also the confusion that existed 
as to how these powers and privileges must be defined. A discussion of the judicial 
and penal powers of Parliament in modern times, and their relationship with 
privilege, follows further below. 
3. Demarcating Exclusive Cognisance: Lex Parliamenti and Lex Terrae 
One of the most central questions arising in the context of a conceptual analysis of 
British parliamentary privilege is that of the nature of the relationship between lex et 
consuetudo parliamenti (hereinafter lex parliamenti) and lex terrae. Lex parliamenti is the 
law which governs the internal affairs of Parliament and of which only Parliament 
may take cognisance, and lex terrae is the law of the land – statutory and common 
law, as well as equity.  
 
91 Ibid. 
92 For a full account of this case, see Wittke 1970, p. 79 et seq. 
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The relationship between lex parliamenti and lex terrae, or rather the question 
what that relationship should ideally be, is the focal point where the doctrinal issues 
of parliamentary privilege and parliamentary sovereignty meet the more practical 
question of how justice is best done for an effective, independent legislature and the 
citizens. The latter is the question which all systems of parliamentary immunity 
have to answer: the immunity dilemma. The UK has never adopted conclusive 
constitutional rules to demarcate lex parliamenti from lex terrae, and has instead 
opted for constitutional uncertainty – or flexibility. In the following, we will 
examine the relationship between the law of Parliament and the law of the land and 
the effect of that relationship on parliamentary privilege. 
3.1. A Categorisation 
As much as many historical institutional quarrels have been resolved, or are by now 
of merely academic interest, the particular problem of doing equal justice to 
potentially antagonistic needs is very much alive. As has been shown in the 
previous part, this is particularly true for the British system of privilege. The 
historical notion that Parliament, as the highest court of the land, enjoys exclusive 
cognisance of its internal affairs has never really been abandoned, and the 
constitution does not provide for sufficiently clear boundaries between institutions 
and the powers allocated to them.  
The highly abstract discussion of whether or not the part of the law of which 
Parliament enjoys exclusive cognisance must be regarded as a full-fledged separate 
legal system (or, if this is answered in the negative, what it is instead) may at first 
glance be of no practical relevance. However, in practice the relationship between 
lex parliamenti and lex terrae materialises as the relationship between institutions, 
defined by the distribution of powers concerning the law of parliament between the 
two Houses of Parliament and the courts. The relevant powers can roughly be 
classified as follows: 
a. the power to determine the extent, that is to say, the limits, of lex parliamenti, 
and  
b. the power to determine the interpretation and application of its content.  
Hence, with regard to the privileges of Parliament, the relationship between lex 
parliamenti and lex terrae boils down to a question of jurisdiction: who has the 
delimitative authority to determine the extent of privilege; within the reach of 
privilege, who has the interpretative authority to determine the content and meaning 
thereof?  
Admittedly these two powers are not as clearly distinct from one another as 
the above categorisation might suggest. The question (long resolved, though, by the 
Parliamentary Papers Act 1840) of whether publications done by order of 
Parliament should be privileged and therefore immune from, for example, 
defamation suits may serve as an example. Whether the nature of such a publication 
is that of a privileged parliamentary proceeding (whether it falls under Article 9 of 
the Bill of Rights 1689) is clearly an interpretative question with regard to the 
meaning of ‘proceedings’. Viewed from a different angle, however, the question 
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whether the act of publishing, done by a private person or company unconnected to 
Parliament, is governed by the law of the land or the law pertaining to internal 
affairs of Parliament only, certainly is a delimitative one. The powers of 
interpretation and delimitation cannot fully be separated from one another.  
To a certain extent this problem is moot, as Parliament is the supreme 
legislator of the law of the land and the law of Parliament. It has the power to 
determine, to define, and to demarcate privilege by enacting statutory legislation to 
that effect. The issue of jurisdiction discussed in this section therefore arises only 
where a sufficiently clear definition of either the content or the extent (or both) of 
parliamentary privilege is lacking. However, bearing in mind that statutory 
instruments with regard to privilege are as scarce as they are ancient, it is evident 
that this situation is bound to arise regularly. When it does, it is for the courts (and 
for Parliament where it sees the necessity) to speak out on which powers each 
institution possesses, respectively. Even though a clear separation of interpretation 
and demarcation is hardly possible, case law has shown that both institutions do 
themselves see a difference between the two powers and deal with them 
accordingly. 
Chafetz proposes that, applied to British Parliament and courts, three 
theoretical possibilities exist for the relationship between lex parliamenti and lex 
terrae, and thereby for the question of jurisdiction in matters of privilege, namely:  
(1) the courts have no say whatsoever in lex parliamenti and both powers are fully 
exercised by Parliament. Parliament defines the legal nature and the content of 
privilege. In addition, it has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether or not a certain 
matter involves privilege, that is, whether that matter comes within the sphere of 
its application.  
(2) the courts can adjudicate on the extent but not on the interpretation and application 
of lex parliamenti. Parliament has the sole power to define the nature and content of 
privilege. The courts retain jurisdiction to determine whether or not privilege is at 
issue in a case before them.  
(3) the courts are competent to exercise both powers, namely, to review the extent and 
the interpretation and application of the lex parliamenti. The courts fully treat 
privilege as part of the law of the land: they have the power to define the nature 
and content of privilege and they also have jurisdiction to decide whether privilege 
is at issue in a certain case.93 
Which of these possibilities should be adopted depends on the particular legal and 
political situation of a system. It can be argued that, where Parliament as the 
democratically legitimised legislator must be anxious to secure its power and 
position against intrusions by the executive, lex parliamenti should, in case of conflict 
between the two, enjoy primacy over lex terrae. Applied to British parliamentary 
history, Chafetz calls this the ‘Blackstonian conception of privilege’,94 after the 
 
93 Chafetz 2007, p. 27. 
94 Chafetz 2007, p. 28 et seq. 
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famous judge and jurist who, at a time where the Commons still were not entirely 
safe in their position vis-à-vis the Crown and Lords, emphasised the importance of 
the absolute protection of the Commons which necessitated the lower House to 
have both powers in its own hands: 
[…] whatever matter arises concerning either house of parliament, ought to be 
examined, discussed, and adjudged in that house to which it relates, and not 
elsewhere.95 
On the other hand, it can – and must – of course be argued that this absolute 
supremacy of lex parliamenti over lex terrae can work to the extreme detriment of the 
citizens in that there would be absolutely no legal remedy for the ordinary citizen 
against an unfavourable decision of Parliament. Accordingly, it might carry 
benefits, in particular for citizens vis-à-vis Parliament, to define the abovementioned 
relationship with a strong tilt towards the primacy of lex terrae so that the courts 
would be competent to take cognisance of, and exercise full jurisdiction in cases 
involving lex parliamenti. As a consequence thereof, the law of Parliament could then 
well be regarded as part of the lex terrae, with no room for exclusive cognisance. The 
obvious danger here is, of course, that Parliament would no longer be able to 
effectively shield itself from influence by citizens or politically or otherwise biased 
courts. Therefore, the third option described above leaves Parliament without much 
protection against an intrusive executive and judiciary. From a point of view 
favouring the separation of powers and inter-institutional checks and balances, this 
option would therefore not be acceptable.  
From our modern vantage point it seems prima facie most logical to adopt the 
second of the options set out above. It will be shown in the following that the 
second option is indeed the most suitable one of the three to describe the current 
situation, even though recent case law has shown a tendency to limit exclusive 
cognisance more and more. In any event, the nuances of a long line of individual 
judicial decisions and legislative acts were what have led to the intricate 
construction with which we are faced today when looking at the relationship 
between the parliamentary law of privilege and the law of the land.  
3.2. The Evolution of the Relationship between Lex Parliamenti and Lex 
Terrae in Case Law 
The long history of British parliamentary privilege reflects a slow movement from 
the ‘Blackstonian’ model to what Chafetz calls the ‘Millian’96 paradigm. Whereas in 
medieval times strong privileges appeared necessary to defend Parliament, 
especially the Commons, against the monarch (and his power vested in the common 
law courts and the House of Lords), the Commons later became 
 
95 Blackstone 1832, p. 119. 
96 After J.S. Mill, who emphasised the importance of the possibility for the people to participate 
in the political process (and the danger of their exclusion from it), cf. Chafetz 2007, 
introduction. 
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[…] the real power in the state. As such, its position became more and more secure, 
and sweeping claims of privilege were no longer so necessary to protect it in the 
exercise of its legislative activities, and to guard it against encroachments from Crown, 
Lords, and courts.97 
In 1604 the Commons resolved that it regarded itself a ‘Court of Record, and so ever 
esteemed’,98 and a variety of cases – from the reign of Elizabeth I until the 19th 
century – display this view and the struggle of the Commons for jurisdictional 
supremacy in cases of privilege. This began to change in the 19th century. One 
notable case hinting in this direction was Burdett v. Abbot.99 Sir Francis Burdett, a 
member of the Commons, was arrested by order of the Commons for having 
breached the privileges of the House (contempt) by having published ‘a libellous 
and slanderous paper’. The arrest involved armed soldiers entering Burdett’s house 
by force. After having been imprisoned, he brought a suit against the Speaker of the 
House, Abbot, in the Court of King’s Bench, alleging trespass and false 
imprisonment. The Court recognised that ‘[t]he first and most important question 
[was], whether this Court can take cognisance of the question concerning privilege 
of Parliament which is brought in judgment before it in this cause’. Burdett’s 
counsel argued that 
by laying the basis of Parliamentary privileges in the law of the land, and subjecting 
them to the examination and control of the Courts of Law, no arbitrary and despotic 
power can be exercised, and no person can be deprived of his liberty, without ultimate 
redress, except by a law made or recognized by the whole body of Parliament; 
whereby the one House may operate as a check upon the other, agreeably to the 
general principle of the Constitution, which is composed of checks and balancing 
powers. In such a Constitution it is of essential consequence that the legality of every 
act affecting the liberty of the subject should be open to the examination and trial of the 
Courts of Justice.100 
Chief Justice Ellenborough, pondering this argument with care, replied that ‘[the 
House of Commons] certainly must have the power of self-vindication and self-
protection in their own hands’,101 for 
could it be expected that they should stand high in the estimation and reverence of the 
people, if, whenever they were insulted, they were obliged to wait the comparatively 
slow proceedings of the ordinary course of law for their redress?102 
However, Ellenborough also inserts a highly important caveat into this reasoning:  
 
97 Wittke 1970, p. 21. 
98 Hatsell 1818, p. 233. 
99 Burdett v. Abbott (1811) 104 ER 501. 
100 Ibid., at 530-531. 
101 Ibid,. at 559. 
102 Ibid. 
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[…] if a commitment appeared to be for a contempt of the House of Commons 
generally, I would […] [not] inquire further: but if it did not profess to commit for a 
contempt, but for some matter appearing on the return, which could by no reasonable 
intendment be considered as a contempt of the Court committing [id est, the House of 
Commons; note from the author], but a ground of commitment palpably and evidently 
arbitrary, unjust, and contrary to every principle of positive law, or national justice; I 
say, that in the case of such a commitment, (if it ever should occur, but which I cannot 
possibly anticipate as ever likely to occur) we must look at it and act upon it as justice 
may require from whatever Court it may profess to have proceeded.103 
While the Court found unanimously in favour of the Speaker, the question mainly 
treated in Burdett v. Abbot is essentially whether or not lex parliamenti is in fact part 
of lex terrae. If so, there could be no doubt that cases like Burdett’s are justiciable in 
the courts, since they are the administrators of the law of the land. Chafetz rightly 
points out that Ellenborough’s statement above can mean two things for the 
positioning of lex parliamenti: if interpreted restrictively it says that the only power 
the courts have is that of ‘policing the boundaries between the two distinct systems 
of law’,104 thus implementing option (2) of Chafetz’ categorisation (see above). Lex 
parliamenti would remain a legal system of its own right, the interpretation and 
enforcement of which is left entirely to Parliament. However, if interpreted more 
radically, Ellenborough’s statement seems to actually plead for the treatment of lex 
parliamenti as a part of lex terrae, ‘albeit a part in which judges should tread 
lightly’.105 This, in turn, would mean that the relationship between the two could be 
categorised as a somewhat tempered version of Chafetz’ option (3). The latter was 
the view of the House of Lords when it affirmed the Court’s ruling in Burdett v. 
Abbott.106 Lord Erskine expressed this view as follows: 
My opinion is that these privileges are part of the law of the land, and upon this record 
there is nothing more than the ordinary proceeding; the Speaker of the House of 
Commons, like any other subject, putting himself on the country as to the fact, and 
pleading a justification in law; […] Therefore, by this judgment, it appears that it is the 
law which protects the just privileges of the House of Commons, as well as the rights 
of the subject.107 
Another case in which the same question was at stake was that of Stockdale v. 
Hansard.108 In this case, Stockdale sued Hansard, a publishing house, for libel. 
Hansard contended that the relevant publication had been printed by order of the 
Commons and that it was therefore protected by parliamentary privilege (as a 
proceeding in Parliament within the meaning of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689). 
It was clear that papers printed for sole use in Parliament would have been subject 
to privilege as they would have constituted a part of Parliament’s very own affairs. 
 
103 Ibid., at 558-559. 
104 Chafetz 2007, p. 38. 
105 Chafetz 2007, p. 39. 
106 Burdett v. Abbott (1817) 3 ER 1289; 5 Dow 165 (H.L.). 
107 Ibid., at 1301-1302. 
108 Stockdale v. Hansard (1839) 112 ER 1112. 
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However, Stockdale contended that this was not true for papers printed for 
distribution to the public. Unfolding the old question of delimitation between lex 
terrae and lex parliamenti, this time employing the argument of its being a court of 
law, the Commons argued that they were competent, as a superior court, to judge 
over its own privilege, and that a statement issued by the Commons as to the extent 
of privilege was binding on any inferior court. The Court of Queen’s Bench ruled 
otherwise. The presiding judge Lord Denman wrote: 
I will dispose of the notion that the House of Commons is a separate Court, having 
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter, on which, for that reason, its adjudication 
must be final. The argument placed the House herein on a level with the Spiritual 
Court and the Court of Admiralty, adopting this analogy; it appears to me to destroy 
the defence attempted to the present action. Where the subject matter falls within their 
jurisdiction, no doubt we cannot question their judgment; but we are now enquiring 
whether the subject matter does fall within the jurisdiction of the House of Commons. 
It is contended that they can bring it within their jurisdiction by declaring it so. To this 
claim, as arising from their privileges, I have already stated my answer: it is perfectly 
clear that none of these Courts could give themselves jurisdiction by adjudging that 
they enjoy it.109 
The above, first of all, displays a similar line of reasoning to what was followed in 
Burdett v. Abbot: the Court readily admits that it has no jurisdiction in matters 
internal to Parliament – but it does assume jurisdiction to determine whether or not 
the matter at hand actually is such an internal affair. And in Stockdale the King’s 
Bench ruled that one must distinguish between documents printed for use within 
Parliament alone and documents published and sold ‘indiscriminately’. The Court 
denied Hansard’s claim of privilege and fined the publisher. Thereby it effectively 
set a limit to the absolute application of parliamentary privilege. As a consequence, 
Parliament, ‘concerned by the wider implications of the decision’,110 passed the 
Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 shortly after, overruling Stockdale v. Hansard.  
The Court’s ruling in Stockdale appears highly questionable, since a publication 
ordered by Parliament can be seen as amounting to a deliberate act of 
communication of Parliament with the public. Arguably this falls within the core 
business of any representative legislature, at least pursuant to a modern 
understanding of parliamentary work. However, the more crucial point of Stockdale 
is that the Court, once again, assumed for itself the power to draw the line between 
lex parliamenti and lex terrae. At the same time, the ruling makes clear that the Court 
is not ready to intrude into the law of Parliament, namely, that it would not trespass 
the limit – set, however, by itself – of the law of the land. This, again, seems to hint 
at Chafetz’ second option for the relationship between lex terrae and lex parliamenti. 
The courts can determine the extent (and thereby the limits) of the law of 
Parliament, but they cannot interpret and apply this body of law once they have 
decided that a matter falls within its territory. The same was reiterated by Lord 
 
109 Ibid., at 1166 
110 Leopold 1990, p. 184. 
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Coleridge C.J., this time to the detriment of the plaintiff, in the case of Bradlaugh v. 
Gossett:111  
It is said that in this case the House of Commons has exceeded its legal powers, 
because it has resolved that the plaintiff shall not take an oath which he has a right to 
take, and the threatened force is force to be used in compelling obedience to a 
resolution, in itself illegal. […] Consistently with all the statements in the claim, it may 
be that the plaintiff insisted on taking the oath in a manner and under circumstances 
which the House had a clear right to object to or prevent. Sitting in this seat I cannot 
know one way or the other. But, even if the fact be as the plaintiff contends, it is not a 
matter into which this Court can examine. If injustice has been done, it is injustice for 
which the Courts of law afford no remedy.112 
In Bradlaugh, the Court saw the facts it was called to adjudicate (the refusal of the 
Commons to let the atheist Bradlaugh take his oath) as a matter internal to 
Parliament. Consequently, it deferred to the jurisdiction of the House while 
recognising that the plaintiff may have suffered injustice and simply stating that it 
could not offer a remedy.  
With Burdett, Stockdale and Bradlaugh, the 19th century seems to have been 
marked by a general movement away from Chafetz’s ‘Blackstonian’ model of the 
relationship between lex terrae and lex parliamenti, and towards the ‘Millian’ model, 
but not entirely getting there yet: indeed the courts did loosen Parliament’s grip on 
one of the two decisive powers – the power to determine the extent of the law of 
Parliament, and thereby of privilege. The power to interpret and apply this law, 
however, remained quite firmly in the hands of Parliament. On a more subtle level 
it can also be noted that Stockdale was the strongest of the three cases on the lex 
terrae side, in that the King’s Bench outrightly contradicted the judgment of the 
Commons, provoking the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 to be adopted promptly, 
in direct opposition to the ruling. Chafetz notes that this might have incited the 
Court to back-pedal to some extent in Bradlaugh.113 
The easing up of Parliament’s stance with regard to lex parliamenti and its 
privileges did not continue without interruption in the 20th century, with more case 
law adding another layer of historic uncertainty and inconsistent precedents to the 
difficulties in determining the relationship between the law of the land and the law 
of Parliament. One of these cases was that of Graham-Campbell, mentioned earlier 
(see section 2.6 above), in which the Court was not ready to hold the manager of the 
House of Commons’s bar (a servant of the House) responsible under the Licensing 
Act 1910. Crucially, the Court did not engage in a more detailed discussion of 
whether or not there needs to be a functional connection to the work of the House in 
addition to the matter at stake being spatially ‘internal to the House’. In this respect 
it merely stated that  
 
111 Bradlaugh v. Gossett (1884) 12 QBD 271. 
112 Ibid., at 276-277. 
113 Cf. Chafetz 2007, p. 40. 
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The House sits for long periods and arrangements have to be made for […] 
refreshment for the body in suitable places. The regulation of those matters is clearly 
within the area of the internal affairs of the House and connected with the affairs of the 
House.114 
The fact that (the Kitchen Committee of) the House had allowed the contested sale 
of liquor without a licence satisfied the Court that this sale should be privileged: 
[I]n the matters complained of the House of Commons was acting collectively in a 
matter which fell within the area of the internal affairs of the House, and, that being so, 
any tribunal might well feel, on the authorities, an invincible reluctance to interfere.115 
This appears to be a leap backwards by the Court, which in this case again seems to 
have followed the ‘Blackstonian’ rather than the more up to date ‘Millian’ 
understanding of privilege. In Stockdale the reluctance of the judges to interfere was 
apparently not so strong as to prevent them from deciding that publications 
ordered by Parliament are not subject to privilege, even though the House had 
resolved, ‘acting collectively’, that they should. The argument that Stockdale must be 
distinguished from Graham-Campbell, since the publication of parliamentary papers, 
as opposed to the sale of liquor in Westminster Palace, has a connection to the 
outside world: This can be countered by the observance that ordering the 
publication of papers is clearly part of the natural workings of any parliament – 
which one is perhaps inclined to deem less true for the sale and consumption of 
liquor. Consequently, Graham-Campbell must be seen as a backslide to the age of 
Blackstone.  
This applies similarly if not more strongly to the case In Re Parliamentary 
Privilege Act 1770 [the case of Strauss] of 1958.116 In this case, the London Electricity 
Board threatened to bring a libel suit against Strauss, a member of the Commons, 
over a letter sent by Strauss to the paymaster general in which he criticised the 
Board. At the time, the Commons’ Committee on Privileges quickly declared that 
the letter was privileged under the Bill of Rights 1689 as a proceeding in parliament 
(see section 3.1).117 The Committee then requested an Advisory Opinion from the 
Privy Council to determine whether the House could, considering the 
Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770, treat the bringing of a suit over a privileged 
matter as a breach of privilege. In this respect, the Parliamentary Privilege Act 
1770118 provides in section 1 that:  
 
114 Ibid., at 598-599. 
115 Ibid., at 602. 
116 In Re Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770 (1958) AC 331 (P.C.). 
117 In a later committee vote, however, this view was curiously not adopted. This seems an 
unnecessarily narrow view of ‘proceedings in Parliament’. Cf. Chafetz 2007, Chapter 1, notes 
50 and 87. 
118 1770 10 Geo. 3 c50: An Act for the further preventing Delays of Justice by reason of Privilege 
of Parliament. 
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[A]ny person […] shall and may at any time commence and prosecute any action or 
suit in any court of record […] against any [member of Parliament] or any other person 
entitled to the privilege of Parliament […]; and no such action […] shall at any time be 
impeached, stayed, or delayed by or under colour or pretence of any privilege of 
Parliament. 
The Privy Council answered the question of the Committee in the affirmative; the 
act of suing over a privileged matter had already been considered as a breach of 
privilege. This conclusion seems strangely at odds with the very wording of section 
1 of the Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770 quoted above. The Privy Council reached 
it by inferring a limitation of the scope of said section 1 from a juxtaposition of this 
Act with the ‘Act for preventing any inconveniences that may happen by privilege 
of Parliament’ of 1700.119 Section 1 of that Act allowed subjects to bring against Peers 
and members of Parliament such actions ‘for which they have cause or suit of 
action’. On the basis of this formulation the Privy Council held that ‘by clear 
implication [the Section] referred only to those suits which […] were ultimately 
enforceable’120 – and thus not to suits barred by privilege. Reasoning that the Act of 
1770 was, in principle building on the Act of 1700 and it clearly did not intend to 
abrogate from the Bill of Rights 1689, the Lords of the Privy Council went on to hold 
that:  
the Act [of 1770] applies only to proceedings against members of Parliament in respect 
of their debts and actions as individuals and not in respect of their conduct in 
Parliament as members of Parliament, and does not abridge or affect the ancient and 
essential privilege of freedom of speech in Parliament.121 
The line of reasoning followed by the Privy Council in Strauss seems somewhat 
adventurous. It is clear that the Lords wanted to avoid calling into question the 
continued validity of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, but the judgment leaves little 
doubt that the Privy Council did not feel completely at ease with the Opinion it 
expressed; after all, the Lords thought it necessary to add that they did  
not intend expressly or by implication to pronounce upon any other question of law. In 
particular they express no opinion whether the proceedings referred to in the 
introductory paragraph were ‘a proceeding in Parliament,’ a question not discussed 
before them […].122 
But even if we consider the latter statement to be a courteous note of complaint of 
the House’s interpretation of ‘proceedings in Parliament’ it is clear that Strauss is a 
further instance of the Privy Council’s back-pedalling to the ‘Blackstonian’ concept 
of lex parliamenti and privilege.  
The majority of the Law Lords in the Council in Strauss seem to have 
overlooked a much more logical and elegant way to fit section 1 of the 
 
119 1700 12 & 13 Will. 3, c3. 
120 In Re Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770 (1958) AC 331 (P.C.), at 350. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid., at 353. 
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Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770 into a modern concept of privilege and jurisdiction 
which leaves the Bill of Rights intact. Section one could also be interpreted as being 
directed at the courts, explicitly allowing them to hear, in principle, ‘any action or 
suit’ against a member. The courts would then still be obliged, under the Bill of 
Rights and by virtue of other privileges, to stay outside the off-limits territory of 
exclusive cognisance. However, they would have jurisdiction – very much in line 
with the ‘Millian’ concept – to determine the boundaries of that territory. This way a 
plaintiff would have been free to commence a suit against a member without thereby 
running the risk of breaching privilege. If pursuing the action in Court had 
subsequently infringed upon privilege in any way, the courts would have had to 
stay proceedings. This view was held, in an unpublished dissenting Opinion, by 
Lord Denning.123  
A series of important case law at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 
21st century seems to indicate that the tide has turned, at last, in favour of what 
Chafetz calls the ‘Millian’ concept of parliamentary privilege. Whereas in 1972 the 
judges denied themselves access to parliamentary proceedings (by means of 
consulting Hansard) to be used as evidence against a member of the Commons in a 
libel action in Church of Scientology v. Johnson-Smith,124 the House of Lords undertook 
quite a far-reaching excursion into the territory of the law of Parliament in the 
famous case of Pepper v. Hart125 of 1993. On the substance, this case revolved around 
the definition of the word ‘cost’ in section 63 of the Finance Act 1976.126 Reference to 
Hansard was desirable here in order to clarify the intended meaning of the concept 
of ‘cost’ in legislation and, crucially, not in order to obtain evidence against a 
member or indeed to ‘impeach or question’ what has been said in Parliament. This 
would remain off limits as the very essence of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. It must 
also be noted that the rule which barred the courts from referring to Hansard cannot 
be held to be part of that old-ancient privilege but was judge-made,127 and that other 
references, especially with regard to ministerial statements in Parliament, had 
occasionally been made, even if for other purposes (mainly to determine the 
purpose of government policy and of legislation).  
The novelty of Pepper consisted in the intended use of Hansard to establish the 
true meaning of legislation: in pondering what had been said in Parliament, the 
judges would search for hints as to the intended meaning of the statutory provision 
in question. Apparently, the House of Lords was now ready, in Johnson Smith as 
well as in Pepper (only with different outcomes), to apply functional criteria in 
delimiting the reach of parliamentary privilege. In order to do this, they had to 
express a judicial opinion – that is, assume jurisdiction! – on the question of what 
the aim of privilege is, and so determine whether or not allowing reference to 
Hansard carries the risk of jeopardising that aim. Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
acknowledged that, if the judges extended the boundaries of lex parliamenti as far as 
 
123 Chafetz 2007, p. 42. 
124 Church of Scientology v. Johnson-Smith (1972) 1 QB 522. 
125 Pepper v. Hart (1993) AC 593 (H.L.). 
126 Oliver 1993, p. 5-13. 
127 Ibid. 
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they did in Pepper, they would have to be ‘astute to ensure’128 that privilege, where it 
applied, be upheld during court proceedings. However, he was of the opinion that 
judges were able to do so and thus had no reason to leave to Parliament what was 
not for Parliament to have: privilege irrespective of the function parliamentary 
proceedings would serve in court.  
It is clear that Pepper v. Hart carries far-reaching implications for the 
interpretation of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, and these will be discussed in more 
detail in part IV of this chapter. However, Pepper is also a striking move in the 
evolution of the relationship between lex parliamenti and lex terrae and the connected 
question of jurisdiction: while cautiously pointing out that the Law Lords  
[…] are motivated by a desire to carry out the intentions of Parliament in enacting 
legislation and have no intention or desire to question the processes by which such 
legislation was enacted or of criticising anything said by anyone in Parliament in the 
course of enacting it [...].129 
In what was probably one of the sharpest statements on the position of privilege vis-
à-vis the law of the land ever made in a court ruling, Lord Browne-Wilkinson also 
elaborated that 
[a]lthough in the past the courts and the House of Commons both claimed the 
exclusive right to determine whether or not a privilege existed, it is now apparently 
accepted that it is for the courts to decide whether a privilege exists and for the House 
to decide whether such privilege has been infringed[...].130 
This seems to be a conclusive departure from the ‘Blackstonian’ concept of privilege 
and the relationship between lex terrae and lex parliamenti, expanding the powers of 
the courts and limiting those of Parliament. While this is true if one regards 
privilege alone, it can certainly be argued131 that the role of the courts as a 
constitutional corrective might very well be weakened by allowing reference to 
Hansard for the interpretation of statutes. Previously the judges, barred from taking 
(official) cognisance of parliamentary proceedings, employed a range of judicial 
presumptions which enabled them to uphold certain constitutional principles. 
Oliver lists as examples the presumption that Parliament cannot have intended to 
breach treaty obligations or the presumption that Parliament did not intend to oust 
the jurisdiction of the courts.132  
Further, the courts habitually strike from the list of possible meanings of 
statutory provisions what they hold to be absurd, presuming that the legislators 
cannot have intended the absurd to become law. Pepper opened up the possibility 
for the courts to take Parliament literally in construing the meaning of statutory 
provisions, at least where there is no danger of an infringement of privilege. 
 
128 Pepper v. Hart (1993) AC 593 (H.L.), at 639. 
129 Ibid., at 646. 
130 Ibid., at 645. 
131 Cf. Oliver 1993. 
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However, the case seems to have also limited the courts’ room for manoeuvre since 
they cannot depart as easily from what has been said in Parliament. Taking into 
account that many parliamentary speeches (and other proceedings, such as the 
tabling of bills) are delivered by the executive, it is not inconceivable that the Pepper 
rule may ultimately have strengthened the executive and weakened, in turn, the 
judiciary – both at the expense of parliamentary independence.  
Where the courts have jurisdiction to hear suits brought by members of 
Parliament against non-members, the situation may arise that privileged material 
(such as a speech that a member gave in Parliament) is required as evidence for the 
defence. This is problematic because privilege accrues to Parliament (or one of its 
constituent Houses) as a body, and not to the individual member (this issue will be 
discussed in more detail in part IV). As a result, the member does not have 
privileged material at his free disposal; he may not allow the courts to use such 
material as evidence. This raises a further question of jurisdiction: may the court 
proceed with a suit brought by a member of Parliament where the suit itself is not 
barred by privilege but where, by reason of privilege, the defendant is placed at a 
disadvantageous position due to limited access to privileged evidence? This was the 
question the Privy Council had to deal with in Prebble v. Television New Zealand.133 
Prebble, a member of the New Zealand House of Representatives and former 
minister, had brought charges of defamation against TV New Zealand about a 
television programme in which it was alleged, among other things, that Prebble had 
conspired to sell state assets to private parties in return for generous donations to 
the New Zealand Labour Party. TVNZ contended that the relevant allegations 
raised in the programme were justifiable as true, as could be evidenced by 
statements made by Prebble in the House. These statements, however, were 
privileged by virtue of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. TVNZ requested privilege 
to be waived in order for Prebble’s speeches to be admitted as evidence in court. 
This request was denied after the Privileges Committee of the House of 
Representatives ‘decided that the House has no power to waive Parliamentary 
privilege’.134 The Privy Council was now faced with the question if and how the 
courts are able to proceed in such a situation. The Lords of the Privy Council held 
that  
[t]here may be cases in which the exclusion of material on the grounds of 
Parliamentary privilege makes it quite impossible fairly to determine the issue between 
the parties. In such a case the interests of justice may demand a stay of proceedings. 
But such a stay should only be granted in the most extreme circumstances.135 
 
133 Prebble v. Television New Zealand (1995) 1 A.C. 321 (P.C.). The case is relevant to the UK since it 
involves the application of Art. 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 which is also law in New Zealand. 
Further, New Zealand abolished Commonwealth appeals to the Privy Council only in 2003, 
in favour of the new NZ Supreme Court. Privy Council rulings originating in 
Commonwealth jurisdictions possess precedence value in the UK, provided that the relevant 
law is mutually applicable. 
134 Ibid., at 321. 
135 Ibid., at 338. 
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The relevance of Prebble for our quest to understand the relationship between the 
law of Parliament and the law of the land, and to gauge the extent of court 
jurisdiction in cases involving privilege, results from the clarity the case adds to 
previous developments. It is clear that any use of parliamentary proceedings that 
would be intrusive to Article 9 of the Bill of Rights remains off-limits (see part IV). 
However, it is within the power of the courts to ‘prevent lex parliamenti from 
adversely affecting the operations of lex terra’.136 by ordering a stay where necessary. 
Jurisdiction to determine what constitutes an ‘extreme case’ rests, of course, firmly 
with the courts (this question does not touch upon Parliament in any way; the 
courts will decide it on the basis of the amount of evidence available to them). In 
Prebble the Privy Council also recognised an additional function of parliamentary 
proceedings as subject to privilege: 
[…] to allow it to be suggested in cross-examination or submission that a member or 
witness was lying to the House could lead to exactly that conflict between the courts 
and Parliament which the wider principle of non-intervention is designed to avoid. 
Misleading the House is a contempt of the House punishable by the House: if a court 
were also to be permitted to decide whether or not a member or witness had misled 
the House there would be a serious risk of conflicting decisions on the issue.137 
Thus, the Council was of the opinion that privilege must be observed by the courts 
not merely as an act of deference with regard to the powers of Parliament, but also 
for the avoidance of inter-institutional conflict, this being one of the main functions 
of privilege.  
3.3. The Defamation Act 1996 
Case law from the late 20th century, including Pepper and Prebble and Chaytor, seem 
to lead up to a fair degree of clarity on the question of jurisdiction and the 
delimitation between the sphere of lex parliamenti and that of the law of the land. 
However, matters have been complicated in one area of law which is particularly 
relevant in the context of speech in Parliament – the law of defamation. The 
Defamation Act 1996,138 in particular section 13 of this Act, constitutes a significant 
encroachment on Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. Section 13 provides, inter alia, 
that 
(1) Where the conduct of a person in or in relation to proceedings in Parliament is in 
issue in defamation proceedings, he may waive for the purposes of those proceedings, 
so far as concerns him, the protection of any enactment or rule of law which prevents 
proceedings in Parliament being impeached or questioned in any court or place out of 
Parliament.  
 
136 Chafetz 2007, p. 44. 
137 Prebble v. TVNZ (1995) 1 A.C. 321 (P.C.), at 334. 
138 1996 c31 An Act to amend the law of defamation and to amend the law of limitation with 
respect to actions for defamation or malicious falsehood. 
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(2) Where a person waives that protection— 
(a) any such enactment or rule of law shall not apply to prevent evidence being given, 
questions being asked or statements, submissions, comments or findings being made 
about his conduct, and  
(b) none of those things shall be regarded as infringing the privilege of either House of 
Parliament.  
[…] 
The passing of section 13 of the Defamation Act must be seen as a most remarkable 
and incisive event in the development of the relationship between lex terrae and lex 
parliamenti as it opens up – or rather, completely removes – parliamentary privilege 
in defamation suits where the member concerned so wishes, without a decision of 
the House, a committee or the Speaker. In such cases, individual members can 
therefore relinquish lex parliamenti jurisdiction on behalf of their entire House, 
though only with regard to themselves, and instead allow the courts to extend lex 
terrae jurisdiction into the very core of Parliament’s internal affairs and the 
parliamentary legal system.  
It is worthwhile to look into the genesis of section 13, which was inserted into 
the Defamation Bill by way of an amendment put forward in the Committee by 
Lord Hoffman while the Bill was discussed in the Lords. It has been observed that 
only four Lords were present when the amendment was put forward and that it 
was not discussed at length before the third reading.139 The Commons, eager to pass 
the Act quickly, did not reconsider the amendment at great length before giving 
their approval. This course of events was recognised and criticised by scholars as a 
severe procedural flaw. It was contended, among other things, that ‘so significant 
an amendment to the Bill of Rights 1689 should more properly be the subject of 
investigation by a joint committee of both Houses’.140  
The tabling of the amendment by Lord Hoffmann is seen to have been a 
reaction141 to the first stage of the saga which was to end with the case of Hamilton v. 
Al Fayed.142 Following the publication of an article in the newspaper The Guardian in 
which it was alleged that Mr Hamilton MP had received material benefits from the 
businessman Mohamed Al Fayed, Hamilton, Rupert Allason MP143 and the lobbyist 
Ian Greer144 sued the authors and The Guardian for defamation, but the action was 
stayed on the grounds of the Prebble rule: the defendants would have had to rely on 
parliamentary statements by Hamilton and Allason to justify the allegedly 
defamatory allegations made in the paper. Since the use of these statements in court 
was precluded by privilege, the court declared the case irresolvable and stayed 
 
139 Loveland & Sharland 1997, p. 113-124. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Munro 1999, p. 241. 
142 Hamilton v. Al Fayed (2001) 1 AC 395 (H.L.). 
143 Allason v. Haines & another (1995) NLJR 1576. 
144 Hamilton v. Hencke & others; Greer & others v. Hencke & others (both 21 July 1995, unreported). 
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proceedings accordingly. Hamilton was thus left without a remedy and had no 
opportunity to clear his name.  
After the enactment of the Defamation Act, Hamilton sued Mr Al Fayed (the 
suit against the journalists and The Guardian was not reopened)145 who had in the 
meantime publicly admitted having rewarded Hamilton in cash and other means 
for asking questions in Parliament and generally championing his business interests 
in Parliament and vis-à-vis the Government. While the problem as regards privilege 
was essentially identical in this new lawsuit, this time Hamilton had at his disposal 
the new instrument of a section 13 waiver, of which he made use. In Hamilton v. Al 
Fayed the question arose whether such a waiver entailed that statements in 
parliament (in this particular case in a committee of the Commons) could also be 
challenged (thus not merely be used as evidence against the non-member party, or 
used for the construction of statutes, but also questioned with regard to their truth) 
in the courts. It was held by the House of Lords that indeed in case of a waiver the 
utterances in the committee could be challenged in order to enable the other party 
to make a defence.146 In the course of the defence, counsel for Mr. Al Fayed raised 
the interesting argument that a section 13 waiver could only concern such privileges 
as were enjoyed by individual members, but not those enjoyed by the House as 
body, among which was its ‘autonomous jurisdiction over certain matters’.147 
However, this argument was summarily dismissed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 
stating that  
[t]his argument is fallacious. The privileges of the House are just that. They all belong 
to the House and not to the individual. They exist to enable the House to perform its 
functions. Thus section 13(1) accurately refers, not to the privileges of the individual 
MP, but to ‘the protection of any enactment or rule of law’ which prevents the 
questioning of procedures in Parliament. The individual MP enjoys the protection of 
parliamentary privilege. If he waives such protection, then under section 13(2) any 
questioning of parliamentary proceedings […] is not to be treated as a breach of the 
privilege of Parliament.148 
With regard to the intended meaning of section 13, this assessment is certainly 
correct. After all it has repeatedly been put forward in doctrine, practice and case 
law that parliamentary privilege belongs to Parliament (or, more particularly, its 
constituent Houses) as a body and not to individual members. Recognising this 
principle, however, is only one little step short of identifying one very fundamental 
flaw of section 13. For, as mentioned earlier, one can say that section 13 essentially 
allows members, who are not the primary beneficiaries of privilege, nor the bearers 
of jurisdiction with regard to it, to abandon privilege on behalf of the respective 
House. They may do so where they see it as beneficial for themselves to submit the 
share of ‘proceedings in Parliament’ which relates specifically to the jurisdiction of 
 
145 Mr Hamilton asserted that he only withdrew the action because he would not have been able 
to pay the necessary legal fees.  
146 Hamilton v. Al Fayed (2001) 1 AC 395 (H.L.) at 408. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid., at 408-409. 
 90 
Parliamentary Privilege in the United Kingdom 
lex terrae. More dramatically, they may do so without approval, or even 
consultation, of the House of which they are a member.  
These are not petty theoretical problems of irrelevance beyond the doctrine of 
lex parliamenti and lex terrae which has been (further) complicated by the Defamation 
Act. It has widely been held that section 13 entails a variety of technical problems 
which ‘range from the constitutional to the practical’.149 Practically, the (yet) 
hypothetical case has been put forward in which two members are involved in 
defamation proceedings, only one of whom opts for the waiver. It will be extremely 
difficult for any court to investigate parliamentary proceedings with regard to one 
member without breaching privilege with regard to the other. And even if the court 
succeeds in doing so, the defence might request (and be entitled to) a stay according 
to the Prebble rule as it will still be in a disadvantaged position.150  
Further, in a certain sense privilege worked both ways prior to the Defamation 
Act. Parliamentarians were safe from being sued for what they said in Parliament. 
Of course, this has been left unchanged, since the waiver is only an option, fully at 
the disposal of the member.151 However, the media and private parties were also 
relatively safe from defamation suits against them, instituted by parliamentarians, 
at least in cases which would have necessitated the use of parliamentary 
proceedings as evidence and thus would have led to a Prebble stay of proceedings. 
The possibility of a waiver takes away much of that certainty; and it has been 
argued that this might lead to a ‘chill’ in the publication of critical news.152 In other 
words, section 13 might even carry implications, probably wholly unintended, for 
the freedom of the press.  
It is certain that the overall integrity of privilege, theoretically belonging to 
Parliament as a body, has been weakened by section 13: even though the waiver is 
nominally nothing but an option, it is not beyond imagination that members will 
often be coerced to opt for the waiver if faced with the consequence of otherwise 
having their defamation suits stayed. Since the Commons did not reserve for 
themselves or the speaker the right to approve or disapprove of a section 13 waiver, 
the extent to which their proceedings will be ‘questioned’ is now practically beyond 
their control.  
Aside from such criticism, with the Defamation Act and the confirmation of its 
face value by case law in Hamilton v. Al Fayed, the development of the relationship 
of the law of Parliament and the law of the land, and the question of jurisdiction so 
closely attached to it, has clearly moved further away from the ‘Blackstonian’ 
concept of privilege. Putting it in dramatic terms, this last stage of the development 
 
149 Williams 1997, p. 390. 
150 Ibid. See also Loveland & Sharland 1997. 
151 Which in itself has been held to be unfair, since ‘MPs themselves readily abused their 
protection from defamation suits by making unsupportable accusations in the House. [Lord 
Ewing of Kirkford] suggested that to leave the victim of such defamation without a remedy, 
while enhancing the remedies available to MPs was not an appropriate course for Parliament 
to follow’. Loveland 2000, p. 158. 
152 Loveland & Sharland 1997. 
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described here may have started to erode Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, one of the 
most fundamental components of British parliamentary privilege.  
It is possible that section 13 was a step that necessarily had to follow in what 
can be seen as a sort of chain reaction after Pepper and Prebble: whereas especially 
the latter case served to secure procedural fairness for the non-privileged party to a 
defamation dispute as proceedings had to be stayed where the non-privileged party 
was rendered defenceless by the privilege of the other, there was, after Prebble, still 
no remedy for a privileged person being defamed, as she could not waive her 
privilege before the enactment of the Defamation Act (the argument being that 
privilege accrued to Parliament as a body and individual members thus could not 
waive it). This imbalance was remedied by the Defamation Act, tilting the 
imbalance back to the disadvantage of the non-privileged party, as long as she 
could still not challenge statements in Parliament, now exempt from privilege, 
which could, however, be used as evidence against her. This, in turn, had to be 
remedied in the case of Hamilton. However, the arguments against section 13 briefly 
outlined above show that it is at least doubtful whether at the end of this chain of 
changes in the law that there is now an actual procedural equilibrium. It is very 
possible that the damage done by section 13 to the doctrinal framework of privilege, 
but also to its practical value, outweighs its benefits. The problems created by the 
Defamation Act 1996 have not gone unrecognised; new statutory legislation, either 
on the law of defamation or on parliamentary privilege is likely to be enacted soon. 
This will be addressed in our discussion of recent developments with regard to the 
privilege ex Article 9 of the Bill of Rights further below.  
3.4. The Parliamentary Expenses Scandal and R v. Chaytor: The End of 
Exclusive Cognisance? 
The current state of affairs as regards the boundary between lex parliamenti and lex 
terrae has recently been illustrated, and perhaps shifted even further towards the 
‘Millian paradigm’ by case law in the wake of the parliamentary expenses scandal. 
This major political scandal erupted in 2009, after a request by journalists under the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000,153 initially challenged by Parliament without 
success,154 forced the House of Commons to release details about the expenses 
claimed by its members. The House announced that the requested information 
would be released in July 2009, but with the exception of ‘sensitive’ information. 
However, in May, the Daily Telegraph newspaper had already started publishing 
uncensored information about members’ expenses155 which had been leaked to the 
paper from the House of Commons fees office.156 As a result of the information 
revealed by the Telegraph, a number of fraudulent expenses claims were discovered, 
 
153 2000 c. 36. The Act entered into force on 1 January 2005. 
154 Corporate Officer of the House of Commons v. Information Commissioner (2008) EWHC 1084 
(Admin). 
155 ‘Full list of MPs investigated by The Telegraph’, The Telegraph online, 8 May 2009. 
156 ‘Police hunt expenses mole’, The Daily Mail online, 9 May 2009. 
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leading to widespread public outrage, resignations and de-selections and, 
ultimately, criminal proceedings against a number of members.157  
The members of the House of Commons, Chaytor, Morley and Devine as well 
as Lord Hanningfield were accused of false accounting under the Theft Act 1968. 
Among others, they were accused of claiming cost allowances for rent which had 
never been paid (Chaytor), mortgage interest for a mortgage which had already 
been repaid (Morley), and service costs for services which had not been supplied 
(Devine). After the defendants had been convicted158 and their appeals dismissed,159 
their case was decided by the Supreme Court in the final instance (Lord 
Hanningfield did not join in this final appeal).160  
This case is important because it illustrates the current state of parliamentary 
privilege in two respects. First, Chaytor and the other defendants argued that their 
expenses claims were subject to privilege as proceedings in Parliament under 
Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. This gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to 
consider once again the scope of the concept of proceedings in Parliament. We are 
going to address this part of the ruling later, but for a better understanding of the 
case it should be pointed out that the Court did not deem the claims and their 
administrative processing ‘proceedings’ in Parliament. Second, however, the 
defendants also claimed that, even if expenses claims did not constitute proceedings 
in Parliament, their case fell within the category of ‘internal affairs’ over which 
Parliament enjoys exclusive cognisance. The Supreme Court therefore had to review 
– quite independently of the question what constitutes proceedings in Parliament – 
the line of demarcation between the jurisdiction of the courts and that of Parliament, 
between lex terrae and lex parliamenti.  
In R v. Chaytor and others, the President of the Supreme Court, Lord Phillips, 
notes that the phrase exclusive cognisance ‘describes areas where the courts have 
ruled that any issues should be left to be resolved by Parliament rather than 
determined judicially’. He thus recognises, first of all, that the line of demarcation 
between the jurisdiction of Parliament and that of the courts is for the latter to draw, 
even though he realises that ‘the boundaries of exclusive cognisance result from 
accord between the two Houses and the court as to what falls within the exclusive 
province of the former’.161 Lord Phillips then reiterates that exclusive cognisance can 
be relinquished by Parliament, that its field of application has been significantly 
reduced in the past as a result of legislation.162 He refers to R v. Graham-Campbell ex 
parte Herbert, according to which legislation does not apply within Parliament 
unless it explicitly provides so, but also to the 1999 report of the Joint Committee on 
 
157 The scandal has also led to more transparency with regard to members’ expenses. As of 18 
June 2009, information about the allowances paid to both members of the Commons and 
Lords is published on the website of Parliament. 
158 R v. Morley, Chaytor, Devine and Hanningfield, Southwark Crown Court, judgment of 11 June 
2010 by Saunders J. (unreported). 
159 R v. Morley, Chaytor, Devine and Hanningfield (2010) EWCA Crim. 1910. 
160 R v. Chaytor and others (2010) UKSC 52. 
161 Ibid., para. 63. 
162 Ibid. 
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Parliamentary Privilege, which has noted that Parliament sometimes chooses to 
abide by statute in its internal affairs, even where an Act does not contain an explicit 
provision to that effect. Paragraphs 72 and 73 of the judgment quote the report of 
the Joint Committee which has tried to define the boundaries of exclusive 
cognisance:  
Perhaps the nearest approach to a definition [of exclusive cognisance] is that the areas 
in which the courts ought not to intervene extend beyond proceedings in Parliament, 
but the privileged areas must be so closely and directly connected with proceedings in 
Parliament that intervention by the courts would be inconsistent with Parliament’s 
sovereignty as a legislative and deliberative body. […] It follows that management 
functions relating to the provision of services in either House are only exceptionally 
subject to privilege. […] The boundary is not tidy. Occasionally management in both 
Houses may deal with matters directly related to proceedings which come within the 
scope of Article 9. For example, the members’ pension fund of the House of Commons 
is regulated partly by resolutions of the House. So too are members’ salaries and the 
appointment of additional members of the House of Commons Commission under 
section 1(2)(d) of the House of Commons (Administration) Act. These resolutions and 
orders are proceedings in Parliament, but their implementation is not.163 
In line with the report of the Joint Committee, Lord Phillips adopts a narrow view 
of the area of exclusive cognisance with regard to administrative matters: where 
decisions in relation to matters of administration are taken by parliamentary 
committees – that is, by parliamentarians – these decisions are protected by 
privilege. However, administrative acts and procedures which exist pursuant to 
such decisions are not.164  
According to Lord Phillips’s assessment, extensive inroads have been created 
into areas which previously fell squarely within the exclusive cognisance of 
Parliament. These inroads are the results of numerous explicit statutory 
encroachments into exclusive cognisance which, for instance, allow the application 
of the laws of contract and tort within (the administration of) Parliament, but also of 
instances at which Parliament has voluntarily accepted the application of statute. In 
addition, Parliament itself does not (or no longer) interpret(s) exclusive cognisance 
broadly, as evidenced by the distinction which the Joint Committee has observed 
between, on the one hand, actions and decisions of the House itself or one of its 
committees and, on the other hand, the dealings of the administration of the House. 
As a result, the doctrine of Graham Campbell – that statute does not apply within 
Parliament unless it provides so and that the courts, consequently, lack jurisdiction 
– now appears questionable.165 Since this case was decided in 1935, the area of 
exclusive cognisance has diminished more and more; the area over which 
Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction is now not much broader than the scope of 
Article 9 of the Bill of Rights – only proceedings in Parliament and matters which 
are immediately connected with it remain off-limits to the courts.  
 
163 Report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, HL 43-1, HC 214-1 (1998-99), 
paras. 247-248. 
164 R v. Chaytor and others [2010] UKSC 52, para. 89. 
165 Ibid., para. 78.  
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With regard to criminal conduct in Parliament, Lord Phillips recalls that 
‘Parliament has never challenged, in general, the application of the criminal law 
within the precincts of Parliament and has accepted that the mere fact that a crime 
has been committed within these precincts is no bar to the jurisdiction of the 
courts’.166 This may, of course, lead to overlapping jurisdiction where a crime also 
constitutes a contempt of Parliament.167 Where this is the case, Parliament remains 
free to exercise its penal powers, but ‘the House does not assert an exclusive 
jurisdiction to deal with criminal conduct, even where this relates to or interferes 
with proceedings in committee or in the House’.168 In evidence of this, Lord Phillips 
refers to an agreed statement of the Chairman of the Committee on Standards and 
Privileges, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, and the Commissioner 
of the Metropolitan Police regarding their mutual cooperation and coordination in 
the investigation of alleged criminal conduct in the House.169 He also refers to the 
conviction of a former budget officer in the House of Commons fees department, 
who had organised money transfers to himself by drawing up false invoices in the 
names of former MPs.170 Accordingly, there is precedent for the application of 
criminal law to conduct within Parliament, and even for the cooperation of 
Parliament therein.  
A further interesting argument against the claim of the defendants – that their 
prosecution in court is barred by exclusive cognisance – is made by Lord Clarke in 
his separate concurring Opinion. He argues that, since indeed the privilege of 
exclusive cognisance can be waived or relinquished by Parliament, and since 
Parliament has apparently done so for cases of criminal conduct in one of the 
Houses, it is not for individual members to claim this privilege. He recognises that 
this view is inconsistent with older case law from the 19th century, according to 
which the courts cannot take cognisance of anything from within Parliament except 
 
166 Ibid., para. 80. This is certainly the case for ‘big crimes’: the judgments refer to the murder of 
Prime Minister Spencer Percival at the entrance to the lobby of the House of Commons in 
1812. His murderer, John Bellingham, was tried and convicted in court; the House did not 
assert exclusive jurisdiction. However, less important cases and cases intimately related to 
the parliamentary business were not always left to the courts, see infra.  
167 Ibid., paras. 81-82. Lord Phillips recalls an incident in 1988, when Ron Brown MP ‘damaged 
the mace in the course of a heated debate and declined to apologise’. At the time, the House 
of Commons made use of its penal powers; a private prosecution in court was halted by the 
director of Public Prosecution.  
168 Ibid., para. 83. At times, the House has even directed the Attorney General to prosecute 
offenders.  
169 Ibid., para. 84. 
170 R v. Gibson, Southwark Crown Court, judgment of 30 September 2010 by Rivlin QC, case No. 
T T20107344. 
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enacted legislation.171 Lord Clarke contends, however, that this view is outdated 
and ‘sounds odd to modern ears’.172 
All the above has led the Supreme Court to the conclusion that exclusive 
cognisance did not bar the prosecution of Chaytor and the other defendants for 
fraudulently submitting false expenses claims. Since these claims and their 
administrative processing could also not be deemed proceedings in Parliament 
under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, the three members of the Commons (and Lord 
Hanningfield) could be tried and convicted in ordinary courts. The impact of R v. 
Chaytor and others on the relationship between lex parliamenti and lex terrae can 
hardly be overestimated: the case has made it clear that the privilege of exclusive 
cognisance, as regards matters which are not specifically under privilege as 
proceedings in Parliament – has all but lost its relevance. First, according to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Chaytor, it is for the courts to decide what falls within the 
area of exclusive cognisance (even though the courts will consider the views 
expressed by Parliament). Second, exclusive cognisance only extends to matters 
which are very closely connected with proceedings in Parliament. Administrative 
operations in either House do not fall under it, even though the administrative 
schemes under which they may take place have in fact been adopted by decisions of 
the House or committees which must be deemed proceedings. Third, although the 
Houses retain jurisdiction over contempt, they have relinquished exclusive 
cognisance with regard to criminal conduct, even where it relates to proceedings.  
3.5. Lex Parliamenti and Lex Terrae: Conclusions 
After centuries of development in case law, statute and, not least, political culture, 
what is the nature of the relationship between lex et consuetudo parliamenti and lex 
terrae in the United Kingdom? Is it (still) apt to speak of two separate legal systems, 
one governing, and entirely governed by, Parliament and one for the outside world, 
or is there only one, albeit one with a special autonomous zone to allow Parliament 
to carry out its constitutional tasks? More practically speaking, how are the two 
facets of power, delimitative and interpretative authority, divided between 
Parliament and the Courts? Who has what to say with regard to parliamentary 
privilege?  
It has been shown, first of all, that this relationship is anything but static: there 
has been tremendous change in the distribution of jurisdiction. More has changed, it 
is true, with regard to the delimitative power than with regard to the interpretative 
power: as Lord Browne-Wilkinson made clear in Pepper v. Hart, it is now for the 
courts to determine whether a privilege exists, that is, whether a matter is covered 
by privilege so as to bar jurisdiction of the courts. However, where this is the case, it 
 
171 In particular, he cites Wellesley v. Beaufort (1827) 2 Russell 1; 28 ER 236 in which Lord 
Brougham LC held that ‘[the] Court is […] bound to give [the defendant] the benefit of his 
privilege, and to give it to him with all its incidents, even although the House to which he 
belongs abandons it as a claim of right; for a Court knows nothing judicially of what takes 
place in Parliament till what is there done becomes an Act of the Legislature’. 
172 R v. Chaytor and others [2010] UKSC 52, paras. 129-133. 
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is still for Parliament to decide whether its privileges have been infringed and to use 
its penal powers in cases of contempt.173 However, as we saw earlier, the powers of 
delimitation and interpretation are so closely intertwined that it is by default hard 
to view them separately; and the smaller the area of exclusive cognisance becomes, 
the more the distinction between the two powers is rendered meaningless, since an 
ever narrower ‘legal territory’ governed exclusively by lex parliamenti leaves almost 
no room for Parliament to deploy its power of interpretation and application.  
That the area governed by lex parliamenti is narrower today than it was at any 
point since the enactment of the Bill of Rights in 1689 is certain. The courts view 
privilege of Parliament as being restricted to matters functionally connected to 
Parliament’s constitutional tasks. On the one hand, they assume for themselves a 
wide discretion to use parliamentary proceedings, for example, to help them with 
their task of construing statutory legislation and government policy, only limited by 
the obligation that proceedings in Parliament should not be ‘impeached or 
questioned’. But even this boundary is today permeable, though not at the 
discretion of the courts, and only in defamation cases, if individual members of 
Parliament so desire. Despite this qualification it is clear that, for section 13 cases, 
the House as a whole has relinquished its power to assert privilege vis-à-vis the 
courts.  
On the other hand, as illustrated by R v. Chaytor, there is hardly anything left 
to the jurisdiction of Parliament beyond what is specifically privileged under Article 
9 of the Bill of Rights. Statutory limitations and voluntary relinquishment of the 
privilege of exclusive cognisance have resulted in wide inroads for lex terrae into 
what was once reserved to the jurisdiction of the two Houses. This concerns matters 
of criminal law, but also matters ranging from safety at work to contracts and torts. 
Only what is intimately related to actual proceedings in Parliament remains subject 
to exclusive cognisance – and the definition of proceedings is also increasingly 
narrow, as will be argued later.  
We can thus see, in broad terms, that little is left to which the courts have no 
access, and little which is governed by Parliament alone. But does this mean that the 
theory of two legal systems, separate and independent from each other, is outdated 
and that the parliamentary law (and privilege with it) is part of the law of the land? 
Probably, yes. And this has already been observed by Wittke, writing in 1920, thus 
after Burdett, Stockdale and Bradlaugh but before Graham-Campbell, Strauss and all 
later case law: ‘[c]ourts and Parliament are today in practical agreement that the law 
of Parliament is part of the law of the land, and there can be no privilege of which 
the courts cannot take cognizance’.174 But he was careful enough to add that if 
‘champions of a supreme High Court of Parliament, and a separate lex parliamenti, 
 
173 However, as has been shown in R v. Chaytor, contempt does not require exclusive cognisance: 
an act which has been committed in Parliament but which constitutes an offence in criminal 
law and falls within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts may still also constitute a 
contempt of Parliament. 
174 Wittke 1970, p. 171. 
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were not wanting throughout the whole of the 19th century, it would be surprising if 
none could be found in the twentieth, should another crisis arise’.175  
Returning to Chafetz’s categorisation, it can be distilled from the body of case 
law and statute that, not too surprisingly, the current situation is an amalgamation 
of models (2) and (3), tilted towards the latter. The extent of privilege is fully 
governed by the courts, which acknowledge that Parliament governs the nature and 
application of privilege, but only in the very small area left to it. If this 
categorisation has any practical meaning, it is that the courts will take the views of 
Parliament into account, and tread carefully in areas of doubt. 
Chafetz comes to the conclusion that there are two competing theories of the 
relationship between lex parliamenti and lex terrae. Either the one is part of the other, 
or they are in fact separate, but with the courts alone to ‘police the boundaries’.176 
We may not be satisfied, because on this point the British constitution is, in fact, not 
restlessly clear and none of these theories can be disproven. But this fact hints at a 
conclusion which is more relevant to the practice of parliamentary privilege, namely 
that it must be seen as a constitutional convention in itself that both Parliament and 
the courts are utterly eager to avoid conflict on this point. They must be so in order 
to evade a dispute to which, as we have seen, there is no definite solution. The 
notion that the question for the relationship between lex terrae and lex parliamenti is 
left open as a constitutional custom should be borne in mind when considering the 
nature and content of today’s parliamentary privilege, which will be discussed in 
the following part.  
4. Parliamentary Privilege Today 
4.1. The Modern Perception of Privilege 
Today, parliamentary privilege is still regarded as essential to the proper 
functioning of Parliament. As a principle, the rule that Parliament should therefore 
enjoy certain powers to govern and protect itself remains therefore relatively intact 
as a basic feature of British constitutionalism. This is true even though the 
development towards a more confident demeanour of the courts, statutory incisions 
(in particular section 13 of the Defamation Act) and the near-complete 
relinquishment of exclusive cognisance beyond proceedings in Parliament have 
somewhat pruned the autonomy of the two Houses. That the privileges of 
Parliament are still important and desirable is widely accepted by doctrine and also 
evidenced by a variety of statements from the ranks of Parliament, such as the 
following by the House of Commons’ Committee of Privileges: ‘Parliamentary 
Privilege is designed to ensure the proper working of Parliament, and is an essential 
constitutional safeguard’.177 
 
175 Ibid. 
176 Chafetz 2007, p. 47. 
177 Public Life, First Report of the Committee of Standards in Public Life [Nolan Report], London: 
HMSO, 1995, Chapter 2, para 91. 
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It is today an established principle that privilege does not exist in order to 
protect and benefit members in their personal capacity but so as to ensure the 
proper functioning of Parliament as a body. Accordingly, where it happens to 
protect individual members, it does so in order to safeguard their functioning in 
their capacity as constituent elements of the respective House. Apart from 
defamation cases, as has been shown, the principle remains that in general 
individual members are not able to waive their privilege if they so desire.178 After 
all, the possibility of a waiver could contingently be at odds with the primary aim of 
privilege, to protect parliament as a corporate body, by infringing on the proper 
functioning of one of its members.  
While the overall recognition of privilege as an important protection 
mechanism has thus undergone little change, it must be observed that Parliament 
itself, the courts, as well as legal doctrine have today adopted a more moderate and 
limited view of the nature of privilege than that which was prevalent in the era of 
Blackstone. Broadly, two factors may be identified which greatly contribute to this 
change.179  
On the one hand, Parliament, and the lower House in particular, now finds 
itself in a much safer position of power vis-à-vis the Crown than during the middle 
ages and up until the civil war, from which Parliament emerged as ‘sovereign’. 
Thus, there is now less need to protect members and the House of Commons from 
intrusions by the Crown. It is a long-standing constitutional convention that the 
leader of the government of the United Kingdom (the Prime Minister) is recruited 
from the ranks of the House of Commons rather than the House of Lords. With the 
current Monarch’s role largely reduced to ceremonial functions, and the Lords 
effectively deprived of much of their former powers, existential clashes between the 
Crown and Parliament today appear highly unlikely. On the other hand, 
Parliament, though de iure retaining unlimited legislative power (formally royal 
assent is required) and wide privilege, has conceded to modern political and 
societal realities also in its self-conception, accepting in principle the importance of 
the rule of law,180 and developing the principle that that privilege ‘must not be used 
for the danger of the commonwealth’.181 This contributes to the application of 
 
178 However, prior to the enactment of the Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770, members could 
waive privilege (i.e. the privilege of freedom from arrest and molestation) in order to attend 
court, e.g. in a civil suit against them.  
179 These two factors are certainly not exhaustive. Factors such as, for example, the general 
evolution of constitutional legal doctrine towards more emphasis on the rule of law, but also 
public opinion, triggered by more influential media, certainly contributed to this process as 
well. 
180 This point requires an additional remark for clarification: undoubtedly, the law of privilege 
as part of lex parliamenti is law. Accordingly, the rule of law is technically not hampered by it. 
However, the special nature of lex parliamenti as a superseding legal system, limiting the 
application of ordinary laws to Parliament, may be seen as an exception to the rule of law 
where the application of the law of the land is limited by it and citizens are deprived of rights 
they would normally have. See below for a discussion of the applicability of the law to 
Parliament and its members.  
181 Erskine May 2004, p. 93. 
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privilege being generally more limited and more in line with contemporary 
concepts of democracy and the separation of powers than it has been at many 
instances in the past.  
This change of circumstances and in mentality has of course also resulted in 
considerable changes in the positive law of privilege. For example, several 
privileges and classes of persons enjoying them have been abolished altogether: the 
privilege of freedom from arrest no longer accrues to members’ servants (quite 
apart from the fact that the scope of freedom from arrest ratione materiae has been 
profoundly limited).182 As the single most prominent and important privilege and 
the least curtailed one, the privilege of freedom of speech and parliamentary debate 
(‘proceedings’) ex Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 is today the vehicle through 
which parliamentary immunity is given effect to in Westminster Parliament. Other 
privileges, such as that of freedom from arrest, freedom of access to Her Majesty or, 
for the House of Lords, the privilege of Peerage are of very little practical relevance 
today.  
4.2. Flexibility vs. Legal Certainty 
Before we attempt to analyse the material scope of parliamentary privilege as it 
stands today, and to determine precisely what rights it confers on Parliament and 
its members, a word ought to be had on the controversial issue of its flexibility – or 
potential vagueness.  
The fact that the rather extensive privileges of the past have in many ways 
been pruned back so as to jar with modern circumstances and requirements does 
not mean that their application has thereby become an easier exercise. As will later 
be shown through the example of the privileges ex Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 
1689, the opposite may be the case where attempts are made to accommodate new 
legal needs in the old law of privilege.  
Much of the difficulty one has to face in determining the exact scope of 
Westminster parliamentary privilege is due to its being elusive, indefinite, and 
framed in vague terms. This, however, has frequently been interpreted as being the 
vehicle of a highly intended flexibility: by keeping privilege indefinite, it is argued 
that it is less susceptible to dangerous loopholes, remains adaptable to novel 
situations and is, in consequence, better apt to protect Parliament and its 
independence. Back in 1939, the Select Committee on the Official Secrets Act has 
argued in this vein: 
 
182 This was the effect of the enactment of the Parliamentary Privilege Act 1770, which also 
brought to a much needed end the abusive custom of trade in protections. Note, however, 
that there is still freedom from arrest for family members of peers by virtue of the privilege of 
peerage.  
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Any attempt to translate [the privileges of Parliament] into precise rules must deprive 
them of the very quality which renders them adaptable to new and varying conditions, 
and new or unusual combinations of circumstances, and indeed might have the effect 
of restricting rather than safe-guarding members’ privileges.183 
This view is still propounded today,184 but may well be interpreted as representing 
the ancient ‘Blackstonian paradigm’ of privilege, referred to above: Parliament, 
according to this view, must first and foremost be protected and this need is so 
important that other aims such as legal certainty must yield. This opinion is a 
remnant of a time when Parliament was still ‘in a fragile stage of its development’, 
and it is questionable whether a more balanced approach, more in line with legal 
certainty and other requirements of today’s legal system, would not be more 
desirable under today’s circumstances.185 On the other hand, the advantage of 
safeguarding the protection of Parliament against all possible novel or ‘unusual’ 
threats achieved by such flexibility remains the same today. However, it may be 
argued that the disadvantages for the practical application of privilege that come 
with such vagueness have increased, corresponding to the increase in complexity 
both of the operations of Parliament and the legal system as a whole. Critics of the 
high degree of uncertainty surrounding privilege assert, for example, that 
[t]he uncertainty which affects the law of Parliamentary Privilege comes from the 
dearth of ordinary case law, a paucity of statutes and a large number of Parliamentary 
precedents of doubtful relevance to the present day. The uncertainty arises in two main 
ways: 
(i) in determining whether an alleged privilege exists […] 
(ii) in the application and enforcement of a particular privilege […].186 
Parliamentary privilege is a body of law which regulates an extremely contentious 
issue: the immunity of lawmakers from the application of the law. It is conceivable 
that, where the exact content of this body of law is left in abeyance, this ‘can 
sometimes give an impression of arbitrariness’.187 It also gives rise to difficulties in 
upholding, and indeed determining, citizens’ rights vis-à-vis (members of) 
Parliament. At several instances, questions have even arisen as to the compatibility 
of (absolute) parliamentary privilege with European human rights standards.  
The above basically reflects the dilemma between the warranted need for 
Parliament to be protected and that for citizens to be respected in their rights and to 
be able to enforce them. The latter point of enforcement brings us, again, to the 
point of justiciability and the necessary question of which entity – parliament or the 
courts, is competent to rule on the content and scope of parliamentary privilege. As 
 
183 Report from the Select Committee on the Official Secrets Act (1938-39, HC 101), p. 14. 
184 See e.g. Public Life, First Report of the Committee of Standards in Public Life [Nolan Report], 
London: HMSO, 1995, Chapter 2, para. 87. 
185 See supra at 180. 
186 Report from the Select Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (1967-68, HC 34), p. 171-172, as 
quoted in Lock 1998, p. 49. 
187 Ibid. 
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we have seen, this issue has not, to this date, been finally resolved, so that, 
theoretically 
[t]here may be at any given moment two doctrines of [the justiciability of] privilege, 
the one held by the Courts, the other by either House, the one to be found in the Law 
Reports, the other in Hansard; and there is no way of resolving the real point should 
the conflict arise.188 
Thus, while today it certainly takes less audacity for the courts to take a strong 
stance against an assertion of privilege, citizens’ access to legal recourse still 
depends to a large extent on ‘the proper anxiety of [Parliament] to confine its own 
or its members’ privilege to the minimum infringement of the liberties of others’.189 
Whether this is an acceptable situation is debatable. However, cases such as R v. 
Chaytor show not only that the courts have become more assertive vis-à-vis 
Parliament, but that Parliament itself has displayed little interest in conflict, and has 
allowed – and even appreciated – the application of the law of the land to almost 
anything which does not actually constitute proceedings in Parliament. The 
situation is therefore much less serious than the above seems to suggest.  
4.3. The Modern Privileges: The Law 
Having discussed the overarching question of exclusive cognisance and the 
evolution and current state of the relationship between the law of Parliament and 
the law of the land, we will now turn to an analysis of the modern content and 
scope of parliamentary privilege as far as it confers immunities. This section will 
individually assess the specific privileges of freedom of speech, debate and 
proceedings in Parliament (Article 9 of the Bill of Rights), and of freedom from civil 
arrest. The discussion will be limited to these two essential privileges and the penal 
powers of Parliament, since the other specific privileges (access to her Majesty, 
favourable construction) are now redundant. We will omit a detailed discussion of 
the privilege of the House of Commons to provide for its own constitution, for it 
would lead us too far from the theme of immunity – much of what is relevant there 
has already been covered in our examination of exclusive cognisance.190  
 
188 Ibid., p. 53. 
189 A-G of Ceylon v. de Livera (1962) 3 All ER 1066. 
190 Note, however, that the right of the House of Commons to regulate their constitution seems 
very much alive: it was upheld relatively recently in the case of R v. Speaker, ex parte 
McGuiness (3 October 1997, unreported). The Speaker of the Commons had denied two Sinn 
Féin MPs the right to use the facilities of the Palace of Westminster. They had refused to take 
the oath of allegiance and therefore had no right to sit in the House. The Northern Ireland 
High Court declined jurisdiction over the matter, stating that it was ‘within the realm of 
internal arrangements’; see Munro 1999, p. 231. 
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4.3.1. The Privileges ex Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 
The most important component of Westminster parliamentary privilege law is still 
based on Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. The Bill of Rights is a piece of statutory 
legislation designed for the Parliament of the 17th century, which, despite having 
been prima facie the very same institution performing roughly the same tasks, is in 
many ways hardly comparable with its modern counterpart. Hence, the application 
and interpretation of Article 9 to the Parliament of the 21st century is difficult from 
the outset. Not only have the old questions as regards the precise meaning of certain 
components of Article 9 never really been conclusively resolved, the range of 
activities of today’s Parliament and MPs is also much wider than it was in the 17th 
century. Accordingly,  
[t]he modern limits of and application of [proceedings in Parliament], which may have 
been clear enough to the legislature in the 17th century, are no longer free from 
uncertainty.191 
In this section we will therefore consider the extent, application and interpretation 
of the privilege granted by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 today and consider the 
legal issues arising therein. Bearing in mind our aim to explore what the exact rights 
conferred by privilege are, the wording of Article 9 shall be the starting point: 
Freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be 
impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of Parliament.  
4.3.1.1. Freedom of Speech and Debate 
As is confirmed by Erskine May, it follows from Article 9 of the Bill of Rights that ‘a 
member may state whatever he thinks fit in debate, however offensive it may be to 
the feelings, or injurious to the character, of individuals; and he is protected by his 
privilege from any action for libel, as well as from any other question or 
molestation’.192 This means that utterances in parliamentary debate as well as other 
acts which qualify as ‘proceedings in Parliament’ (see below) are not punishable or 
otherwise susceptible to legal action in the courts, for want of jurisdiction. Where an 
action for defamation is brought against a Member of Parliament in relation to an 
utterance made by him in his House, the courts will not receive the action.193 The 
same is true for other types of action or investigation: Munro cites the case of 
Duncan Sandys MP, who brought up a matter of national security in a 
parliamentary question, but refused to disclose the source of his information. When 
the government wanted to launch an investigation under official secrets legislation, 
‘the House asserted its privilege in order to avert the threat’.194 Further, the 
 
191 Erskine May 2004, p. 98. 
192 Erskine May 2004, p. 96. 
193 Dillon v. Balfour (1887) 20 LR Ir 600.  
194 HC 146 (1937-38), HC 173 (1937-38); cited in Munro 1999, p. 221. 
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privileges of Article 9 do not exclusively protect members, but in fact anyone who 
takes part in ‘proceedings’, thus also experts or members of the public that are 
heard by the House or, more likely, by a Committee195 (a fact that may be taken as 
further evidence for the institutional, rather than personal, character of privilege). 
It is important to note, however, that Article 9 creates a privilege (similar to all 
other privileges of Parliament) only with regard to the legal sphere of the non-
parliamentary outside world. This means that speech, debates and proceedings are 
subject to regulations which are part of the law of Parliament, thus mainly the rules 
of procedure in debate. Hence, they are also punishable, should the case arise, 
under the parliamentary law of contempt.  
Although the text of Article 9 has never been formally amended, the scope of 
its application has been limited by subsequent legislation; one may thus speak of 
several implied amendments to Article 9. Erskine May196 mentions in this respect 
the Parliamentary Elections Act 1695,197 the House of Commons (Disqualifications) 
Act 1801198 and the Parliamentary Oaths Act 1866,199 all concerning penalties for 
irregular sitting in the House, as well at the Witnesses Protection Act 1892,200 the 
Perjury Act 1911201 and, of course, the Defamation Act 1996.202 All of these statutes 
derogate from, and therefore impliedly amend, Article 9 to the effect that certain 
proceedings may indeed be the subject of scrutiny by the courts. Hence, the areas 
covered by these statutes are not privileged. The same is true where statutes 
explicitly provide that they be applied to Parliament, as is the case in employment 
law pertaining to staff (other than members) of both Houses under the Employment 
Act 1990.203 
Apart from these limitations, the immunity from application of the ordinary 
law conferred on Parliament by Article 9 seems, at first glance, quite wide. However 
it also quickly becomes clear that determining the exact extent of this immunity 
depends on questions of definition which turn out to be difficult.  
4.3.1.2. Proceedings in Parliament 
It is difficult to draw a line between what qualifies as a ‘proceeding in parliament’ 
and what does not. In order to formulate an exact idea of what is a proceeding 
relating to privilege, several questions have to be answered: do we have to take 
‘proceedings in parliament’ as a spatial notion? If so, is there an additional 
functional requirement for an act or event to relate in some way to the constitutional 
tasks of Parliament in order to qualify as a proceeding? Further, while it may be 
 
195 Goffin v. Donelly (1881) 6 QBD 307. 
196 Erskine May 2004, p. 115. 
197 1695 c25 7 & 8 Will. 3. 
198 1801 c52 41 Geo. 3. 
199 1866 c19 29 & 30 Vict. 
200 1892 c64 55 & 56 Vict.  
201 1911 c6 1 & 2 Geo. 5. 
202 1996 c31. 
203 1990 c38.  
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reasonably clear what a court is, what is a ‘place out of parliament’? Does this cover 
public debate or media publications? What exactly is meant by the terms 
‘impeached’ and ‘questioned’? This might be very relevant where a proceeding in 
parliament, for example, a speech given there, could serve as evidence in court. And 
finally, can we rightfully infer any qualification of the privilege from the wording of 
the article, in that speech, debate, and proceedings ought not to be impeached or 
questioned – as opposed to must not? Lingering around these issues is, of course, the 
question if and how the antiquity of this statute should be considered in its 
interpretation.  
Thus far, there is no statutory definition of the term ‘proceedings in 
parliament’, nor has complete agreement been reached otherwise. There has been 
much debate as to whether the term ‘proceedings in parliament’ actually covers 
every event or act that takes place in the Palace of Westminster. At the same time, it 
is not inconceivable in modern times that events or acts that do not take place in the 
Parliament building could qualify as proceedings in parliament because of their 
close connection with the business of Parliament or the parliamentary work of a 
member. Erskine May states that only ‘a broad description’ can be given, while 
‘comprehensive lines of decision’ as to what does and what does not constitute a 
proceeding in parliament have not emerged.204 The Treatise thus arrives at a 
summary definition which leaves much room for uncertainty: as a ‘technical 
Parliamentary term’, proceedings are ‘some formal action, usually a decision, taken 
by the House in its collective capacity’. By extension, ‘proceedings’ should include 
the various forms of business, the necessary processes and the actors which play a 
part in such action.205 This seems to make reasonably clear that not everything 
becomes a proceeding in parliament just because it happens to occur on the 
premises of Parliament, that is to say, at the Palace of Westminster. However, 
diverging views adopted in case law illustrate that this is basically the smallest 
common denominator, beyond which no consensus can be reached.  
In Rost v. Edwards it has been judicially acknowledged that a definition cannot 
be achieved.206 The case brought up the question of whether or not the Register of 
Members’ Interests and the procedure relating to it is part of the ‘proceedings of 
parliament’. Popplewell J was of the Opinion that ‘[i]t is clearly not possible to 
arrive at an exhaustive definition’207 of ‘proceedings in parliament’. Having to 
deliver a judgment, the court decided that the Register of Members’ Interests does 
not qualify as a proceeding. This decision was taken, however, on the basis of 
analogies to statutory definitions in other Commonwealth jurisdictions208 and, one 
might suggest, to a certain extent arbitrarily. Popplewell J reiterated the 
 
204 Erskine May 2004, p. 111. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Rost v Edwards (1990) 2 QB 460. 
207 Ibid., at 478. 
208 Ibid., at 477. Section 16(2) of Australia’s Parliamentary Privileges Act 1986 defines 
‘Proceedings in Parliament’ as ‘all words spoken and acts done in the course of, or for 
purposes of or incidental to, the transacting of the business of the House or of a Committee 
[…]’; ibid., at 477. 
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impossibility of arriving at a conclusive definition by citing Lord Pearce: ‘I do not 
know, I only feel’.209 As a consequence, the Register of Members’ Interests could be 
used as evidence in court. Leopold cites the Canadian case of R. v Bunting210 in 
which it was ruled that ‘anything [a member] might say or do within the scope of 
his duties in the course of Parliamentary business’211 would be subject to privilege, a 
view that has at the time (1939) been accepted by the Select Committee on the 
Official Secrets Act. This very wide interpretation of Article 9 was, however, later 
not consistently upheld, either by Parliament or by the courts.  
It is clear that for this issue to be resolved, a statutory definition would have to 
be adopted. This has been proposed at various instances. In 1999 the Joint 
Committee on Parliamentary Privilege pondered a wide range of individual acts, 
considering whether they should or should not be covered by the term ‘proceedings 
in parliament’. Finally, the Committee called for a statutory definition:  
129. The Joint Committee recommends the enactment of a definition on the following 
lines: 
(1) For the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 ‘proceedings in Parliament’ 
means all words spoken and acts done in the course of, or for the purposes of, or 
necessarily incidental to, transacting the business of either House of Parliament or of a 
committee. 
(2) Without limiting (1), this includes: 
(a) the giving of evidence before a House or a committee or an officer appointed by a 
House to receive such evidence 
(b) the presentation or submission of a document to a House or a committee or an 
officer appointed by a House to receive it, once the document is accepted 
(c) the preparation of a document for the purposes of transacting the business of a 
House or a committee, provided any drafts, notes, advice or the like are not 
circulated more widely than is reasonable for the purposes of preparation 
(d) the formulation, making or publication of a document by a House or a committee 
(e) the maintenance of any register of the interests of the members of a House and any 
other register of interests prescribed by resolution of a House. 
(3) A ‘committee’ means a committee appointed by either House or a joint committee 
appointed by both Houses of Parliament and includes a sub-committee. 
(4) A document includes any disc, tape or device in which data are embodied so as to 
be capable of being reproduced there from.212 
 
209 Ibid., at 478. 
210 R. v. Bunting (1885) 7 OR 524 (Ont. C.A.). 
211 Leopold 1998, p. 73. 
212 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, First Report, 1999, HL 43-I, HC 214-I para. 129. 
See also Annex B to this report, which contains several alternative proposals for a statutory 
definition of ‘proceedings in Parliament’ by the Joint Committee on the publication of 
proceedings in Parliament, Second Report (1969-1970) HL 109, HC 261, paras. 27-30. While the 
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This or a similar definition, if adopted, would serve to clarify many of the questions 
relating to the interpretation of ‘proceedings in parliament’. In particular the 
recommended introduction of a test as to whether something is ‘necessarily 
incidental to’ the work of Parliament might be of help, even though the phrase is 
still very broad. It would, for instance, simplify the task of answering the question 
whether different types of correspondence or other communication are considered 
to be covered by privilege as proceedings by introducing a relatively clear and 
binding functional criterion. That this is desirable is evidenced by the fact that both 
Parliament and the courts have applied a similar rationale in the past when 
determining the status of correspondence: where a minister invites a 
parliamentarian to discuss with him a matter that has been brought up in 
Parliament, the ensuing talk or correspondence is privileged.213 Defamatory 
statements about a person’s former spouse in correspondence addressed to MPs do 
not fall under a privilege even if the letters concerned have been posted from the 
premises of the Palace of Westminster.214 Munro argues that, in this vein ‘even 
unsolicited correspondence is covered [as a proceeding], if it is immediately related 
to a question or motion already tabled or a pending debate’.215 The problem of 
privilege with regard to correspondence becomes more difficult where the 
connection of an act, utterance or document to the ‘core’ parliamentary work is less 
evident (and less necessarily incidental, as it were). In Beach v. Freeson,216 it was held 
that letters of an MP, in which he complained on behalf of constituents to the Law 
Society about a law firm in his constituency, were protected by qualified 
privilege.217 This was the case even though the correspondence in question did 
decidedly not qualify as ‘proceedings in parliament’, but was nonetheless a result of 
the member’s pursuit of his duties as a representative of his constituency. In the 
presence of a statutory definition, as recommended by the Joint Committee, it 
supposedly would (narrowly) have passed the test of being necessarily incidental to 
the parliamentary work.  
However, an example of a question that would not be resolved – or not 
satisfactorily be resolved – even by the introduction of a statutory definition of 
‘proceedings’, is whether courts would be allowed to conduct procedures of judicial 
review of decisions or of ministers (which is in principle possible) where such 
decisions, or the communication thereof, are effected by speech in Parliament, as is 
often the case. After all, the decision itself need not be directly related to 
parliamentary business.  
 
application of the definitions then proposed was intended to be limited to cases involving the 
publication of Parliamentary materials, the definitions themselves were more detailed than 
the one quoted here.  
213 This was decided by the Speaker of the Commons, see Munro 1999, p. 222, citing 591 HC 
Official Report (5th series) 208. 
214 Rivlin v. Bilainkin (1953) 1 QB 485. 
215 Munro 1999, p. 223. 
216 Beach v. Freeson (1972) 1 QB 14. 
217 Privilege which can be challenged by proving malice. This type of privilege applies also to 
publications of parliamentary debates. These are protected by qualified privilege if accurate 
or wrong without malice, but not in case of malicious misrepresentation.  
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Another issue which would remain unresolved by the definition proposed by 
the Joint Committee is the question whether criminal acts could possibly be under a 
privilege, if committed in the course of proceedings in Parliament. Since the phrase 
‘in the course of’ does not explicitly limit the scope of privilege to such acts which 
bear a thematic connection to the parliamentary business in progress (in which case 
it would hardly be conceivable how any crime could be covered by the definition), 
it remains theoretically possible that Article 9 would put criminal acts (other than 
speech acts) under privilege. This position has historically been rejected in Bradlaugh 
v. Gossett,218 with reference to Elliot’s case,219 but was apparently accepted by the 
Commons in 1988, when Ron Brown MP ‘damaged the mace in the course of a 
heated debate, and failed to apologise in the way expected’.220 In that case, the issue 
was not left to the courts, but was dealt with by means of the penal powers of the 
House. Of course, one can see that this instance should not be overestimated as a 
precedent for criminal acts being under privilege and therefore not subject to 
ordinary judicial procedure; while breaking the mace admittedly can be seen as a 
criminal act, it is still so intimately related to Parliament’s inner dealings, and so 
utterly unimportant to the outside world and the general interest of justice, that it 
may constitute a rather minor exception without the value of a precedent.  
More recently, the UK Supreme Court, in its important decision in R v. Chaytor 
and others221 (see above), was confronted with the question whether the act of 
submitting claims for expenses (as well as the claims forms themselves and the 
administrative processing thereof) falls under the definition of proceedings in 
Parliament. In order to answer this question, the Court had to determine whether 
proceedings in Parliament are defined by a functional criterion. If this were the case, 
something would have to be an immediate and necessary part of the constitutional 
functions of Parliament in order to be protected under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights.  
The Court followed a number of leads: First, it conducted an extensive review 
of case law, citing Elliot’s case, Bradlaugh v. Gossett, Pepper v. Hart and Prebble v. 
TVNZ. While all these cases point in the direction of a wide interpretation of 
proceedings in Parliament, they all relate to matters which are very obviously part 
of Parliament’s core business, in that they mainly concern utterances in 
parliamentary debates.222  
Second, the Court examined corruption cases.223 The difficulty in these cases is 
that the act of taking or giving a bribe, or that of conspiring to deceive Parliament, is 
 
218 Erskine May (2004, p. 117) warns that this statement should be taken to refer to criminal acts, 
as distinguished from criminal speech. 
219 R. v. Elliot, Hollis and Valentine [1629] 3 St. Tr. 294. See also Erskine May 2004, p. 81. In this 
case, the Speaker of the Commons had been physically restrained in this chair so as to 
prevent him from adjourning the session of the House. The responsible members were 
arrested and sentenced for seditious libel as well as for the attack on the speaker. Although 
the judgment was later reversed under a writ of error, it was not denied that physical acts of 
violence by members in the House are not privileged.  
220 Leopold 1998, p. 74. 
221 R v. Chaytor and others [2010] UKSC 52. 
222 Ibid., paras. 27-32. 
223 Ibid., paras. 33-46. 
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itself never part of proceedings, while it clearly has as its objective to influence 
proceedings. The Court cites the case Ex parte Wason of 1869,224 in which it was held 
that no prosecution could be based on untrue statements made in the House of 
Lords in the course of a conspiracy to deceive the House, because ‘the motives or 
intentions of members of either House cannot be inquired into by criminal 
proceedings with respect to anything they might do or say in the House’. However, 
the Court also refers to the Canadian case R v. Bunting,225 in which conspiracy to 
influence a vote in Parliament by bribery was treated as an offence at common law. 
In the United States case US v. Brewster,226 the US Supreme Court followed the 
teleological argument that the aim of freedom of debate was to protect the legislator 
as a body, not the individual congressman, and that ‘depriving the judiciary of the 
power to punish bribery of Members of Congress is unlikely to enhance legislative 
independence’. Still, the Supreme Court recognises that the issue is difficult: it cites 
the Indian case Rao v. State,227 in which it was held that MPs could not be prosecuted 
for bribery related to voting in Parliament, because that would require judicial 
review of their voting behaviour. Lastly, the Supreme Court considers R v. 
Greenway. In this case of 1992, the defendant, Mr. Greenway MP, tried to invoke 
parliamentary privilege ex Article 9 of the Bill of Rights against his prosecution for 
bribery. However, the court in that case rejected this defence. Buckley J held that ‘If 
[…] a bribe is given and taken by a member of Parliament, to use his position 
dishonestly […], the crime is complete. It owes nothing to any speech, debate or 
proceedings in Parliament’. He also based his decision against Greenway’s claim to 
privilege on the observation that immunity from prosecution for corruption is ‘an 
unacceptable proposition at the present time’ and that a body like the House’s 
Committee of privileges would not be well-equipped to try a member for 
corruption.  
From the above, the Supreme Court infers that the protection of Article 9 of the 
Bill of Rights 1689 is to be interpreted narrowly – yes, proceedings in Parliament 
remain off-limits to the courts, but only actual parliamentary debates, votes and 
decisions are to be considered as proceedings. Lord Phillips, author of the majority 
Opinion in R v. Chaytor, clearly assumes a functional criterion for the definition of 
proceedings in Parliament: 
[…] the principal matter to which article 9 is directed is freedom of speech and debate 
in the House of Parliament and in parliamentary committees. This is where the core or 
essential business of Parliament takes place. In considering whether actions outside the 
House and committees fall within parliamentary proceedings because of their 
connection to them, it is necessary to consider the nature of that connection and 
whether, if such actions do not enjoy privilege, this is likely to impact adversely the 
core or essential business of Parliament.228 [Emphasis added.] 
 
224 Ex parte Wason (1869) LR 4 QB 573. 
225 R v. Bunting (1885) 7 OR 524. 
226 US v. Brewster (1972) 408 US 501. 
227 Rao v. State (1998) 1 SCJ 529. 
228 R v. Chaytor and others [2010] UKSC 52, para. 47. 
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In the following paragraph of the judgment, Lord Phillips draws the obvious 
conclusion for the case of submitting fraudulent expenses claims: 
[i]f this approach is adopted, the submission of claims forms for allowances and 
expenses does not qualify for the protection of privilege. Scrutiny of claims by the 
courts will have no adverse impact on the core or essential business of Parliament. It 
will not inhibit debate or freedom of speech. Indeed it will not inhibit any of the varied 
activities in which Members of Parliament indulge that bear in one way or another on 
their parliamentary duties. The only thing it will inhibit is the making of dishonest 
claims.229  
Finally, the Court acknowledges that this view is consistent with that expressed by 
the Joint Committee on parliamentary privilege in its 1999 report, by the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and by the Speaker of the Commons. 
Does R v. Chaytor finally bring the old quest for a definition of ‘proceedings in 
Parliament’ to an end? Probably not, as the judgment still leaves room for ‘actions 
outside the House’ and ‘committees fall within parliamentary proceedings because 
of their connection to them’. However, this is an almost negligible test of 
uncertainty: there seems to be consensus that parliamentary proceedings are those 
things which form or are closely connected to the ‘core or essential business of 
Parliament, which consists of collective deliberation and decision making’.230 This 
definition is perhaps not a panacea for all possible cases, but it limits the room for 
interpretative speculation considerably and, more importantly, it seems to introduce 
a workable judicial test. Where, in future cases, a defendant claims privilege ex 
Article 9 in his defence, he will need to convince the court that the subject matter of 
his case touches the very core functions of Parliament – in short, that it touches 
upon freedom of speech.  
Hence, we can conclude that a narrow interpretation of Article 9 of the Bill of 
Rights is now widely accepted, and that the hinge of this definition is a functional 
criterion. Criminal acts (other than criminal speech) therefore cannot constitute 
proceedings in Parliament, unless they relate so directly to parliamentary debate 
that they must be considered part of it (think of MP Ron Brown damaging the mace 
without due apology). Equally, acts and documents relating merely to the 
administration of the Houses or the administrative concerns of members will not 
constitute proceedings.  
4.3.1.3. ‘Questioned’ 
Whereas the term ‘impeached’ may be regarded as relatively clear, that does not 
hold true for the term ‘questioned’ in Article 9. The main scenario in which 
‘questioning’ is at issue is where it is intended to use parliamentary proceedings as 
evidence in court. Since Pepper v. Hart and Prebble v. Television New Zealand, the rule 
has been that, on the one hand, proceedings in Parliament may be used by judges to 
 
229 Ibid., para. 48. 
230 Ibid., para. 62. 
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help them interpret statutory provisions, provided the proceedings would in no 
way be criticised. They may also be used by courts in proceedings of judicial review 
of government decisions or other administrative acts.231 Munro describes such usage 
as ‘benign or neutral, rather than adverse’.232 When looking for a definition of the 
term ‘questioned’ in Prebble, the Privy Council consulted section 16(3) of the 
Australian Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987, which says that:  
[i]t is not lawful for evidence to be tendered or received, questions asked or statements, 
submissions or comments made, concerning proceedings in Parliament, by way of, or 
for the purpose of:  
(a) questioning or relying on the truth, motive, intention or good faith of anything 
forming part of those proceedings in Parliament;  
(b) otherwise questioning or establishing the credibility, motive, intention or good faith 
of any person; or  
(c) drawing, or inviting the drawing of, inferences or conclusions wholly or partly from 
anything forming part of those proceedings in Parliament.  
Whereas this provision is not wholly suitable as a definition of the word ‘questioned’ 
proper (as it employs the word several times itself), it does provide us with good 
guidance as to what may not be done with parliamentary proceedings in Court. In 
Prebble, the Privy Council agreed with the Australian definition. Proceedings may 
thus not be brought as evidence where there is any chance that what has been said 
or done in Parliament might be attacked, argued against, doubted or in any other 
way questioned. In the UK, this is of course only true as long as there is no waiver of 
parliamentary privilege pursuant to section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996.233 Where 
the prohibition to ‘question’ makes it impossible to determine the case, court 
proceedings have to be stayed. As has been mentioned previously, this situation 
could potentially leave MPs without a remedy where they are unable to defend 
themselves, or bring an action, since they would have to rely on parliamentary 
proceedings.  
Whereas the usage of proceedings in Parliament as evidence is certainly the 
most common instance at which the interpretation of the term ‘questioned’ is at 
issue, one may also ask whether privilege protects proceedings from being 
questioned in other contexts. For example, parliamentary proceedings are very 
frequently the object of highly critical comment in the media which could well 
amount to ‘questioning’ if the term were to be interpreted broadly. However, 
Parliament today seems to favour a much narrower interpretation which does not 
stand in the way even of critical ‘questioning’ or commenting. This is still subject to 
the conditions that, first, proceedings are not maliciously misrepresented and, 
 
231 Examples for such usage can be found in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Brind (1991) 1 AC 696 and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire 
Brigades Union (1995) 2 AC 513. 
232 Munro 1999, p. 224. 
233 That in case of a waiver the ‘questioning’ may indeed amount to a challenge of the contents 
of a statement has been confirmed in Hamilton v. Al Fayed (2001) 1 AC 395 (H.L.). 
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second, that the ‘questioning’ does not (potentially) entail any legal effects (which 
can be the case where proceedings are challenged in court).234  
One may conclude that the term ‘questioned’, though perhaps equally in need 
of statutory definition, is easier to apply than ‘proceedings’. The body of case law 
and statute which has evolved since Pepper is still somewhat imperfect, and an 
entirely satisfactory answer has not yet been found in UK law. However, such case 
law has brought quite an insight: the mere usage of proceedings is not necessarily in 
breach of privilege. Citing Hansard in court for the purpose of proving that a certain 
statement has been made, or a certain ‘proceeding’ has taken place in Parliament, is 
not ‘questioning’ in the sense of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. To a certain extent, 
such a statement may also be understood, that is, the courts may take cognisance of 
its meaning, for how else could it otherwise help them to interpret statutory 
provisions or identify government policy? This is more debatable than it may seem 
at first glance because it takes away from Parliament, at least to a certain extent, the 
interpretative authority over its own word. What if, say, the House of Commons 
came to the conclusion that a court had profoundly misinterpreted a statement 
made in one of its debates? Clearly, even if no such error occurred, the taking into 
consideration of parliamentary statements in the interpretation of statutes already 
necessarily amounts to ‘drawing inferences or a conclusion’ which is unlawful 
under Australian law. We may therefore see, also in the seemingly harmless usage 
of proceedings, an intrusion into the proceedings in Parliament. The law as it stands 
does not seem to recognise this as a breach of privilege. Lacking a statutory 
definition, however, the boundary between lawful usage and prohibited 
questioning of parliamentary proceedings remains thin. Admittedly, it is by no 
means certain that a statutory definition would be able to solve this problem.  
4.3.1.4. ‘Place Out of Parliament’ 
The term ‘place out of Parliament’ is another example of how inadequate the 
wording of Article 9, drafted in 1689, is with regard to present-day circumstances. 
The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege has called it ‘another obscure 
expression of uncertain meaning’.235 The Joint Committee went on to recognise, 
without any doubt, that: 
[t]o read the phrase as meaning literally anywhere outside Parliament would be 
absurd. It would prevent the public and the media from freely discussing and 
criticising proceedings in Parliament. That cannot be right, and this meaning has never 
been suggested.236 
Whereas in the 17th century the meaning of ‘any place out of Parliament’ may not 
have caused much difficulty (since a spatial or geographical reading of the phrase 
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seq. 
236 Ibid., para. 91. 
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could have been conceivable), it now has to face questions like, for instance, 
whether or not the media and media publications are ‘places’. The same question 
can also be asked about independent review commissions, even where they are 
appointed by the government, for evidently being ‘independent’ means that 
reviews are explicitly not conducted by Parliament. Hence, though ordered by 
Parliament, review commissions will likely operate out of Parliament. 
With regard to the media, the situation has not been finally resolved; however, 
Parliament has at various instances made clear that it will not intervene where 
media coverage of proceedings in Parliament is done accurately. In cases of 
misrepresentations of parliamentary proceedings, especially where done wilfully, it 
is very likely that Parliament would treat them as breaches of privilege, applying 
sanctions under the law of contempt.  
As for the case of independent review commissions, Leopold refers to the 
inquiry into overseas weapons sales to Iraq led by Sir Richard Scott. Sir Richard was 
a Lord Justice and, in his capacity of leader of the inquiry, he heavily criticised 
several statements made in Parliament. Had privilege been applied strictly, he 
would not have been able to discharge his task which, after all, included the 
‘questioning’ of what had happened in Parliament – otherwise his task would have 
been meaningless.237 The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege found it 
dissatisfactory that, in its view, statutory tribunals under the Tribunals of Enquiry 
(Evidence) Act 1921,238 being sufficiently similar to a court, would qualify as ‘places 
out of Parliament’ whereas Scott’s non-statutory independent inquiry did not. The 
Committee recommended, therefore, that the term ‘place out of Parliament’ be 
defined by statute,  
to the effect that `place out of Parliament' means any tribunal having power to examine 
witnesses on oath, coupled with a provision that Article 9 shall not apply to a tribunal 
appointed under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 when both Houses so 
resolve at the time the tribunal is established.239 
Erskine May notes that in 2003, members of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
voluntarily gave evidence to a non-statutory inquiry, which did not incite a 
discussion with regard to privilege.  
 
237 Leopold 1998, p. 82. 
238 1921 11 & 12 Geo 5 c7 [repealed]. It has meanwhile been replaced by the Inquiries Act 2005 
(2005 c. 12) which regulates the work and procedures of inquiry panels set up by the 
government. With regard to parliamentary privilege, the problems which the Joint 
Committee saw under the Act of 1921 would also arise under the new Act. Interestingly, S. 
22(1) of the Inquiries Act 2005 provides that a person may not be required to produce 
evidence or documents ‘if (a) he could not be required to do so if the proceedings of the 
inquiry were civil proceedings in a court in the relevant part of the United Kingdom, or (b) 
the requirement would be incompatible with a Community obligation’. According to the 
explanatory memorandum, it follows from S. 22(1) that ‘a person will be able to refuse to 
provide evidence […] because it relates to what has happened in Parliament’. 
239 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, First Report, 1999, HL 43-I, HC 214-I, para. 96. 
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The term ‘place out of Parliament’ has not yet been the subject of case law, so 
that we cannot attempt to draw a definition from judicial decisions. What seems 
sufficiently clear, however, is that ‘place’ should not be read strictly, and certainly 
not as a spatial notion, limiting ‘Parliament’ to the Palace of Westminster. In 
practice, Parliament itself has already conceded wide freedoms to criticise 
Parliament to the media, in the interest of public debate. It is clear that statutory as 
well as non-statutory inquiries, where they are officially sanctioned by Parliament, 
should also not be held to be places in which parliamentary proceedings must not 
be impeached or questioned, for this would make it impossible for them to do 
justice to their assignment.  
4.3.1.5. Recent Developments and the Future of the Article 9 Privileges 
Since the publication of the Joint Committee’s report in 1999, no legislative action 
has taken place concerning privilege. It is therefore at this point utterly difficult to 
foresee future developments. However, at this point, in early 2013, it must be 
assumed that new legislation is imminent, as parliamentary privilege has received a 
great amount of – largely unfavourable – public attention in recent years. 
Even before the parliamentary expenses scandal of 2009 and the subsequent 
Supreme Court judgment in 2010, privilege came under the spotlight in the course 
of what has become known as the Damian Green affair in late 2008. This affair 
unfolded after the Metropolitan Police, invited by the Cabinet Office, had entered 
into an investigation of leaks of secret material to the press. Following the arrest of a 
Home Office official who had supposedly given the material to Damian Green MP, 
who in turn had leaked it to the press, a court had issued a search warrant for Mr. 
Green’s home and constituency office, but not for his parliamentary office. The 
police then asked for permission from the Sergeant at Arms to search the 
parliamentary office. The Sergeant at Arms was informed by the Clerk of the House 
that he had the delegated authority to permit the search, but only if the Speaker 
agreed. The Sergeant gave her consent to the police and informed the Speaker, who 
wrongly believed that the police had a warrant. During the search, a variety of 
documents were seized that were later identified as being protected under privilege 
as parliamentary proceedings and had to be returned. Damian Green was arrested. 
However, criminal charges against him under official secrets legislation were 
eventually dropped.  
After this unprecedented search of a member’s parliamentary office by the 
police without a warrant, the seizure of privilege-protected parliamentary 
documents from that office and the arrest of a member of the Commons, the House 
established a Committee on Issue of Privilege, whose report was published on 26 
March 2010.240 Along with a review of the internal processes of the House, the terms 
of reference assigned the Committee with the task ‘to consider any matter relating 
 
240 Committee on Issue of Privilege, Police Searches on the Parliamentary Estate, first report, 22 
March 2010, HC 62. 
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to privilege arising from the police operation, and to make recommendations for the 
future. ‘ 
The Damian Green affair brought to light, on the one hand, that the rules on 
privilege, especially as to the definition of proceedings in Parliament and those 
governing the procedure which has to be followed during investigation on the 
parliamentary premises, are as of yet unclear, and that it is not evident that the 
vagueness (or flexibility) of these rules constitutes an advantage where a detailed 
interpretation is needed. In the Damian Green episode it was utterly unclear 
whether privilege would prohibit a search, or under which conditions it would not 
prohibit it, since the situation was novel.241 What was also shown, on the other 
hand, is that another major disadvantage of unclear rules lies in the ignorance 
concerning privilege on the parts of members, House officials and the government, 
the police and the judiciary. In the minutes of evidence to the report, the Clerk of 
the House speaks about ‘the slightly mysterious term of “exclusive cognisance’”242 
when reporting on the powers of the Speaker and those of the officials who are not 
members. This, and the failure of the Sergeant and the Speaker to act in a 
coordinated way when confronted with the request of the police for permission to 
search Mr. Green’s office, suggests that putting privilege on a statutory footing 
might be a desirable step, despite the unease with which this idea is frequently met. 
In its conclusion, the Committee on Issue of Privilege states that it does ‘not 
consider that anything the police did amounted to a breach of privilege or a 
contempt of the House but [that] the conduct of the police in this matter clearly fell 
below acceptable standards […]’.243 Then, however, the recommendations of the 
Committee stop short of demanding the enactment of new statutory legislation:  
As we have indicated, there are a number of issues connected with parliamentary 
privilege which deserve careful consideration. It would in our view be a mistake for 
Parliament to legislate in haste or to address only one aspect of the multi-faceted relationship 
between liberty, Parliament and the law. While we have no unanimous conclusion on the 
wisdom or necessity of legislating on parliamentary privilege, we agree in recommending that 
before any Government Bill on the subject was introduced it would be highly desirable for the 
whole question to be addressed in the round by a special joint committee drawn from both 
Houses. Before setting out to define and limit parliamentary privilege in statute, there needs to 
be a comprehensive review of how that privilege affects the work and responsibilities of an MP 
in the twenty-first century. [Emphasis original.]244 
The report once again underlines the need to clarify the exact nature and content of 
parliamentary privilege, as in novel situations (those in which the ‘flexibility’ of 
privilege law is considered particularly useful by its supporters) it will often be the 
case that nobody knows the exact scope of privilege and there remains a high 
degree of uncertainty as to the procedural aspects of its application. 
 
241 In para. 143 of the report, the committee acknowledged that the question had not been 
mentioned at all in the Joint Committee report of 1999.  
242 Ibid. Evidence 30, question 223. 
243 Ibid., para. 30. 
244 Ibid., para. 169. 
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After the Damian Green affair and the parliamentary expenses scandal, 
legislation on privilege has been expected. The Queen’s speech of 2010 stated that 
‘A draft Bill will be published on reforming parliamentary privilege’.245 The deputy 
leader of the House of Commons announced in December 2011 that consultations 
on the desirability of legislation would be held before the end of the 2012/2013 
session.246 While it seems now that the introduction of a privilege bill during this 
session is unlikely,247 the government has indeed published a Green Paper on 
parliamentary privilege in which it discusses the pertinent issues, presents the 
current state of the law and raises a number of questions for consultation with 
Parliament and the wider public.248 For instance, the paper acknowledges – with 
reference to the Damian Green affair – the sometimes ambiguous meaning of 
‘proceedings in Parliament’ and asks whether there should be a statutory definition 
of this phrase. It also asks whether proceedings should be allowed to be used as 
evidence in court, whether section 13 of the Defamation Act should be repealed, and 
whether, following the Chaytor judgment, the extent of Parliament’s privilege to 
organise its internal affairs should be clarified by statute.  
Following the advice of the Committee on Issue of Privilege quoted above, the 
government Green Paper does not take a hasty, one-sided stance on the question of 
whether or not legislation is due. Rather, the paper attempts a holistic review of all 
issues arising in the context of privilege. Thus, instead of making concrete 
proposals, the paper mainly discusses the background of these issues and the 
presumed advantages and disadvantages of statutory regulation. The government 
acknowledges the recommendations for legislation made by the Joint Committee in 
1999. It does, however, not believe that the case has been made for a comprehensive 
codification of privilege: ‘[…] in general the Government does not see enough 
evidence of problems in practice to justify such a significant exercise, which would 
inevitably have other consequences that may not be currently foreseen’.249 It adds 
that, ‘notwithstanding the discrete areas discussed in this paper where there may be 
a clear case for legislative change, the boundaries of parliamentary privilege have 
for the most part been very clear, and its operation has not been sufficiently 
problematic to justify such a radical departure from the UK’s basic constitutional 
underpinning’.250 In particular, the paper does not appear to call for a statutory 
definition of the elements of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The areas where the 
government does propose legislation relate to:  
 
245 The Queen’s Speech is available on the website of 10 Downing Street.  
246 HC Deb 19 December 2011 c144WS. 
247 The Queen’s Speech 2012, House of Commons Library standard note of 18 April 2012, 
SN/PC/06254, p. 8. 
248 Green Paper on Parliamentary Privilege, Cm8318, published on 26 April 2012. 
249 Ibid., para. 38. 
250 Ibid., para. 39. 
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- the use of proceedings in Parliament as evidence in criminal proceedings;  
- voting rights for lay members of the House of Commons committee on 
standards;  
- the reporting of proceedings in Parliament and the Parliamentary Papers Act 
1840.  
The second of these points is of minor relevance to this study.251 Following the 
expenses scandal of 2009, the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) had 
made a recommendation, among others, that there should be at least two lay 
members who had never been parliamentarians on the standards and privileges 
committee (CSP).252 However, there were doubts as to whether committee 
proceedings in which lay members take part would still be protected by 
parliamentary privilege.253 In addition, the House of Commons Procedure 
Committee recommended that the Committee on Standards and Privileges be split 
in two separate committees, and that lay members with voting rights should only sit 
on a Committee on Standards.254 The split has in the meantime been effected. The 
Green Paper contains a draft clause which allows the House to grant lay members 
of the Committee on Standards full voting rights without prejudice to the 
applicability of privilege to the Committee’s proceedings. 
The first and second points on which the government proposes legislation are 
more interesting for our purpose. The government considers that ‘it is wrong in 
principle to deny the courts access to any relevant evidence when the alleged act is 
serious enough to have been recognised as a criminal offence’.255 Hence, it proposes 
to allow the use of proceedings, otherwise privileged by virtue of Article 9 of the 
Bill of Rights, as evidence in criminal proceedings. These need not necessarily relate 
to criminal acts committed in proceedings or even by a participant therein; the 
questioning of proceedings in court would be allowed as long as they contain 
evidence relating to the alleged criminal act. Section 1(1) of the government’s draft 
clause on the matter reads as follows: 
(1) No enactment or rule of law preventing the freedom of speech and debates or 
proceedings in Parliament being impeached or questioned in any court or place out 
of Parliament is to prevent any evidence being admissible in proceedings for an 
offence.256 
However, subsequent sub-sections make this permission subject to a number of 
exceptions in the form of a list of offences to which it would not apply. According to 
the Green Paper, these are offences ‘related closely to the principal reason for the 
 
251 Green Paper on Parliamentary Privilege, Cm8318, published on 26 April 2012, p. 59. 
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253 Green Paper on Parliamentary Privilege, Cm8318, published on 26 April 2012, paras. 236-237. 
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Privileges, HC 1606, para. 53. 
255 Green Paper on Parliamentary Privilege, Cm8318, published on 26 April 2012, para. 95. 
256 Ibid., p. 37-41.  
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protection of privilege, i.e. the protection of freedom of speech and debate in 
Parliament’.257 The list of offences in relation to which proceedings could not be 
used as evidence contains the common law offence of misconduct in public office as 
well as most of the offences listed in the Official Secrets Act 2000 and the Public 
Order Act 1986. According to an analysis published by the House of Commons 
Library, these exceptions would play a role where an MP (for example as a 
defendant in court) wants to refer to material ‘which might be in breach of the 
law’.258 Other offences listed as exceptions mainly relate to data protection law and 
serve the protection of persons who provide members of Parliament with 
information.259  
Interestingly, the Green Paper discussed the danger of a ‘chilling effect’ on free 
speech in Parliament which might result from allowing the courts to use (and 
‘question’!) parliamentary proceedings if participants in those proceedings would 
be prevented from making a contribution due to fear that it might later be examined 
in court. The government acknowledges this danger but also contends that enacting 
the draft clauses (including the list of exceptions) would make it possible to balance 
two competing requirements – ensuring that parliamentary privilege cannot be 
used to evade the reach of the courts where criminality is suspected, while 
protecting the right of free speech and debate in Parliament.260 Moreover, privilege 
would still protect any participants in parliamentary proceedings – not only 
members – from civil actions, for example, for defamation.  
Significantly, the government does not propose the repeal, amendment or 
replacement of section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996. If briefly addresses the 
criticism which the possibility of a personal waiver has received, but also points out 
the disadvantages of alternative solutions: repealing it would, of course, bring back 
the problems which it was meant to remedy. Giving the power of waiver to the 
House, a committee or the Speaker instead of the individual member could have a 
great and chilling effect on free speech, as a member could not be certain whether 
privilege would be waived. And allowing the House to waive a member’s privilege 
only under the condition that he would not incur legal liability would deprive the 
waiver of all use. Observing that no use has been made of section 13 since Hamilton 
v. Al Fayed, the government does not offer a solution, and apparently doubts that 
one is needed.261  
This is particularly interesting in the light of a Defamation Bill which the 
government introduced in the House of Commons in May 2012.262 It has already 
passed through three readings in the Commons and is currently being debated in 
the Lords.263 The Bill does not make any amendments to section 13 of the 
Defamation Act; the government has explicitly omitted any consideration of 
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parliamentary privilege, for which it deems a privilege bill which might potentially 
follow the consultation initiated by the Green Paper a more appropriate place.264 In 
May 2010, Lord Lester of Herne Hill had introduced a Defamation Bill to the House 
of Lords.265 It envisaged the repeal of section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 and 
would instead have conferred the power to waive the privilege ex Article 9 of the 
Bill of Rights for an individual member to the Speaker of either House.266 However, 
Lord Lester’s Bill was not continued after the second reading in the Lords. 
Considering that, according to the 2012 Green Paper, the government does not 
necessarily see the need for legislative action as regards defamation proceedings 
and parliamentary privilege, it is at this point open but not very likely that section 
13 will be repealed or amended in the near future. 
As a final point, the Green Paper contains a draft clause concerning the 
publication and broadcasting of proceedings in Parliament which would, in 
particular, amend the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840.267 This Act, adopted as a 
reaction to Stockdale v. Hansard, protects authorised publications of parliamentary 
proceedings from civil and criminal suits, such as for defamation. Section 3 of the 
Act extends this protection to publications which were not ordered by Parliament, 
but only in cases where the defendant can ‘show that such extract or abstract was 
published bonâ fide and without malice’. The burden of proof thus lies with the 
defendant, which is rather unusual. Next to this, the opaque wording of some of its 
sections has also led to calls for modernisation – the 1999 Joint Committee referred 
to its ‘somewhat impenetrable early Victorian style’.268 The draft clause contained in 
the Green Paper269 provides that malice has to be proven by the claimant. It also 
intends to afford equal protection to publications in any form, including audio-
visual media and the internet. According to the Green Paper, the government does, 
however, not intend to create an absolute privilege for fair and accurate reporting, 
since this ‘would remove the existing conditions in common and statute law that 
reports of parliamentary proceedings are in good faith and without malice’.270 As an 
example of why such an absolute privilege would not be desirable, the government 
refers to a scenario in which the media provides a member of Parliament with 
private information covered by a court injunction and encourages the member to 
use that information in parliamentary proceedings on which it can then report 
without having to fear legal consequences.271 This would clearly constitute 
malicious use of proceedings, which the courts should be able to examine. 
The consultation phase following the publication of the Green Paper ended in 
autumn 2012. Whether the draft clauses will be adopted and whether any other 
 
264 Horne 2012, p. 6-7. 
265 HL Bill 3 2010/11, introduced on 26 May 2010. 
266 Ibid., S. 16. 
267 1840 c. 9, 3 and 4 Vict. 
268 Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, First Report, 1999, HL 43-I, HC 214-I, para. 342. 
269 Green Paper on Parliamentary Privilege, Cm8318, published on 26 April 2012, paras. 75-76. 
270 Ibid., para. 311. 
271 Ibid. 
 119 
Chapter 3 
statutory legislation – perhaps even a full privilege code – will emerge from this 
government-led review remains to be seen in the near future.  
4.3.2. The Privilege of Freedom from Arrest 
It was noted earlier that the privilege of freedom from arrest never applied in 
criminal cases but was limited to arrest in civil cases. However, where a member of 
either House is arrested on a criminal charge, the relevant House must be informed 
immediately about the arrest and the nature of the charges.272 The same is true 
where a member of either House is given a prison sentence by a court. No such 
notification is necessary if a member’s absence from the House is explained by his 
being elected to the House while detained.273 
As has been mentioned earlier, since the Judgments Act 1838, arrest in civil 
cases is no longer practised except, as the case may be, in proceedings on 
bankruptcy according to the Insolvency Act 1986.274 For cases of bankruptcy of 
members of either House of Parliament, it is explicitly provided by statute that they 
be, upon declaration of their bankruptcy, disqualified from their seats in the Lords 
or Commons and that their seats be vacated. Further, persons thus disqualified may 
not return for membership of the Commons.275  
One further non-criminal occasion for detention is detention under mental 
health legislation. Such detention seems possible for members of the Commons, 
since the relevant Mental Health Act 1983 contains a procedure for detention of 
members of that House.276 As to the Lords, their Committee on Privileges accepted 
that neither parliamentary privilege nor the privilege of peerage overrides mental 
health legislation and that detention is therefore possible.277 
Apart from arrest, the privilege, until recently, extended to certain other 
events which may prevent a member from attending Parliament, especially being 
summoned before a court as a witness, or to serve on a Jury. It is clear that 
Parliament still has the supreme right to require the attendance of its members; yet, 
according to Erskine May, it is doubtful whether the privilege would today be 
strictly enforced.278 Where a member chooses to attend court, he is free to do so at 
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any time, with or without formal leave.279 The exemption from jury service which 
members and officers of both Houses, and certain other peers, used to enjoy has 
been abrogated by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
Whereas it appears that the privilege of freedom of arrest today is ‘largely a 
historical artefact’280 which has played its role especially in very early times of 
parliamentary history, it has never been completely abolished. It is clear that its 
relevance in modern times is more than marginal, and it is in no way comparable to 
the freedom of arrest as it follows from parliamentary inviolability in other 
jurisdictions, which usually prohibits the arrest of a member of Parliament, and 
other measures of investigation against him or her without prior authorisation by 
Parliament, save where he is apprehended flagrante delicto in committing a crime. 
The complete abolition of what remains of the British privilege of freedom of arrest 
has been recommended by parliamentary committees several times during the 20th 
century, and was last done so by the Joint Committee in 1999 which viewed it as 
‘anomalous and of little value’.281 Without explicitly saying so, the 2012 Green Paper 
on parliamentary privilege suggests the same, and therefore asks the question 
whether freedom from arrest in civil matters should be abolished.282  
That this privilege, which must indeed be deemed to add but very little to the 
necessary protection of Parliament, is outdated and can create unjustifiable adverse 
effects is illustrated by the case of Stourton v. Stourton.283 The wife of William M. 
Stourton, a Peer, had secured a decree of separation from her husband and was 
suing for the return of certain property. A court order was issued accordingly, but 
when Baron Stourton failed to comply (and thus was in contempt of court) the wife 
issued a summons for leave to issue a writ of attachment (arrest) against him. Baron 
Stourton countered this by pleading the parliamentary privilege of freedom from 
arrest, which he enjoyed as a Peer. After examining the nature of the writ of 
attachment, the court in that case concluded that it was not a means to punish the 
contemnor – which would have brought it into the sphere of criminal law to which 
the privilege does not apply – but a means of coercion in a civil matter. Therefore, 
Baron Stourton could indeed rely on privilege to avoid his arrest. As this case 
shows, a particular concern raised by the privilege of freedom from arrest is that 
there is no requirement of a functional connection of the matter in which the 
privilege is asserted with the parliamentary work of a member or Peer. While such a 
requirement has developed for the privileges of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, with 
the effect that no privilege exists where parliamentary business is untouched by the 
case, freedom from arrest applied regardless of the circumstances of the case 
(although, or probably because, the cases in which it does apply are extremely rare). 
Due to the marginal role played by this privilege, the abolition of freedom from 
arrest appears to be a sensible choice. Yet, this could only be achieved by Parliament 
enacting a statute to that effect, which has so far not been done. Whether a potential 
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privilege bill, following consultations on the 2012 Green Paper, will address this 
issue is uncertain. Unless such a bill will actually endeavour a comprehensive 
codification of privilege, freedom from arrest in civil matters seems too unimportant 
an issue to be the subject of any forthcoming statute. 
4.3.3. The Enforcement of Privilege: Penal Powers of Parliament 
At the outset of this chapter we described how Parliament developed out of the 
ancient Curia Regis, a body that fulfilled a variety of tasks and did not distinguish 
between its legislative and judicial powers. These functions have subsequently 
grown apart and are now exercised by the King in Parliament and the courts 
respectively. However, with regard to lex parliamenti, Parliament is not only acting 
as a legislator; the two Houses both retain penal jurisdiction over so-called 
contempts. In this, the powers of the Houses of Parliament very much resemble 
those of judges where they exercise penal jurisdiction in cases of contempt of court. 
Erskine May explains that ‘the origin of the power to punish for contempt is 
probably to be found in the medieval concept of the English Parliament as primarily 
a court of justice’.284 Indeed the power to penalise for contempt does resemble that 
same power as it accrues to the common law courts. It is noteworthy, in this respect, 
that the view of Parliament as a court, as least as regards its own affairs and the lex 
parliamenti, is still alive today, as for example in the Nolan Report of 1995, where it 
is argued that ‘it is […] important for Parliament, the highest Court in the land, to 
have established procedures which operate as a matter of course rather than of 
chance’.285 
The term contempt does not come with a precise definition. It is clear, 
however, that contempt must be understood as a concept much wider than only the 
breach of one of the privileges enjoyed by Parliament:  
[A]ny act or omission which obstructs or impedes either House of Parliament in the 
performance of its functions, or which obstructs or impedes a member or officer of 
such House in the discharge of his duty, or which has a tendency, directly or indirectly, 
to produce such results, may be treated as a contempt, even if there is no precedence of 
the offence.286 
In addition to this extremely broad definition of contempt, the exercise by either 
House of Parliament of its penal powers is discretionary: no body or individual but 
the relevant House itself is competent to decide whether a contempt has occurred 
and whether and how it should be punished. However, upon recommendation of 
the Committee of Privileges287 the House of Commons resolved in 1978 to exercise 
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its penal jurisdiction ‘in any event as sparingly as possible, and only when satisfied 
that to do so is essential to provide reasonable protection for the House’.288  
It must be noted that under the law of contempt on which the penal powers of 
Parliament are based there is no need for a breach of any clearly defined privilege or 
any other precisely formulated legal rule. The above definition by Erskine May 
makes this abundantly clear. Since the law of contempt does not in fact require any 
previously defined conditions to be met in order for one of the Houses to make use 
of its penal powers, it is in principle evident that the law of contempt does not abide 
by the principle of ‘nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali’. In practice, 
however, this no longer seems to bear as much adverse effect as might be expected, 
as at least the House of Commons has self-limited the use of its penal powers. This 
does not, of course, limit the competence of any (consecutive) Parliament to make 
use of such powers in the manner it pleases, since ‘[t]he Houses, and they alone, are 
the proper judges of when these powers may be rightly exercised’.289 
What exactly are the penal powers of Parliament? First of all, both Houses 
have the power to order persons to appear before them to answer charges of 
contempt or breach of privilege.290 This is true for both members and non-members 
of the respective House; notification of the object or cause of the order is not 
required.291 As to further-reaching punishments, it seems that one had, until very 
recently, to make a distinction between the House of Lords, which was undoubtedly 
a court of record and thereby was able to inflict all forms of punishments which 
other courts of record have at their disposal, and the House of Commons, whose 
status as a court of record has historically been asserted but is nonetheless 
doubtful.292 In consequence, the possibility to punish by imposing a fine was only 
open to the House of Lords. It is likely that this possibility no longer exists since the 
House of Lords ceased to be a court of record. Both Houses, however, have the 
power to commit, id est, imprison, those they find guilty of a grave contempt or 
breach of privilege. Whereas the Lords commit by simple order, the Commons 
usually issue a warrant to that effect. While power of the Lords, as the highest 
‘regular’ court, to impose proper prison sentences has not been doubted, it has 
historically been uncertain whether the Commons enjoy this power without any 
restriction or whether the ordinary courts (and thereby previously the House of 
Lords) are competent to review the cause for committal and possibly admit a 
committed person to bail. According to Erskine May, a distinction has subsequently 
been made between situations where a warrant for committal, issued by the 
 
288 Erskine May 2004, p. 167. 
289 Ibid., p. 156. See in this respect Gosset v. Howard (1847) 116 ER 158. 
290 Erskine May 2004, p. 156. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid., p. 161. Since the UK Supreme Court started to operate in October 2009 and replaced the 
House of Lords as the highest regular court of the United Kingdom, it is likely that the status 
of the House of Lords must today be equated to that of the House of Commons. As 
constituent parts of the High Court of Parliament, however both exercising their penal 
jurisdiction independently, they can be seen as courts equipped with jurisdiction over lex 
parliamenti.  
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Commons, is expressed ‘in general terms’293 or whether it states explicit facts 
constituting the contempt for which the person in question is committed. Curiously, 
in the former case it has historically been held that:  
When the House of Commons adjudge anything to be a contempt or a breach of 
privilege, their adjudication is a conviction, and their commitment in the consequence 
is execution; and no court can discharge or bail a person that is in execution by the 
judgment of any other court.294 
This was tantamount to acknowledging that (a) the Commons, at least with respect 
to their own privileges and with respect to contempt of their House, are a court of 
law and (b) that consequently the other courts had no right to review decisions of 
the Commons as to the content and scope of their privileges and of what does or 
does not constitute contempt. In cases where the warrant does state facts and 
reasons for committal, it has been observed that courts ‘may be obliged to consider 
it and pronounce it defective’.295 It is uncertain whether courts would or would not 
take this view today.  
It has been acknowledged that the Lords, when they were still a court of 
record, had the powers to commit for a specified term, id est, to impose a fixed 
prison sentence. According to Erskine May, the House of Commons ‘is now 
considered as without power to imprison beyond the session’296 so that prisoners 
must be released upon the prorogation of Parliament. At the time the Commons last 
used their powers to commit persons for contempt, it was practice ‘to keep them in 
custody until they presented petitions expressing proper contrition for their 
offences and praying for their release […]’.297 A similar practice has been used in the 
Lords.  
With respect to members of the Commons, the House can also inflict the 
punishments of reprimand, suspension, or expulsion from the House, the latter two 
accompanied by withholding the salary of the respective member. The Lords do not 
have the power to exclude a member of their House permanently.298 
Lastly, where the offence in question is not merely a contempt or a breach of 
privilege, but in addition also an offence under the normal law of the land, such as 
assault (or in fact any offence), both Houses have the power – and have made use of 
it – to direct the Attorney General to commence prosecution. While this is quite 
logical and does, in principle, not give rise to much difficulty, it must be noted that 
this does not take away the power of the respective House to exercise its penal 
jurisdiction. Thus, a person could theoretically be prosecuted for an offence at law 
and for contempt at the same time, contingently receiving a prison sentence by a 
court and being committed by the relevant House. The likelihood for this scenario 
 
293 Ibid., p. 158. 
294 Brass Crosby’s case (1771) 95 ER 1011. 
295 Burdett v. Abbot (1810) 104 ER 501. 
296 Erskine May 2004, p. 160-161. 
297 Erskine May 2004, p. 161 Erskine May lists a number of examples from the 19th century (note 
1). Detainees were also frequently reprimanded before they were freed upon their petition.  
298 Erskine May 2004, p. 163. 
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to become reality is undoubtedly low; however as an academic thought experiment 
it does reveal, once more, the peculiar nature of the relationship between the lex 
parliamenti and the law of the land.  
Another scenario which has proven problematic in the past is the fact that, 
while certain matters fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament and are 
therefore only justiciable in the relevant House, acting as a court, there is no 
‘regular’ way of legal recourse to that House. This means that non-members who 
lack a remedy in the ordinary courts for matters which fall under privilege have no 
legal means of instigating proceedings. A complaint of breach of privilege or 
contempt may only be made by a Member of Parliament, by written notice to the 
Speaker of the House who will, under his discretion regarding the priority to be 
granted to the matter, proceed to bring it to the attention of the House.299 This lack 
of a commonly available remedy has given rise to human rights concerns in the 
context of British parliamentary privilege. 
Of course, neither Chamber is likely to make use of the more extreme 
punishments which it theoretically has at its disposal to avenge contempt. It is quite 
safe to predict that we will not see anyone thrown into a parliamentary dungeon 
again. One reason for this is certainly that this would simply not fit a modern 
conception of the rule of law and that it would cause public outrage. However, a 
much more important reason for the demise of Parliament’s penal powers – or 
rather of their being used – lies in the increasing curtailment of parliamentary 
privilege itself. After all, Parliament can only punish for contempt.  
We have already observed that contempt does not necessarily have to 
correspond with a breach of privilege. However, where privilege is not at issue and 
an offence is sufficiently grave, it falls within the realm of the law of the land. This 
means that the ordinary courts have jurisdiction and Parliament is probably not 
inclined to exercise concurrent jurisdiction. In other words, the penal powers of 
Parliament were much more useful, and in fact very much needed, when 
Parliament still had truly exclusive jurisdiction over near enough everything that 
happened within its precincts. Certainly, grave criminal offences (like the murder of 
the Prime Minister in the Lobby of the House of Commons) were at all times subject 
to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Nevertheless, until well into the 20th 
century (Graham Campbell was decided in 1935!) the judges still largely adhered to 
the doctrine that ‘a Court knows nothing judicially of what takes place in 
Parliament’300 and kept well clear of matters which fell within their relatively wide 
interpretation of exclusive cognisance. Today, Parliament may reprimand or require 
apologies of members or other persons who use inappropriate language in 
proceedings. It may even punish a member for damaging the mace. But already – to 
use the most recent example again – defrauding the House of Commons’ 
allowances scheme is no longer considered a matter for the penal powers of the 
House.  
 
299 Erskine May 2004, p. 167. 
300 Wellesley v. Beaufort (1827) 2 Russell 1; 28 ER 236. 
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5. Conclusion 
This chapter has been a long journey through the legal field of British parliamentary 
privilege and the law of Parliament. We are now able to draw a set of conclusions 
about privilege. Before doing so, however, we must consider one important caveat: 
for reasons closely entangled with British parliamentary history and with the nature 
of its common law legal system, a succinct and final definition of the nature of 
parliamentary privilege, its scope, and its content cannot be distilled from any 
examination, however comprehensive or specific. The reason for this is that the law 
has never produced such a definition – that it has rejected the idea of a clear-cut 
concept. On the one hand, the need for absolute certainty has never arisen with 
sufficient urgency, partly because the vagueness of the law was widely held to be 
beneficial and can also be expressed in the more positive term ‘flexibility’. On the 
other hand, none of the relevant actors (the two Houses of Parliament, the courts, 
and the Crown) has ever had sufficient authority to impose such a definition on the 
respective others and thereby risk latent conflict to flare up. This notion, it must be 
said, is a very ironic one. There was never an incisive moment in the history of 
Parliament and its privileges at which the separation of powers between Parliament 
and the courts had fully and formally been established, and the remainder of the 
historic mingling of functions between the two remains today as a historic artefact, 
but one which is still relevant where the application of privilege is concerned. The 
irony lies in the fact that, very probably, it was exactly the non-occurrence of a 
sudden formal-constitutional separation of powers which has eventually proven to 
preserve the inter-institutional checks and balances which other systems had to 
create artificially, such as by inscribing them in a definite and rigid constitution. 
In the light of these considerations, what are the ‘peculiar rights’ which, 
according to Erskine May, constitute privilege in their sum? We can infer from the 
discussion of privilege in this chapter that all privileges derive ultimately from one 
principle, namely that Parliament rules autonomously over its own affairs and that 
it does so in order to secure the unimpeded and effective discharge of its 
constitutional tasks (id est, primarily its tasks as a legislator). This is the principle of 
exclusive cognisance. Within this über-privilege, eclipsing all other specific 
privileges, the most important privilege is that of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689: 
proceedings in Parliament must not be impeached or questioned by any person or 
institution out of Parliament. As a basic principle, this privilege still stands firmly. 
However its scope has been increasingly curtailed by statute, case law and 
Parliament’s own interpretation. Even though the precise boundaries remain 
somewhat unclear, certain conclusions are safe: proceedings in Parliament include 
first and foremost everything said within parliamentary debates and any written 
documents which contribute to such debates. At times, proceedings may reach 
slightly beyond this. As a blunt rule of thumb, the more connected a potential 
proceeding is with matters belonging to the core tasks of Parliament, the more likely 
they are to be covered by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. Meanwhile, it is clear that 
Parliament as a geographical lieu of application of privilege is no longer of supreme 
importance, albeit that speech and debate that does not take place at the Palace of 
Westminster does not usually qualify for privilege.  
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What exactly may not be done with regard to speech, debate, and proceedings 
in Parliament? So far, they certainly may not be impeached or questioned. That is, 
they may not be attacked, examined as to their truth, misrepresented to the public 
or otherwise, or treated in any other way which might harm their integrity as 
elements of parliamentary proceedings. In the future, if legislation to that effect is 
adopted, this might change in that proceedings will be allowed as evidence in 
criminal cases, which would necessarily involve their ‘questioning’. Today, 
proceedings may already be used by courts in order to identify the intended aim and 
content of statute or government policy. The courts may also use proceedings where 
they merely serve to establish facts, id est, where they are not in any way 
impeached but merely ‘registered’. Proceedings may be reported to the public, but 
only where such is done accurately and without malice, and if Parliament has not 
prohibited their publication. However, it must be noted that publications and re-
statements of parliamentary proceedings outside Parliament are not in themselves 
parliamentary proceedings and are therefore not automatically privileged as such. 
This means, for instance, that privilege will not bar legal action for defamation 
against a publisher or broadcaster if the latter has published a parliamentary 
statement with malicious intent, even if the statement was accurately reproduced.  
Next to the privilege of freedom of speech, there still exists, nominally, the 
privilege of freedom from civil arrest. However, as civil arrest has ceased to be a 
common occurrence in British law, this privilege has long since been marginalised. 
The privilege might be relevant in the unlikely case of imprisonment for contempt 
of court. Moreover, civil arrest is still possible in certain cases under bankruptcy 
law; however, bankruptcy of a member of the Commons also leads to the loss of the 
mandate, thus making the application of the privilege superfluous. With regard to 
Peers, however, the privilege of freedom from arrest could possibly still be applied. 
Other statutes either explicitly provide for their applicability to 
parliamentarians regardless of the privilege, or the Houses have resolved not to 
apply the privilege in the cases pertaining to these statutes (the latter is the case 
under mental health legislation). Overall, the privilege of freedom from arrest has 
all but lost its practical relevance.  
For the enforcement of its privilege, Parliament is still equipped with penal 
powers. Those powers are also inherent in the notion that Parliament must be able 
to take charge of its own affairs, and do so exclusively. Even though there is no 
doubt as to their existence, the penal powers of Parliament are very rarely applied 
in modern times, primarily due to the curtailment of exclusive cognisance: there is 
little left over which the two Houses have exclusive jurisdiction, as statute, case law 
and the voluntary deference of Parliament have created extensive inroads through 
which the courts have gained access to matters which once fell under exclusive 
cognisance.  
The latter is of importance for the question of how the law of Parliament 
relates to the law of the land. We have illustrated that this question of constitutional 
theory cannot be finally resolved: there are two theories, one of which states that lex 
terrae and lex parliamenti are in fact two different and separate legal systems which 
co-exist, but where it is for the administrators of lex terrae (that is, the courts) to 
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determine the borderline between the two. The other theory treats lex parliamenti as 
a part of lex terrae in which, however, the material and procedural rules of the latter 
are of limited application. Both are supported by a long range of historic precedence 
and by a body of constitutional doctrine; however it is for the want of an imposed, 
conclusive definition that none of the two can ultimately be proven right or wrong. 
In practice, however, this is of little relevance. While friction may arise from time to 
time between Parliament and the courts, history (continuing up until very recent 
case law) has shown that it is in fact a constitutional convention for both 
institutions, Parliament and the courts, to avoid conflict in this matter. Case law 
shows, however, that privilege has recently been treated as merely an exception to 
the otherwise applicable law. In practice, privilege takes the form of a procedural 
bar for court proceedings rather than being treated as its very own body of rules.  
Much of what we have seen in our examination of the modern privileges 
indicates one very clear general trend: both the courts and Parliament increasingly 
interpret, assess and apply privilege according to a functional approach. This means 
that privilege is still deemed important in order to protect and guarantee the 
unimpeded performance of the core functions of Parliament – but no more than 
that. Hence, we can observe that recent developments of British parliamentary 
privilege constitute case in point for our hypothesis that immunity systems are 
generally evolving towards a functional approach.  
A century ago, it would have been almost unthinkable not to treat the expenses 
claims submitted by members of the Commons as proceedings in Parliament;301 the 
search of an MP’s parliamentary office without a warrant would have been treated 
as contempt of Parliament. Until Pepper v. Hart, so as recently as 1993, the 
prohibition to ‘impeach or question’ proceedings in court was taken to mean that 
judges could not even refer to proceedings in order to elicit the true intention 
behind the wording of an Act of Parliament. Twenty years later, the government 
has proposed legislation which would explicitly allow the use of proceedings as 
evidence in nearly all criminal cases (with the exception of offences relating directly 
to freedom of speech in Parliament); and such use would certainly include the 
‘questioning’ of proceedings. Already from 1996 section 13 of the Defamation Act 
has allowed individual members to waive privilege in certain cases. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in R v. Chaytor has shown that the privilege of exclusive cognisance 
does not fill the gap which the ever narrower privilege of Article 9 leaves on its 
retreat. Seen individually, these developments are incidental. Neither the courts, 
Parliament, or its committees (or the government, in its Green Paper) have formally 
and explicitly committed to an agenda which aims at reducing the overall scope of 
privilege. Nevertheless, they have done just that. What has changed is the general 
attitude towards the purpose of privilege: it is now understood to serve a specific 
function, to protect Parliament from undue influence and enable it to carry out its 
constitutional tasks. At the outset of this chapter we stated that parliamentary 
privilege is more than just the British term for parliamentary immunity. However, 
 
301 If any allowances for members had existed. Prior to 1911, members of Parliament did not 
receive any salary and could not claim expenses. 
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the functional reduction of parliamentary privilege, the demise of the notion of lex 
parliamenti as a special legal territory, leads to the daring conclusion that privilege is 
developing to become just that: parliamentary immunity, much as it exists 
elsewhere. 
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Chapter 4 
PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY IN FRANCE 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Structure of this Case Study 
Following this introduction (part one) are four component parts to this case study. 
In part two, the history of parliamentary immunity is explored with a particular 
focus on the French Revolution, in which both French parliamentarianism in 
general and parliamentary immunity in particular find their common origin. In this 
part particular regard will be given to the interrelation between the revolutionary 
events and the shaping of the first immunity provisions.  
Part three is devoted to an account and analysis of the theoretical foundations 
and justifications of parliamentary immunity and its two elements, irresponsabilité 
(non-accountability) and inviolabilité (inviolability), respectively. Part four describes 
and analyses the current law and practice of parliamentary immunity and discusses 
legal problems existing in their context. Finally, part five lays out the conclusions 
which can be drawn from this analysis of the French system of parliamentary 
immunity.  
1.2. Parliamentary Immunity in France 
This case study examines the system of parliamentary immunity of the French 
legislature, consisting of the National Assembly and the Senate. The French 
immunity regime is laid down in Article 26 of the French Constitution, which reads 
as follows: 
No member of parliament may be prosecuted, investigated, arrested, detained or tried 
based on opinions expressed or votes cast by him in the exercise of his functions.  
No member of parliament may be arrested or subjected to any other measure of a 
criminal or correctional nature depriving him of or restricting his liberty without the 
authorisation of the bureau of the Chamber to which he belongs. Such authorisation is 
not required in case of a crime or misdemeanour in flagrante delicto or in case of a final 
conviction.  
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The detention of a member of parliament, any measures depriving him of or restricting 
his liberty, or his prosecution shall be suspended for the period of the session if the 
Chamber to which he belongs so requires.  
The affected Chamber shall convene by operation of the law for supplementary 
meetings in order to allow, where appropriate, the application of the preceding 
paragraph.1 
Article 26 thus creates a two-tier immunity in which two distinct elements together 
provide parliamentarians with a relatively wide protective shield. On the one hand, 
non-accountability (irresponsabilité) ex paragraph 1 protects members of either 
chamber of parliament from legal action or any measure of investigation or 
prosecution for opinions expressed and votes cast in the exercise of their mandate. 
On the other hand, inviolability (inviolabilité) ex paragraph two protects members of 
either chamber from being deprived of their liberty (that is, from being arrested or 
detained) in criminal or correctional matters, save flagrante delicto, without the 
approval of the bureau of their respective chamber. This second layer of immunity 
extends to matters which are not covered by inviolability: anything that goes 
beyond ‘opinions or votes expressed in the exercise of the parliamentary mandate’. 
Whereas non-accountability is absolute and perpetual, inviolability is limited ratione 
temporis to the parliamentary session, does not apply in the case of an arrest flagrante 
delicto or a final criminal sentence and may be lifted by the bureau2 of the respective 
 
1 The French original reads as follows:  
 ‘Aucun membre du Parlement ne peut être poursuivi, recherché, arrêté, détenu ou jugé à 
l'occasion des opinions ou votes émis par lui dans l'exercice de ses fonctions. 
 Aucun membre du Parlement ne peut faire l’objet, en matière criminelle ou correctionnelle, 
d'une arrestation ou de toute autre mesure privative ou restrictive de liberté qu'avec 
l'autorisation du Bureau de l'assemblée dont il fait partie. Cette autorisation n'est pas requise 
en cas de crime ou délit flagrant ou de condamnation définitive. 
 La détention, les mesures privatives ou restrictives de liberté ou la poursuite d’un membre 
du Parlement sont suspendues pour la durée de la session si l'assemblée dont il fait partie le 
requiert. 
 L’assemblée intéressée est réunie de plein droit pour des séances supplémentaires pour 
permettre, le cas échéant, l'application de l'alinéa ci-dessus’. 
2 The bureau is the executive organ of either chamber. It regulates its deliberations and 
organises its services (see Art. 14 of the règlement of the National Assembly, Art. 2 of the 
règlement of the Senate). In the National Assembly, it comprises the president of the 
Assembly, six vice-presidents, three questeurs (treasurers) and twelve secretaries (Art. 8 of the 
règlement of the National Assembly). Except for the president, who is elected for the entire 
legislature, the members of the bureau are elected annually, except in the year preceding 
general elections. A list of candidates is drawn up by the leaders of the political groups. If the 
list of candidates for one of the bureau functions does not exceed the number of offices 
available, the candidates are appointed. Otherwise, they are elected, using a majoritarian list 
system (scrutin plurinominal majoritaire) (Art. 10). This way, the political configuration of the 
bureau roughly matches that of the Assembly, which the règlement explicitly recognises as the 
purpose of these elections (Art. 10(2)). The bureau of the Senate comprises the president of 
the Senate, eight vice-presidents, three treasurers and 14 secretaries. The Senate also has a 
procedure in place to ensure the proportional representation of the political groups in the 
bureau (see Art. 3 of the règlement of the Senate). That the political configuration of the 
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chamber. However, pursuant to sub-paragraph three of Article 26, either chamber 
of parliament has the power to demand the suspension, for the duration of the 
chamber’s session, of any measure of prosecution or detention of one of its 
members. 
Like all other countries with a system of parliamentary immunity, France is 
confronted with the fundamental dilemma which lies in the fact that immunity 
stands in contrast – or possibly even conflicts – with the principle of equality before 
the law enshrined in democratic constitutions.3 Nevertheless, some degree of 
parliamentary immunity is regarded as a fundamental and necessary safeguard of 
the functioning of parliament in that democratic system.4 It has therefore been 
described as an ‘inégalité qui est un fondement de la démocratie parlementaire’.5 
However, even if one accepts that parliamentary immunity is thus justified in 
principle, its scope and legal implementation as well as its application in practice 
always requires careful balancing – and occasional re-balancing, as the socio-
political and institutional framework in which parliaments operate are subject to 
evolutionary processes and change. This case study endeavours to elicit the French 
solution to the immunity dilemma, to examine the particular balance which the 
French immunity system has found (and occasionally lost during parts of its 
history) between the competing legal needs of protecting the legislature and 
safeguarding equality before the law.  
1.3. Delineation 
In its examination of parliamentary immunity in France, this chapter is limited to 
the national parliament of the French Republic. Assemblies which exist at a sub-
national level (namely the regional, departmental and communal councils) as well 
as the parliaments of other entities or states, in particular former French colonies, 
whose parliamentary systems are sometimes modelled after the French example, 
are not considered. This twofold delineation is necessary for the following reasons.  
First, France is a unitary state in which the constitutional nature of the sub-
national territorial entities is in essence that of an administrative organ rather than a 
sub-state. Accordingly, regional assemblies cannot be equated to parliaments as 
they exist on a sub-national level in federal states or in the countries of the United 
Kingdom by virtue of devolution legislation (where they do possess legislative 
capacity, if only at the will of the central legislator). The assemblies of the French 
sub-national assemblies (conseils municipaux, généraux, régionaux) do not possess 
 
respective bureaux reflects that of the chambers should be borne in mind when considering 
the role of the bureaux in lifting parliamentary inviolability.  
3 This is also true for the French constitution. Art. 1 assigns the republic with the task to ensure 
the equality of all citizens before the law. The first article of the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen of 26 August 1789 states that ‘[m]en are born and remain free and equal 
in rights’. 
4 While this thought is occasionally questioned in the literature (in particular as regards 
inviolability), it is still the prevalent legal opinion. See amongst others: Bigaut 1996, p. 81 et 
seq. 
5 Luchaire & Conac 1980, p. 440. 
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proper legislative powers. While they do have the (limited) competence to issue 
regulations (règlement) and to take policy decisions in local matters,6 these powers 
depend entirely on the competences attributed to the communes, départements and 
régions by statute. Thus, although deliberations of a political nature do take place in 
the assemblies of the respective territorial entities, the latter should be considered as 
administrative rather than legislative bodies. Since the object of the present study is 
a comparison of the immunity systems of national legislative bodies, a detailed 
examination of the immunities of members of the French sub-national assemblies 
would exceed our purpose, as it would not contribute to the envisaged comparison. 
However, it can be noted at this point that the members of sub-national assemblies 
in France are not fully devoid of protection: they enjoy a limited form of 
professional immunity for unintentional misdemeanours in office.7 
Second, although the parliamentary systems of many countries – 
predominantly former French colonies in Francophone Africa, have been modelled 
after the French example, their immunity systems are also not considered in this 
chapter. While some of them certainly offer interesting aspects for a study of 
parliamentary immunity, it is nonetheless justifiable not to take them into account 
here. Not only would a detailed examination of these systems exceed the scope of 
this study, they would also, for the most part, lack the necessary comparability on a 
variety of important social, political and economic issues with the three European 
systems studied. Moreover, there is no continued legal interdependence, similar to 
that between the British law of parliamentary privilege and that of other 
Commonwealth countries,8 between the French system and those derived from it, 
which would merit and, in fact, necessitate such an examination.  
2. The History of Parliamentary Immunity in France 
This part of the present chapter is devoted to the history of the French 
parliamentary immunity regime, concerning the immunities enjoyed by members of 
the consecutive legislative bodies which existed after the Revolution, up until the 
 
6 Under Art. 72 of the constitution, the territorial entities administer themselves freely through 
elected councils and possess regulatory powers [pouvoirs réglementaires] for the exercise of 
their competences, which are attributed to them by law. The competences of the three levels 
of local government, the communes, départements and régions lie in the field of cultural, social, 
environmental and economic affairs, as well as education. 
7 Members of municipal, departmental and regional councils as well as the respective mayors 
and presidents of these councils may not, on the basis of Arts. 121-123 of the Criminal Code, 
be convicted for unintentional acts committed in the exercise of their functions, even where 
these would otherwise be punishable as misdemeanours, safe where it is established that 
they did not act with reasonable diligence and effort (Arts. L2123-34, L3123-28 and L4135-28 
of the General Territorial Collectives Act [Code général des collectivités territoriales]. There is no 
such protection in case of punishable acts committed intentionally, nor for punishable acts 
committed in the extra-professional sphere. Interestingly, there is also no form of non-
accountability, e.g. for utterances in council, even though the proceedings in these sub-
national organs must be considered political – i.e. deliberative, but not legislative in nature. 
8 E.g. through Privy Council case law with precedent value for the UK; see Chapter III.  
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establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958. While all relevant constitutional 
provisions will be dealt with in the chronological order of each constitution, the 
primary focus of this historical account will rest on the earliest occurrence of 
parliamentary immunity in the days of the Revolution. As will be shown, this focus 
is justified by the importance which must be ascribed, in hindsight, to the 
revolutionary events which first gave rise to the idea of parliamentary immunity in 
France and which must still be seen as the foundation on which all later immunity 
systems were built.  
2.1. The Concept of Parliament in Pre-revolutionary France 
Very much unlike its counterpart in Westminster, the French parliament – or the 
concept of parliament in France9 – cannot trace its origins back to the uncertain 
depths of early medieval history. Instead, its existence, along with that of the 
entirety of France’s modern constitutional tradition, is largely owed to one incisive 
moment in history: the French Revolution. The revolutionary National Assembly is 
therefore the natural starting point for an analysis of the history of parliamentary 
immunity in France.  
This does not mean, however, that no representative and consultative bodies 
existed in pre-revolutionary France. Numerous national and regional assemblies 
were convened from time to time; however, none of them reached the level of 
institutionalisation which is commonly associated with a parliament, and which 
already existed in Westminster during the Middle Ages. While not all of the pre-
revolutionary assemblies are of interest in the context of this study, some of them 
will be briefly discussed, in order to provide an understanding and conceptual 
delineation of the notion of parliament prior to the Revolution. 
2.1.1. Representative and consultative assemblies in pre-revolutionary France 
2.1.1.1. The Curia Regis 
In Capetian France,10 a medieval kingdom with feudal structures comparable to 
those which existed across Europe at the time, there was a Curia Regis, a council of 
the King’s highest-ranking vassals similar to the one found in Anglo-Norman 
England, which is assumed to have exercised mainly judicial functions,11 but which 
also more generally served as a forum for the feudal interrelations and interactions 
between the monarch and his tenants-in-chief. Along with this assembly of the 
highest-ranking vassals there were a number of other consultative assemblies. These 
 
9 On the term ‘parliament’ in the context of the Ancien Régime and the question whether the 
pre-revolutionary États Généraux can rightfully be called a parliament in the modern sense, 
see below. 
10 After the dynastic House of Capet, which ruled France from 987 until 1328. 
11 Major 1980, p. 10. 
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were convened irregularly and without a fixed composition at the behest of the 
King to advise him upon request, but had no binding power.12  
2.1.1.2. The Conseil du Roi 
Over time, the old curia regis has split up into separate and more permanent organs, 
such as the chambre des comptes,13 parlement and a conseil d’état14 which together 
formed the conseil du roi (the latter is to be understood as an umbrella term for all 
the institutions auxiliary to the King). Duverger notes that these institutions were 
composed of members of the nobility and clergy as well as relatives of the King, 
who had a traditional claim to membership of the conseil, but also with 
‘functionaries of modest origin but of great competence’.15 Over time, the monarchy, 
developing towards absolutism, increasingly sought to put the latter category of 
non-noble members of the different sub-organs of the conseil in a dominant position 
by either eliminating the old feudal Lords from the conseil, or by confining them to 
purely honorary positions.16 
2.1.1.3. Parlement 
One of the organs which formed part of the conseil du roi was the parlement. Despite 
the similarity in names, the institution of parlement under the French monarchy 
must be clearly distinguished from Parliament as it existed in England at the time, 
or from our modern conception of parliament as a body with legislative and 
representative functions. From medieval times up until the 18th century, the term 
parlement was used to refer to a variety of regional or provincial councils which 
primarily functioned as courts or tribunals, exercising regional jurisdiction (in the 
absence of a central, codified body of law).17  
 
12 Ibid.  
13 A court of audit which originated in a specialised section of the curia regis and later became 
an independent proto-institution.  
14 The name conseil d’État first appeared in 1578 under King Henri III; it referred to the section 
of the royal council which was charged with the interior administration of the kingdom and 
with jurisdiction in administrative disputes. Later, a special judicial section, referred to as the 
conseil d’État privé or conseil privé assumed the role of a court of last instance. In absolutism the 
monarch retained the right to dispense justice and interpret the law with final authority 
(justice retenue), so the conseil d’État privé exercised supreme jurisdiction and had the power to 
overturn judgments of the parlements (see below), primarily on grounds of errors of law or 
interpretation. The conseil d’État privé can thus technically be said to be ancestral to today’s 
Court of Cassation. (while in an absolute monarchy this will probably have meant to 
overturn judgments which displeased the monarch). For an informative historical overview, 
see the website of the modern Conseil d’État, the highest administrative court in France. 
15 Duverger 1991, p. 19. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Whereas initially there was only one parlement (of Paris), similar organs were established as 
new territories and were incorporated in the kingdom. These factually separate assemblies 
existed under the fiction of forming an aggregate institution of parlement, hence the singular 
use of the word. 
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This does not mean that the parlement did not play any political role. It must be 
borne in mind that the concept of separation of powers was entirely absent from 
pre-revolutionary political reality in France, to the effect that the entities collectively 
referred to as parlement, in their decisions as well as in their self-perception, could 
also be seen as political bodies.18 Regional parlements, however, had the important 
task of receiving and implementing royal edicts and decrees, which did not take 
effect until their registration with the parlement and other high courts. They also had 
the right to raise objections or make remonstrance against royal orders or 
legislation, which could then only take effect after having been registered with the 
parlement in the King’s personal presence, in a procedure referred to as ‘lit de justice’. 
Duverger observes that, in this respect, the parlement played a role of ‘conseil a 
posteriori’, as it gave its advice only after an initial royal decision had been taken.19 
Despite the self-image of the regional parlements, however, who collectively 
regarded themselves as ‘le gardien des lois fondamentales du royaume’,20 the final 
decision was always the King’s alone. Nevertheless, their resistance could at times 
be considerable. The reason for this is found in the relative independence vis-à-vis 
the monarch, which the parlements enjoyed mainly because membership was either 
venal or hereditary, and so not subject to royal nomination. This also makes it 
evident, however, that the institution of the parlement did not bear any element of 
representation of the people or nation, other than perhaps in their self-perception: 
‘Le Parlement n’était representatif que dans l’imagination des parlementaires’.21 
2.1.1.4. Les États Généraux 
Of all the pre-revolutionary institutions in France, the one which certainly bore the 
closest resemblance to a parliament in the modern sense, and which was eventually 
transformed into one in the Revolution, was the états généraux. However, prior to 
the Revolution the états also still lacked many characteristics of a modern 
parliament – for example, they did not have regular sessions or an institutionalised 
set of functions and powers.22 Originally conceived as one of the various bodies 
which together formed the conseil du roi, it did not develop a fixed form and 
 
18 Duverger 1991, p. 25. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Duverger 1991, p. 26 et seq. Duverger also discusses the content of these fundamental laws 
and in how far the (increasingly absolute) monarch was bound by them. 
21 Duverger 1991, p. 27. 
22 In principle, the King was at complete liberty to ignore the advice of the états généraux. 
Notable exceptions were the right of the états to determine royal succession in the case of a 
vacancy of the throne (i.e. in case there was no heir) and the right to authorise new taxes – or 
to refuse their imposition. While the latter can be seen as an important right with the 
potential to strengthen the institution exercising it (as was the case in the UK after Magna 
Carta), several factors prevented such a development in France. On the one hand, taxes, once 
granted, could be levied by the Crown without any temporal constraints, since only new 
taxes required authorisation. On the other hand, the lack of regular meeting intervals of the 
états and the habit of Kings to levy new taxes even without the authorisation of the états 
prevented its emergence as a powerful organ of state.  
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organisation until the late 15th century, by which time it had already degenerated 
into ‘an occasional instrument to be used in time of crisis’.23 Such crises frequently 
took the form of wars which required funding. The King therefore had to raise taxes 
for which he requested the consent and collaboration of his vassals in the états 
généraux, often without success, which led to the rare use of the assembly and the 
(formally illegal) imposition of taxes without its consent. Maingot notes, therefore, 
that ‘[i]n France by the end of the 15th century, the Estates General could be said to 
have acquired its main characteristics but it was not nor would ever become an 
institution’.24  
In 1614 the états généraux was convened for the last time in the pre-
revolutionary era, formally on the occasion of Louis XIII reaching majority age, but 
more likely upon the pressure of the nobility who sought to preserve their influence 
against emerging absolutism.  
2.1.2. The États Généraux as a Proto-parliament 
Despite its irregular sessions, its institutional weakness and the lack of clear-cut 
functions and powers which was typical for the institutions of medieval states, the 
aspect which nonetheless could justify a view of the états généraux as a proto-
parliament is its representative nature. Having been first convened in 1302 by King 
Philippe IV,25 its members were elected by the members of the three estates, the 
nobility, clergy and the tiers état (the third estate, primarily peasants and craftsmen). 
The election system for the états has changed often over time, but the états 
généraux of 1789 was, among other things, particularly noteworthy for its 
remarkably democratic election mode: while elections were held by estate (clergy, 
nobility and the third estate voted separately for their respective representatives), 
every born or naturalised Frenchman of at least 25 years of age who was inscribed 
in the tax register and had his domicile in one of the electoral districts had the right 
to vote.26 Apart from a citizen’s status as a tax payer, which required at least a 
minimum level of wealth, there was thus no census or other requirement apart from 
nationality, age and domicile. This made suffrage for the elections of the états 
généraux of 1789 considerably more ‘universal’ than it was under many post-
revolutionary constitutional systems to come.27 In the unusual case that a woman 
held a fief of her own she was also entitled to vote, to the effect that even female 
suffrage was not completely excluded.28  
 
23 Major 1980, p. 11. Major notes that the assemblies of Paris (1302) or Tours (1308) have often 
been named as the origin of the National Assembly in its final form. He argues, however, that 
this is wrong, since other national assemblies have been convened during the same period, 
but with a different composition and for different purposes.  
24 Maingot 2010, p. 39. 
25 Also referred to as Philippe the Fair, 1268-1314.  
26 See the règlement électoral, reproduced in Brette 1894-1915. 
27 See on this point Thumerel 2010. 
28 Art. XX of the règlement électoral, see also Duverger 1991, p. 22. Note, however, that this is a 
truly marginal exception. Due to the requirement of holding an independent fief, only very 
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Once elected, the états généraux only theoretically formed one assembly; in 
reality, the representatives of the three estates met and voted separately (vote par 
ordre). Whereas in previous états all three estates were represented by an equal 
number of deputies, the representation of the tiers had been doubled in that of 1789. 
However, this did not greatly improve the representativeness of the états généraux, 
nor did it initially lead to a shift of power towards the tiers: on the one hand, the 
third estate, whose members made up about 96 per cent of the French population, 
was still significantly underrepresented. On the other hand, more importantly, the 
vote by estate was initially maintained, so that the increase in the number of 
deputies for the tiers did not add to its political weight. The ensuing country-wide 
campaign for substituting the vote by estate by an individual vote par tête provoked 
the transformation of the états généraux into the Assemblée Nationale and thereby 
initiated the Revolution on the parliamentary level.29 
An important characteristic of the pre-revolutionary états which clearly 
distinguishes it from later French parliaments is the nature of the mandate of its 
members.30 Representation in the états généraux was direct in the sense that the 
deputies received from their constituents an ‘imperative mandate’. This means that 
they were not at all free to profess their personal opinions in the états and to vote as 
they deemed appropriate. Instead, they were bound by written instructions,31 
drawn up by the electoral assembly of their respective constituency,32 which 
contained the grievances for which the deputies were to demand redress and the 
concessions they were authorised to make. The imperative mandate precluded per 
definition the free deliberations which are deemed necessary for the proper 
functioning of a parliament in the modern sense, since it also entailed a right of 
recall where a deputy did not follow the instructions of his constituents: ‘[s]i le 
député ne tient pas compte, il peut être révoqué par ses commettants’.33 
As a consequence, parliamentary immunity was impossible in this system, as 
far as it is understood as being for the protection of free parliamentary 
deliberations, also shielding members from their electorate. In other words, the 
system of representation itself, providing for the immediate accountability of the 
 
few women of the second estate (nobility) enjoyed the right to vote; no corresponding 
exception existed for the tiers.  
29 Duverger 1991, p. 23. 
30 On the importance of the nature of the parliamentary mandate and the bearing it has on the 
theory of parliamentary immunity, see part II of the current chapter.  
31 These instructions were called cahiers de doléance (books of complaint).  
32 Members representing the first and second estate were elected per baillage (bailiwick) while 
the election procedure for members of the tiers differed between rural communities (baillages, 
paroisses) and the cities. In the countryside, depending on the size of the constituent 
community, two hundred households (feux) or less elected two deputies, less than three 
hundred elected three, etc. In the cities, the different guilds and crafts formed constituencies 
which elected certain numbers of deputies depending on the number of their members. 
Citizens of cities who were not comprised in any of these professional communities but who 
were eligible to vote (i.e. they were French, male, at least 25 years old and paid taxes) then 
formed ‘rest-constituencies’ who also elected a certain number of deputies, depending on the 
number of electors. See Art. XXIV et seq. of the règlement électoral. 
33 Duverger 1991, p. 23. 
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members of the estates general vis-à-vis their constituents, stood in the way of basic 
parliamentary non-accountability, and did so quite independently of any 
considerations regarding the relationship between the états and the monarch. 
2.2. The Emergence of Immunity in the Revolution 
2.2.1. Minimal Privilege under the Ancien Régime 
In principle, members of the pre-revolutionary états généraux cannot be said to have 
enjoyed any form of immunity in the strict sense of protection against the regular 
application of the law. The ‘law’ could take the form of a royal lettre de cachet, a 
directly enforceable order by which the King could cause the arrest or impose any 
punitive measure against any person in his realm. In short, the law was what 
pleased the King, without exception. In this sense, the very nature of the absolute 
monarchy precluded the existence of any immunity, except that of the King himself, 
who was by definition not subject to the law.34  
However, the états were one of the assemblies which had evolved out of the 
medieval curia regis and together formed the conseil du roi, so the deputies were 
considered members of the latter organ and therefore enjoyed a special status as 
advisors of the King. This status did entail certain privileges. However, these were 
minimal, essentially limited to a suspension of trials35 against members of the états 
in the 15 days prior to the beginning of the session, the duration of the session itself, 
and the 15 days immediately after the end of the session, although always subject to 
a ruling by the conseil d’état, which could override the suspension.36  
The similarity between the privilege of the French conseillers du roi and that of 
the members of the early English curia regis is conspicuous. However, the fact that in 
France this privileged status did not evolve along the same lines is readily explained 
by the different routes the two countries took in their constitutional development. In 
England the very origins of parliamentary privilege can be traced to the special 
status which royal advisors enjoyed under the pax regis. Privilege then evolved, in 
the wake of Magna Carta and due to a great and lasting dependence of the King on 
an increasingly assertive parliament. It became a body of law with parliament itself 
as its institutional base. Such an institutional shift never occurred in France, where 
the rare and instrumental use of the états généraux by the King eventually made it 
succumb completely to absolutism.  
Consequently, when the états généraux were finally reconvened on the eve of 
the French Revolution, their self-image still adhered to a traditional, monarchical 
concept of representation.37 This entailed that, as advisors to the monarch, the 
 
34 With the exception of the theoretically existing ‘fundamental laws of the kingdom’, see the 
discussion of the institution of parlement above. 
35 It may be assumed that these did not include measures of prosecution ordered by the King 
himself by means of letter de cachet. 
36 Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 24. 
37 Ibid. 
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deputies only enjoyed a minimal degree of protection which also ensued from his 
immunity and not, crucially, from any immunity attached to their own institution.  
As has been explained above, there was also no form of non-accountability of 
members of the états vis-à-vis their constituents in the sense of freedom of speech 
and a free vote, independent of the cahiers de doléance. Deputies who did not speak 
or vote in accordance with the imperative mandate, which was the basis of their 
membership in the états, could theoretically be recalled by their constituents who 
had sent them to the capital to speak in their place and who paid for their expenses.  
2.2.2. The National Assembly 
On 17 June 1789, the third estate, together with a number of clergymen and nobility 
who had accepted the invitation of the tiers to join its sessions, adopted the name 
Assemblée Nationale, reasoning that its members represented at least 96 per cent of 
the nation.38 In an effort to contain the revolutionary momentum which was 
building up within this new National Assembly, the King tried to prevent its 
session of June 20 by closing the assembly hall, under the false pretence of necessary 
construction works in preparation of the lit de justice to be held on 23 June.39 This led 
to the well-known serment du Jeu de Paume, in which the members of the National 
Assembly, provisionally convened in the Palace’s tennis hall, declared themselves la 
constituante, the constituent assembly of France, by taking the famous oath not to 
dissolve the assembly and to convene wherever necessary until a constitution had 
been adopted for the kingdom: 
‘L’Assemblée Nationale […] [a]rrête que tous les membres de cette Assemblée 
prêteront, à l’instant, serment solennel de ne jamais se séparer, et de se rassembler 
partout où les circonstances l’exigeront, jusqu’à ce que la Constitution du Royaume 
soit établie et affirmie sur des fondements solides’.40 
2.2.3. The Earliest Immunity Provisions 
It is apparent from the wording of the oath of the tennis hall that the National 
Assembly was not yet, at this early stage, pursuing any plans to do away with the 
monarchy as such (after all they vowed to give a constitution to the kingdom). 
Rather, it was only to limit its absolute power by embedding it into a binding 
constitution. It is clear that the limited protection enjoyed by the deputies as 
advisors to the King had already become all but meaningless.  
On the one hand, by declaring itself the National Assembly and by assuming 
the role of constituante, the legal foundation of this royal protection, the status of 
members of the estates as conseillers du roi, had already been undermined, because, 
both in its actions and in its self-image, the National Assembly was clearly no longer 
 
38 See the Histoire résumée de l’Assemblée Nationale, published on the website of the National 
Assembly. 
39 Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 27. 
40 As quoted in Buchez & Roux 1834, p. 3. 
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an advisory body. On the other hand, the members of the tiers had already begun to 
openly oppose the wishes of the monarch and continued to do so. On 23 June, the 
King rejected the act by which the tiers had declared itself the National Assembly, 
and ordered it to meet separately from the two privileged estates. But the Assembly 
no longer obeyed him. ‘We are here by the will of the people and we will leave only 
by the force of bayonets’41 – the words with which Mirabeau is said to have refused 
to receive the order of the King have become famous; the reference to the will of the 
people, used to refute the order of the monarch, marks the definite departure from 
absolutism.  
This open disloyalty to the King did not only make it impossible for the 
members of the National Assembly to rely on his protection, but also made direct 
attacks by the royal apparatus on members of the National Assembly very likely. 
The need to protect members of the National Assembly from royal interference had 
suddenly become most acute. During the session which saw the dismissal of the 
bearer of the royal order to convene separately, guards of the royal corps were 
already lining up outside the Assembly Hall and it was believed that 60 members 
would be arrested the following night.42  
This is the historical context in which the adoption of Mirabeau’s motion to 
introduce immunity on 23 June 1789 became one of the first ‘acts of national 
sovereignty’. The motion was introduced as follows:  
‘C’est aujourd’hui que je bénis la liberté de ce qu’elle mûrit de si beaux fruits dans 
l’Assemblée Nationale. Assurons notre ouvrage, en déclarant inviolable la personne 
des députés aux États généraux. Ce n’est pas manifester une crainte: c’est agir avec 
prudence; c’est un frein contre les conseils violents qui assiègent le trône’.43  
That the primary aim of the motion was merely to pre-empt the influence of 
aggressive advisors ‘besieging the throne’ is doubtful. Despite Mirabeau’s assertion 
that declaring the deputies immune ‘is not a manifestation of fear’, it is almost 
certain that the imminence of reprisals by the royal executive was the primary 
motive for adopting an immunity regime. Therefore, it was a circumstantial and 
reactive measure directed against an imminent and tangible threat. 
The National Assembly adopted Mirabeau’s motion by a majority of 493 votes 
to 3444 and established the immunity of each individual deputy by the following 
decree: 
 
41 As quoted by Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 29 (my translation). She notes that Mirabeau has 
probably not used these exact words.  
42 Soulier 1966, p. 14 (citing Michelet 1889, p. 174-175). 
43 Minutes of the National Assembly, session of 23 June 1789, as quoted by Soulier 1966, p. 13. 
See also: website of the National Assembly, <http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/histoire/mirabeau.asp#>. 
44 Soulier 1966, p. 13. 
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‘L’Assemblée Nationale déclare que la personne de chaque député est inviolable; que 
tous particuliers, toutes corporations, tribunal, cour ou commission qui oseraient, 
pendant ou après la présente session, poursuivre, rechercher, arrêter ou faire arrêter, 
détenir ou faire détenir un député, pour raisons d’aucunes propositions, avis, opinions, 
ou discours par lui faits aux États généraux; de même que toutes personnes qui 
prêteraient leur ministère à aucun desdits attentats, de quelque part qu’ils fussent 
ordonnés, sont infâmes et traîtres envers la Nation, et coupables de crime capital. 
L’Assemblée Nationale arrête que dans les cas susdits, elle prendra toutes les mesures 
nécessaires pour rechercher, poursuivre et punir ceux qui en seront les auteurs, 
instigateurs ou exécuteurs’.45  
The wording of this decree leaves no doubt that the meaning which the assembly 
members attached to the term inviolabilité at the time conforms more to what we 
understand today as non-accountability:  
‘any individual, body, tribunal, court or commission that dares, during or after the 
present session, to prosecute, search, arrest or order to arrest, detain order to detain a 
deputy for any proposition, opinion or speech uttered by him in the Estates General’ 
was declared ‘dishonourable and a traitor to the nation’,  
as was anyone who would lend their faculty to such an offence. However, the scope 
of the decree was limited to speech in the états généraux; it did not touch upon 
anything that happened outside of it.  
The second layer of immunity – the one currently referred to as inviolability – 
was only added by a decree of 26 June 1790 which completed the picture of the 
French two-tier system of parliamentary immunity, the essence of which persists to 
the present day:  
‘L’Assemblée Nationale […] déclare que […] les députés de l’Assemblée Nationale 
peuvent, dans le cas de flagrant délit, être arrêtés conformément aux ordonnances, 
qu’on peut même […] recevoir des plaintes et faire des informations contre eux, mais 
qu’ils ne peuvent être décrétés par aucuns juges, avant que le corps législatif, sur le vu 
des informations et des pièces à conviction, ait décidé qu’il y a lieu à accusation’.46 
This decree set limits for judicial action against members of the Assembly beyond 
the scope of utterances in debates. While charges against them were admissible and 
judicial enquiries allowed, they could only be arrested if caught in the act, and 
never sentenced by any judge ‘before the legislative body has, on the basis of 
enquiries and evidence, decided that there is reason for indictment’. 
It is particularly interesting to trace the historical circumstances which led to 
the adoption of the latter decree. Guérin-Bargues observes that it followed – and 
was indeed directly instigated by – the arrest of the deputy de Lautrec, who had 
been suspected of counter-revolutionary activities by the municipality of 
Toulouse.47 The rapporteur du Comité des recherches, Voidel, was of the opinion that 
 
45 Décret du 23 Juin 1789 sur l’inviolabilité des députés. 
46 Décret du 26-27 Juin 1790 qui règle provisoirement les cas où les députés à l’Assemblée 
Nationale peuvent être arrêtés, et la forme des procédures à faire contre eux.  
47 Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 99. 
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Lautrec did not enjoy the protection prescribed by the decree of 13 June 1789. 
Crucially, he did not reach this conclusion by reference to the fact that the alleged 
activities had been performed outside the scope of Lautrec’s mandate (thus 
rendering the decree inapplicable to his case). It was by concluding that Lautrec’s 
situation differed from that to which the decree applied, in that Lautrec had been 
legally indicted, proceedings had commenced, and a warrant had been duly issued. 
He argued that the advanced stage of proceedings rendered the application of the 
decree of 13 June 1789 unnecessary.48 The Assembly took the opposite view – that 
the first immunity decree of 23 June 1789 did in fact apply in this case – and ordered 
the release of deputy Lautrec.49  
Guérin-Bargues draws a conclusion from this episode about the intention of 
the Assembly in subsequently issuing the second immunity decree of 26 June 1790. 
It was not to create a new layer of immunity which had not existed previously, but 
to reiterate and interpret the content of the decree of 23 June 1789, which in the 
Assembly’s opinion had already merited the release of Lautrec.50 Her 
argumentation, based on transcripts of debates in the Assembly, seems 
convincing.51 If it holds true, however, that the decree of 26 June 1790 was intended 
only as a restatement, necessitated by circumstances of the immunity established 
previously, this must change our reading of both decrees. It means that (a) the 
immunity created by the first decree was in fact meant, seemingly in contrast to its 
wording, to cover extra-parliamentary activities including acts other than 
utterances, and that (b) it was not the intention of the Assembly to create a new, 
further-reaching layer of immunity (id est, inviolability) by issuing the second 
decree. Such a reading would have a significant impact on both our interpretation 
of the contents of parliamentary immunity as it was designed during the Revolution 
(to be discussed further below) and on our assessment of the theoretical foundations 
on which French doctrine traditionally bases the system of inviolability. 
In practice, however, the two immunity decrees of 1789 and 1790 in 
conjunction have formed the historical basis of the French two-tier immunity 
system: no member of the legislature could be arrested or subjected to any measures 
of investigation or prosecution for his utterances or the vote cast in the assembly. 
For punishable acts committed outside the scope of the mandate of a deputy, he 
could be arrested flagrante delicto. Measures of investigation and legal complaints 
against him were also permitted, but he could not be detained without a decision to 
that effect having been taken by the legislative body, following its own examination 
of the evidence against him. The decision to put a member of the corps législatif in a 
state of accusation was thus an exclusive right of the assembly.  
The first codification of immunity in formal legislation (id est, not by decree) 
added clarification as to its temporal scope. Pursuant to Article 51 of the loi of 13-17 
June 1791, the representatives of the nation were ‘inviolable’ as of the 
 
48 Ibid. For an account of the facts which led to Lautrec’s arrest, Guérin-Bargues refers to A.P., 
1ère série, t. XVI, p. 458-459 [session of 25 June 1790]. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Other authors do not share her opinion; see e.g. Soulier 1966. 
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announcement of their election, during the entire legislative term and the month 
immediately after the end of that term. Further, pursuant to Article 53 of the same 
Act, a representative could be arrested flagrante delicto or on an arrest warrant, but 
his prosecution could not be continued until the legislature had decided that there 
was reason for his indictment. The French original of these two articles reads as 
follows: 
‘Art. 51: Les représentants de la Nation sont inviolables depuis le moment de leur 
élection proclamé, pendant toute la législature dont ils sont membres, et en outre, 
pendant un mois à compter de cette législature. 
Art. 53: Ils pourront, pour faits de crimes commis hors de leurs fonctions, être saisis 
soit en flagrant délit, soit en vertu d’un mandat d’arrêt; mais la poursuite ne pourra 
être continuée qu’après que le corps législatif aura déclaré qu’il y a lieu à accusation’.52 
The adoption of the Act of 13-17 June 1791 brought the first stage of the 
development of French parliamentary immunity to an end: it consolidated the 
immunity system which had been created ad hoc by the National Assembly. What 
is remarkable about these statutory provisions is that they did not seem to contain a 
reference to non-accountability (in the modern sense) – only inviolability for crimes 
committed outside the sphere of the legislative mandate was explicitly regulated in 
Article 53. This should not be taken to mean that non-accountability was not 
intended by the legislator. Not only would that be illogical in the presence of 
inviolability for extra-parliamentary crimes, it would also be inconsistent with the 
opinio iuris of the National Assembly, both prior to the adoption of the Act (as 
expressed in the two decrees discussed above), and immediately afterwards, when 
the first republican constitution was adopted on 3 September 1791. Therefore, a 
more convincing interpretation of the Act of 13-17 June 1791 seems to be that non-
accountability was, for a reader at that time, so obviously included in the members’ 
inviolabilité that an explicit, separate mention of it was deemed unnecessary.  
It should also be noted that the immunity provisions in the Act of 13-17 June 
1791 did not provide for a comprehensive freedom from arrest: as long as an arrest 
was carried out flagrante delicto or on a valid arrest warrant, a representative of the 
nation could indeed be deprived of his liberty, at least until the legislature had 
decided not to allow his prosecution to continue. The immunity provisions focused 
much more on due observance of procedure in prohibiting arbitrary arrests and they 
required that the deputy concerned be actively indicted by the legislature after the 
arrest in order for the prosecution to continue. This must, again, be taken to have 
applied only to cases involving alleged criminal acts outside the scope of the 
legislative mandate; in the context of the decrees of 1789 and 1790 and the 
Constitution of 1791, arrest and prosecution for utterances in the Assembly are 
likely to have been prohibited in general. 
 
52 Loi du 13-17 juin 1791 relative à l’organisation du corps législatif, ses fonctions et à ses 
rapports avec le roi. 
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The Constitution of 1791 contained two articles with wording very similar to 
that of the statutory provisions discussed above. However, both layers of immunity 
are now explicitly recognisable: non-accountability was laid down in Title III, 
Chapter I, section 5, Article 7, which provided that the representatives of the nation 
could not be investigated, charged or condemned at any time for what they had 
said, written or done in the exercise of their function as representatives: 
‘Les représentants de la Nation sont inviolables: ils ne pourront être recherchés, 
accusés ni jugés en aucun temps pour ce qu’ils auront dit, écrit ou fait dans l'exercice 
de leurs fonctions de représentants’. 
An interesting feature of the first constitutional non-accountability provision is the 
incorporation of acts (‘what they have done’) other than utterances, whereas the 
decree of 23 June 1789 had still spelled out ‘propositions, advice, opinions or 
speech’ uttered in the Assembly as the material scope of non-accountability. If the 
new wording meant more than simply a more concise formulation, it is unclear 
which acts precisely the drafters of the constitution had in mind, but it seems 
unlikely that they actually intended to broaden the scope of non-accountability.  
The second layer of immunity, inviolability, was laid down in Article 8 of the 
same section, and added a degree of procedural precision to the wording of Article 
53 of the Act of 13-17 June 1791. It stipulated that representatives could be arrested 
for criminal acts, either flagrante delicto or upon an arrest warrant, but that the 
legislative body had to be notified of such an arrest without delay. As under the Act 
of 13-17 June, the prosecution was not allowed to continue unless the legislature 
decided that there was reason for indictment:  
‘Ils pourront, pour faits criminels, être saisis en flagrant délit, ou en vertu d’un mandat 
d'arrêt; mais il en sera donné avis, sans délai, au Corps législatif; et la poursuite ne 
pourra être continuée qu'après que le Corps législatif aura décidé qu’il y a lieu à 
accusation’. 
2.2.4. Two Possible Interpretations of the Emergence of Immunity 
The wording and legislative expression of parliamentary immunity have been 
subject to considerable change since its first emergence in 1789, but the system on 
the whole displays a remarkable degree of continuity. This is true for its content and 
structure: a two-tier system which provides members of the legislature with non-
accountability for utterances and acts associated with their legislative mandate. 
Also, doctrine has traced the theoretical justification of immunity back to its historic 
origin, laying a justificatory link between the alleged necessity of, in particular, 
inviolability, and the concepts of national sovereignty and the representative 
legislative mandate, as opposed to the imperative mandate which the members of 
the états généraux received from their constituents. In order to facilitate a later 
evaluation of the doctrinal base of immunity, it is necessary to have a closer look at 
the possible interpretations of the first immunity provisions and their emergence in 
the context of the French Revolution.  
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Different interpretations are conceivable for several aspects of the earliest 
immunity provisions. First, the establishment of what the National Assembly then 
called the ‘inviolability of its members’ can be understood in two ways, a more 
abstract one and one which can be called historic realism. Traditionally, doctrine 
holds that its emergence in the very first days of the Revolution was a logical and 
necessary consequence of the shift from absolute royal sovereignty to national 
sovereignty realised through representation.53 The argument is that, in order to 
allow for the will of the (abstract) sovereign nation to manifest itself in its 
representatives, these must be protected from any interference.54 National 
sovereignty therefore cannot exist without the full set of immunities, id est, both 
non-accountability and inviolability, because only together can the integrity of the 
body representing the nation be safeguarded.55 
The historic realist interpretation56 focuses more on the revolutionary context 
and seeks to explain the emergence of immunity by reference to historical 
circumstances: the members of the National Assembly, openly opposing the king, 
feared serious reprisals by the executive. The adoption of the decree of 23 June 1789 
was directed solely against the executive and motivated by an acute threat 
perceived by the Assembly. Similarly, the adoption of the decree of 26 June 1790 
was merely circumstantial, a reaction to events which urgently required measures 
to be taken.  
These interpretations are not necessarily irreconcilable, in so far as we do not 
attach too much importance to the question of which view is correct on the cause of 
the establishment of immunity. Even if the motivation of the National Assembly to 
issue the two decrees establishing immunity was merely circumstantial, this does 
not mean that it was not also necessary to do so from a theoretical point of view. 
However, the adoption of either view can have far-reaching consequences for the 
assessment of, in particular, inviolability (in the modern sense, of a far-reaching 
immunity for acts committed in the extra-professional sphere). If we assume that 
the establishment of this second layer of immunity was merely circumstantial and 
that it is not at least also a necessary consequence of the idea of national 
sovereignty, this would considerably weaken the justification of inviolability in the 
constitutional system.  
It is therefore interesting to further examine the interpretation which the 
National Assembly itself attached to the immunity system it first created in its 
decrees of 23 June 1789 and 26 June 1790. Is it true that the first decree was only 
intended to create basic non-accountability and that the second decree established 
 
53 We will discuss the details of this line of reasoning in section 3 of this chapter.  
54 An immunity based on this thought is akin, though not identical, to that enjoyed by the 
absolute monarch before the Revolution. In absolutism, the monarch could not be subject to 
the law since, as the sovereign, his will was identical with the law. The comparison is impure, 
since the National Assembly did not claim to be but to represent the sovereign nation. 
55 This argumentation, in much more detail, can be found in most works on French 
parliamentary immunity, of which the most comprehensive to date is still the work of Soulier 
1966. 
56 Proposed recently by Guérin-Bargues 2011. 
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inviolability as a second layer of immunity? First, it is certain that the drafters of the 
two decrees did not differentiate between non-accountability and inviolability as 
distinct concepts.57 Whereas the wording of the decree of 23 June 1789 suggests an 
interpretation of the term ‘inviolabilité’ as non-accountability, a wider interpretation 
has also been proposed.58  
According to Guérin-Bargues, a wider interpretation is corroborated by a 
number of historical leads, such as the answer Mirabeau gave to a member who 
opposed the adoption of the decree of 23 June 1789, because the establishment of 
immunity would mean ‘to arrogate an exclusive privilege, whereas all citizens have 
the same right to the security we claim’.59 Mirabeau responded that ‘undoubtedly 
all citizens must be protected from arbitrary imprisonment; but the deputies are the 
only ones who must not be investigated during the session, even where this would 
be done in a legal manner’.60 If this was the opinion of the majority which adopted 
the decree, the intention must indeed have been to establish a wider immunity than 
mere non-accountability and, in its own view, this was then also what the National 
Assembly had done.  
Guérin-Bargues also found in the parliamentary archives a version of the 
decree of 23 June 1789 which contained a paragraph providing that ‘toutes 
poursuites, civiles et criminelles’ against members of the National Assembly are 
prohibited unless they are explicitly authorised by the assembly.61 Thus, apparently 
the term ‘inviolabilité’ was understood by the drafters of the decree as meaning a 
broad immunity, covering both utterances and acts within and outside the scope of 
the legislative mandate. This would also justify the proposition, explained earlier, 
that the decree of 26 June 1790 should be understood as a mere reiteration, or a 
specification at most, of the decree of 23 June 1789.  
In conclusion, both the drafting process and the content value of the first 
immunity provisions can be interpreted in different ways. While the interpretation 
of the former depends on whether one assumes a more abstract, theoretical 
perspective or a historic realist view of the revolutionary events, the interpretation 
of the latter largely depends on whether one adopts a purely literal or a more 
contextual reading of the two decrees. The ambiguous term ‘inviolabilité’ in the 
earliest immunity provisions should very probably be read as having a similar 
content value as it has today, while also covering non-accountability.  
It is important to bear this in mind when discussing the relationship between 
the conception of national sovereignty, the representative legislative mandate and 
parliamentary immunity (part three of this chapter). 
 
57 Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 96. 
58 Soulier 1966, p. 14; Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 96 et seq.; Duez 2004, p. 569. 
59 As quoted by Guérin-Barges 2011, p. 97 (my translation). 
60 Ibid. (author’s translation). 
61 Ibid., note 8. 
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2.3. The ‘Waltz of Constitutions’62 
Between 1789 and today, France has had a multitude of constitutions. The exact 
number depends on what one accepts as a constitution. An example is whether the 
Charter of 1815, in force during the 100 days reign of Napoleon after his return from 
exile on Elba, and formally only an amendment to the Charter of 1814, is counted as 
a proper constitution. But it is safe to say the number of constitutions amounts to 
more than eight. While the wording of the immunity provisions contained in these 
constitutions63 varies considerably, the principal features of the two-tier immunity 
system of non-accountability and inviolability are a recurring theme. Not all 
constitutions contained both elements of this two-tier system, especially in the 
autocratic, non-republican periods of the 19th century, but the idea of both 
immunities has resurfaced, time and again, with the adoption of a new system.  
It cannot be said that the multitude of immunity provisions French 
parliamentarians have seen during the ‘waltz of constitutions’ have had a decisive 
impact on the doctrine of parliamentary immunity – which usually refers to the 
origin of immunity in the Revolution. An all too extensive treatment of the details of 
the immunity regimes under all these constitutions is thus not necessary for the 
purposes of this study. It will consequently be omitted where it does not contribute 
to a better understanding of parliamentary immunity: instead, a short account of the 
respective constitutional systems and their immunity provisions will be given in 
order to illustrate the continuity of the fundamental idea of parliamentary 
immunity, and to provide the necessary historical background for an examination 
of the system as it applies in the Fifth Republic. 
2.3.1. The Period of the National Convention 
The development of the immunity regime during the years of the National 
Convention (21 September 1792 – 26 October 1795) is most interesting. It illustrates 
the limitations of the possibility to protect parliamentarians, and parliament as an 
institution, in a situation in which the rule of law is all but absent, and in which any 
system of legal protection is therefore ineffective.  
The factual circumstances and subsequent legal provisions which effectively 
abolished both components of the immunity regime (but especially inviolability) 
during that time have subsequently been taken back. This has characterised the time 
of the Convention in essence as an interruption rather than a stage in the 
development of parliamentary immunity in its own right. The fact that, and the 
 
62 Duverger 1991, p. 34. 
63 Not all of them did contain immunity provisions. The constitution of 1852, establishing the 
second French Empire, did not provide for any immunity, although two (very weak) 
parliamentary Chambers (Sénat and Corps Législatif) existed under the Empire. The full text of 
the constitution of 1852 is available on the website of the Conseil Constitutionnel. Several other 
documents which are occasionally counted as constitutions are de facto only far-reaching 
amendments of previous constitutions and did not contain immunity provisions as they left 
the unamended parts of the previous constitutions intact.  
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manner in which, the immunity provisions lost their effect nonetheless teaches us 
an important lesson about the mechanisms of any immunity regime – especially 
about its shortcomings.  
On 10 August 1792, the masses of Paris stormed the Tuileries, the seat of the 
legislative assembly provided for by the Constitution of 3 September 1791, 
demanding the end of the monarchy. Subsequently, the legislative assembly 
suspended the monarchy, decreed its own dissolution, and the election by universal 
(male) suffrage64 of a National Convention tasked to draft a new constitution for 
France. After these elections had taken place, the National Convention held its first 
session on 20 September 1792. The next day, it abolished the monarchy, thus 
creating the first French Republic.  
The National Convention did proceed with the drafting of a new constitution; 
however, that constitution never entered into force.65 Instead, the Convention, 
initially intended to function as a (constitutional) legislator, assumed executive 
power as well, which it exercised through several committees, most notably the 
committee of public welfare (comité de salut public) and the committee of general 
safety (comité de sûreté générale). In doing so, the Convention acted in direct 
contravention of the ideas which formed the theoretical basis of the Revolution, in 
particular the Montesquieuvian idea of the separation of powers. 
The period of the National Convention was marked by the grande terreur, the 
terror regime during which, between the summer of 1793 and the summer of 1794, 
tens of thousands of death sentences were handed down – and executed – for 
alleged counter-revolutionary activities. 
The system of immunity of members of the legislature, established by the 
National Assembly and enshrined in the Constitution of 1791, was not formally 
abolished during the rule of the Convention. However, it was subject to serious 
assaults and, for all practical purposes, was not observed. This is particularly true 
for the time of the grande terreur. On the first of April 1793, the Convention adopted 
the following decree upon the proposition of Marat:  
The National Convention, considering that the well-being of the people is the supreme 
law, decrees that, notwithstanding the inviolability of a representative of the French 
Nation, it will order the indictment of those of its members against whom there are 
grave presumptions of complicity with the enemies of freedom, of equality and of the 
republican form of government, resulting from denunciations or from written evidence 
submitted to the committee of general defence [later: committee of general safety], 
 
64 As opposed to suffrage under a census, as it had been provided for in the constitution.  
65 Constitution of 24 June 1793 (Under the revolutionary calendar which the national 
convention adopted in 1793 and which declared the day following that of the deposition of 
the King the 1st Vendemière of year one, this constitution is referred to as la constitution de l’an 
I). Having been drafted and approved by referendum in times of war and a general national 
crisis, the constitution never entered into force. Ironically, the constitution of the year one 
would have been much more democratic than the one of 1791 and the one of 1795 
(constitution de l’an III); amongst other things, it would have provided for universal suffrage 
without a census. As regards immunity, the constitution of the year one would have 
maintained non-accountability and inviolability along the lines of the previous constitution 
(Arts. 43 and 44).  
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which shall be responsible for matters relating to orders of indictment to be issued by 
the Convention.66 
The effect of this decree is striking: not only could the immunity of members be 
lifted by the Convention (which had always been the case), it was now 
automatically rendered inapplicable to any member against whom there were 
presumptions of complicity with counter-revolutionary activities or persons. And the 
mere denunciation of a member was already sufficient to give rise to such 
presumptions. Further, the decree not only lifted a member’s immunity, allowing 
the arrest of a member, it also automatically put the member concerned in a state of 
accusation.  
After the period of terreur had begun, concerns about the negative effects of 
the above decree seem to have increased among the members of the Convention. 
They tried to mitigate the automatisms described by adopting, on 10 November 
1793, a decree which provided that members could not be arrested before being 
heard by the Convention.67 However, this decree was taken back only two days 
later, justified as being done for ‘the national interest, the justice owed to the people 
and the principle of equality’.68 The period of terreur culminated in the adoption, by 
the Committee for Public Welfare (comité de salut public) of the law of 10 June 1794 
(22 prairial of year II under the new revolutionary calendar). This law aimed at 
simplifying the proceedings of the revolutionary tribunal and at making trials more 
expedient. It limited the tribunal to only two possible judgments: acquittal or 
death.69 It also provided for a ‘definition’ of the punishable counter-revolutionary 
crimes, which was so broad that a guilty verdict was all but inevitable.70 At the same 
time, it obliged citizens to denounce conspirators and counter-revolutionaries71 and 
denied the accused the right to counsel.72  
On the day after the adoption of the law of 10 June 1794, the members of the 
Convention tried to exclude themselves from its application, by decreeing that, ‘by 
yesterday’s decree concerning the revolutionary tribunal, [the convention] did not 
intend to derogate from laws which prohibit the committal to the revolutionary 
tribunal any representative of the people against whom no decree of accusation has 
 
66 As quoted by Soulier 1966, p. 15 (my translation). The French original reads as follows:  
 ‘La Convention nationale, considérant que le salut du people est la suprême loi, décrète que, 
sans avoir égard à l’inviolabilité d’un représentant de la nation française, elle décrètera 
d’accusation celui ou ceux de ses membres contre lesquels il y aura des graves présomptions 
de complicité avec les ennemis de la liberté, de l’égalité et du gouvernement républicain, 
résultant des dénonciations ou de preuves écrites déposées au Comité de défense générale, 
chargé des rapports relatifs aux décrets d’accusation à lancer par la Convention’. 
67 Soulier 1966, p. 15. 
68 Ibid. (author’s translation). 
69 Law of 22 prairial of year II, Art. 7.  
70 Ibid., Arts. 5 and 6.  
71 Ibid., Art. 9. 
72 Ibid., Art. 16. This article is particularly cynical, as it states that ‘slanderously accused patriots 
are provided with patriotic jurors as defenders. None are provided to conspirators’, thus 
making the condemnation of any accused person in advance practically explicit. 
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been issued previously’.73 However, the de facto dictatorial Committee of Public 
Welfare retracted this decree the next day.74 
During the period of terreur, a multitude of members of the Convention – and 
finally also the group around Robespierre that had designed the law of 10 June 1794 
– were sentenced to death by the revolutionary tribunal and executed. As has been 
mentioned previously, the period of the National Convention should not be seen as 
a stage in the development of immunity but as a phase during which exceptional 
circumstances led to its suspension. The period may serve as one of the most 
extreme illustrations of the limitations of parliamentary immunity and the 
protection it can offer. It shows that any immunity fails to fulfil its purpose where 
its guarantees cannot be relied upon against those in power, for example, under a 
dictatorial regime, in a state of lawlessness or in another situation in which 
fundamental constitutional guarantees and the rule of law are either abused or 
disregarded. In other words, any legal immunity still requires that the law be 
observed, and not abused, by the persons or institutions in power.  
Another interesting aspect which can be observed when looking at the period 
of the National Convention is that the decrees of 1 April and 12 November 1793 
suspend the immunity regime with reference to, amongst others, the principle of 
equality. While this principle, understood as equality before the law, is rendered de 
facto meaningless in times where no legal guarantees exist, these references do hint 
at the fundamental dilemma which arises in the context of parliamentary immunity 
– the clash of two constitutional principles of the same order.75 While it is certain 
that the motives for the suspension of immunity during the time of the National 
Convention was not based on such theoretical considerations, it serves to draw our 
attention to the problem of invoking one constitutional principle against another, 
which will be discussed further in part three of the current chapter.  
2.3.2. The Constitution of Year III 
After the fall and execution of Robespierre and other prominent figures who had 
overseen the reign of terror, a commission of 11 members of the National 
Convention was charged with drafting a new constitution, as the Convention now 
rejected the idea of a late entry into force of the Constitution of year I.  
On 22 August 1795 (5 fructidor of year III), the new constitution was approved 
by the Convention. In a subsequent popular referendum it was also accepted by the 
French people. It entered into force on 23 September 1795 (1 vendémaire of year IV).  
The new constitution re-introduced a clear separation of powers. However, it 
was one which came at the price of a political deadlock, as Martin and Cabanis 
explain: ‘[…] the members of the constituante […] tried to fragment power in order 
to avoid tyranny both of the executive and of the legislature. In the end, they 
achieved nothing but a system which favoured immobilism and corruption’.76 
 
73 Soulier 1966, p. 16 (author’s translation).  
74 Ibid. 
75 This has also been observed by Soulier 1966, p. 56 et seq. and other authors. 
76 Martin & Cabanis 2000, p. 19. 
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Indeed, the constitution contained many safeguards against tyranny, but no 
mechanism for the resolution of inter-institutional conflict, which made its 
application cumbersome.  
The Constitution of year III provided for a bicameral legislature consisting of a 
Council of Five Hundred77 and a Council of Elders.78 Membership of either body 
was incompatible with any other public office.79 A third of both assemblies, 
respectively, was to be elected each year by a body of electors (itself composed of 
members elected by so-called Primary Assemblies; regional gatherings of citizens 
eligible to vote). The executive consisted of five so-called Directors80 (the period 
during which the constitution of year III was in force is also referred to as the time 
of the directoire) and a number of ministers appointed by the Directorate. The 
Directors were chosen by the Council of Elders from a list of candidates drawn up 
by the Council of Five Hundred from among the former members of the legislature 
and the former ministers.81 The term of office of the Directors was five years. They 
could not be re-elected for a period of five years following the end of their term. 
Furthermore, one Director was to be replaced each year (during the five years 
following the entry into force of the constitution, the order by which the Directors 
were replaced was determined by a ranking among the members of the first 
Directorate). 
The legislative procedure provided for an equilibrium of powers between the 
two chambers of the legislature (and for the possibility of a complete dead-lock). It 
also strictly adhered to the principle of separation of powers. Bills were introduced 
to the Council of Five Hundred by one or more of its members and, if adopted, 
transferred to the Council of Elders as resolutions. In order to enter into force as lois, 
 
77 Constitution of year III, Arts. 73-81. 
78 Ibid., Arts. 82-109. 
79 Ibid., Art. 47. 
80 Ibid., Arts. 132-173.  
81 Ibid., Arts. 135 and 136. Pursuant to Art. 135, the requirement of formerly having been a 
minister of member of the legislature was only to be applied as of the ninth year of the 
republic (i.e. the fifth year from the entry into force of the constitution). However, as of the 
fifth year of the republic, current members of the legislature and members whose mandate 
had expired less than a year ago could not be elected directors (Art. 136). These articles must 
be read as an emanation of the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive 
branch; however, they must also be read in the context of the décret des deux tiers, a decree, 
adopted by the National convention prior to the entry into force of the new constitution, 
which stipulated that, in the first election of both chambers of the new legislature, two thirds 
of the members of either chamber had to be elected from among the members of the former 
national convention. This measure was meant to provide for a degree of political continuity 
after the introduction of the new system and thus to avoid the events which followed the 
exclusion of all members of the National Assembly after the entry into force of the 
constitution of 1791. In fact, the décret des deux tiers effectively imposed the a political majority 
(that of the drafters of the constitution) on the new legislative institutions. This rule, read in 
conjunction with the provisions concerning the eligibility criteria for directeurs during the 
year immediately following the entry into force of the new constitution and, subsequently, 
five years later, leads to a picture of a composite mechanism designed to exclude certain 
political groups (the royalists, who opposed the republic) from power, both in the executive 
and in the legislative institutions.  
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such resolutions then had to be adopted by the Council of Elders, which had neither 
a right of initiative nor of amendment. They were promulgated by the Directorate, 
which could not refuse to do so without thereby committing an ‘attentat contre la 
sûreté de la République’ – an assault on the security of the Republic.82 
The Constitution of year III must, to a large extent, be read as a reaction to the 
experience of the period of terror which the Republic had undergone during the 
time of the National Convention. This is illustrated, on the one hand, by the many 
provisions the constitution included as precautions against a usurpation of power 
by the directoire, and on the other hand, by the number and the degree of precision 
of its provisions on legislative immunity. The members of the Directorate disposed 
of the armed forces but were not allowed to command them directly.83 They were 
also not allowed to leave French territory until two years after the end of their 
term,84 nor to be absent for longer than five days from the seat of the Directorate,85 
from which they could also not remove themselves by more than 40 kilometres 
without prior authorisation by the legislature.86 Thus, the constitution did not only 
limit the room for political manoeuvre but also the physical freedom of the 
Directors. This certainly reflects the extreme degree of fear, on the part of the 
drafters of the constitution, of dictatorial government (and perhaps of foreign 
conspiracy). 
Similarly, it is owing to the proximity of the events during the period of 
terreur, which the deputies of the National Convention must still have had vividly 
in mind when drafting the new constitution, that the immunity provisions in the 
Constitution of the year III were the most detailed than any other French 
constitution to date. No less than 13 articles87 of this constitution stipulated very 
precisely not only the immunities which members of the corps legislative were to 
enjoy, but also the procedure which had to be followed for the authorisation of the 
prosecution of a member, the prosecution itself, and the consequences such 
proceedings entailed for the mandate of that member. The same immunity regime 
applied to the members of both chambers of the legislature and, in part, to the 
members of the directoire.88 First of all, Article 110 provided for absolute non-
accountability:  
 
82 Constitution of year III, Art. 104. The role of the directoire in the legislative process was 
formally limited to this duty to promulgate statutes without objection. However, Art. 63 
provided that it could ‘invite’ the conseil des cinq cents to take a certain matter into 
consideration, however not in the form of presenting it with a legislative proposal.  
83 Ibid., Art. 144. 
84 Ibid., Art. 157. 
85 Ibid., Art. 164. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., Arts. 110-123, ‘de la garantie des membres du Corps législatif’.  
88 By virtue of Art. 158, Arts. 112-123 applied analogously to the directeurs. They did not enjoy 
the non-accountability afforded to members of the legislature by Art. 110. This is explicable 
from a doctrinal point of view, given that the Directoire did not take part in legislative 
deliberations, i.e. their utterances were not important to the formation of the national will, 
and thus did not deserve equal protection.  
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The citizens who are, or have been, members of the legislative body may not be 
investigated, accused nor tried at any time for what they have said or written in the 
exercise of their functions.89 
Next to this primary layer of immunity, members of both chambers of the 
legislature as well as the Directors were protected by a remarkably complex system 
of inviolability. Article 111 of the constitution determined that the scope of this 
inviolability ratione temporis extended from the moment of their election90 up to 30 
days after the expiry of their mandate. During this time, members enjoyed freedom 
from arrest – except flagrante delicto, or where the lifting of inviolability had been 
proposed by the Council of Five Hundred, and subsequently decreed by the 
Council of Elders. In case of an arrest flagrante delicto, any further proceedings 
against the member concerned had to be authorised in the same manner. This 
means that, irrespective of which chamber the person concerned belonged to, the 
active consent of both chambers was required in order to instigate judicial 
proceedings against him, even where he had been arrested flagrante delicto.91 If 
proceedings against a member were authorised, he was to be tried before the High 
Court of Justice (haute cour de justice), a special, non-permanent court staffed by 
judges of the tribunal de cassation and several hauts-jurés, jurors elected by the same 
electoral college as the chambers of the legislature.92 The constitution also stipulated 
explicitly that the same court (and probably, for want of any provision suggesting 
otherwise, the same authorisation procedure) was to try members of the legislative 
body and Directors for the crimes of treason, squandering as well as ‘manœuvres 
pour renverser la constitution et d’attentat contre la sûreté intérieure de la 
République’.93 In Articles 116 to 122 of the constitution, details were laid down as to 
formal requirements for complaints against members (these had to be in writing, 
signed and addressed to the Council of Five Hundred) as well as the procedure to 
be followed by the two chambers; amongst others, the accused member had to be 
heard by both chambers before they took their respective decisions. Article 123 
provided that the mandate of a member who had been put in a state of accusation 
(that is, those whose prosecution had been authorised by the legislature) was 
suspended and could be resumed if that member was acquitted by the haute cour. 
It is readily apparent from the above that the immunity regime provided for 
by the Constitution of year III was exceptionally elaborate and that the protection it 
afforded to members of the legislature (and by analogy also to members of the 
Directorate) was exceptionally strong. It did not, however, deviate in its legislative 
form and its basic content from the two-tier immunity system established by the 
first immunity decrees of 1789 and 1790. In effect, just as one can see the period of 
the National Convention as a historic low point in the effectiveness of immunity but 
 
89 The French original reads: ‘Les citoyens qui sont, ou ont été, membres du Corps législatif, ne 
peuvent être recherchés, accusés ni jugés en aucun temps, pour ce qu’ils ont dit ou écrit dans 
l’exercice de leurs fonctions’. 
90 The original French term is ‘nomination’. 
91 Constitution of year III, Arts. 112 and 113. 
92 Ibid., Art. 266. 
93 Ibid., Art. 115. 
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not as a stage in its development, one may similarly regard the period following the 
adoption of the Constitution of year III as a particularly high amplitude on an 
immunity scale, but not one which brought any lasting change to the system. The 
entire constitution provided for inter-institutional relations marked by a highly 
accentuated separation of powers and, in particular, for a tightly controlled 
executive. Much in line with this spirit, the immunity regime of year III is 
characterised by the inter-institutional distrust which is undoubtedly owed to the 
experience of terreur. In this sense, later constitutions can be seen as a return to 
normality. 
2.3.3. The Constitution of Year VIII 
On 9 November 1799 (18 brumaire of year VIII), the constitutional system of the 
Directorate was overthrown by Napoleon Bonaparte in a coup d’état which 
abolished the Directorate and installed a nominally three-headed provisional 
consulate to take its place. It consisted of Napoleon as the First Consul (premier 
consul) and two others, Sieyès and Ducos, who had been members of the Directorate 
and had sympathised with a military coup. In reality, however, the First Consul, 
Napoleon, had assumed near-dictatorial powers which were later formalised in the 
Constitution of year VIII, adopted on 13 December 1799 (22 frimaire of year VIII).  
While an extensive account of the content of this constitution would lead us 
too far, it is sufficient to say that it provided for the peculiar construction of a 
tricameral parliament,94 consisting of a Conservative Senate (sénat conservateur) of 80 
members for life, a Tribunate (tribunat) of 100 members and a Legislative Body 
(corps legislatif) of 300 members. The members of the latter two chambers were 
appointed by the Senate,95 which itself was a self-replenishing assembly: the first 60 
members were picked by the two former, and lesser, consuls of the provisional 
consulate, Sieyès and Ducos, whom the constitution explicitly assigns with that 
task, together with the two lesser consuls of the new consulate. Subsequently, the 
Senate was to elect the remainder of its own members.96  
Though the constitution re-established universal male suffrage, the influence 
exercised by the people through elections was extremely limited, since elections 
only produced lists of notables from which the holders of any public office had to be 
picked; thus, the people did not bear any immediate influence on national politics. 
This is all the more true since the constitution prescribed a legislative process in 
which the government held the sole right of initiative (in which it was assisted by a 
Council of State, which gave legal advice on bills); bills were discussed in the 
Tribunate and subsequently voted without debate in the Legislative Body. The 
 
94 It may, however, be seen as inappropriate to refer to the sénat conservateur as a parliamentary 
chamber, as it does not have a role in the legislative process apart from a constitutionality 
check. One could, therefore, also speak of a bicameral parliament (tribunat and corps legislatif) 
and count the sénat as an institution auxiliary to the executive.  
95 Constitution of year VIII, Art. 20. 
96 Ibid., Art. 24. 
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Senate had the right to pronounce on the constitutionality of bills adopted by the 
Legislative Body as long as they had not yet been promulgated by the First Consul. 
The system of immunity laid down in the Constitution of year VIII covered the 
members of the Conservative Senate, the Tribunate and the Legislative Body as well 
as the members of the Council of State. It again maintained the two-tier structure of 
non-accountability and inviolability, the former also covering the consuls. In what 
appears to be a very remarkable deviation from all other immunity regimes in 
French constitutional history, the Constitution of year VIII did not, however, 
provide for freedom from arrest. It did contain an element of inviolability, but that 
was limited to an authorisation requirement for the prosecution of members of the 
respective assemblies. The immunity provisions laid down in Articles 69 – 71 of the 
constitution read as follows:  
Article 69. The functions of members of the Senate, the Legislative Body and the 
Tribunate, as well as those of the Consuls and the members of the Council of State do 
not give rise to any responsibility.  
Article 70. Criminal acts [délits personnels] punished with an afflictive or infamous 
penalty, committed by a member of the Senate, the Tribunate, the Legislative Body or 
the Council of State, are prosecuted in the ordinary courts after this prosecution has 
been authorised by a decision of the body of which the accused is a member.97 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that the protection enjoyed by members of the 
legislature was indeed considerably more limited under Napoleon’s Consulate than 
ever before since the beginning of the Revolution, with the exception of the period 
of terreur. The relative loss of protection becomes strikingly evident when compared 
to the immunity regime under the Constitution of year III, which had provided for a 
wide inviolability, including freedom from arrest and which had required the 
authorisation of both legislative chambers for the prosecution of a member of either 
chamber. The detailed formal requirements for complaints against members of the 
legislature have also been omitted from the first Napoleonic constitution.  
To conclude that the temporary decline of parliamentary immunity under 
Napoleon was a consequence of the departure from revolutionary ideas would 
probably be inaccurate – after all, parliamentary immunity was to be restored, more 
or less, to its revolutionary form during the subsequent monarchies and republics. 
However, its decline certainly signifies the slowing-down of the revolutionary 
momentum or, according to some, the end of the Revolution.98 It underscores the 
impression that the Constitution of year VIII, though formally still republican, in 
fact created a republican façade which concealed the return of certain mechanisms 
characteristic of the ancien regime, including personal rule and weak representative 
assemblies wielding very little actual power. 
 
97 For the purposes of both immunities, ministers (whose role was comparable to that of 
ministers under the constitution of year III) were regarded as conseillers d’état. This follows 
from Art. 71 of the constitution of year VIII.  
98 Martin & Cabanis 2000, p. 22. 
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The system established by the Constitution of year VIII underwent two 
significant amendments in 1802 and 1804 – equally often referred to as constitutions 
in their own right, the Constitutions of year X and year XII. The former installed 
Napoleon Bonaparte as First Consul for life, the second as Emperor of the French. 
Both documents also introduced other changes of the institutional setup and the 
functioning of the state, without, however, changing the system of immunity 
introduced by the Constitution of year VIII. 
2.3.4. The Constitutional Charters of 1814 and 1830 
After Napoleon had been exiled in 1814, the monarchy of the house of Bourbon was 
restored, however without a return to absolutism. Instead, the Constitutional 
Charter of 1814 (the restoration brought with it the end of the revolutionary 
calendar) established a constitutional monarchy in which the King held a strong 
position. Similarly to Napoleon, he had the sole right to introduce legislative 
proposals to the bicameral legislature, consisting of a Chamber of Peers (chambre des 
pairs), which comprised an indefinite number of peers appointed by the King, and a 
Chamber of Deputies of the Departments (chambre des députes des départements).  
The monarchy of the restoration lasted until 1830, briefly interrupted by the 
Napoleon’s return from exile for the period of 100 days during which the empire 
was restored. In the revolution of July 1830, King Charles X had to abdicate. His 
successor, Louis XIX, famously reigned for only 20 minutes, before abdicating in 
favour of Henri d’Artois, the grandson of Charles X, who then became Henri V of 
France, establishing the July Monarchy (monarchie de juillet). This lasted until 1848 
and featured a very similar institutional setup as the monarchy of the restoration, 
albeit under a new constitution.  
The immunity provisions of both constitutional Charters, though numbered 
differently, were identical. For the Chamber of Peers, Article 34 of the constitutional 
Charter of 1814 (Article 29 of the Charter of 1830) provided that 
No peer may be arrested except by order of the Chamber, and only the Chamber may 
judge a peer in criminal matters. 
For the Chamber of Deputies of the Departments, Articles 51 and 52 (43 and 44) 
provided that:  
No physical restraint may be imposed on a member of the Chamber during the session 
and within the six weeks preceding or following it. 
During the session, no member of the Chamber may be prosecuted nor arrested in 
criminal matters, except flagrante delicto, without the prior permission of his 
prosecution by the Chamber.  
Several elements of these provisions set the immunity system of the two monarchies 
apart from those of previous and subsequent constitutions. First, none of these 
constitutional rules seems to provide for non-accountability, or at least they do not 
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do so explicitly. However, members of both chambers were protected from any 
criminal prosecution, which must be interpreted as including prosecution for 
utterances in parliament deemed to be of a criminal nature. Nevertheless, even if 
criminal proceedings for parliamentary speech and other acts related to the 
mandate of a peer or deputy was thus barred, for the Chamber of Deputies this was 
only the case during the session and the six weeks preceding and following it. In 
other words, even if the material scope of non-accountability could potentially be 
read into the much wider material scope of inviolability, this is not true for the 
temporal scope which usually renders non-accountability absolute. The immunity 
system of the two monarchies can thus be said to have limited non-accountability 
where the duration of the parliamentary session is concerned.99  
From a doctrinal point of view, this may be explained or justified by the return 
to royal sovereignty. While the monarch was bound by the constitution and thus 
did not reign as an absolute ruler, it was once again he, and not the nation, in whose 
name legislation was passed. From a merely theoretical perspective, the complete 
and utter freedom of speech, which is held to be a prerequisite for the formation of 
the national will in legislative debate, was therefore not necessary as a matter of 
principle.  
The second remarkable characteristic of the immunity regime of the 
monarchies was that the inviolability afforded to the members of the Chamber of 
Peers was considerably stronger than that granted to the Deputies. On the one 
hand, the inviolability of the peers did not have the exception of an arrest flagrante 
delicto. On the other hand, while a member of the Chamber of Deputies could, 
during the session, only be prosecuted with the permission of the Chamber but was 
then tried before an ordinary court, a peer was protected from ordinary criminal 
justice for life; he could only be judged by his chamber, which then acted as a 
court.100 
2.3.5. The Constitution of 1848  
The July Monarchy ended with the Revolution of 1848, which led to the election of a 
new constituent National Assembly, assigned with the task of drafting a new 
constitution. This constitution was finally adopted by the assembly and entered into 
force on 4 November 1848. It established the second French republic, in which 
sovereignty rested with ‘the entirety of the French people’.101 In turn this delegated 
legislative power to a unicameral parliament, the Assemblée Nationale,102 elected for 
three years by universal (male) suffrage. Executive power was vested in a president 
of the republic, elected by the people for a term of four years (renewable after an 
 
99 For the chambre des pairs, however, this was irrelevant, since they were appointed for life.  
100 It is of interest that, in several respects, the chambre des pairs resembled the British House of 
Lords, membership in which (peerage) is also granted by the monarch either for life or 
(formerly) even as a hereditary right and which also held judicial functions (and continues to 
do so as regards parliamentary privilege).  
101 Art. 1 of the constitution of 1848. 
102 Ibid., Art. 20. 
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interval of one term) and was equipped with the right of legislative initiative as well 
as the right to demand a renewed deliberation of bills by the assembly, before 
promulgating laws ‘in the name of the French people’.103 
In the Second Republic, the constitutional provisions on parliamentary 
immunity almost reached their modern form. The immunity rules for the 
unicameral parliament read as follows:  
Article 36 – The representatives of the people are inviolable. — They may not be 
investigated, accused, nor tried, at any time, for the opinions they have expressed in 
the National Assembly.  
Article 37 – They may not be arrested in criminal matters, except flagrante delicto, nor 
prosecuted unless the Assembly has permitted the prosecution. — In case of an arrest 
flagrante delicto, this shall be reported to the Assembly immediately, which will 
authorise or refuse the continuation of the prosecution. This provision also applies to 
the case in which a detained citizen is nominated as a representative.  
In essence, these constitutional provisions comprise most of the elements which we 
also find in the immunity regime currently applicable in the Fifth Republic. Several 
observations can be made, however, which are specifically characteristic of the 
system of the Second Republic. First, it appears from the wording of Article 36 that 
the term inviolabilité had not yet undergone a process of disambiguation during the 
time between the revolution of 1789 and that of 1848. Article 36 declared the 
members of the assembly ‘inviolable’ and attaches to that term the definition which, 
according to our modern understanding, pertains to non-accountability. Another 
possible reading is that both elements of immunity, defined in Articles 36 and 37, 
are subsumed under the heading of ‘inviolability’. In light of the considerations 
presented in section 2.4 above, it is likely that the latter reading is more accurate. 
Second, neither of the two articles limits the temporal scope of immunity, as 
did the constitutional Charters of 1814 and 1830, where members of the Chamber of 
Deputies enjoyed immunity only while the chamber was in session and in the 
weeks immediately preceding and following it. This lack of a limitation of the 
temporal scope of immunity is explicable, given that the constitution provides for a 
session which is in principle permanent, while granting the assembly the right to 
adjourn its session.104  
Finally, Article 37 provided that the authorisation requirement it stipulated 
also applied where a detainee is elected a representative. It is questionable whether 
this should be interpreted to mean that the assembly could free an elected member 
serving a prison sentence to which he had been sentenced by a court. This is 
unlikely, because the article only allows the assembly to refuse the authorisation of 
(the continuation of) the ‘poursuite’, the prosecution. In case of a definite criminal 
 
103 Ibid., Art. 56-59. The text of the constitution does not provide for a duty of the president to 
promulgate laws. Instead, Art. 59 provided that promulgation may be done by the president 
of the National Assembly in case the president fails to promulgate within the prescribed 
period of time.  
104 Ibid., Art. 32. 
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sentence already issued by a court, the prosecution would already have come to an 
end, which renders the object of the authorisation, or the refusal to authorise, moot. 
However, at any stage of proceedings short of an actual sentence, the assembly was 
able to secure the release of both a sitting member (for example, in case of an arrest 
flagrante delicto) and a newly elected member.  
2.3.6. The Constitutional Laws of 1875  
In 1852, the Second Republic had already turned into a de facto dictatorship, and 
later into the Second Empire. On 14 January, the President of the Republic, Louis 
Napoleon Bonaparte, announced his plans to return to the institutional structure of 
the First Empire. After all, the Empire under Louis Napoleon’s famous uncle had 
proven its worth for the nation and it had ‘taken the whole of Europe allied against 
us to abolish it’. A new constitution was promulgated on the same day, by which 
‘the government of the republic of France [was] conferred for ten years on Prince 
Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the current President of the Republic’.105 Later in the 
same year, the republican façade was finally abandoned with the Sénatus-Consulte of 
7 November 1852, which re-established the Empire after the Napoleonic model and 
vested imperial power in Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and his heirs.  
The imperial Constitution of 1852 was the only post-revolutionary French 
constitution which did not contain any immunity provisions, even though, to a 
large extent, its text drew on the model of the Constitution of year VIII. 
Parliamentary immunity also remained entirely absent from the Second Empire 
throughout all subsequent amendments (by Sénatus-Consulte) of its constitution. 
The Second Empire ended in the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war 
of 1870-71. A provisional republican government was installed, which negotiated 
the peace with the newly established German empire. With the election of a new 
constituent assembly on 8 February 1871 and the tumultuous socialist episode of the 
commune de Paris in between March and May of that year, it took four more years 
before the institutional setting of the new republic was formalised in a constitution.  
This constitution did not take the form of a single document but consisted of 
three individual documents: the constitutional laws of 24 February,106 25 
February,107 and 16 July 1875.108 These constitutional documents stipulated that the 
Third Republic should have a bicameral parliament, consisting of a Senate and a 
Chamber of Deputies. The Senate was composed of 300 members, of whom 225 
were elected by the Departments and the colonies and the remainder by the 
(constituent) National Assembly. The Chamber of Deputies was elected by 
universal (male) suffrage; the number of its members varied over time, as it was not 
fixed in constitutional law but left to statute. The joint session of both chambers 
constituted the National Assembly (to be distinguished from the constituent 
assembly which was dissolved after the entry into force of the new constitutional 
 
105 Constitution of 14 January 1852, Art. 2. 
106 Loi constitutionnelle du 24 février 1875, relative à l’organisation du Sénat. 
107 Loi constitutionnelle du 25 février 1875, relative à l’organisation des pouvoirs publics. 
108 Loi constitutionnelle du 25 février 1875 sur les rapports des pouvoirs publics.  
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documents), which elected the president of the republic. He, as well as the members 
of either chamber of parliament, had the right of legislative initiative; statutes were 
promulgated by the president, who also appointed the ministers. Those, in turn, 
were politically accountable both collectively and individually to both chambers of 
parliament.  
It was this institutional setting with which France finally broke the cycle of 
constitutional volatility and instability: ‘[la constitution] met également fin à un 
rythme de production constitutionnelle et de succession politique relativement 
soutenu, au plan quantitatif comme au plan qualitatif, pour s’ouvrir sur une ère de 
stabilité’.109 Indeed, in terms of longevity the Third Republic is the most successful 
post-revolutionary French state to date. It lasted 70 years until 1940, when it was 
ended by the German invasion and not by a revolution or coup. 
The immunity regime laid down in Articles 13 and 14 of the loi constitutionnelle 
of 16 July 1875 is already very similar to the one which applies today and was, in 
essence, maintained both in the Fourth and in the Fifth Republic, where the scope of 
inviolability was only reduced by a constitutional amendment in 1995 (see part IV). 
Other than this recent amendment, no significant changes have been made to 
French parliamentary immunity since 1875. The provisions laying down non-
accountability and inviolability for the Third Republic read as follows:  
Article 13 – No member of either Chamber may be prosecuted or investigated on the 
basis of the opinions he expressed or the votes he cast in the exercise of his functions.  
Article 14 – No member of either Chamber may, for the duration of the session, be 
prosecuted or arrested in criminal or correctional matters without the authorisation of 
the Chamber of which he is a member, except flagrante delicto. The detention or 
prosecution of a member of either Chamber is suspended during the session, and for 
its entire duration, if the Chamber so requests.  
While these articles do not mention the words inviolability (inviolabilité) and non-
accountability (irresponsabilité) explicitly, they do formalise the immunity regime in 
its well-known two-tier structure, clearly separating the two elements and 
formulating them in an exhaustive way (id est, stating both the material and 
temporal scope of both elements of immunity in a clear manner). There is no longer 
any difference between the immunity regime which accrues to members of the 
Senate and that enjoyed by members of the Chamber of Deputies. In effect, non-
accountability for opinions uttered and votes cast in the exercise of the mandate is 
absolute for members of both chambers; during the session, both the criminal 
prosecution and the arrest of a member of either chamber are prohibited where they 
are not either authorised by the chamber concerned or where they happen flagrante 
delicto.110 In all cases, either chamber has a discretionary right to suspend the 
 
109 Martin & Cabanis 2000, p. 45. 
110 It should be noted that the parliamentary session, during which members enjoyed 
inviolability, was markedly short during the Third Republic. The first article of the 
constitutional law of 16 July 1875 (sur les rapports des pouvoirs publics) only stipulates that the 
session should last for a minimum of five months, while the president had the power to 
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detention or prosecution of one of its members. Such a suspension is, however, 
limited to the duration of the session. As a consequence, inviolability is a non-
absolute form of immunity, limited by the discretionary power of the respective 
chamber (which means that it cannot, other than non-accountability, be described a 
right of the member), and is contained by the limited duration of the parliamentary 
session. 
2.3.7. The Vichy Regime 
The Third Republic – or in any event the effectiveness of its constitution – ended 
with the adoption of the loi constitutionnelle of 10 July 1940, by which the National 
Assembly (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in joint session) ceded all 
constitutional power to Marshal Petain. The only article of this act reads as follows:  
The National Assembly gives full powers to the government of the Republic, under the 
authority and signature of Marshall Pétain, to promulgate by one or several acts a new 
constitution for the French state. This constitution shall guarantee the rights of work, of 
the family, and of the homeland. 
It shall be ratified by the National and applied by the Assemblies which it will have 
created. […].111 
By virtue of this constitutional act, Petain was at liberty to assume dictatorial 
powers. He did so on the very next day by decreeing three constitutional acts112 
which deposed the president of the republic, transferred all legislative and 
executive powers of the state to Petain himself, adjourned both chambers of 
parliament indefinitely113 and abolished all provisions of the constitutional 
 
adjourn both chambers twice for one month per session (Art. 2). These short sessions meant 
that parliamentarians of the Third Republic were only inviolable for a relatively short time 
per year, since inviolability was limited to the time of the session. Today, the French 
parliamentary session lasts 9 months.  
111 The French original: 
 ‘L'Assemblée Nationale donne tout pouvoir au gouvernement de la République, sous 
l'autorité et la signature du maréchal Pétain, à l’effet de promulguer par un ou plusieurs actes 
une nouvelle constitution de l’État français. Cette constitution devra garantir les droits du 
travail, de la famille et de la patrie.  
 Elle sera ratifiée par la Nation et appliquée par les Assemblées qu’elle aura créées […]’. 
 The reference to travail, famille, patrie was meant to replace the famous French motto of liberté, 
égalité, franternité. In his article ‘Politique sociale de l’avenir’ (Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 
September 1940), Pétain justified the new motto as follows:  
 ‘When our young people enter their lives [...] we shall tell them that it is nice to be free, but 
that real liberty cannot be had except under the shelter of an absolute authority […]. We shall 
tell them that equality is a good thing […], but that [...] [equality] must be encased in a 
rational hierarchy, based on the diversity of functions and merits and committed [...] to the 
public good. We shall tell them that fraternity is a great ideal, but that [...] real fraternity can 
only exist within natural groups, the family, the city, the fatherland’. 
112 Actes constitutionnels nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 11 July 1940. 
113 The second constitutional act of 11 July 1940 provides that the chambers could only be 
reconvened by order of Petain. 
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documents of the Third Republic which were inconsistent with these measures. 
Since parliament, consequently, was all but abolished in Vichy France for the 
remainder of World War II, parliamentary immunity was ineffective during this 
time, although Articles 13 and 14 of the constitutional law of 16 July 1875 were 
technically still in force. Article 13, providing for non-accountability for 
parliamentary speech and vote, was rendered irrelevant by the inactivity of 
parliament. Inviolability ex Article 14 was inapplicable as it only applied during the 
session, which was continuously suspended. 
2.3.8. The Constitution of 1946 
It has been alleged that the main difference between the Third and the Fourth 
Republic is to be found in their numbering.114 While this is of course a stark 
exaggeration, a comparative reading of the Constitution of 1946 and the 
constitutional laws of 1875 reveals that the differences between the two systems 
were indeed limited and in some cases only consisted of a difference in names. 
After a first draft constitution, devised by a constituent National Assembly 
elected in October 1945, had been dismissed by the people in a referendum on 5 
May 1946,115 a newly elected constituent assembly drafted a new constitution, which 
was adopted by referendum on 13 October 1946 and entered into force on the 27th of 
the same month. It provided for a bicameral parliament, consisting of a National 
Assembly and a Council of the Republic (corresponding to the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Senate of the Third Republic), the former elected by direct universal 
suffrage under proportional representation, the latter indirectly.116 Both chambers 
jointly elected the president of the republic,117 who appointed the ministers. The 
latter were accountable only to the National Assembly.118 Interestingly, the Council 
did not have anything but a limited suspensive veto right in the legislative 
procedure,119 which reinforced the dominance of the Assembly. The political 
functioning of the Fourth Republic was deeply troubled by the instability and 
volatility of government under its parliamentary system: a government only lasted 
six months on average.120  
As was the case in the constitutional laws of 1875, the regime of parliamentary 
immunity laid down in the constitution of the Fourth Republic reflects the strong 
position of the legislature in the system. 
 
114 Duverger 1991, p. 91. 
115 For the historical backgrounds of the negative result of the referendum, see Martin & Cabanis 
2000, p. 59 et seq. and Duverger 1991, p. 92-93. It is noteworthy that this was the first 
referendum in French history which the people answered in the negative.  
116 Constitution of 1946, Art. 6. In an amendment of 1954, the conseil was renamed into sénat. 
117 Ibid., Art. 29.  
118 Arts. 49 and 50. 
119 Art. 20. 
120 Duverger 1991, p. 99. 
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Article 21 – No member of parliament may be prosecuted, investigated, arrested, 
detained or tried on the basis of the opinions expressed votes cast by him in the 
exercise of his functions. 
Article 22 – No member of either Chamber may, for the duration of his mandate, be 
prosecuted or arrested in criminal or correctional matters without the authorisation of 
the Chamber of which he is a member, except flagrante delicto. The detention or 
prosecution of a member of either Chamber is suspended if the Chamber so requests.  
The text of the immunity provisions of Articles 21 and 22 does not differ 
significantly from that of the previous constitution, except for a broader temporal 
scope of inviolability. Whereas Article 14 of the loi constitutionnelle of 16 July 1875 
had merely declared members of parliament inviolable during the parliamentary 
session, Article 22 of the Constitution of 27 October 1946 provided for inviolability 
for the entire duration of the mandate. The arrest or prosecution of a member of 
either chamber, except flagrante delicto, was now also subject to an authorisation 
requirement. The constitutional amendment of 30 November 1954 brought a further 
modification of the inviolability provision. It re-introduced the differentiation 
between the period of the parliamentary session and the remaining time by creating 
a discretionary power for the bureau of either chamber, instead of the chambers 
themselves, to authorise the prosecution or arrest of a member outside the session. 
Further, it provided that an arrested member be freed automatically if his chamber 
failed to decide on the lifting of his inviolability within 30 days after the opening of 
the session:  
Article 22 – No member of either Chamber may, for the duration of the session, be 
prosecuted or arrested in criminal or correctional matters without the authorisation of 
the Chamber of which he is a member, except flagrante delicto. Any parliamentarian 
arrested outside the parliamentary session may vote by delegation as long as the 
Chamber of which he is a member has not decided on the lifting of his parliamentary 
immunity. If it has not decided within thirty days following the opening of the session, 
the arrested parliamentarian shall be freed by operation of the law. Except in cases of 
arrest flagrante delicto, authorised prosecution or a final judicial sentence, no 
parliamentarian may, outside the session, be arrested without the authorisation of the 
bureau of the Chamber of which he is a member. The detention or prosecution of a 
member of parliament is suspended if the Chamber of which he is a member so 
requests.  
First, the amendment of 1954 re-introduced the differentiation between the period 
of the parliamentary session and the remaining time. For the time when parliament 
was not in session, it was now for the bureau of the respective chamber to take the 
discretionary decision to authorise the arrest or prosecution of a member. In 
addition, the amended text of Article 22 now also provided for a right of an arrested 
member to be released if the chamber concerned failed to pronounce itself on the 
authorisation of his prosecution within 30 days of the beginning of the session. 
This was to be the state of affairs, with regard to parliamentary immunity, for 
approximately four years. Then, in 1958, the Fourth Republic came to an end, and 
the Constitution of 1958 introduced the immunity regime which still applies today, 
though with a reduced material scope of inviolability after the constitutional 
amendment of 1995. 
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2.4. The History of Parliamentary Immunity in France: A Summary 
Picture 
From the above description and discussion of the emergence of the French regime of 
parliamentary immunity, the circumstances under which it came into being and the 
subsequent development it underwent in the long succession of constitution 
systems during the ‘waltz of constitutions’ of the 19th century, a number of 
conclusions should be drawn at this point. This shall help to understand the 
theoretical foundations of immunity and the current system to be discussed in the 
following parts of this chapter. 
In France, parliamentary immunity cannot be said to have ‘evolved’ in the 
proper sense of the word. It is not the result of a gradual process of crystallisation 
from ancient legal institutions, as we have observed in the case of the United 
Kingdom. Instead, it has been established in the course of a most incisive and 
radical revolutionary process, which ended the monarchical concept of sovereignty 
and of popular representation under an imperative mandate, and was replaced by 
national sovereignty and legislative independence. The National Assembly had 
become the representation and, for the purpose of national will-formation, (see part 
III) the personification of the abstract sovereign nation and could thus claim 
inviolabilité,121 which before had pertained to the sovereign monarch himself. At the 
same time, the Revolution should be understood not as a more or less inanimate 
process of change, but as a time of distressing volatility, political instability, 
uncertainty and threat, which the members of the National Assembly sought to 
alleviate by declaring themselves inviolable. Depending on which perspective one 
chooses in an examination of the very first immunity provisions of 1789 and 1790, 
they can either be seen as concomitant to the process of revolutionary change, borne 
out of acute fear of reprisals, or as a necessary consequence of the change of 
systems.  
The exact legal meaning of the first immunity provisions is not certain. The 
wording of the National Assembly’s decrees of 23 June 1789 and 26 June 1790, and 
the early instances of their application leave little doubt that the drafters of the 
decrees did not understand the term inviolabilité as excluding non-accountability. 
Whether they used it synonymously with non-accountability, or whether they 
understood it as encompassing both elements of immunity present in our modern 
categorisation cannot be determined conclusively. However, various historical leads 
indicate that the latter was the case. 
Ensuing from the first immunity provisions, a two-tier system has developed 
which has as its primary elements, (a) absolute non-accountability of members of 
the legislature for utterances done in the exercise of their mandate, and (b) freedom 
from arrest except flagrante delicto and freedom from prosecution. The latter two are 
usually limited to the time of the parliamentary session and subject to a 
discretionary right of the chamber concerned to authorise the arrest or prosecution.  
 
121 Note, however, that the process of terminological disambiguation between inviolabilité and 
irresponsabilité had not yet taken place at the time of the first National Assembly. 
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Not all constitutions between the Revolution of 1789 and today provided for 
both of these elements; where they did, details differed considerably. However, 
none of the constitutions (except for the rare case of a constitution from which 
immunity was entirely absent, most notably the constitution of the Second 
Empire)122 departed significantly or inexplicably from the idea of the immunity 
system as it was conceived during the Revolution. That is to say, none added 
entirely new concepts to the legal organisation of immunity. Especially when 
contrasted to the tremendous volatility of other parts of the constitutional system, 
such as the form of government, immunity has thus been a remarkably stable part 
of constitutional law since the Revolution and has become a fixed part of what may 
be called French constitutional culture. 
3. Theoretical Foundations of Parliamentary Immunity 
3.1. The Significance of Constitutional Theory 
An examination of the theoretical foundations of parliamentary immunity in France 
serves a double purpose. First, it is necessary to conduct such an examination in 
order to understand the underlying logic of the French immunity system. In order 
to compare this system to those of other countries, as is the aim of this study, we 
need to establish the relationship between the positive law of immunity and other 
elements of the constitutional edifice of a state. This can only be achieved by 
showing the links and cause-effect constructions which theory uses to support the 
grand structure of the state. On the other hand, theory necessarily contains elements 
of factitiousness. Only rarely is the complex structure of a state built entirely in 
pursuance of a theoretical blueprint; more often, doctrine follows the development 
of a state by seeking to explain and justify a posteriori the shape and form of certain 
elements of the grand structure. Therefore, a critical assessment of the justification 
provided by constitutional theory is necessary for a meaningful appraisal of the 
positive law.  
The following will show that this is particularly true with regard to the French 
system of parliamentary immunity. In part II it was already observed that the 
emergence of parliamentary immunity in France can in principle be understood in 
two profoundly different ways. First, through the lens of what we called historic 
realism, the adoption of immunity was essentially circumstantial. From this 
perspective, decreeing themselves ‘inviolable’ was an attempt by the members of 
the revolutionary National Assembly to protect themselves against reprisals which 
they had good reason to fear, the guards already lining up outside the convention 
hall. In other words, non-accountability and inviolability were not conceived as a 
logical consequence of the new order of state. Instead they were, at first, nothing but 
the circumstantial by-products of a time in which the members of the National 
 
122 Whether this was the only constitution without immunity provisions depends on the 
definition one chooses to apply to the term ‘constitution’.  
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Assembly led a rather dangerous life and the new form of government had yet to be 
established.  
From a more detached theoretical perspective, immunity was the necessary 
result of the assumption, held by the first National Assembly and later written into 
the constitution of 1791, that the members of the legislature held a representative 
mandate: that they, constituting the assembly, represented the sovereign nation.123 
In this sense, French doctrine describes immunity as a necessary tool to guarantee 
the complete liberty which is necessary to properly represent the people (see section 
two below).  
It has already been found that these two interpretations of the emergence of 
immunity are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In a comprehensive study of 
parliamentary immunities, both perspectives on the emergence of non-
accountability and inviolability are worth exploring in their own right. 
Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to distinguish the different purposes which 
these two perspectives serve in such an analysis. An account of the historical events 
which led to the adoption of immunity is useful, as it explains how and why, from a 
practical point of view, the immunity provisions were originally formulated, and 
why they developed over time in the way they did. Without such information, a 
comparative study could be no more than a snapshot of the current situation. An 
analysis of theory, on the other hand, can show how parliamentary immunity is 
embedded in the overarching constitutional system. Theory also provides the 
framework of reference for assessing the justification of immunity. While the 
political context of the immunity system of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Republic is 
hardly comparable to that of the Revolution, its doctrinal base has remained 
remarkably – or perhaps suspiciously – stable.  
Guérin-Bargues recognises that the reason for this doctrinal stability is mainly 
to be found in the tremendous influence of the work of Raymond Carré de 
Malberg.124 She argues that his positivist theory of law and state lies at the basis of 
several doctrinal works on parliamentary immunity throughout the 20th and early 
21st century.125 No other author has seriously challenged the theoretical justification 
of parliamentary immunity through Carré de Malberg’s theory of state. In the 
following, we will try to trace the lines of argumentation of both this classical 
justification of parliamentary immunity, and the criticism offered by Guérin-
Bargues.  
 
123 It should be noted – but ignored for practical reasons, since the term is commonly used in this 
way – that the phrase ‘representative mandate’ is a contradiction in terms. This is at least the 
case when defining ‘representation’ as it is done in French constitutional doctrine. The term 
‘mandate’ (latin mandatum) originally means ‘commission’ or ‘order’ (Cf. Lewis & Short, A 
Latin Dictionary). Thus, being someone’s mandatary means to act for that person upon his 
instructions or order, whereas a representative acts independently in lieu of the represented. 
For the same reason the term ‘imperative mandate’ is tautological.  
124 1861-1935. 
125 Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 103 et seq. In particular, she refers to Marchand 1950; Soulier 1966; 
Bonnotte 2002. In the relatively scarce body of legal literature on the subject of parliamentary 
immunity, these works stand out as the most exhaustive contributions. 
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3.2. The Justification of Parliamentary Immunity in Classical Theory 
after Carré de Malberg 
The tremendous constitutional volatility of the 19th century has led to the emergence 
and demise of a variety of forms of government during the ‘waltz of constitutions’, 
outlined earlier in this chapter. However, a major part of French constitutional 
theory still draws on the earliest developments of the Revolution of 1789 and not, 
crucially, on doctrinal elements and constitutional texts which were introduced at a 
later stage. The doctrinal justification of parliamentary immunity as a condition for 
the representative mandate relies on the conception of national sovereignty as 
believed by Raymond Carré de Malberg and several others. Their theories, in turn, 
were based on the revolutionary thinking from which Siyès had derived the notion 
of representative and democratic government as opposing concepts.  
The continued validity of the idea of national sovereignty as proposed by 
Carré de Malberg as the basis of immunity is not entirely self-evident, though 
almost globally accepted in the literature. At the time that Carré de Malberg wrote, 
during the Third Republic, the concept of national sovereignty was no longer 
inscribed in the text of the constitution. Nor had it been in several previous 
constitutions since the Revolution (see section 2.3 above). Nevertheless, he argued:  
‘Et si, aujourd’hui, on ne trouve aucune formule spéciale, à ce sujet, dans la 
Constitution si laconique de 1875, les auteurs n’en sont pas moins d’accord pour dire 
que toute l’organisation constitutionnelle actuellement existante est basée sur l’idée de 
souveraineté nationale’.126 
In his view, the concept of national sovereignty was thus still supported by 
doctrine, even though it was no longer part of the positive constitution itself. Carré 
de Malberg attributes this to the constitution being ‘laconic’. Accordingly, it was the 
silence of the constitutional laws of 1875 on the matter of sovereignty which 
allowed him to build his doctrine on earlier constitutions and, for the most part, on 
doctrine alone. However, when we look at the now much longer timeline of 
constitutional development with hindsight, we can observe that, after the first 
revolutionary constitution, national sovereignty has never again been unreservedly 
endorsed in constitutional texts. While this does not automatically allow any 
conclusions as to the validity of the concept, we must at least question its 
unconditional position at the foundation of substantial parts of French 
constitutional law – most notably parliamentary immunity. 
3.2.1. National Sovereignty and Representation 
The link between the concept of national sovereignty and parliamentary immunity 
is the mode of representation. Applied to the legislative branch of government, this 
 
126 Carré de Malberg 1920-22, Vol. 1, p. 168. 
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is translated into the nature of the parliamentary mandate.127 In order to understand 
if and how the mandate justifies or in fact necessitates immunity, one must first see 
how, in constitutional theory, the nature of the mandate (id est, representative or 
imperative) is conditional on the concept and form of sovereignty. A considerable 
body of literature has dealt with this question.128 
One of the cornerstones of classical French constitutional theory129 is the 
assumption that representative government is a necessary consequence of national 
sovereignty. Although to a certain degree blended into one in the text of the 
present-day constitution, it is necessary to distinguish the two concepts of national 
and popular sovereignty. This is for the purpose of understanding exactly why 
representative government should follow from national sovereignty, and what is 
meant, in this context, by the term ‘representation’ as opposed to ‘delegation’. 
Traditional doctrine presents this thought in the following way.  
In order to distinguish ‘people’ from ‘nation’ – and thus popular from national 
sovereignty – it helps to attach to the term ‘nation’ a set of abstract qualities which 
are lacking in the ‘people’: ‘la nation forme une entité, personne morale, distincte de 
ceux qui la composent ou qui la constituent. La nation serait faite des vivants et des 
morts et de ceux à naître’.130 Thus, the nation is an entirely abstract being, which is 
distinct from its component parts. Those comprise not only the contemporary 
nationals, but also the dead and those yet to be born. This signifies that the nation is 
a timeless, entirely abstract concept and its abstract nature is a defining part of its 
existence. The term ‘people’, on the other hand, merely means those who currently 
live, taken as a collective of individual beings physically present in the world.  
Because the nation exists, both materially and temporally, in the abstract, it is 
indivisible, inalienable and imprescriptible.131 This means that it cannot be said to 
‘belong’ partly to each of its components (in particular not to individual citizens or 
to the people as a whole), that ‘nationhood’ cannot be transferred or limited to some 
of them while excluding others, and that it cannot cease to exist. Since these 
characteristics apply to the nation, they also apply to the primary property of the 
nation, sovereignty.132 Carré de Malberg defines sovereignty as supreme power, 
with no force above it and none coequal with it:  
‘La souveraineté, c’est le caractère suprême d’un pouvoir : suprême, en ce que ce 
pouvoir n’en admet aucun autre ni au-dessus de lui, ni en concurrence avec lui’.133  
 
127 The executive also exercises sovereign power. For the purposes of this study, however, it 
need not be considered separately.  
128 An influential part of this body of literature is still the work of Carré de Malberg 1920-22. For 
a more specific and much more recent discussion of the theory of sovereignty and 
representation, see Brunet 2004.  
129 Brunet 2004, p. 31. 
130 Brunet 2004, p. 30. 
131 Ibid. 
132 This is the refutation of the idea of Rousseau that every citizen is part-sovereign, the thought 
which lies at the basis of popular sovereignty.  
133 Carré de Malberg 1920-1922, Vol. 1, p. 70. 
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The link between representative government and national sovereignty can be found 
in the problem that the nation, abstract entity that it is, is unable to form and 
manifest a will. On the one hand, national will-formation cannot take place in those 
of its component parts which are physically present (the living citizens who 
constitute the people), since this would conflict with the indivisibility of sovereignty 
and since it would violate the principle that the nation is essentially distinct from its 
parts:  
‘La souveraineté […] est dite nationale, en ce sens qu’elle réside indivisiblement dans la 
nation tout entière, et non point divisément dans la personne, ni davantage dans aucun 
groupe, de nationaux. La nation est donc souveraine, en tant que collectivité unifiée, 
c’est-à-dire en tant qu’entité collective, qui, par là même qu’elle est le sujet de la 
puissance et des droits étatiques, doit être reconnue comme une personne juridique, 
ayant une individualité et un pouvoir à la fois supérieurs et indépendants d’eux’.134  
Accordingly, sovereignty is vested in an entirely abstract entity, which, however, 
must be understood as having individual legal personality. This construction, on 
the other hand, bears one readily apparent problem: while the nation is assumed to 
have individual legal personality, the abstract entity evidently does not have at its 
disposal a physical mind of its own in which any process of national will-formation 
could take place, nor any possibility to manifest its will. Classical doctrine derives 
from this the conclusion that, in order to exercise sovereignty, the nation must be 
represented.135 However, as already mentioned, representation cannot mean that 
sovereign powers are for practical purposes simply transferred to the not-so-
abstract part of the nation, to the people. This would be at odds with the nature of 
the nation, and, according to a classical definition, it would not amount to proper 
representation.  
When considering the latter thought, it must be borne in mind that 
representation is essentially different from mere delegation. In classical French 
constitutional theory, the representative is distinguished from the delegate by his 
characteristic independence and autonomy.136 The delegate does not represent the 
sovereign, as ‘he has […] no decision-making power of his own, all his acts are 
determined in advance by legal rules or by binding instructions, or he may not 
decide anything without the ratification of the sovereign’.137 The true representative, 
however, decides autonomously in lieu of the sovereign and must therefore be 
capable of true independent will formation.138 It must therefore be concluded, in the 
words of Christophe Bonnotte, that what is transferred from the sovereign nation to 
her representatives is not the ownership or enjoyment of sovereignty (‘sa propriété 
ou sa jouissance’), but merely its exercise. The representatives are thereby made 
‘titulaires effectifs’ of this supreme power.139 In short, the bearer of a truly 
 
134 Carré de Malberg 1920-1922, Vol. 2, p. 173. 
135 Brunet 2004, p. 30. 
136 Bonnotte 2002, p. 74. 
137 Esmein 1927, p. 441. 
138 Bonnotte 2002, p. 74. 
139 Bonnotte 2002, p. 73. 
 170 
representative mandate exercises sovereignty autonomously, while not being 
sovereign himself. In a seemingly paradoxical twist, it is thus precisely the 
severance of every link between the representative and the represented nation 
which enables true representation.  
If these thoughts are translated from mere theory into an actual constitutional 
system, this leads to the notion that national sovereignty requires a representative 
legislative mandate in which the representatives are not accountable. They are 
certainly not accountable to the people, and in principle not to anyone, since the 
only entity to which account would theoretically be due – the nation – is incapable 
of holding them to account. Consequently, national sovereignty is incompatible 
with delegation, that is, with an imperative legislative mandate as it was enjoyed by 
the members of the états généraux prior to the Revolution. 
The opposite situation materialises under popular sovereignty. The ‘people’ is 
not abstract, it is the very physical community of all individual living citizens. 
Because popular sovereignty therefore rests with a group of actual persons, it can 
and must be partitioned between those: every citizen is part-sovereign and this 
sovereignty is thus ‘atomised’.140 Apart from being split, however, the properties of 
sovereignty must remain essentially the same. Popular sovereignty cannot be 
exercised through representation because the part-sovereign citizens who are in a 
position to exercise their share of power would alienate sovereignty (which means, 
would be no longer sovereign) if they were to be represented. However, it would be 
practically impossible for every citizen to opine on every issue for the purpose of 
national will formation, so popular sovereignty allows for delegation.141 This means 
that certain individuals are assigned to conduct the will formation process. 
However, this would have to be understood as an imperative mandate. Delegates 
equipped with such a mandate do not exercise sovereign decision making powers 
autonomously but are bound by instructions they receive from their principals – the 
electors – to whom they would also remain accountable. 
From a juxtaposition of national and popular sovereignty and the 
consequences ensuing from either, classical French constitutional doctrine infers 
that the two types of sovereignty and the two types of mandate stand in complete 
opposition to each other. This means that neither concept of sovereignty could 
sustain the type of mandate which ensues from the other.  
It is important to note, at this point, that representation as defined in classical 
theory is not synonymous with (representative) democracy; in a strictly formal sense 
the assumption of national sovereignty even precludes it.142 In the view of Carré de 
 
140 Brunet 2004, p. 31. 
141 Ibid. 
142 As a formal notion, democracy is synonymous with popular sovereignty. Along with this 
rather obvious conflict between national sovereignty and democracy, the definition of 
representation in classical French theory also makes representative democracy formally 
incompatible with national sovereignty: Kelsen argues that ‘[a]ccording to the traditional 
definition, a government is ‘representative’ because and insofar as its officials during their 
tenure of power reflect the will of the electorate and are responsible to the electorate’; General 
Theory of Law and State, Cambridge (Ma.): Harvard University Press, 1945, p. 289. In French 
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Malberg, the concept of representation as a necessary consequence of national 
sovereignty does neither automatically entail nor favour any of the classical forms 
of government of monarchy, democracy or aristocracy.143 Instead, he argues that 
representative government – regardless of which organ, entity or collective 
represents the sovereign – should be added to that list as a new form of 
government.144 For there is an essential difference, in the light of the logic of 
representation, between a sovereign monarch as he existed in absolutism and one 
that, together with the National Assembly, merely exercises sovereignty as a 
representative in lieu of the sovereign nation. This was envisaged by the French 
constitution of 1791. The difference is that, in the latter situation, sovereignty 
precedes and justifies royal power, but is by no means identical with it. Under the 
Constitution of 1791 the form of government was therefore neither true monarchy 
nor true democracy, since neither king nor people were considered sovereign.145 
Instead, national sovereignty had led to a new form of government – representation. 
What, if any, are the practical implications of the above? Is there more to 
national sovereignty and the ensuing theory of representation than an intellectual 
exercise in ‘legal metaphysics’? It has been argued that the attribution of 
sovereignty to an entirely abstract entity was meant to prevent that any actual entity 
or organ would assume sovereignty. For de Soto, this is the quintessential function 
of the idea of national sovereignty. Where the highest power is ascribed to an 
entirely abstract – and thus harmless – nation, we can evade the dangers of one 
omnipotent institution:  
‘La vérité c’est qu’en déclarant la Nation « omnipotente », on a voulu supprimer toute 
souveraineté véritable […]. Le peuple omnipotent, chez Rousseau, ne fournit plus ici 
que des électeurs et il n’y a pas plus de corps électoral souverain qu’il n’y a pas de 
Parlement souverain ou de chef d’Etat ou de Constituant souverain : il y a seulement 
des électeurs, des députés, un exécutif, des constituants, représentants de la Nation 
souveraine.146 
It will easily be admitted that both the concept of national sovereignty and that of 
representation in the strict sense are constitutional fictions – virtual constructions 
which are imposed on a factual situation in order to explain or legitimise it, or, in 
this case, to withhold legitimacy from any one organ that might claim it.147 In this 
light, the historical importance of the theory of national sovereignty and 
representation lies in the fact that it provided legitimacy to the revolutionary 
 
classical theory, however, a mandate with these characteristics precisely is not representative 
but imperative and as such is irreconcilable with national sovereignty. 
143 Carré de Malberg 1920-1922, Vol. 2, p. 181. 
144 Carré de Malberg 1920-1922, Vol. 2, p. 180. 
145 Carré de Malberg 1920-1922, Vol. 2, p. 184. 
146 de Soto et al. 1946, p. 82-83.  
147 A comparable and related constitutional fiction is that of the people’s authorship of a 
constitution, a virtual tool to bridge the gap between the factual constitutional legislator and 
the legitimate pouvoir constituant. Cf. Riberi 2007. 
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transformations of the French state in which now none of the institutional actors 
could claim supreme power. 
At the same time, and perhaps even more importantly, the concept of national 
sovereignty and representation provided the self-proclaimed representatives of the 
sovereign nation with virtually unlimited constituent freedom, both vis-à-vis the 
monarch and vis-à-vis the people. Carré de Malberg confirms this in his conclusion: 
‘[C]e que la Révolution française a fondé en vertu du principe de la souverainté [sic] 
nationale, c’est le régime représentatif, un régime dans lequel la souveraineté, étant 
réservé exclusivement à l’être collectif et abstrait nation, ne peut être exercée par qui 
que ce soit qu’à titre de représentation national. Telle est, en dernière analyse, la 
signification de la souveraineté nationale’. 
One cannot but admire the elegance of this construction: While nobody can claim to 
possess sovereignty, the representatives can claim to be the ones entitled to exercise it. 
At the same time no-one is empowered to hold them to account.  
If we accept this conclusion we can thus observe that, historically, the primary 
function of the theory of national sovereignty and the system of representation was 
to justify the self-conception of the revolutionary representatives of the nation and 
the system of government which they were about to create. In light of the historical 
events of the Revolution and the novelty – or, one could say, the experimental 
nature – of the post-revolutionary system at its time, the development of this 
theoretical superstructure is not surprising, as it de-legitimised the ancien régime and 
simultaneously provided legitimacy to virtually any new form of government to be 
chosen in its place. Hence, the constitutional fiction that is national sovereignty was 
by no means an intellectual exercise devoid of any practical purpose or use, since it 
was taken to legitimise the most incisive factual measures.  
Positive (constitutional) law has drawn on this fiction. The results of that are 
still visible today, as doctrine still assumes that national sovereignty and 
representation constitute the foundation of immunities of holders of high offices of 
state and of members of the legislature. The following is to show how the 
representative mandate is assumed to necessitate the two elements of non-
accountability and inviolability.  
3.2.2. Parliamentary Immunity as a Corollary of the Representative Mandate 
We have seen that, whereas the holder of an imperative mandate is an agent bound 
by the instructions of his principal, a true representative decides freely in lieu of the 
sovereign. According to Bonnotte, building on the reasoning of Carré de Malberg, 
Esmein and others, the will expressed by those endowed with public power must 
therefore not be considered the proper will of these individuals themselves; rather, 
it is an expression of the national will.148 However, any difference in content between 
the two is by definition excluded. Carré de Malberg expresses this even more 
poignantly: ‘l’essence de la représentation, c’est que le représentant possède les 
 
148 Bonnotte 2002, p. 74-75.  
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mêmes pouvoirs que s’il était personnellement souverain’.149 It is this assumption of 
complete liberty of the representative vis-à-vis the represented from which classical 
French theory deduces the requirement of the greatest possible independence of the 
representative.150  
On this note, Bonnotte observes that, for the constituent National Assembly of 
1789-1791, the defining element which distinguished the true representative from a 
mere functionary or civil servant was the former’s complete autonomy.151 The will 
of the representative, after all, could only properly substitute for the will of the 
nation – or in fact be that will – if it was completely free from any distortion or 
interference. Since the abstract sovereign nation is incapable of will formation other 
than through its representatives, it is unable to bind or limit the will expressed by 
them by means of instructions. The electorate (the people), on the other hand, must 
also not interfere with the process of will formation which takes place among the 
elected representatives. After all, the electors do not exercise sovereign power, their 
constitutional role as the physically present fraction of the nation is merely to 
physically provide the representatives by electing them (électorat-fonction as 
opposed to électorat-droit).152 Other than this constitutive act there is no link between 
election and representation.153 
That the justification for parliamentary immunity should lie in the 
independence of the representative seems curious, or at least counter-intuitive, 
especially if one looks beyond mere theory and takes into account the very real 
possibility of abuse of power by a representative completely unbound by the will of 
the represented and unaccountable to him. This argument can be found in the work 
of the constitutionalist and legal historian Adhémar Esmein (1848-1913). He argues 
that it is precisely the complete autonomy of the representative which at first sight 
seems quite irreconcilable with immunity – after all, the representative wields 
power, though independently, not in his own right but for the nation and should, 
consequently, be accountable to her:  
 
149 Carré de Malberg 1920-1922, p. 208. 
150 In outcome, this thought is very reminiscent of the British doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. The route taken to reach this conclusion, however, could not be more different.  
151 Bonnotte 2002, p. 75. 
152 The distinction between électorat-droit and électorat-fonction refers back to the concepts of 
national and popular sovereignty. Under national sovereignty, where ‘the people’ is not 
identified with ‘the nation’ and where elections are merely a function exercised by the people 
in order to provide representatives of the nation, there would be no need for universal 
suffrage, since the political will of the electorate and the reflection of that will in the 
legislative assembly is immaterial. Conversely, where (ideally) all citizens enjoy a right to 
elect the candidate they see fit according to their own political views, this is taken to be an 
attribute of popular sovereignty. That the current French constitution no longer adheres to 
the idea of the électorat-fonction becomes evident, among others, when considering the 
possibility of referenda, by which ‘the people exercise national sovereignty’, as can be read in 
Art. 3 of the constitution of 1958. 
153 Bonnotte 2002, p. 76. 
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It seems that national sovereignty has as its necessary consequence the full 
responsibility of all those who exercise public authority, under whichever title. All of 
them act, after all, not pursuant to their own right, but in name of the nation in whom 
sovereignty resides. This seems true not only with regard to so-called functionaries, 
[…] but also and above all with regard to the representatives, that is, with regard to 
those who hold a more or less arbitrary power of decision and who will for the nation. 
As the danger to see the delegate [le délégué] abuse a power which does not belong to 
him is greater in the second case, responsibility appears to imply two things: 1. a 
sanction, each time a functionary or representative exceeds his powers; 2. the 
revocability of any functionary or representative by the authority which has conferred 
his power or his function on him, whenever this authority may fear that he, without 
trespassing the limits of the powers conferred on him, exercises them […] in a manner 
which is not useful or even dangerous. This is the natural condition of someone who 
merely exercises the right of another by the will of another.154 
The reasons why these ‘natural’ consequences of national sovereignty and 
representative government – responsibility and the possibility of a recall – had to be 
abandoned in practice are, in Esemin’s view, only of practical nature. On the one 
hand, he observes, they are very difficult to organise and to cast in concrete 
legislation while staying true to the principles of representative government. On the 
other hand,  
[responsibility] would most often turn against the public interest, against the veritable 
interest of the represented, since the action of the representatives, who most often need 
to be free in order to be useful, would be paralysed by fear and since the continuous 
interplay of the representative institutions would be troubled or interrupted.155 
He therefore concludes that, contrary to his initial considerations, ‘one can almost 
say that representative government naturally tends towards non-accountability 
[irresponsabilité] of the representatives’.156 With regard to members of the legislature 
specifically, he notes that their mandate is ‘the most representative one’, as it is in 
them that the national will manifests itself. Consequently, they necessarily enjoy the 
widest measure of irresponsabilité. In addition, their mandate cannot be revoked, for 
want of an authority which could have jurisdiction to do so; after all, while the 
members of the legislature derive their mandate from elections, it would amount to 
a fundamental change in the nature of this mandate – from representative to 
imperative – if the power to revoke the mandate were granted to the electorate. 
Even if the electorate could not issue direct instructions to the representatives as 
they did in the états généraux before the Revolution, the power of recall would 
indirectly bind the representatives to the wishes of the electors.  
Parliamentary immunity has generally received relatively little doctrinal 
attention throughout the Fourth and Fifth Republic. Still, it is clear that 
constitutional theory after Esmein and Carré de Malberg generally sees immunity as 
a necessary consequence of the representative mandate, which in turn is seen as a 
 
154 Esmein 1927, p. 444-445. 
155 Esmein 1927, p. 445. 
156 Ibid. 
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corollary of the concept of national sovereignty. Some important works157 confirm 
this. Pierre Marchand, in his thesis of 1950 on parliamentary immunity in the Fourth 
Republic, acknowledges the completely fictional nature of the concept of national 
sovereignty. However, he remains firm on the point of the necessity of the absolute 
freedom in which the parliamentarians, who may not be but do act as sovereign, 
must exercise their mandate in a representative system, the existence of which he 
does not deny. With regard to the legislator in a representative system, he writes: 
‘les immunités parlementaires apparaissent comme un prolongement naturel du 
même dessein dont elles garantissent le respect’.158 In this sense, he sees both 
elements of parliamentary immunity as ‘natural’ attributes of parliament, but not of 
the individual parliamentarian: ‘l’irresponsabilité et l’inviolabilité parlementaires ne 
sont pas établies dans l’intérêt personnel de chaque député, mais dans l’intérêt du 
[…] Parlement tout entier quelle qu’en soit par ailleurs la nature’.159 
Gérard Soulier’s thesis on parliamentary immunity of 1966 is the most 
extensive work of the 20th century on this subject. He is even less critical of the 
Malbergian fiction of national sovereignty, which he assumes as the starting point 
for the straight line of argumentation which we tried to outline above: national 
sovereignty necessitates a representative mandate, which in turn necessitates the 
complete liberty of the parliamentarian. The protection of this liberty is the aim of 
parliamentary immunity.160 In contrast with Marchand, Soulier does recognise the 
distinctness of the two elements of immunity, non-accountability and inviolability. 
However, he views them as two sides of the same coin, each in itself rather 
worthless without the other:  
Without inviolability, non-accountability would be […] futile. For what would it serve 
the deputy to be totally free in debate and in his vote if he were intimidated, 
constrained by the threat of prosecution or, more radically yet, prevented from 
debating or voting by the exercise of such prosecution? In reality, if inviolability is 
complementary to non-accountability, it is its necessary, indispensible complement.161 
Much in the same vein, Christophe Bonnotte, in his comprehensive theoretical 
analysis of the notion of immunity in French constitutional law, finds that  
[T]he requirement that the representatives be autonomous constitutes an almost 
axiomatic principle. This requirement demands for the institution of immunities 
insofar as they aim to make sure that the governing are not troubled by legal 
proceedings which are inappropriate, ill-founded or which constitute political 
manoeuvres: in this sense, the constitutional immunities appear to be both the 
guarantee and, at the same time, the condition for the independence of the 
representatives.162  
 
157 Cf. supra at 125. 
158 Marchand 1950, p. 27. 
159 Marchand 1950, p. 29. 
160 Soulier 1966, p. 18 et seq. 
161 Soulier 1966, p. 38. 
162 Bonnotte 2002, p. 72-73. 
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The one author who has recently pleaded for a more differentiated appraisal of non-
accountability and inviolability is Cécile Guérin-Bargues. On the basis of an 
extensive review of the history, doctrine and recent application of parliamentary 
immunity in France, she reaches the conclusion that the link between both 
components of the immunity system and the representative mandate, assumed by 
others to be a logical necessity and a constitutional ‘axiom’, is in reality much 
weaker than commonly assumed. She reasons that, since the two immunities have 
been adopted at different points in time and for different political and practical 
reasons, they should, first of all, be considered individually.163 Second, she argues 
that the purely abstract Malbergian concept of representation does not – and due to 
its paradoxical nature cannot164 – match with political reality, which however has to 
be taken into account in a meaningful appraisal of the justification of immunity. 
Third, while she still views non-accountability as a condition for the functioning of 
parliament under a concept of representation adjusted to constitutional reality, she 
contests the justification of inviolability. Whereas non-accountability aims at 
safeguarding the complete freedom of speech and the parliamentary vote, she 
claims that inviolability aims primarily at the completeness of the legislative 
assemblies, since it prohibits the arrest of members.165  
However, it is, in her view, not necessary for the legislative assemblies to be 
complete in the sense that they accurately reflect the results of their elections, since 
it would be manifestly at odds with the concept of the representative mandate to 
assume that the will expressed by the legislator must conform or reflect the political 
will of the electorate. In this sense, Guérin-Bargues argues, the justification of 
inviolability as a means to ensure the completeness of parliament would be 
paradoxical even if we were to accept the theory of representation in the form 
presented by Carré de Malberg.166  
The work of Guérin-Bargues’ is a ‘reality check’ on the traditional justification 
of parliamentary immunity, with the outcome that the justification of, in particular, 
inviolability, is defective for the reasons outlined above. These reasons seem to lead 
to the conclusion that – since the assumption of a straightforward systemic necessity 
of non-accountability and inviolability turns out to be indefensible – one had better 
look for a justification of the immunity system in today’s political and institutional 
reality. For Guérin-Bargues, this does not mean that the element of inviolability, 
namely, freedom from arrest even for crimes and misdemeanours committed in the 
 
163 Guerin-Bargues 2011, p. 409. This is one of her central propositions, setting her approach 
apart from that of previous authors.  
164 The paradox which she sees in the theory of national sovereignty and representation is, in 
short, to be found in the assumption that it is precisely the complete severance of the link 
between the representative and the represented has as its ultimate effect the identification, for 
all practical purposes, of the two with each other. Since the will formed by the representatives 
is the will of the sovereign nation and since no accountability mechanisms exist between the 
assumed sovereign (or anyone else) and its representatives, the differentiation between the 
two is rendered meaningless. Hence, no valid justification of the immunity system can be 
derived from this differentiation. Cf. Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 108-112.  
165 Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 117 et seq. 
166 Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 123-130. 
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extraprofessional sphere, should be abolished, as persisting institutional imbalances 
still pose the threat of politically motivated proceedings.167 We will look more 
closely into the latter argument in part three of the present chapter.  
The argumentation presented by Guérin-Bargues suggests that the 
justificatory power, with regard to parliamentary immunity, of the theory of 
national sovereignty and representation is intrinsically weak. Furthermore, a 
justification on this basis is not useful if constitutional reality does not reflect the 
Malbergian idea of national sovereignty. A justification of the immunities which 
emanates from the logic of this idea can thus only be of any value if the idea itself is, 
at least in principle, accepted as the foundation of the system. In order to complete 
our discussion of the theoretical foundations of parliamentary immunity, we need 
to establish whether that is actually the case.  
3.2.3. Popular vs. National Sovereignty: Constitutional Text and Reality 
Both the declaration of 1789 and the Constitution of 1791 express the principle of 
national sovereignty. Article 1 of the latter states as follows:  
‘La Souveraineté est une, indivisible, inaliénable et imprescriptible. Elle appartient à la 
Nation; aucune section du peuple, ni aucun individu, ne peut s'en attribuer l'exercice. 
Between these early stages of the Revolution and the Constitution of 1793 
(constitution de l’an I; it never entered into force), however, a certain shift has taken 
place, replacing national sovereignty with popular sovereignty. Article 7 of the 
Constitution of 1793 allocates sovereignty with the people:  
Le peuple souverain est l'universalité des citoyens français. 
It has been suggested that this shift can be attributed to the Montagnard group of 
deputies who drafted this constitution and expressed their left-leaning political 
views by the adoption of popular sovereignty. However, this should be considered 
an oversimplification. It is true that the concept of national sovereignty can, to a 
certain extent, be linked with more conservative political views and popular 
sovereignty with more progressive political ideas. However, this categorisation is 
not reflected by other provisions of the Constitutions of 1791 and 1793. Curiously, 
the Constitution of 1793 maintains the explicit prohibition of an imperative 
mandate, which, as we have seen, doctrine has deemed a necessary consequence of 
popular sovereignty. The view that the adoption of popular sovereignty was a 
corollary of a political swing to the left is also not confirmed by the Constitution of 
1795 (constitution de l’an III, the Constitution of the Directorate), which reiterates in 
Article 2 the sovereignty statement of its predecessor but then maintains the 
prohibition of imperative mandates, does not allow referenda and furthermore 
provides for census suffrage – ideas which can hardly be attributed to leftist 
 
167 Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 410-411. 
 178 
Parliamentary Immunity in France 
ideology.168 Rather, these inconsistencies should be read as signs of a certain 
‘confusion’169 or, more precisely, an indication of the lack of conceptual clarity and 
disambiguation at the time.  
While the Constitutions of year VIII (the Constitution of the Consulate) and 
also those of the first Empire and the restored monarchy are silent on the matter of 
sovereignty (the latter stipulates in Article 14 that the King is ‘chef suprême de 
l’État’), Article 1 of the Constitution of the Second Republic reads as follows: 
‘La souveraineté réside dans l'universalité des citoyens français. Elle est inaliénable et 
imprescriptible. Aucun individu, aucune fraction du peuple ne peut s'en attribuer 
l'exercice’. 
Hence, the conceptual blur which could already be observed in the Constitutions of 
the First Republic had not become any clearer.  
The restoration of the French empire in 1852, though of course factually a coup 
d’état, might be seen as a test case for the question whether popular or national 
sovereignty was the prevailing concept in this era. This is not to say that adherence 
to either concept would have made a practical difference to the events of 1851 and 
1852. However, the constitutional documents by which Napoleon III had his coup 
d’état legalised, and the procedural form in which he chose to cast the pretence of its 
legitimacy, reveal that the new emperor deemed popular sovereignty better suited 
to legitimise his usurpation of power. In the proclamation of 14 January 1852, the 
soon-to-be emperor refers to the ‘sovereign judgment’ of the people he is 
addressing.170 Later that year, the decree by which the empire is restored is ratified 
by a referendum in which the French people accept a formula by which the 
restoration of the empire is attributed to its will, not that of a sovereign nation: ‘Le 
peuple veut le rétablissement de la dignité impériale dans la personne de Louis 
Napoléon Bonaparte […]’. There is no evidence of national sovereignty being 
considered in any way in establishing the Second Empire. 
The documents which form the Constitution of the Third Republic, again, do 
not contain an allocation of sovereignty to either the people or the nation at all. Also 
the texts of the Constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republic did not return to an 
‘undiluted’ concept of national sovereignty. Article 3 of the Constitution of 1946 
states:  
‘La souveraineté nationale appartient au people français. Aucune section du peuple ni 
aucun individu ne peut s'en attribuer l’exercice’. 
The same article, in the Constitution of 1958, maintains this formula and adds that 
the people shall ‘exercise sovereignty by its representatives and by referendum’. 
 
168 Cf. Bermann & Picard 2008, p. 6.  
169 Pactet & Mélin-Soucramanien 2007, p. 84-85. 
170 ‘La Constitution actuelle proclame […] que le chef que vous avez élu est responsable devant 
vous; qu'il a toujours le droit de faire appel à votre jugement souverain, afin que, dans les 
circonstances solennelles, vous puissiez lui continuer ou lui retirer votre confiance’. 
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The above analysis of constitutional texts alone readily shows that national 
sovereignty, conceived of in the early days of the Revolution, was by no means 
passed down from one form of government to the next throughout the ‘waltz of 
constitutions’ without ever being disputed or altered. Instead, the modern 
constitutional realisation of national sovereignty – if one can still speak of the same 
concept – seems to attempt the levelling-out of any perceptible, practical difference 
between national and popular sovereignty and to install a sort of ‘blended 
sovereignty’ instead.  
The wording of Article 3 of the Constitution of 1958 leaves no doubt as to who 
is sovereign: the people. However, the abstract concept of ‘nation’ is preserved in 
the first half-clause, which does not exactly identify the people with the nation but 
only declares that national sovereignty belongs to the people. If this statement, 
paradoxical as it appears when read against the light of classical constitutional 
theory, is the only remnant of national sovereignty today, can we then conclude that 
popular sovereignty is the concept which truly applies in the Fifth Republic? And is 
it the one which we should use as the benchmark for an assessment of the 
theoretical justification of parliamentary immunity? This would probably be a step 
too far; after all, the declaration of the rights of man and the citizens of 1789 whose 
Article 3 proclaims national sovereignty is still part of the bloc de constitutionnalité, 
the entirety of French constitutional norms and values.171 It is therefore assumed 
today that the main significance of national sovereignty, limited though it is by 
Article 3 of the Constitution, lies in the prohibition of the imperative mandate. Each 
elected deputy is still a representative of the entire nation.172 True, the introduction 
of universal suffrage173 and the possibility of direct democracy – most remarkably 
also in the constitutional amendment procedure (Article 89 of the Constitution of 
1958) – have made popular sovereignty ‘gain territory’ over the past two hundred 
years, while national sovereignty seems to be on the retreat.174 Nevertheless this 
does not merit the conclusion that the blended concept of sovereignty inscribed in 
the constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth Republic does not warrant, in principle, the 
system of representation. Members of the Senate and the National Assembly are 
unbound by the will of their electors; they do not represent their constituents and 
cannot be recalled, other than in regular new elections. Therefore, parliamentary 
immunity will still have to be assessed and justified with the representative 
 
171 The preamble of the constitution of 1958 refers, among others to the declaration of the rights 
of man and the citizens of 1789. In a fundamental decision of 16 July 1971 (Decision No. 71-44 
DC, Liberté d’association) the Constitutional Council has recognised that the preamble, and 
with it the documents to which it refers, together with the current constitution, form the so-
called bloc de constitutionnalité, the body of constitutional law which the Council accepts as its 
framework of reference.  
172 Pactet & Mélin-Soucramanien 2007, p. 85. 
173 Which is, however, never truly universal, since it usually excludes minors and other 
categories of citizens deemed incapable to make a conscious and informed decision. In this 
sense, popular sovereignty, of which universal suffrage is taken to be an attribute, is of course 
also based on elements of constitutional fiction.  
174 Pactet & Mélin-Soucramanien 2007, p. 85. 
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mandate as a framework of reference, though the stringent Malbergian logic should 
be applied with care and without losing sight of constitutional reality.  
3.3. Theoretical Foundations: A Summary Picture 
With regard to constitutional theory it is generally impossible to proceed in the 
same way as we do with theories of natural science. We cannot prove or dismiss the 
doctrine of national sovereignty or popular sovereignty in the sense that we could 
determine its ‘truth’ according to assumed pre-existing laws of nature against which 
it could be tested. Where constitutional theory introduces and defines at the very 
basis of a constitutional system a set of principles or ‘axioms’, such as those of 
national or popular sovereignty or also that of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK, 
these will always take the form of legal fictions with their own inherent logic. 
Whenever we work with constitutional fictions, therefore, we have to be aware of 
our vantage point.  
In one analytical approach, we may analyse the positive law of parliamentary 
immunity, using as our framework of reference the systemic grid of a legal fiction 
like national sovereignty. Such an analysis allows us to determine whether positive 
law matches the legal fiction, id est whether, for instance, the rules of parliamentary 
immunity are reconcilable with or justified by national sovereignty and 
representation. Any such conclusion, however, will only be valid in the light of the 
inherent logic of our constitutional fiction. In another analytical approach, we can 
question the justificatory model created by a constitutional fiction by using the 
positive law and its factual development as our framework of reference.  
In the foregoing, we have tried to trace both analytical approaches as they 
have been used by other authors in order to elucidate the relationship between the 
French system of parliamentary immunity and classical French constitutional 
theory. We have found, first, that the principle of national sovereignty was laid 
down as the foundation of the constitutional system during the French Revolution 
with the specific purpose of creating a system in which those who exercised 
constituent and legislative power were independent from the executive and from 
their electorate. In this system of representation, the will of the representatives is 
identified with the general will and is completely unchallengeable.  
Second, national sovereignty as the basis of the constitutional system has not 
been preserved after the Revolution without serious concessions. Already during 
the Third Republic, the period in which the most influential contributors to 
constitutional doctrine reiterated national sovereignty and postulated the 
representative system as its logical consequence, the actual constitutional and 
institutional setup of the French state reflected a blend of elements attributed to 
national and popular sovereignty, with a strong trend towards the latter. 
Nevertheless, the representative mandate – formulated negatively as the prohibition 
of the imperative mandate – has remained in place despite elements of direct 
democracy and the électorat-droit (instead of the électorat-fonction) which are 
attributed to popular sovereignty. Thus, the representative legislative mandate still 
stands as the key concept for an analysis of parliamentary immunity.  
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Considering the two-tier system of parliamentary immunity in the light of the 
internal logic of the system of representation, we have seen that non-accountability 
appears to be a natural corollary of representation. Inviolability, on the other hand, 
has at times been presented as the necessary ‘prolongation’ of non-accountability, 
that is, as an indispensable additional layer of protection for the representatives of 
the nation. However, there are strong arguments against the justification of 
inviolability as a necessary consequence of the representative mandate. While 
inviolability is of course not precluded by representation, it can be argued that this 
theoretical justification alone is too weak to support an immunity which reaches 
that far.  
Consequently, the question whether inviolability is necessary cannot be 
answered on the basis of a theoretical analysis alone. In order to reach a conclusion 
on this issue, we will have to turn to an analysis of the current state of affairs and 
assess the institutional balance which inviolability is meant to ensure. 
4. The Immunity Regime of the Fifth Republic 
We have already seen that the two-tier immunity system of non-accountability and 
inviolability for members of both chambers of parliament has undergone relatively 
little change since the adoption of the constitutional documents of the Third 
Republic in 1875. After having discussed the evolution of the French immunity 
system in the ‘constitutional laboratory’ that France has been since the Revolution 
and the doctrinal superstructure in which it has been embedded, a closer look at the 
precise content of the two immunities will serve to clarify the exact extent of the 
protection which French parliamentarians enjoy. The text of Article 26 of the 
Constitution appears relatively straightforward at first glance, in particular when 
compared to the much less elaborate provisions of other systems such as the United 
Kingdom. Article 26 reads as follows:  
No member of parliament may be prosecuted, investigated, arrested, detained or tried 
based on opinions expressed or votes cast by him in the exercise of his functions.  
No member of parliament may be arrested or subjected to any other measure of a 
criminal or correctional nature depriving him of or restricting his liberty without the 
authorisation of the bureau of the Chamber to which he belongs. Such authorisation is 
not required in case of a crime or misdemeanour in flagrante delicto or in case of a final 
conviction.  
The detention of a member of parliament, any measures depriving him of or restricting 
his liberty, or his prosecution shall be suspended for the period of the session if the 
Chamber to which he belongs so requires.  
The affected Chamber shall convene by operation of the law for supplementary 
meetings in order to allow, where appropriate, the application of the preceding 
paragraph. 
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A number of important questions do, however, remain with regard to the exact 
scope of the immunities. For instance, how exactly are the ‘functions’ of a 
parliamentarian defined? When exactly does the parliamentary mandate begin and 
when does it end – what is the temporal scope of the immunities? What is the 
procedure for lifting the inviolability of a member and which political and 
institutional implications does it have? Since we are particularly interested in the 
entanglement of parliamentary immunity with the constitutional and legal system 
as a whole, we also need to inquire into its legal nature: do we have to understand 
parliamentary immunity as a ‘privilege’ in the proper sense of the term – a system 
which creates a class of individuals which is exempt from the application of the 
general law? Or does it have to be understood as either an exculpation ground, a 
material exception to provisions of the (criminal) law or a mere procedural 
impediment? Finally, we shall attempt to answer the question whether there is a 
justification, beyond constitutional theory, for the element of inviolability which, 
after all, is the broadest immunity discussed in this study. 
4.1. The Constitutional Amendment of 1995 
The current wording of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Constitution is 
relatively recent. Until 1995, inviolability was significantly broader than it is today, 
since it barred for the duration of the parliamentary session not only the arrest of 
members but also any criminal proceedings against them. In the course of an 
extensive constitutional overhaul in 1995,175 this prohibition of criminal prosecution 
was lifted. Prior to this amendment, the second paragraph read as follows:  
No member of parliament may, for the duration of the session, be prosecuted in 
criminal or correctional matters without the authorisation of the Chamber to which he 
belongs. No member of parliament may, outside the session, be arrested without the 
authorisation of the bureau of the Chamber to which he belongs, except in case of an 
arrest flagrante delicto or pursuant to a final judicial sentence.  
Thus, in addition to a complete bar on criminal prosecution during the session, the 
power to lift a member’s inviolability was allocated with the respective chamber as 
a whole, though again only during the session. Outside the session, members could 
be prosecuted but not arrested, except flagrante delicto or following the authorisation 
by the chamber or a criminal sentence in final instance. During this period, the 
bureau of either chamber176 was competent to lift this freedom from arrest. The 
constitutional amendment of 1995 essentially limited the scope of inviolability to 
freedom from arrest both during and outside the session and rationalised the lifting 
procedure.  
 
175 The full title of the amendment act reads ‘loi constitutionnelle No 95-880 du 4 août 1995 
portant extension du champ d’application du référendum, instituant une session 
parlementaire ordinaire unique, modifiant le régime de l’inviolabilité parlementaire et 
abrogeant les dispositions relatives à la Communauté et les dispositions transitoires’. 
176 For the function and composition of the bureau, cf. supra at 2. 
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Several reasons led to this significant limitation. First, the constitutional 
amendment also changed Article 28 of the Constitution, which previously provided 
for two ordinary parliamentary sessions per year, each of a duration of only up to 
three months. In addition to allowing only very limited parliamentary control of the 
government during half the year and an often rushed legislative process, these short 
sessions meant that members enjoyed the broadest form of inviolability only for six 
months a year and with an interval of three months between sessions. The 
constitutional amendment of 1995 prolonged the parliamentary session to nine 
months; it now lasts from October to June with no winter break. This would have 
meant a very significant broadening of inviolability if the immunity regime had not 
been amended simultaneously, introducing the longer session. Second, a series of 
corruption affairs177 and ‘une certaine incompréhension de la part du citoyen 
[…]’,178 which had previously also contributed to the decision to modify the 
constitutional provisions on the criminal responsibility of ministers,179 motivated 
the proposal to amend the immunity system. The explanatory memorandum 
attached to the amendment bill shows that the revision was meant to remedy a 
perceived institutional disequilibrium brought about by the extreme scope of 
inviolability:  
[…] with a view to achieving a better equilibrium between the necessary protection of 
members of parliament and the observance of the rules of criminal procedure, the 
system of parliamentary inviolability is modified. Inviolability should be limited to the 
guarantees strictly necessary for the exercise of the parliamentary mandate. The 
requirement to obtain the authorisation of the Chamber before initiating the 
prosecution of a parliamentarian during the session is therefore abolished. However, 
the authorisation requirement for an arrest and the power of the Chamber to require 
the suspension of the prosecution or detention of a member are maintained.180 
Thus, while freedom from arrest was still deemed necessary by the government 
which drafted the amendment bill, it felt that parliamentarians should, as far as 
possible in the light of this necessity, be subject to the rules of criminal procedure.181 
The amendment was adopted on 4 August 1995 after receiving the required 
supermajority of two thirds in both parliamentary chambers.  
4.2. The Scope of Non-accountability and Inviolability 
In the following, the scope of non-accountability and inviolability will be 
considered in more detail. It is convenient to examine the temporal and personal 
scope of both immunities together, as the duration and capacity of the 
 
177 Pactet & Mélin-Soucramanien 2007, p. 443. 
178 Isar 1994, p. 676. 
179 Loi constitutionnelle No. 93-952 of 27 July 1993. 
180 Projet de loi nº 2120, exposé des motifs, 28 June 1995. 
181 It has been argued that the constitutional amendment was not so much instigated by 
circumstantial pressure emanating from ‘bad press’ and public opinion but by the desire to 
modernise the parliamentary system as a whole; cf. Fraisseix 1999, p. 503. 
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parliamentary mandate is the basis for both. The material scope of the immunities 
shall be considered individually, since it is here that the systemic divide between 
the two manifests itself. 
4.2.1. The Temporal Scope of the Immunities 
At first sight it does not seem too difficult to determine the temporal scope of non-
accountability and inviolability: the protection enjoyed by each parliamentarian on 
the basis of non-accountability sets in with the beginning of the mandate – the 
moment that the member assumes the capacity of parliamentarian – and lasts 
perpetually. This means that the protection afforded by this first layer of immunity 
extends beyond the duration of the mandate; members of the National Assembly 
and the Senate can never be held accountable for their votes and utterances in 
parliament. However, at one specific instance in history, this rule was not observed: 
after World War II, those parliamentarians of both chambers who had voted for the 
granting of full powers to marshal Pétain (see part two, section 3: the Vichy regime) 
were declared ineligible for the post-war parliament by a jury d’honneur.182  
The application of inviolability is limited to the duration of the mandate. It sets 
in at the same time as non-accountability but ends with the expiry of the mandate. 
As a result, while measures depriving a parliamentarian of his liberty are barred183 
for the period during which a person is a member of the National Assembly or the 
Senate, this person may be arrested or otherwise deprived of his liberty 
immediately after the termination of the mandate. It is important to note that such 
measures may then also relate to criminal acts or misdemeanours committed during 
the time of the mandate: inviolability only defers the arrest temporarily.  
In the case of inviolability, it is also important to note that paragraph two of 
Article 26 of the Constitution, prohibiting arrests or other measures depriving 
parliamentarians of their liberty, applies both during the session and in between 
sessions.184 However, the suspension of detention or prosecution of a member 
according to paragraph three of Article 26 can only be demanded for the duration of 
the session. 
As both immunities only start to apply at the moment that a citizen becomes a 
member of the National Assembly or a senator, it is important to determine exactly 
the moment at which membership of parliament begins. As inviolability ceases to 
apply at the end of the mandate, the moment of termination of the mandate is also 
of interest. One might expect that the mandate begins with the day on which the 
election results are announced. However, at least for the Senate this does not seem 
to be the case. Half of its members are elected every three years (series 1 and 2), so 
 
182 Avril & Gicquel 2010, p. 50. 
183 Unless they are authorised by the respective chamber or its bureau, as the case may be.  
184 The term ‘session’ refers to both ordinary and extraordinary or supplementary sessions. Cf. 
Calvo 1995, p. 7-11. 
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that the mandates of senators do not all start and end at the same time.185 Article 
LO277 of the electoral code provides as follows:  
In each series, the mandate of the senators begins with the opening of the ordinary 
session which follows their election. At the same time, the mandate of the senators 
previously in office expires.  
One could possibly argue that the term ‘member of parliament’ in Article 26 of the 
Constitution can be construed to mean any citizen elected a member. However, this 
interpretation does not appear very convincing, since ultimately the notion of a 
member of parliament not (yet) equipped with a parliamentary mandate and not 
yet performing any parliamentary tasks makes little sense. It may thus be the case 
that a senator-elect, whose election has been proclaimed, does not yet enjoy 
parliamentary immunity, since his mandate has not yet begun. This is self-evident 
for non-accountability, whose application is only possible with regard to 
parliamentary acts and utterances (see below). With regard to inviolability, the fact 
that there can be a time gap between the announcement of election results and the 
moment at which the immunity starts to apply can be significant in cases where a 
senator-elect has not yet taken up his mandate. 
The situation for members of the National Assembly seems to be the same, 
although here the electoral code does not explicitly mention the mandate of its 
members, but simply provides, in Articles LO121 and LO122 respectively: 
The powers of the National Assembly expire on the third Tuesday in June of the fifth 
year following its election. [emphasis added] 
Except in case of dissolution [of the Assembly], general elections take place during the 
sixty days preceding the expiry of the powers of the National Assembly.  
If we may assume that the parliamentary mandate of a newly elected member 
cannot commence before the ‘powers’ of the outgoing assembly have expired, a 
situation could arise in which a newly elected member is entitled to a mandate but 
that mandate has not yet begun. If election results are announced before the end of 
the last session of the outgoing assembly, this will mean that the newly elected 
members do not yet enjoy parliamentary immunity. This appears, on the one hand, 
from the fact that the number of members is fixed to 577 members by Article LO119 
of the electoral code, to the effect that a brief period of a ‘double assembly’ is not 
only technically inexpedient but legally impossible.186 On the other hand, if the 
members-elect were to enjoy immunity without ‘their’ assembly having been 
convened yet, this would place any request to lift the inviolability of a member-elect 
at the disposal of the outgoing assembly.187 Considering the possibility of changing 
 
185 Art. LO276 of the electoral code, as amended by loi organique 2003-696. Formerly, one third 
of the Senate was elected every three years.  
186 Art. LO277 of the electoral code suggests the same for the Senate: the mandate of the newly 
elected senators only begins at the moment that the mandate of their predecessors expires. 
187 This has been observed by Isar 1994, p. 682. 
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political majorities between the outgoing and the new assembly, this appears highly 
undesirable. As is the case for senators, non-accountability before the beginning of 
the mandate would be completely immaterial for the members-elect, as they do not 
perform any parliamentary tasks before taking up their mandate.  
In addition, it should be noted that a pending review of election results for (a 
member of) either chamber by the Constitutional Council does not have suspensive 
effect according to Articles LO182 and LO325 of the electoral code. A member 
whose election is under review may therefore take up his mandate and 
consequently enjoy parliamentary immunity.  
In conclusion, we may assume that that both immunities apply from the 
moment that the parliamentary mandate begins, and not the moment that election 
results are published. The mandate starts, in simple terms, at the moment that the 
member begins to take part in parliamentary activity. From the beginning of the 
mandate onwards, non-accountability applies perpetually whereas inviolability 
ends with the expiry of the mandate. 
4.2.2. The Personal Scope of the Immunities 
The personal scope of both non-accountability and inviolability is strictly limited to 
the member of parliament himself. It does not extend to his family or his staff.188 It is 
noteworthy that ‘places frequented by the parliamentarian’ as well his domicile and 
goods are also not protected by parliamentary immunity.189 While Isar made this 
observation before the constitutional amendment of 1995, it appears to be 
unaffected by the changes to Article 26 of the Constitution. It follows from the 
limitation of the scope of the immunities to the person of the parliamentarian 
proper that even such places and material which are attached to the person and can 
be characterised as ‘parliamentary’ are not covered. Nothing indicates, for instance, 
that parliamentary offices and documents are off-limits to measures of prosecution 
and investigation against a member of parliament,190 while such prosecution itself is 
no longer impeded by inviolability even during the session. It is clear that immunity 
would in any event bar legal proceedings and measures of investigation against a 
member on the basis of such documents if they fell under the material scope of non-
accountability (see section 2.4). However, it is noteworthy that, after the 
constitutional amendment of 1995, criminal measures against a member on any 
extraprofessional grounds are perfectly allowed as long as his physical liberty 
remains unaffected and as long as the relevant chamber has not made a demand 
under paragraph three of Article 26 of the Constitution.  
 
188 Isar 1994, p. 681-682. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Searches of the parliamentary offices of senator Charles Ceccaldi-Reynaud (10 February 2004 
and Assembly member Joëlle Ceccaldi-Reynaud (9 April 2004) have been performed by an 
investigating judge (juge d’instruction). In case of the senator’s office, this was done in the 
presence of the president of the Senate. Cf. Avril & Gicquel 2010, p. 52. 
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Only relatively recently, with the adoption of the act of 14 November 2008,191 
has one important exception to the strict limitation of non-accountability to the 
person of the member been introduced. This act introduced an extension of non-
accountability, by virtue of Article 41 of the Act of 29 July 1881 on the freedom of 
the press, to the testimony of any person heard as a witness by a parliamentary 
enquiry committee of the Senate or the National Assembly. This extension of non-
accountability, though very important to the work of enquiry committees, was 
previously not accepted by the courts.192 The inserted provision reads as follows: 
Neither any written or oral utterances made before an enquiry committee of the Senate 
or the National Assembly by a person asked to testify there, except where these 
utterances are unrelated to the object of the enquiry, nor any reproduction in good 
faith of the proceedings of public meetings of such an enquiry committee, give rise to 
any legal action for defamation, libel or insult.  
This is a case in point of the argument that parliamentary immunity has at its aim 
the protection of parliament, not the parliamentarian as a person. Also in the French 
context, that is an argument frequently heard.193 On the one hand, this institutional 
reasoning is reinforced by the existence of freedom from arrest in criminal matters, 
which allows parliament to secure the presence of its members at all times, and the 
recent extension of non-accountability to committee witnesses. On the other hand, 
any provision which adds to the personal scope of immunity an ‘institutional scope’ 
by covering parliamentary buildings, documents, and also persons other than 
witnesses involved with parliamentary affairs who are not members is glaringly 
absent from the French immunity system.194 This stands in sharp contrast to the 
British system of parliamentary privilege, where the protection of ‘proceedings in 
parliament’ is given much more prominence than the protection of the members 
personally. 
4.2.3. The Material Scope of Non-accountability 
Non-accountability constitutes a legal immunity in the proper sense of the term. Its 
effect is absolute in that it prohibits any form of legal proceedings, civil or criminal, 
against a member for acts performed, votes cast or opinions uttered by him in the 
exercise of his parliamentary functions. We have already seen that it is also 
perpetual and does not end with the end of the mandate. The material consequences 
in cases where non-accountability applies are therefore clear: due to its perpetual 
effect, non-accountability means true legal impunity for the parliamentarian even if 
 
191 Act No. 2008-1187 of 14 November 2008, modifying Art. 41 of the Act of 29 July 1881 and Art. 
6 of Ordinance No. 58-1100 of 17 November 1958. 
192 Cour de Cassation, 22 February 1956, bull. civ., II, No. 137, p. 87. 
193 Cf. for instance Fraisseix 1999, p. 497. 
194 Perhaps with the exception of Art. 100-7 of the French code of criminal procedure which 
prohibits the tapping of a member’s phone line without prior notification of the president of 
the chamber concerned, while the member himself does not have to be notified. 
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his utterances are defamatory or injurious or incite murder or treason.195 Similarly, it 
is immaterial whether the parliamentary act or utterance causes any damage.196 The 
absolute nature of non-accountability is not hampered by the fact that non-
accountability is deemed to be offset, though not legally enforceable outside the 
chamber, by a devoir de reserve which obliges members to mitigate the tone and 
content of their utterances in parliament.197 
But what exactly is protected by non-accountability for ‘opinions expressed 
and votes cased in the exercise of [a member’s] functions’? After all, the term 
‘opinions’ in the first paragraph of Article 26 of the French constitution is not much 
clearer than the British ‘proceedings in Parliament’. It is generally given a wide 
interpretation, practically synonymous to ‘utterances’. The protection of non-
accountability does not only extend to votes, speeches, questions and other oral 
interventions in the plenum of either chamber, but also to utterances made in 
committees, parliamentary groups or on parliamentary missions.198 Such utterances 
(or ‘opinions’) may be oral or written.  
The wording of Article 26 of the French Constitution, as opposed to the 
wording of Article 9 of the English Bill of Rights 1689, leaves little doubt that the 
connecting factor which places an utterance under the protection of non-
accountability is not a spatial or geographical one: it is clear that ‘parliamentary 
functions’ are exercised not only in the hemicycle or the building of the chamber. 
With a view to Title IV and V of the constitution on parliament and the relations 
between parliament and the government, one may also include the proposal and 
signing of a motion of censure, the drafting (and the ensuing text) of a bill and 
similar acts and products of a parliamentarian in the list of possible ways of 
expressing an ‘opinion in the exercise of [the] functions’ of a member.199  
If the term ‘opinions’ must be given a broad interpretation and if 
parliamentary ‘functions’ may be performed outside the parliamentary premises, 
this makes it hard to assess, in an individual case, whether a certain utterance falls 
under the material scope of Article 26(1) of the Constitution. As a rule to help 
determine whether non-accountability applies in a certain case, Isar has suggested 
that non-accountability only covers utterances (speech acts) of which only a 
parliamentarian is capable, due to his mandate.200 Whether such a test will yield 
accurate results in all cases is doubtful. On the one hand, many speech acts can be 
 
195 Isar 1994, p. 688. 
196 Pactet & Mélin-Soucramanien 2007, p. 443. 
197 Transcript of the debates of the National Assembly, 2nd session of 3 November 1986, p. 5696; 
cf. Avril & Gicquel 2010, p. 51. 
198 Avril & Gicquel 2010, p. 50. Note that the notion ‘parliamentary missions’ only means 
missions undertaken in a member’s capacity as a parliamentarian. Missions with which a 
member is assigned by the executive are not covered; Cf. Vivien c/ Eglise de Scientologie, Cour 
d’appel de Paris 11 March 1987 and the corresponding case note by Bigaut 1989, p. 12. The 
Conseil Constitutionnel subsequently declared an act which would have placed reports 
emanating from such a government-assigned mission under the cover of non-accountability 
unconstitutional; Conseil Constitutionnel, 7 November 1989, No. 89-262 DC. 
199 Isar 1994, p. 684. 
200 Isar 1994, p. 689. 
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imagined which can only be performed by parliamentarians because they require 
information to which only they have access. On the other hand, in such a case the 
exclusive capability does not actually relate to the speech act itself but to certain 
prerequisites for that act. If all such cases were to be covered by non-accountability, 
this would lead to results which are, in all likelihood, politically unacceptable: 
imagine, for instance, that parliamentarians – only parliamentarians – have access to 
certain classified information from non-public committee meetings or other sources 
inaccessible to non-members and that they disseminate or ‘leak’ such information to 
the press. According to the test proposed by Isar, at least if we interpret the 
‘exclusive capability’ requirement generously, non-accountability would easily 
protect parliamentarians who engage in ‘leaking’ and betrayal of state secrets. This 
however, will in all likelihood be hard to defend as being done ‘in the exercise of [a 
member’s] functions’. For determining whether or not a certain act is covered by 
non-accountability, therefore, the ‘exclusive capability’ test is only useful if that 
requirement is indeed given a restrictive interpretation. On a side note, the recent 
extension of non-accountability to committee witnesses and their testimony has 
added an exception to the rule that only parliamentarians can enjoy non-
accountability (see above). By means of an exception to this exception, however, 
non-accountability for committee witnesses has been limited to such utterances as 
are related to the object of the enquiry. It is not hard to imagine a scenario in which 
the latter condition is excessively hard to test for a judge confronted with a 
committee witness accused of criminal speech. 
The definition of ‘parliamentary functions’ is relatively narrow. The term does 
include literal reproductions of parliamentary utterances and documents in the 
press201 as well as discussions of such utterances by journalists in good faith.202 It 
does not, however, extend to utterances and written statements by a 
parliamentarian in newspaper or journal articles or at public gatherings.203 
Statements of parliamentarians in radio or television broadcasts, where it does not 
concern direct transmissions of the parliamentary session, are not covered by non-
accountability.204 Case law has confirmed that this is the case even where a 
parliamentarian is invited to take part in a television debate in his capacity as head 
 
201 Art. 41 of the Freedom of the Press Act (loi sur la liberté de la presse) of 29 July 1881, as 
amended by loi no. 2008-1187 of 14 November 2008:  
 ‘Ne donneront ouverture à aucune action les discours tenus dans le sein de l’Assemblée 
Nationale ou du Sénat ainsi que les rapports ou toute autre pièce imprimée par ordre de l’une 
de ces deux assemblées.  
 Ne donnera lieu à aucune action le compte rendu des séances publiques des assemblées 
visées à l’alinéa ci-dessus fait de bonne foi dans les journaux.  
 Ne donneront lieu à aucune action en diffamation, injure ou outrage ni les propos tenus ou 
les écrits produits devant une commission d’enquête créée, en leur sein, par l’Assemblée 
Nationale ou le Sénat, par la personne tenue d’y déposer, sauf s’ils sont étrangers à l’objet de 
l’enquête, ni le compte rendu fidèle des réunions publiques de cette commission fait de 
bonne foi […]’. 
202 Chantebout 2007, p. 498. 
203 Avril & Gicquel 2010, p. 52. 
204 Calvo 1995. 
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of a parliamentary inquiry committee on the issue of that committee. The Tribunal de 
grande instance de Paris held that Jacques Guyard, chairman of an inquiry committee 
of the National Assembly on religious sects, could not rely on parliamentary non-
accountability as a defence in defamation proceedings against him. Mr. Guyard had 
referred to the anthroposophy movement as a ‘sect’ in a television interview, 
thereby repeating the content of a committee report. The Court reasoned as follows:  
The circumstance that Mr. Guyard has been invited to speak in his capacity of 
president of the enquiry committee on sects does not suffice to give his contribution 
the character of an act of the parliamentary function; consequently, the statements of 
the defendant – uttered outside the parliamentary premises – cannot be regarded as a 
prolongation of the report drafted by the committee.205 
While this ruling was not upheld on appeal, the cour d’appel based its decision on 
the merits of the defamation case (it held that the anthroposophy movement could 
legitimately be referred to as a ‘sect’) and not on parliamentary non-
accountability.206 The reasoning of the lower court therefore seems to remain intact 
on the issue of the applicability of non-accountability. 
Similarly, utterances of parliamentarians are not protected by non-
accountability where they are done in the context of an assignment which a member 
has been given by the government.207 This has been decided by the Constitutional 
Council on the basis of the argument that, while such missions are compatible with 
the parliamentary mandate, they are by no means part of it: ‘[…] la rédaction d'un 
rapport, à la demande ou pour le compte du Gouvernement, diffusé sur son ordre, 
ne semble pas pouvoir être rattachée à l'exercice du mandat parlementaire’.208 
We can conclude that the material scope of non-accountability is demarcated 
rather strictly along the boundaries of a parliamentary mandate which is not 
deemed to include communication with the outside world, other than indirectly 
through broadcast debates or through documents officially sanctioned by 
parliament. The only point where the application of non-accountability crosses this 
boundary and goes beyond the parliamentary mandate is the exception adopted 
very recently for witnesses in inquiry committees mentioned earlier. This strict 
demarcation limits the material scope of non-accountability significantly and can be 
seen as a counterweight to the unlimited duration of this immunity.  
4.2.4. The Material Scope of Inviolability 
On top of non-accountability, which protects the work of a member of parliament 
itself, inviolability is a measure of ‘protection of the physical and intellectual liberty 
 
205 Guyard, Tribunale de grande instance de Paris, 21 March 2000. 
206 Cour d’Appel de Paris, 6 September 2001, No. 00-02776.  
207 While membership of the government is incompatible with the parliamentary mandate, 
temporary government assignments are compatible with it according to Art. LO144 of the 
code électoral.  
208 Conseil Constitutionnel, 7 November 1989, No. 89-262 DC. 
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of parliamentarians’,209 whereby the ‘intellectual’ protection must be understood as 
an indirect one: members are not to be troubled by fear of an imminent arrest or, 
under certain circumstances, measures of criminal prosecution. It is argued that, 
It is perfectly conceivable that the political adversaries of a parliamentarian seek to 
destabilise him by prosecution (which will often turn out to be unfounded), if not even 
to prevent him from taking his seat in parliament by arranging for his arrest while in 
reality he cannot be blamed with anything, or, simply, by exerting pressure on him by 
simple threats.210 
While preventing this is certainly the declared aim of both non-accountability and 
inviolability, the material scope of the latter is also not unlimited. As we have seen, 
inviolability can be characterised as a temporary and provisional immunity. 
Temporary, because it is limited to the duration of the parliamentary mandate and 
because the right of the chambers to demand a stay of measures of prosecution 
against a member or to have him released from detention pursuant to paragraph 
three of Article 26 of the Constitution is limited to the duration of the session. 
Provisional, because the immunity may be lifted by the bureau of the chamber 
concerned at any time and because it does not apply in case of an arrest flagrante 
delicto or upon a criminal sentence pronounced in final instance.  
In principle, the acts covered by inviolability are acts which qualify as crimes 
or misdemeanours (délit) committed in the extraprofessional sphere, id est, outside 
the immediate scope of activities which can be attributed to the parliamentary 
mandate. Evidently, this means that the simultaneous application of non-
accountability and inviolability to the same act or utterance is impossible.  
Avril and Gicquel define the sphere of application of inviolability as 
encompassing ‘anything which may be examined by an investigative judge 
[magistrat instructeur] under the conditions of the general law’.211 Conversely, 
inviolability prohibits for the entire duration of the mandate the arrest of a member 
of parliament and any other measures of a criminal or correctional nature which 
deprive him of or limit his liberty. These ‘other measures’ have been added to 
paragraph two of Article 26 by the constitutional amendment of 1995, taking into 
account the implications of an earlier amendment made in 1970 to Article 138 of the 
code of criminal procedure. That amendment introduced 16 measures of contrôle 
judiciaire, to be imposed on a suspect by the investigative judge, among which some 
limit the freedom of the suspect.212  
It is important to note that the freedom from arrest effected by inviolability 
only concerns deprivation of liberty in criminal and correctional matters. Certainly, 
arrest in civil matters has long been abolished in France as it has been elsewhere. 
Situations in which a member of parliament could be deprived of his liberty other 
than in criminal matters are nonetheless conceivable, if yet unlikely. For instance, it 
 
209 Hamon & Troper 2009, p. 675. 
210 Luchaire & Conac 1980, p. 793. 
211 Avril & Gicquel 2010, p. 52. 
212 For instance, the investigative judge may order a suspect not to leave his place of residence, 
not to visit certain places, etc.  
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would be imaginable that a parliamentarian is placed under quarantine or taken 
into custody on grounds of his mental health. In contrast to the situation in the UK, 
where this possibility needed to be made explicit by statute for members of the 
House of Commons and is still not finally decided for members of the House of 
Lords, Article 26 of the French Constitution sets a very clear boundary.  
In addition to the prohibition of arrest which applies throughout the time of 
the mandate, the chamber concerned may demand the release of a detained member 
or the stay of any measures of investigation or pursuit against time for the duration 
of the session (paragraph three). Since this demand cannot be made by the bureau 
but only by the full chamber, supplementary sessions may be convened to make 
such a demand. Thus, subject to the condition that a political majority must be 
obtained for the chamber to make this demand, a member can still enjoy complete 
freedom from any measure of criminal investigation for the duration of the session 
and can even be released from detention where it does not concern imprisonment as 
the consequence of a final judicial sentence.  
As regards the material scope of inviolability, we can conclude that it presents 
itself as a broad but by no means limitless immunity. Most importantly, any effect it 
has ceases with the end of the parliamentary mandate. During the time of the 
mandate, however, it automatically bars the application of the criminal law only as 
far as it would lead to a deprivation of liberty. Criminal investigations, trials and 
detention not based on a final criminal sentence can be suspended only at the behest 
of an active intervention by the chamber concerned. 
4.3. Procedures for Lifting Inviolability and for the Suspension of 
Detention or Prosecution 
4.3.1. The Procedure for Lifting Inviolability 
When considering the lifting of parliamentary immunity, we should first consider 
that neither of the two layers of immunity is placed at the disposal of the individual 
parliamentarian himself, that is to say, a member can under no circumstances waive 
his immunity. This appears logical in the light of the thought that immunity is not 
considered a personal privilege of the individual member as a person but a means 
to safeguard the functioning of parliament as an institution.  
As has been mentioned previously, non-accountability is perpetual and cannot 
be lifted, while inviolability is temporarily limited and can be lifted at the behest of 
the chamber or bureau. This means that, save in cases of arrest flagrante delicto213 or 
after a member has incurred a final criminal sentence pursuant to which the arrest is 
made, any arrest or other criminal measure restricting the liberty of a 
 
213 Avril and Gicquel observe that this notion has at times been subject to abuse. They cite the 
curious case of Jacques Duclos, member of the National Assembly for the communist party. 
During a time of violent protests, two pigeons were found in his car on 28 May 1952. 
Subsequently he was accused of using the birds to give secret instructions to the protesters 
and the lifting of his inviolability was requested. Later, it was established that the pigeons 
were rather normal birds and by no means secret messengers. Cf. Avril & Gicquel 2010, p. 54. 
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parliamentarian requires prior authorisation. Such authorisation must, on sanction 
of nullity, be requested in writing by the procurator general at the competent court 
of appeal and transmitted, via the minister of justice, to the president of the 
chamber concerned.214 The steps of this line of communication must be strictly 
observed: it has repeatedly been reiterated that the minister of justice is ‘the only 
interlocutor’ that the Senate recognises in such matters;215 the same procedure 
applies to requests made to the National Assembly. Requests must indicate 
precisely for which measures authorisation is requested, unless the request relates 
to all possible measures;216 requests to the Senate must also indicate the motives 
which the request is based on.217 
In both chambers, the decision whether the requested authorisation is granted 
is taken by the respective bureau alone, which is seized by the president of the 
chamber upon receipt of the request; no debate or vote is held in the plenum of the 
chamber as was the case before the constitutional amendment of 1995. In the 
National Assembly, the request will be dealt with and the decision prepared by a 
committee formed within the bureau, while no such delegation takes place in the 
bureau of the Senate.218 Finally, where the authorisation is granted, it is limited to 
the measures explicitly mentioned in the request.219 In reality, this procedure can 
and does lead to a partial lifting of inviolability. This happens either where the 
request is formulated in such a way that authorisation is sought for only one or 
several specific measures or where an initial request is turned down by the bureau 
and subsequently reformulated, as it happened in the case of the assembly member 
Bernard Tapie in 2001, where the bureau resolved that measures of contrôle 
judiciaire220 should suffice for the due administration of justice.221  
It is not without a certain irony that the constitutional revision of 1995, while 
reducing the scope of inviolability significantly, has had one very important side 
effect which results from the new lifting procedure: requests to lift inviolability are 
no longer publicly debated in the plenary chamber. As a result, there is now much 
less opportunity for – or danger of, as perspectives change – public scrutiny and 
media attention. This may, on the hand, have a positive effect, since it has been 
observed that, under the previous system,  
 
214 Art. 9 bis of Ordinance No. 58-1100 of 17 November 1958. 
215 Avril & Gicquel 2010, p. 53. 
216 Art. 16 of the Instruction Général du Bureau (IGB) of the National Assembly and Art. III bis of 
the IGB of the Senate, respectively.  
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Art. 9 bis para. 2 of Ordinance No. 58-1100 of 17 November 1958. 
220 Cf. supra at 212. 
221 Avril & Gicquel 2010, p. 53. 
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The parliamentarian concerned will inevitably see how the decision to lift his 
immunity is interpreted as an implicit recognition of his guilt: conversely, the decision 
to refuse the lifting of his immunity or the inadmissibility of the request will be 
perceived as an evasive maneuver with the aim of delaying judicial action (…).222 
This effect is certainly mitigated by excluding the public and the media from the 
decision making process, which may also have the effect that votes on a request to 
lift inviolability are less likely to be influenced by public opinion and thus, it is 
hoped, more likely to be based on merits. On the other hand, the constitutional 
overhaul of 1995 had the aim of bringing the legal situation of a member of 
parliament more in line with that of an ordinary citizen. It is questionable whether 
the enormous reduction in transparency which comes with the new lifting 
procedure works towards that end. On the one hand, the prosecution of an ordinary 
citizen is usually, and rightfully, not publicly scrutinized before the trial. On the 
other hand, however, inviolability can be a powerful and, lacking the political will 
in parliament to overcome it, insurmountable obstacle to the judicial process which 
ordinary citizens certainly do not have in their arsenal.  
4.3.2. The Procedure for the Suspension of Detention and Measures of 
Prosecution 
Paragraph one of Article 80 of the Rules of Procedure (règlement) of the National 
Assembly stipulates that a permanent immunities committee of 15 members be 
formed for the purpose of examining demands to suspend the detention, measures 
restricting the liberty, or the prosecution of a member. The political composition of 
this committee must be proportionate to that of the assembly. In the Senate, an ad 
hoc committee composed of 30 members, also representing the composition of the 
Senate proportionally, exercises the same task by virtue of Article 105 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Senate. The member concerned or (for example, if that member is 
in detention) a colleague authorised by him may submit to this committee a request 
to make a demand pursuant to Article 26, paragraph three of the constitution. After 
hearing the member or his agent, the committee prepares a draft resolution which it 
submits to the respective plenary chamber. 
Paragraph seven of Article 80 of the Rules of Procedure of the National 
Assembly provides that a limited oral debate shall take place on the basis of the 
draft resolution, at which only the rapporteur of the committee, a representative of 
the government, the concerned member himself or his agent, as well as one speaker 
pro and one speaker contra may have the floor. A subsequent vote in the assembly 
adopts or rejects the demand. If it is rejected, no further request with regard to the 
same matter may be made for the remainder of the session, pursuant to paragraph 
nine of Article 80.  
The procedure in the Senate, ex Article 105 of its Rules of Procedure, is 
regulated far less strictly. Article 105 does not provide for any limitations to the oral 
 
222 Rapport No. 2138 of the commission des lois, 5 juillet 1995, p. 27, as quoted by Fraisseix 1999, p. 
538. 
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debate in the Senate; however, the chamber may, similarly to the assembly, only 
vote on the suspension of the detention or other measures in question. This means 
that it may decide the full or partial suspension of these measures but may, for 
instance, not determine the duration of the suspension or issue an opinion on the 
merits of the case.  
If a decision to demand a suspension pursuant to paragraph three of Article 26 
of the Constitution is taken by either chamber, that suspension is only effective 
during the remainder of the current session. 
4.4. The Legal Nature of Parliamentary Immunity 
The question of the legal nature of immunity appears particularly interesting in the 
light of a comparison between the immunity systems of different countries, since it 
is a strong indicator of the place that immunity takes within the legal system as a 
whole. Different interpretations of this legal nature are possible. Especially with 
regard to speech acts which in themselves qualify as criminal but which are covered 
by non-accountability, one could think of irresponsabilité as an exculpation ground, 
which does not take away the criminal nature of the act but renders the perpetrator 
inculpable by virtue of his parliamentary mandate. One could also think of it as a 
legal justification, similar to legitimate defence or necessity.223 Finally, and perhaps 
most logically, non-accountability can be perceived as a ‘real’ immunity, in the 
sense that it creates a class of people generally exempt from the application of 
certain provisions of the general law where they would apply to acts attached to 
their parliamentary mandate.  
The legal outcome for the parliamentarian would be the same, regardless of 
which legal nature is assumed for non-accountability. Nevertheless, it might have 
consequences for the way in which criminal proceedings against members are 
conducted in court. If non-accountability is either merely an exculpation ground or 
a justification, the criminal judge would still have to establish the alleged act and its 
criminal nature in principle, before he could apply paragraph one of Article 26 of 
the constitution. If, on the other hand, non-accountability is to be understood as an 
immunity in the proper sense of the word, proceedings would have to be 
abandoned the moment it is established that the defendant is a member of 
parliament and the act concerned falls under his parliamentary activity. It appears 
most reasonable to assume that the latter interpretation of non-accountability is the 
correct one, which is also confirmed by court practice and the opinion of 
practitioners.224 As a result, the difference between French parliamentary non-
accountability and British parliamentary privilege does not seem too large and lies 
mainly in the material scope of UK privilege, which covers all ‘proceedings in 
Parliament’, regardless of the person involved.  
The legal nature of inviolability is very different from that of non-
accountability. We have repeatedly mentioned that inviolability neither de-
 
223 Isar 1994, p. 685. 
224 Isar 1994, p. 686. 
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criminalises the criminal act committed by a parliamentarian nor affects the 
culpability of the perpetrator. It is also not what we have called an ‘actual 
immunity’, since legal proceedings remain possible at all times and may, in case of a 
final sentence, even result in incarceration during the time of the mandate. More 
importantly, inviolability never has more than a deferring aspect. After the end of 
the mandate at the latest, prosecution and arrest can proceed as provided by the 
criminal law. Therefore, it is best to understand inviolability as a mere procedural 
impediment, rather than an immunity in the strict sense.  
4.5. A Justification for Inviolability? 
We have seen in part III that a justification of inviolability on the basis of mere 
theoretical considerations is probably too weak to sustain the system as it exists in 
reality. First, this justification is largely based on the logic of the doctrine of national 
sovereignty and a very strict notion of the representative mandate which ensues 
from it. However, this doctrine is no longer rooted in the text of the constitution, nor 
is it reflected in the actual institutional structure of the state. To accept 
parliamentary immunity of formal grounds as a necessary corollary of national 
sovereignty is therefore insufficient to justify the legal phenomenon of 
parliamentary immunity as it exists in practice. Second, the argument that the 
legislature must be complete in order to perform its task of defining and 
formulating the national will can be refuted, since there is no need under the theory 
of representation for the legislature to reflect the political will of the electorate.225 
Perhaps more importantly, parliamentary practice does not suggest that the absence 
of a member is an impediment to decision making, as long as the relevant quorum 
for a particular decision is present. Thus, if completeness of the chambers of 
parliament alone does not justify inviolability, do other considerations justify it?  
Two arguments may, in fact, contribute to a justification. First, inviolability 
reinforces the institutional equilibrium and maintains the balance of power between 
the judiciary and the legislature. Keeping in mind that inviolability is temporary 
and only effective as long as a citizen is indeed part of a legislative organ, a 
justification of inviolability from this angle is conceivable. However, it is doubtful 
whether such a justification suffices in times where the assertiveness of parliament 
vis-à-vis the judiciary is not so much fuelled by actual conflict or threat as it is a 
‘corporate reflex’.226 A much more important institutional argument in favour of 
maintaining inviolability can be derived from the fact that the public prosecution 
service (ministère public) is not entirely independent and even bound by direct 
instructions from the government. Article 30 of the code of criminal procedure 
provides that the Minister of Justice is not only competent to formulate policy rules 
with regard to prosecution but to order the commencement of proceedings in a case. 
 
225 Cf. Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 117 et seq. 
226 Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 371. 
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The Minister of Justice carries out the policies of public prosecution determined by the 
government. He ensures the coherence of its application throughout the territory of the 
Republic.  
To this end, he issues general instructions of public prosecution to the members of the 
prosecution service.  
He may report any violations of the criminal law of which he has knowledge to the 
procurator general and order him, by means of written instructions deposited in the 
case record, to initiate proceedings or to cause them to be initiated, or to seise the 
competent court [jurisdiction] of such written orders as the minister deems appropriate. 
This involvement of the government with the ministère public is more worrying in 
terms of the separation of powers and institutional balance, since the government 
and, in particular, minority members of the legislature may pursue opposing 
interests which could potentially lead to politically motivated proceedings. Several 
authors share this worry and therefore find inviolability, at least to a certain extent, 
justified.227  
4.6. The Immunity Regime of the Fifth Republic: A Summary Picture 
In this part, we have described the current French immunity regime which presents 
itself as a two-tier system of two complementary elements: non-accountability and 
inviolability. Non-accountability is an immunity in the strict sense of the term: it 
permanently bars the application of the general law to a certain group of people 
acting in a specific function. Inviolability, however, is better understood as a 
temporary procedural impediment which is neither permanent in terms of its 
temporal scope nor absolute, since it can be lifted. Both immunities cannot, at any 
time, be waived by an individual member.  
We can observe that, even looking at a relatively small timeframe of less than 
20 years, the system of parliamentary immunity in France is anything but static. A 
major constitutional amendment has significantly reduced the material content of 
inviolability and changed the lifting procedure from a plenary vote to a more 
discrete decision of the bureau. Non-accountability has been slightly broadened in 
2008 by including non-members who testify in parliamentary inquiry committees as 
witnesses. On a general note, one may conclude that the French immunity regime 
has recently undergone a modernisation process aiming at adapting it to a more 
modern understanding of representative democracy and responding to current 
needs.  
Whether inviolability, certainly the more contentious element of immunity, is 
fully justified in its current form might be doubted. However, institutional 
arguments show that its complete abolition is not called for, as it still plays a role, at 
least potentially, in maintaining an institutional balance and safeguarding the 
separation of powers.  
 
227 Cf. Guérin-Bargues 2011, p. 410-411; Luchaire et al. 2009, p. 793-794. 
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5. Conclusion 
The comprehensive analysis of the French parliamentary immunity system 
undertaken in this chapter has spanned a period of more than two hundred years 
and a wide array of individual aspects of immunity.  
In contrast to parliamentary privilege in the United Kingdom, the origins of 
the French immunity system do not lie in the mists of medieval history but can be 
traced to two exact dates in the early days of the French Revolution. The historical 
background of the two first immunity decrees of the National Assembly of 23 June 
1789 and 26 June 1790 leaves no doubt that the immunity system was initially 
adopted out of circumstance, for fear of reprisals and to assert the independence of 
the young Assembly. Even though the Assembly did not clearly distinguish 
between the two different forms of immunity, the two-tier system of non-
accountability and inviolability which remains in place to this date has its historical 
basis in these two decrees. Since the Revolution and throughout the French ‘waltz of 
constitutions’, this system has undergone remarkably little change. It is therefore 
fair to say that, in France, parliamentary immunity is a very stable and time-
honoured constitutional tradition.  
One of the reasons why the two-tier system of non-accountability and 
inviolability has proven so surprisingly persistent despite its evidently 
circumstantial origin can be found in constitutional theory. Classical French 
doctrine has created an intimate – though largely implicit – link between 
parliamentary immunity and two core concepts of French constitutional thinking: 
national sovereignty and representation. According to classical reasoning, the idea 
that the national will has to be formed by completely independent representatives 
of the nation and that this justifies and requires the severance of any (legal) link 
between parliament and the outside world. Parliamentary immunity is an essential 
tool to safeguard this complete independence. In short, national sovereignty 
requires a representative parliamentary mandate, which requires absolute 
independence, which in turn requires parliamentary immunity. This line of 
reasoning relies on legal fictions which the French Constitution had already 
factually abandoned at the time it was formulated by Carré de Malberg and others. 
It is nevertheless still the near-axiomatic justification for parliamentary immunity in 
France and has only recently received some criticism. In particular, it has been 
argued that non-accountability remains essential for the functioning of parliament, 
but that the classical justification of the immunities is weak with regard to 
inviolability because it relies on assumptions which do not match the conditions of 
today’s constitutional and political reality.  
Despite its historical stability, the French immunity regime is not static. The 
constitutional amendment of 1995 has severely limited the material scope of 
immunity; members of parliament can now be prosecuted without the prior 
authorisation of the chamber concerned. While both chambers remain able to 
suspend the prosecution of one of their members, the default inviolability has thus 
essentially been reduced to freedom from arrest. According to the explanatory 
memorandum, the aim of the amendment was to limit inviolability ‘to the 
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guarantees strictly necessary for the exercise of the parliamentary mandate’. On a 
larger scale and seen in conjunction with recent doctrinal calls for a more practical 
approach to the justification of parliamentary immunity, the development of the 
French immunity systems seems to match our hypothesis (see Chapter II, section 4) 
that immunity regimes have a general tendency to develop in the direction of a 
slowly developing European standard whose core is a functional approach to 
immunity. Under this approach, inviolability is especially problematic where it 
exceeds the level of protection which is necessary to protect the functioning of 
parliament. However, with general freedom from arrest and the power of 
parliament to suspend criminal proceedings against its members at will, France still 
roams near the upper end of the ‘immunity scale’.  
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Chapter 5 
PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY IN THE NETHERLANDS 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Structure 
After an introduction (part one), this case study is split into three parts. As in the 
previous case studies, part two explores the origins and history of parliamentary 
immunity. Part three discusses the Dutch immunity system as it applies today. This 
part also pays particular attention to an often neglected or ‘dormant’ constitutional 
provision of only potential relevance to parliamentary immunity: Article 119 of the 
Dutch Constitution. This part also contains a discussion of recent debates with 
regard to broadening the scope of the immunity system. The final part, part four, 
contains the conclusions which can be drawn from a comprehensive analysis of the 
Dutch immunity regime.  
1.2. Terminology 
The most frequently used Dutch terms for parliamentary immunity are parlementaire 
immuniteit and parlementaire onschendbaarheid. The latter term is often used to refer to 
the immunity laid down in Article 71 of the Constitution. It has, however, been 
identified as misleading,1 since it literally translates into ‘inviolability’ whereas 
Article 71 only provides for non-accountability. Thus, the term onschendbaarheid 
suggests a degree of immunity which the Dutch Constitution does not offer to 
members of the States-General. In addition, the same term is used to denote the 
actual inviolability of the Dutch monarch ex Article 42(2) of the Dutch Constitution, 
which is much more substantial.  
Belgian authors, writing about the Belgian immunity system (which is very 
similar to the French one), often speak of onverantwoordelijkheid when discussing 
non-accountability as opposed to onschendbaarheid, by which they mean 
 
1 Bovend’Eert et al. 2009, p. 115. 
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inviolability.2 This term is not generally used in Dutch literature, presumably 
because using the term onverantwoordelijk in the context of immunity results in an 
involuntary pun: it translates into both ‘unaccountable’ and ‘irresponsible’. Where 
not accompanied by a precise explanation of the legal content of parliamentary 
immunity in the Netherlands (which is hard enough to give!), it is imaginable that 
the ambiguity of the term onschendbaarheid causes misconceptions and thus may 
contribute to an often observed overestimation of the degree of immunity enjoyed 
by members of the States-General.3  
A term which has sometimes been used in Dutch literature to denote 
inviolability or, more specifically, freedom from arrest, is vrijwaring. This term has 
several slightly different meanings depending on the context in which it is used, but 
translates roughly into ‘guarantee’.4 In the context of early Dutch immunity 
provisions, it could be understood as a guaranteed right to personal liberty 
(freedom from arrest), or a right of free passage. 
1.3. Parliamentary Immunity in the Netherlands 
The present case study is concerned with the system of parliamentary immunity of 
the Netherlands. As with the two previous case studies, this means that the primary 
object of study is the immunity which applies to members of the upper and lower 
chambers of the national parliament. In the case of the Netherlands, these are the 
First and Second Chamber of the States-General, respectively. The current Dutch 
system of parliamentary immunity is essentially limited to non-accountability, 
which is laid down in Article 71 of the Constitution. This reads as follows: 
The members of the States-General, the ministers, the secretaries of state and other 
persons who participate in deliberations may not be prosecuted or held liable for what 
they have said in the meetings of the States-General or of committees thereof, or for 
what they have submitted to them in writing.5 
The persons thus covered by Dutch non-accountability are not only the members of 
the two chambers of the States-General but also the ministers, secretaries of state 
(also referred to as ‘junior ministers’ in the Netherlands) and ‘other persons who 
participate in deliberations’. Accordingly, non-accountability has a wide personal 
 
2 See for instance Sottiaux 2010, p. 50.  
3 This overestimation has been discussed in Drexhage 2011, p. 65-82. 
4 In private law, for instance, the term vrijwaring can denote the duty of the seller of a good to 
guarantee the buyer the free and full enjoyment of the sold good. If it turns out that a third 
party is entitled to the good, this may result in an obligation of the seller to compensate the 
damage suffered by the buyer; in civil procedure, the possibility to seek redress from a third 
party is also referred to as vrijwaring.  
5 Translation from Kiiver & Kornet 2010. The Dutch original reads as follows: 
 ‘De leden van de Staten-Generaal, de ministers, de staatssecretarissen en andere personen die 
deelnemen aan de beraadslaging, kunnen niet in rechte worden vervolgd of aangesproken 
voor hetgeen zij in de vergadering van de Staten-Generaal of van commissies daaruit hebben 
gezegd of aan deze schriftelijk hebben voorgelegd’. 
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scope which reaches beyond actual members of parliament. In part, this is certainly 
explained by the incompatibility of the parliamentary mandate with government 
office: ministers and secretaries of state may not be members of the States-General. 
At the same time, however, the government is part of the Dutch legislature. 
Ministers and secretaries of state will therefore regularly take part in legislative 
debates in parliament. It would therefore appear absurd to deny them the same 
freedom of speech as is enjoyed by parliamentarians, at least if parliamentary 
immunity is to be understood as the legislator’s privilege.  
In the Netherlands, no additional layer of inviolability is available on top of 
the non-accountability provided by Article 71, with one possible qualification: 
Article 119 of the Constitution designates the Supreme Court as a forum privilegiatum 
for the trial of crimes committed in office. The provision reads as follows: 
The members of the States-General, the ministers and the secretaries of state are tried 
for crimes committed in these capacities before the Supreme Court, also after having 
left office. The order to prosecute is given by royal decree or by a decision of the 
Second Chamber.6 
This provision thus prescribes a special procedure for the prosecution and 
adjudication of crimes committed by the designated persons in the exercise of their 
office or mandate. Article 119 bears a certain resemblance to provisions which 
regulate the criminal liability of members of the government in the constitutions of 
other countries.7 The existence of such provisions is normal in countries where 
government office is incompatible with the parliamentary mandate, as this means 
that members of the government do not enjoy parliamentary immunity. However, 
such provisions are not normally mutually applicable to parliamentarians but 
constitute a separate and usually more limited immunity regime for the government 
alone.8  
Article 119 of the Dutch Constitution certainly does not create an immunity 
stricto sensu, since it does not even temporarily bar legal proceedings and only 
applies to a limited set of criminal acts, referred to as crimes in office [lit: ‘office 
crimes’ – ambtsmisdrijven]. It is nevertheless reasonable to consider Article 119 in a 
comprehensive analysis of parliamentary immunity. On the one hand, our account 
of the history of the Dutch immunity regime will show that Article 119 is a 
constitutional remnant of actual inviolability, which existed in the early 19th century 
but later disappeared. On the other hand, it has been claimed that Article 119 bears 
at least a hypothetical ‘immunity potential’, even though it has never been applied 
 
6 Translation: ibid. The Dutch original reads as follows: 
 ‘De leden van de Staten-Generaal, de ministers en de staatssecretarissen staan wegens 
ambtsmisdrijven in die betrekkingen gepleegd, ook na hun aftreden terecht voor de Hoge 
Raad. De opdracht tot vervolging wordt gegeven bij koninklijk besluit of bij een besluit van 
de Tweede Kamer’.  
7 See e.g. Art. 68(1) of the French Constitution and Art. 103 of the Belgian Constitution.  
8 For a comparison of a number of such provisions, see Hardt & Eliantonio 2011, p. 17-39. 
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in practice.9 After all, the decision to prosecute a parliamentarian or member of the 
government for crimes in office may not be taken by the public prosecution service 
on its own motion; the order to prosecute must be given either by the government 
or by the Second Chamber. Hence, an element of political scrutiny is required before 
the prosecution of crimes in office can take place. This suggests that Article 119 has 
an immunity dimension which cannot be ignored in this case study.  
1.3.1. Issues 
As with the previous two case studies, this chapter attempts to comprehensively 
examine the constitutional phenomenon of parliamentary immunity. Following a 
similar structure to the chapters on the British and French immunity systems, this 
means that, prior to an analysis of the current positive content of the immunity 
provisions and their practical application, the historical foundations of 
parliamentary immunity in the Netherlands will also be examined. More 
specifically, this examination focuses on a number of issues which are of particular 
interest in the case of the Netherlands.  
1.3.1.1. Historical Reasons for Limited Parliamentary Immunity 
In how far does Dutch constitutional history explain the comparatively limited 
nature of immunity in the Netherlands? We have learned in the previous two case 
studies that parliamentary immunity in Britain and France was originally created – 
or has evolved, if we look at the broader historical picture – in order to answer a 
real and specific need for the protection of parliament against, in particular, the 
monarch. Even though immunity has been embedded in constitutional theory both 
in the United Kingdom and in France, its origins were of a practical nature. Can we 
thus assume that the reason for a more modest immunity regime in the Netherlands 
was a comparative lack of conflict?  
It has been argued that the reason why the Dutch chose to settle for a much 
more limited system of parliamentary immunity – which contents itself with non-
accountability – lies in their republican past.10 This statement may not hold true 
without qualification. First of all, while it is true that Dutch parliamentary 
immunity is, in essence, nothing more than freedom of speech in parliament, the 
system still contains, in the form of Article 119, remnants of inviolability which 
remind us of a different system that existed in the past. Second of all, it will be 
shown that there was no true non-accountability for members of the provincial 
states and the States-General during the republican period; the immunity system in 
its current form was adopted much later. It is therefore at least questionable 
whether the impact of the republican period on the development of the 
parliamentary immunity system really amounted to much more than laying the 
 
9 R. Nehmelman proposes such a reading of Art. 119 in Nehmelman 2010. He rightly observes 
that Art. 119 goes largely unnoticed in the literature on parliamentary immunity in the 
Netherlands.  
10 Elzinga & De Lange 2006, p. 572. 
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foundations of an egalitarian legal culture with only limited space for privileges and 
immunities. What is certainly owed to that Republic, however, is that the 
Netherlands have neither undergone an age-long struggle between monarch and 
parliament – as the one that had spurred the evolution of parliamentary privilege in 
Britain –, nor a full-fledged revolution against absolute monarchy.11 It is thus likely 
that the limited nature of parliamentary immunity in the Netherlands can at least 
partly be attributed to a lack of historical conflict between parliament and monarch. 
This chapter takes a closer look at the historical origins of the Dutch immunity 
system in light of this hypothesis.  
1.3.1.2. How Limited is Dutch Parliamentary Immunity in Reality? 
At first glance, parliamentary immunity in the Netherlands does not seem to be 
much more than basic non-accountability: Article 71 of the Dutch Constitution 
provides for freedom of expression in parliament. The details regarding the scope 
and interpretation of this provision, as well as its historical origin, will be looked at 
in the present chapter. It is readily apparent, however, that Article 71 provides for 
an immunity that is even more limited than its British counterpart. Though only 
vaguely defined, the latter seems to be a more encompassing institutional privilege 
than the freedom of speech in parliamentary debates granted by the Dutch system. 
It withdraws ‘proceedings in Parliament’ in their entirety from the ordinary course 
of justice and, moreover, contains remnants of a much broader immunity in the 
form of freedom from arrest in civil matters (although this is all but defunct 
today).12 Much more striking, still, is the difference in the degree of protection 
afforded to parliamentarians if one compares Article 71 of the Dutch Constitution to 
Article 26 of the French Constitution, which affords members of the National 
Assembly and the Senate the strong protection of inviolability in criminal and civil 
matters alike. When looking solely at Article 71, the protection which the Dutch 
Constitution offers members of the States-General is thus very meagre compared to 
the immunity systems of other states. However, as mentioned above, there might be 
slightly more protection: it has been proposed that Article 119 of the Dutch 
Constitution, which regulates criminal procedure for crimes committed in office by 
members of the States-General, ministers and secretaries of state, could be read as 
an additional layer of immunity, or transformed into one with the help of relatively 
minor changes in statute.13 Since Article 119 only covers crimes committed in the 
exercise of the office or mandate, and because prosecution under this article may be 
ordered by the government, it can hardly be said to constitute fully-fledged 
inviolability. However, depending on its interpretation and usage, it might slightly 
qualify our view on the Dutch immunity system. We will try to establish whether 
the claim that Article 119 has ‘immunity potential’ has any merit.  
 
11 Although the Batavian Revolution of 1795 was certainly also directed against absolutist 
tendencies of the stadholders. 
12 See Chapter III for a detailed discussion on the notion ‘proceedings in parliament’ and its 
practical consequences for the scope of parliamentary privilege. 
13 Supra at 8.  
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1.3.1.3. Parliamentary vs. Political Immunity 
Is the Dutch system of parliamentary immunity adequate in light of the role which 
parliamentarians play in modern society? Recent debates on parliamentary 
immunity in the Netherlands revolve around this question. Of course, a legal 
analysis of immunity cannot provide an exhaustive answer, since that answer will 
partly depend on a political definition of what we see as the content of the 
parliamentary mandate: are members of parliament still exercising their mandate 
when they disseminate their views outside parliament? Is it part of their task to 
participate in public debate through the media? The law does not answer these 
questions with certainty. However, a legal study of parliamentary immunity can 
demarcate the legal parameters within which this political discussion needs to take 
place. This chapter attempts to achieve this by clarifying the content of the law and 
the implications of possible modifications thereof. In particular, the proposal to 
expand the scope of non-accountability beyond parliamentary debates is discussed 
in light of the question of whether immunity is a personal right of the 
parliamentarian or an institutional privilege of the States-General.  
1.4. Delineation  
As in the other two states under consideration, legislative immunity does not only 
exist on a national level: in the Netherlands, members of regional and local 
assemblies also enjoy certain immunities. In particular, there is a system of non-
accountability for members of the Dutch provincial assemblies (provinciale staten) 
and municipal councils (gemeenteraden).14 In light of our aim to compare the 
immunity systems of national parliaments, an extensive discussion of the immunity 
rules pertaining to members of sub-national parliamentary assemblies is omitted 
from this chapter; the immunity rules for representative bodies on the sub-national 
level will only be touched upon where necessary for the discussion of the national 
immunity system.  
On a much more limited scale than the immunity systems of France and the 
United Kingdom, the Dutch model of parliamentary immunity has also found its 
way into the constitutions of former colonies, some of which still use a comparable 
system. In particular, this applies to the Caribbean states which still form part of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands.15 Nevertheless, because the developments in these 
states do not, on the contrary, have any significant impact on parliamentary 
 
14 See Arts. 22 and 57 of the Provinces Act (Provinciewet) and Arts. 22 and 57 of the 
Municipalities Act (Gemeentewet). These provisions regulate the immunity of members of 
provincial assemblies and municipal councils as well as provincial governments (gedeputeerde 
staten) and the municipalities’ councils of mayor and aldermen. All four provisions, mutatis 
mutandis, have identical wording and are very similar to Art. 71 of the Constitution.  
15 But not for Indonesia, which has adopted a much broader system. 
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immunity in the Netherlands, a more detailed examination of these systems is not 
included in this chapter.16 
2. The History of Parliamentary Immunity in the Netherlands 
2.1. The Republican Period 
The history of parliamentary immunity in the Netherlands is older than is 
frequently represented in the literature. Most accounts of the history of 
parliamentary immunity which can be found in Dutch literature begin with the 
constitution of the Batavian Republic of 1798. By then, however, the basic notion of 
parliamentary immunity was not new in the Low Countries. Evidence of 
instruments which resemble modern-day parliamentary immunity can already be 
found in the period of the Republic of the United Netherlands in Holland, then the 
most influential province of the republic.  
Clearly, the institutional setup and tasks of the provincial states and the 
republican States-General of that time make it difficult to compare them to the 
parliament of the later kingdom. Nevertheless, a discussion of these very origins of 
immunity in the Netherlands is useful to test the hypothesis that the reasons for the 
limited nature of immunity in the Netherlands can be discovered in its republican 
past.  
2.1.1. The Republic of the Seven United Netherlands (1579-1795) 
The Union of Utrecht of 1579 and the Act of Abjuration (Plakkaat van Verlatinghe) of 
1581 laid the foundation for the independence of the seven northern Dutch 
provinces from the Habsburg Empire.17 After both the King of France and the 
Queen of England had declined the offer to assume sovereignty over the seven 
provinces of Holland (Zealand, Utrecht, Gelderland, Overijssel, Friesland and the 
city and province of Groningen),18 it was decided in 1588 that they should 
henceforth be the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands.19  
This state, which the legal historian van Caenegem refers to as ‘one of the most 
interesting legal experiments of the Old European era’,20 is hard to describe in 
modern constitutional terms: first, the Republic cannot be categorised as either a 
federation or confederation. On the one hand, it was created as an alliance of 
 
16 It should be noted that the Charter for the Kingdom, the overarching constitutional document 
for all states within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, does not make any mention of 
parliamentary immunity but leaves it to the constitutions of the individual states within the 
Kingdom. The Charter, though of higher rank than the Dutch constitution, is therefore of no 
relevance to our study. 
17 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 121-122. 
18 The Republic included an eighth province, Drente. However, since it did not contribute to the 
union financially, it was not represented in the States-General of the Republic as a fully-
fledged ‘member’. 
19 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 122. 
20 Van Caenegem 1995, p. 142. 
 208 
Parliamentary Immunity in the Netherlands 
nominally sovereign provinces which never formally relinquished their status. On 
the other hand, there were a number of increasingly powerful central institutions 
which played a significant role in the administration of the Republic.21 Moreover, 
although the characterisation of this union of provinces as a republic is certainly 
correct in a technical sense since it never had a monarchical head of state, the House 
of Orange did exercise a quasi-monarchical role in this republic during much of the 
two centuries of its existence.  
It was from the ranks of this family, the descendants of William the Silent, that 
the ‘stadholders’ (stadhouders) were usually recruited. In pre-republican times, the 
stadholders had been provincial representatives of the foreign feudal lords to whose 
realm the seven provinces belonged.22 In the Republic – where the title ‘stadholder’ 
was maintained even though the absence of a monarch or feudal lord had rendered 
it a paradox – they were the highest functionaries23 of the provinces and 
commanders of their armed forces. In principle, each province could appoint its 
own stadholder, but over time the position turned into a hereditary office, which 
members of the House of Orange exercised for the majority of the provinces and 
eventually for the entire Republic. However, the Republic also experienced 
protracted periods (1650-1672 and 1702-1742) during which most of the provinces 
had no stadholders. As will be shown, the political dispute between supporters and 
opponents of a stadholder government stood at the root of the developments of the 
earliest Dutch immunity provisions.  
In the context of parliamentary immunity, the institutions of the republican 
period which are of most interest to us were the proto-parliamentary bodies of the 
Dutch provinces, referred to as the provincial states, and, to a much lesser extent, 
the States-General. As the name suggests, the provincial states were assemblies 
made up of representatives of the different social components (states or estates) of 
early modern Dutch society.24 In the case of the predominantly protestant 
Netherlands, only the nobility and the commons were represented, not the clergy. 
In republican times, the votes of the landed nobility (ridderschap) were often 
combined in the person of the Land’s Advocate, later the Grand Pensionary, who 
also functioned as chairman of the states. The commons were represented by 
delegates of the cities; the peasantry did not send any representatives to the states 
but were deemed to be represented by the nobility.  
 
21 Van Caenegem 1995, p. 144. 
22 The office of stadholder in the feudal system was equivalent to that of a steward, viceroy or 
lieutenant. As with the latter, stadholder literally means place-holder.  
23 Next to the Grand Pensionary (raadspensionaris, formerly Landsadvocaat, Land’s Advocate), a 
high-ranking civil servant appointed and dismissed by the provincial States. The Grand 
Pensionary acted as chairman of the provincial states and represented the nobility in them. 
While this office existed in principle in all the provinces, the Grand Pensionary of Holland 
soon acquired a dominant position. After the office had been shaped and given much 
prominence by Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547-1619), the Grand-Pensionary mainly played 
an important role in foreign relations, and could, depending on the officeholder’s personality, 
at times even take the role of ‘prime minister’; See Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 125. 
24 Van Caenegem 1995, p. 144. 
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It must not be assumed that the representatives of the cities were 
democratically elected in their ‘constituencies’ and that they were equipped with a 
free mandate. Rather, the delegates were chosen by an urban oligarchy, and bound 
by instructions from home. In pre-republican times, the states had been convened at 
irregular intervals at the behest of the provinces’ feudal lords and had an advisory 
function similar to their counterparts in other European feudal states of the time, for 
instance, the états in early modern France. After the provinces had formed the 
Republic, the states themselves became the sovereign organs of each province.  
The States-General, also referred to as the ‘Generality’, was a central assembly 
of delegates of the provincial states in which all provinces except Drente had one 
vote.25 The size of the delegation of each province was in principle undetermined; in 
the 17th century it fluctuated around 30 members.26 The mandate of these members 
differed from that of British parliamentarians at the time or members of the modern 
Dutch parliament: the provincial delegates to the States-General did not enjoy an 
independent mandate but were mere ‘spokespersons’ of their home provinces. They 
were at all times bound by instructions they received by their mandate givers, the 
provincial states of which they were members, with whom they consulted 
continuously.27 The stadholders had access to the meetings of the States-General, 
but only had an advisory vote.28 Voting in the States-General usually took place by 
majority, but the treaty of the Union of Utrecht required unanimity for important 
decisions such as international alliances as well as issues of war and peace. In 
addition, the (very unequal) financial contributions of the various provinces were 
customarily fixed by a unanimous decision of the States-General.  
Although the States-General were originally conceived as an irregular forum 
for negotiations between the provinces, they quickly developed into the Republic’s 
‘permanent principal organ’, which remained constantly in session.29 The States-
General can be understood as both the (con)federal legislator and the government of 
the Republic, but its competences were limited to common affairs of the united 
provinces; the latter remained sovereign with regard to their internal affairs. 
However, a small part of the Republic, the so-called ‘Generality Lands’, was under 
the direct rule of the States-General. The Generality Lands were a cluster of 
fragmented territories and exclaves successively conquered from the Spanish 
during the early 17th century, which had not received provincial status and were 
therefore treated as a possession of the Republic as a whole. 
In light of the institutional structure of the Dutch Republic, it is not surprising 
that the first occurrence of parliamentary immunity of which we find evidence did 
not take place in the States-General but in the provincial states of the vastly 
 
25 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 125. However, in practice the States-General were dominated 
by the rich province of Holland, which contributed more than half of the budget of the entire 
republic. 
26 Ibid. Elzinga and De Lange report that the number of delegates might have been restricted by 
the size of the assembly hall and the 28 available seats. 
27 Van Caenegem 1995, p. 144. 
28 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 126. 
29 Van Caenegem 1995, p. 144. 
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dominant and most developed province, Holland. On the one hand, as opposed to 
other emerging parliaments, the States-General did not have to wrench their power 
from a potentially hostile monarch, since after the treaty of Utrecht its central 
position in the administration of the Republic was unchallenged. On the other hand, 
the States-General functioned as a forum for confederal (in the very early days of 
the Republic possibly even intergovernmental) deliberations between the sovereign 
provinces.  
The participants in these deliberations did not bear a personal mandate to the 
States-General which would have allowed them to negotiate freely. Instead, they 
remained emissaries of the provincial states of which they were members and by 
whose instructions they were bound at all times. It is probably owing to these 
characteristics that non-accountability, one of the two classical components of 
parliamentary immunity, never had issue to emerge in the States-General of the 
Republic: it did not have to be asserted against a ‘rival’ institution at the level of the 
Republic, and the accountability of the delegates to their respective provincial states 
would have made it paradoxical to assert it against the provinces. Rudimentary 
forms of both components of immunity, non-accountability (freedom of speech) and 
inviolability (freedom from arrest) did, however, occur in the States of Holland.  
2.1.2. The Earliest Immunity Provisions in Holland 
For as far as the governing states of the provinces can be considered equivalent to 
modern parliaments, legislation which resembled modern parliamentary immunity 
can already be found in the late 16th century. In 1588, mayor Boom of Amsterdam 
was arrested and held in the city of the Hague (for reasons unknown) and was 
therefore prevented from attending the provincial States of Holland, to which he 
had been summoned. Thereupon, the States issued the following acte van vrijwaring 
(act of guarantee).  
[…] that the States understand, that the delegates of the cities, having been summoned, 
may not, while travelling [to the meeting of the States] or returning, nor during the 
time that they deliberate, for any reason concerning their cities or themselves in 
particular, be arrested in pursuit of the justice of the land, neither proceeded against by 
way of execution.30 
At first glance, it appears strange that this act does not seem to cover all members of 
the States of Holland, but only the deputies of the cities. This may, however, not be 
very surprising in light of the ad hoc manner in which it was adopted by these 
 
30 The word ‘understand’ should probably be read as equivalent to ‘decree’. The Dutch original 
reads as follows: 
 ‘Dat de Staten verstaan, dat de Gedeputeerden van de steden ter dagvaart komende, in het 
reizen noch keeren, noch ook gedurende den tijd, dat zij compareren, uit geenerhande 
oorzaken, hunl. steden noch hunl. in het particulier concernerende, achtervolgende de 
geregtigheid van den lande, zullen mogen worden gearresteerd, noch ook tegen hunl. 
geprocedeerd bij wege van executie’. As quoted in Kluit 1803, p. 39-40; see also Elzinga 1990, 
p. 119. 
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States. While little is known about the precise circumstances, the fact that the acte 
van wrijwaring was a direct consequence of the imprisonment of a deputy of one city 
by another suggests that it was the product of a spontaneous reaction rather than a 
planned legislative act. It is also imaginable that the States of Holland understood 
their act as a reiteration in a particular case of what was already customary law. 
However, such a reading of the acte van vrijwaring of 1588 appears to be incorrect 
when considering of later developments.  
How can the immunity provided by this Act be classified, applying the 
modern framework of reference of non-accountability and inviolability? It seems 
that it only protected the deputies of the cities of Holland from arrest for the time of 
their journeys to and from the meetings of the States of Holland and during the 
meetings themselves. This suggests that the aim of this act of freedom from arrest 
was merely to guarantee the attendance of the deputies of the cities. It appears hard 
to read into its text any form of non-accountability, or freedom of speech, which 
would render members of the States of Holland immune from judicial action for 
their utterances in the States. While the guarantee against the arrest of a member of 
the States for any reason certainly entails the prohibition of such an arrest for 
utterances of that member during the meeting, the limited temporal scope of 
vrijwaring prevents true freedom of speech. Meaningful non-accountability would 
per definition have to be permanent, or at least have a greater temporal scope than 
merely the time of the meeting plus the time required for travelling, since the 
anticipation of being arrested or prosecuted later could already dissuade a member 
from speaking his mind.  
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that a certain freedom of speech was at 
least claimed at the time: A.J. van Emden, in his doctoral thesis of 1857, reports that 
Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, then Land’s Advocate of Holland,31 claimed immunity 
(onschendbaarheid) for his utterances in the States of Holland,32 but legislation and 
resolutions of the States do not provide evidence for a further-reaching immunity 
than the act of freedom from arrest quoted above. Moreover, van Emden explains 
that ‘freedom of discussion’, like freedom from arrest, was only granted for the time 
during which the members deliberated.33 As argued above, such a temporal 
limitation acts against the assumption of freedom of speech. Moreover, absolute 
non-accountability would have been profoundly at odds with the terms of the 
deputies’ mandate. Since the representatives of the free cities were also bound by 
instructions from home and were only provided with limited authority to negotiate, 
it is logical to assume that the cities had a right to hold their own deputies to 
account.34 We may thus assume that the immunity adopted in 1588 by the 
provincial States of Holland only provided for a temporarily limited freedom from 
arrest and that non-accountability or freedom of speech was unknown at the time.  
 
31 The speaker of the nobility and chairman of the provincial states (see supra at 23). In the 17th 
century, the office was renamed to be the Grand Pensionary. 
32 Van Emden 1857, p. 16. 
33 Van Emden 1857, p. 17. 
34 Van Emden 1857, p. 16. Van Emden speaks of the privilege ‘not to be tried but by one’s 
natural judge’. 
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This is further confirmed by developments in the 17th century, during the first 
‘stadholderless’ period (1650-1672). This period was marked by stark opposition 
between supporters and opponents of stadholderless government, which gave rise 
to growing fears of supporters of the stadholderless status quo of future reprisals in 
case the political situation might change. In 1663 this led the States of Holland, in 
which a majority opposed the appointment of a new stadholder, to pass an acte van 
indemniteit (act of indemnity). This Act, quoted by van Os in his work on 
parliamentary immunity of 1910,35 was the first legal instrument which shows a 
certain similarity to modern non-accountability provisions. The States of Holland 
resolved: 
[…] to indemnify all such members of the assembly who, in the course of time, may 
incur any injury to their body, goods, office or honour by reason of their proposals, 
discourse, advice or decisions in favour of the current government and the 
maintenance of freedom, and to compensate them or their heirs out of the funds of the 
Land.36 
Van Os correctly notes that the resemblance of the act of indemnity with actual 
freedom of speech or non-accountability is only superficial. He argues that 
‘indemnity’ only covers speech with a specific content: namely that which is in 
favour of the current stadholderless government. In effect this means, that freedom 
of speech is only granted to members who hold the corresponding political views – 
the majority at the time the Act was passed.37 It may be added that a further great 
difference between the Act of 1663 and modern non-accountability lies in its aim 
and legal consequence: it does take the form of an explicit prohibition of future legal 
action (or in fact other, more physical forms of reprisal!) against members for their 
utterances in the States. Instead, the Act provides members who suffer such 
reprisals – or their heirs in case the suffered injury was lethal – with a claim to 
pecuniary compensation. Yet, the unlimited temporal scope of the Act makes it 
comparable to modern non-accountability instruments.  
Next to the act of indemnity, van Os refers to another instance where the 
political conflict between supporters and opponents of a stadholderless government 
has brought up the question of immunity for the States of Holland. While the States 
opposed the appointment of a new stadholder, other institutions, in particular the 
Court of Holland (Hof van Holland), were strongly in favour of stadholdership. In 
the course of time, the Court had developed from an institution with both judicial 
and executive functions into a purely judicial body. However, it was feared that its 
 
35 Van Os 1910, p. 63. This book, which will later be of interest in a discussion of the theoretical 
background of parliamentary immunity in the Netherlands, presents a fiery and radical plea 
for the complete abolition of non-accountability. 
36 The Dutch original reads as follows:  
 ‘[…] om alle zulke lede der vergadering, welke in vervolg van tijd ter oorzake van de 
voorslagen, vertogen, raad of besluiten, tot handhaving der tegenwoordige regeering en 
behoudenis der vrijheid eenig nadeel in lijf, goed, ambt of eere, mogt overkomen, schadeloos 
de houden en hun of hunne erfgenamen vergoeding te doen uit ’s lands middelen’. 
37 Van Os 1910, p. 63. 
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political agenda, seeking the restoration of stadholdership, could lead to the 
prosecution of members of the States for their political views.38 Therefore, the 
delegation of the city of Amsterdam had already proposed in 1667 that the Court of 
Holland should not be competent to try matters relating to government, unless 
ordered to do so by the States.39 Further, members and former members of the 
States (regenten) who were to stand trial for crimes committed in the exercise of their 
function should have the choice between their local court, the Court of Holland and 
the Hoge Raad van Holland en Zeeland, the High Council of Holland and Zealand, 
which acted as a supreme court for these provinces.40 While these proposals were 
never realised, the Court of Holland eventually lost competence in ‘political 
matters’ in 1674, though an authoritative distinction between political and judicial 
matters was never adopted.41 
Until the end of the Dutch Republic, the measures taken by the provincial 
States of Holland were to remain the only manifestations of parliamentary 
immunity in the Netherlands. It is easy to admit that the instruments quoted above 
are circumstantial consequences of moments of political crisis, rather than evidence 
of an evolving culture of parliamentarianism as has been noted in England at the 
same time. Apart from periods of quarrelling over the question of stadholdership, 
the proto-parliamentarian states of the Dutch Republic and its provinces never 
found themselves on one side of the divide between an increasingly assertive 
legislature and a potentially hostile (monarchical) executive: in the absence of a 
monarch, they functioned as a combination of both. In addition, the States-General 
did not develop an immunity system to protect its members because stricto sensu it 
did not have any members of its own, and with a mandate separate from 
membership of the provincial states.  
Accordingly, parliamentary immunity did not develop into a structural 
component of the Republic’s constitutional law but remained incidental and limited 
in scope. In this respect, it can be concluded that, indeed, the Dutch Republic did 
not lay the foundation for a tradition of parliamentary immunity similar to that of 
France or the United Kingdom. Whether the absence of such a tradition is sufficient 
to explain the limitations of parliamentary immunity in the Netherlands today 
must, however, be doubted. 
 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 After the separation of the provinces which formed the Republic from the southern 
provinces, there was no supreme court with jurisdiction over entire country. Previously, this 
was the function of the Great Council of Mechelen, situated in the south. The Hoge Raad of 
Holland and Zealand had been founded in 1582 as the highest judicial institution of the 
Province of Holland; in 1587 the province of Zealand acceded to its jurisdiction. Van 
Caenegem interprets the lack of a central judicial institution in the Republic as a sign of the 
weakness of the central government, and of the strong regional feelings of the Dutch; Van 
Caenegem 1995, p. 146. This fits well with our view of the States-General as an interprovincial 
council rather than a true national parliament or government. 
41 Van Os 1910, p. 64. 
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2.2. The Batavian and French Period: 1795-1814 
In January 1795, the Dutch Republic, by then ruled in a quasi-monarchical style by 
stadholder William V, was overrun by the armies of revolutionary France and the 
stadholder fled to England. What followed was a period during which the 
Netherlands found itself in the sphere of influence of post-revolutionary France, by 
which it was finally annexed in 1810. The country’s new position in the shadow of 
the mighty neighbour saw an import of many constitutional ideas, among which is 
the Montesquieuvian concept of the separation of powers, and parliamentary 
immunity.42  
2.2.1. The Batavian Republic 
Very soon, the Dutch cities, and with them the majority of the provincial states, 
were taken over by members of the anti-stadholder movement of the Patriots 
(patriotten),43 which thereby also gained a majority in the States-General.44 Following 
the French example, the States-General drew up a procedure for the election of a 
national assembly, whose task it would be to draft a constitution for the newly 
proclaimed Batavian Republic.  
In 1796, elections were held for this national assembly, which became the first 
democratically elected parliament of the Netherlands. Eligible to vote were all male 
Dutch citizens over the age of 20 with a permanent residence and a certain income 
(census). For every 500 citizens of the Republic one member of an electoral college 
was elected. Subsequently, 30 electors elected one representative, resulting in an 
assembly of 126 representatives.45  
Drafting a constitution for the Republic turned out to be an extremely difficult 
endeavour due to fierce opposition between federalists – who wanted to maintain 
the confederal structure of the old Dutch Republic, and unitarists – who favoured a 
more radical new beginning as a unitary state after the French model. The attempt 
to find a compromise resulted in a highly complex and lengthy document of 918 
articles – commonly referred to as ‘the thick book’. However, this was rejected in a 
referendum of August 1797.46 A new national assembly was elected the following 
month. This was as divided as the former, and would have had similarly dim 
prospects of arriving at a workable compromise. However, its work was interrupted 
 
42 To imagine the Batavian Republic as a mere satellite state of France does, however, not do 
justice to this important period in Dutch constitutional development. For a comprehensive 
account and a partial re-evaluation of the Batavian and French period, see Van den Berg en 
Vis 2013, Chapters 1-4. 
43 The Patriots (Patriotten) were a political movement in the latter half of the 18th century which 
opposed the authoritarian rule of stadholder William V. Inspired by the recent American 
revolution and ideas of enlightenment, the Patriots opposed hereditary rule and promoted 
democracy, freedom of religion and equality. Initially, they also looked back to the Act of 
Abjuration sought to restore the initial confederal structure of the Republic. 
44 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 130. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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by a coup d’état staged in January 1798 by radical unitarists. The remaining assembly 
members were forced to sign a declaration of their ‘rrevocable renunciation of 
stadholder government, federalism, aristocracy and the absence of government’ and 
quickly drew up a new draft constitution that was partly inspired by – and to a 
considerable extent literally copied from – the French Constitution of 1795 
(constitution de l’an III).47 This was the Constitution for the Batavian People 
(Staatsregeling voor het Bataafse Volk). It was adopted on the 23rd of April 1798 by 
popular referendum, for which voters had to make a declaration similar to the one 
cited above.48 
2.2.1.1. Immunity under the Constitution for the Batavian people of 1798 
As regards the structure of the state, the new constitution almost transformed the 
Batavian Republic into a Dutch clone of revolutionary France: the self-governing 
provinces and free cities which had been a central characteristic of the old Republic 
and a part of its constitutional identity were abolished and replaced by departments 
and municipalities without sovereign rights.49 For the main institutions of the 
national government, the constitution followed the Montesquieuvian model of the 
separation of powers. It deviated from the latter, however, by providing for a highest 
power – parliament.50 The Constitution refers to parliament simply as ‘he 
representative body’ which consisted of ‘as many members as twenty thousand 
souls are found in the Batavian Republic’.51 Elected in a similar manner to the 
national assembly described above, the complete representative body would, once 
per year, elect 30 of its members to form the Second Chamber, while the remaining 
members formed the First Chamber. The government of the Batavian Republic, the 
executive organ (uitvoerend bewind) consisted of five members who were also elected 
by the representative body out of its own ranks; subsequently, one of the members 
of the executive organs was to be replaced each year.52  
The election system and composition of parliament and the government were 
very similar to the corresponding bodies in France under the Constitution of year 
III, which was adopted after the period of terreur. As argued in the previous 
chapter, that constitution can, in many respects, be seen as a reaction to the 
atrocities and the complete suspension of the rule of law during that period.53 This 
is especially true for the almost excessively precise regulation of parliamentary 
immunity, which also found its way into the Batavian Constitution, whose 
 
47 For more detail on the French influence on the content and drafting process of the Batavian 
Constitution, see Verhagen 1949. 
48 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 131. 
49 Art. 147 of the Batavian Constitution provides that the administration of the departments and 
municipalities was ‘subordinate and accountable to the [national] executive’. 
50 The introductory article to title III of the Batavian Constitution states that ‘the three main 
powers in a well-governed republic are: 1. the representative highest power; 2. the executive 
power; 3. the judicial power’. 
51 Art. 51 of the Batavian Constitution. 
52 Arts. 83, 84 and 86 of the Batavian Constitution. 
53 The French constitution of year III is discussed in part II, section 3 of the previous chapter. 
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immunity provisions are not identical to but are very clearly inspired by their 
French counterparts.  
First, Article 71 of the Batavian Constitution provided that ‘members of the 
representative body may never be arrested, accused or judged for what they have 
said or written in the exercise of their post’.54 This clearly amounted to absolute 
non-accountability. Depending on how broadly one interprets the phrase ‘exercise 
of a member’s post’, this may have even exceeded the scope of today’s Article 71, 
which limits non-accountability to utterances in actual parliamentary debates.  
The Batavian Constitution also contained a detailed system of inviolability, 
laid down in Articles 71 to 82: for the duration of their mandate, members of the 
representative body could not be arrested, accused or put on trial, except with the 
approval of both chambers (so not only their own). Arrests for serious crimes were 
permitted flagrante delicto or within a day of the criminal act being committed, but 
had to be reported to the representative body without delay. An arrested member 
was to be released and rehabilitated immediately unless both the First Chamber, by 
a majority of two thirds, and the Second Chamber, by a simple majority, decided 
that there was reason for indictment.  
Where a member was not arrested flagrante delicto, he could only be prosecuted 
and charged if his inviolability was lifted as a result of a petition, signed by at least 
three citizens and submitted to the First Chamber along with written proof of the 
signatories’ right to vote in general elections. The First Chamber could then decide 
immediately that there was no reason for indictment, or resolve that a further 
examination was required. In the latter case, the accused had to be given the 
opportunity to defend himself before the two chambers, whereupon the First 
Chamber, and if necessary, the Second Chamber, deliberated the case in three 
readings and subsequently decided by secret ballot. The accused was tried by a 
High National Court (Hoog Nationaal Geregtshof) only if a majority of both chambers 
then decided that there was reason for indictment. 
Whilst the complex inviolability mechanism already provided strong 
safeguards for parliamentarians against politically motivated prosecution, a 
similarly complex procedure decided on the composition of the High National 
Court in order to guarantee a non-biased trial. Pursuant to Article 295 of the 
Batavian Constitution, the High National Court was to be staffed by judges of the 
departmental courts. On an ad hoc basis, each of the eight departmental courts 
selected three of its judges by lot. Of the resulting 24 judges, eight could be rejected 
by both the prosecution and the defendant without justification. If reasons for the 
rejection of any of the remaining 16 judges were put forward by either the 
defendant or the accusing petitioners, a departmental court of the defendant’s 
choice determined whether the rejection was well-founded. If this was the case, the 
rejected judges were replaced, again by lot, and without further appeal. Of the 16 
judges who now constituted the court, four were dismissed once again by lot. One 
 
54 The Dutch original reads as follows:  
 ‘De Leden van het Vertegenwoordigend Lichaam kunnen nimmer agterhaald, beschuldigd, 
of geoordeeld worden, over hetgeen zij, in de uitoefening van hunnen Post, gezegd of 
geschreven hebben’. 
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of the remaining 12 was assigned (also by lot), the role of public prosecutor, and 
another that of chairman of the High National Court. 
It is obvious that both the procedure for lifting parliamentary inviolability in 
Articles 72-82 of the Batavian Constitution, as well as the procedure by which the 
composition of the High National Court was determined, were extremely complex 
and excessively lengthy. The complicated nature of these procedures must not be 
understood as a consequence of previous experiences or concrete fears of the Dutch 
drafters of the constitution. As they did with most other parts of the constitution, 
the drafters imported parliamentary immunity from France, in a form which was 
hardly suited to – and certainly not necessitated by – the circumstances in the 
Netherlands. Thus, the two-tier system of non-accountability and inviolability had 
entered the Dutch Constitution as a ‘foreign matter’. It is unsurprising, therefore, 
that the system did not become a lasting institution which the Dutch would have 
found useful to retain after the end of the French period.  
However, the rapid disappearance of immunity from Dutch constitutional law 
was as much imposed by the French, as had been its adoption. In France, Napoleon 
Bonaparte had overthrown the Directorate in the coup d’état of 9 November 1799 
and installed the pseudo-dictatorial government of the consulate, formalised by the 
Constitution of the year VIII in December 1799. At the behest of Napoleon, the 
Batavian Constitution of 1798 was quickly replaced in 1801.55  
2.2.1.2. No Immunity under the Batavian Constitutions of 1801 and 1805 
Even though the Batavian Constitution of 1798 provided in Article 304 that no 
amendments could be made to the constitution until the end of the year 1803, a 
majority of the executive body proclaimed a new draft constitution in September 
1801. A vote on this draft was held in the primary assemblies (regional gatherings of 
citizens able to vote) but achieved a very low turnout: less than 20 per cent of 
eligible voters, of which a large majority rejected the draft.56 However, it was 
quickly decided that all votes not cast were to be counted as votes in favour, so that 
the new constitution could enter into force in October 1801.57  
In response to the Dutch tradition of regionalism and strong identification 
with the old provinces, some of the overly centralistic elements of the Constitution 
of 1798 were mitigated. The departmental borders were redrawn to match, to some 
extent, the old provincial boundaries and the departments regained a degree of 
autonomy.58 With regard to the central government and parliament, most of the 
democratic elements of the old Batavian Constitution were lost, bringing the system 
in line with the increasingly authoritarian style of government in which Napoleon 
now ruled France. The Dutch Constitution of 1801 no longer referred to the 
representative organ, parliament, as the highest power. The new centre of gravity 
was clearly the executive, now consisting of 12 members, seven of whom were 
 
55 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 132. 
56 Ibid. 
57 De Gou 1995, p. XXVII. 
58 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 133. 
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appointed by the sitting executive – the remaining five were subsequently co-
opted.59  
Parliament, now soberly referred to as the ‘legislative body’ (wetgevend 
lichaam) was composed of 35 members. All of them were initially appointed by the 
executive; the mode of subsequent elections was left to ordinary statute.60 The right 
of legislative initiative rested exclusively with the executive and the number of 
speakers in parliamentary debates was limited to 12 out of the 35 members.61  
This radical cut, which limited the powers of parliament, is also evidenced by 
the absence of parliamentary immunity in the Constitution of 1801. The latter was 
generally much more concise than its predecessor in all respects – the number of 
articles was reduced from 308 to 106 – and made no provision for immunity, not 
even basic freedom of speech. This is remarkable in light of the corresponding 
French Constitution of year VIII (Constitution of 13 December 1799), which 
maintained the two-tier system of non-accountability and inviolability (though the 
material scope of inviolability had been reduced). The members of the Dutch 
legislative body were, however, granted a certain procedural guarantee: Article 91 
provided that members of the legislative body and of the government, as well as 
high officials of the state, could only be tried by the National Court (Nationaal 
Geregtshof). The members of this court were elected for life by an electoral college of 
five members of the legislature and five members of the government, acting by 
absolute majority.62 As opposed to similar procedural guarantees in later 
constitutions, parliamentarians were tried before this court for all criminal acts 
committed either in the exercise of their mandate or in the private sphere during the 
time in which they held the mandate. It did not, however, amount to actual 
inviolability, since judicial action against members of the legislature was at no time 
barred, as is the case, in principle, where the authorisation of parliament is required 
to prosecute or try one of its members. Van Os is therefore right when he claims that 
‘the constitution of 1801 is silent as a grave on anything that would amount to 
judicial non-accountability’.63 
In 1804, Napoleon took the streamlining of the Dutch vassal state one step 
further. He urged another constitutional reform by which the number of members 
of the executive was reduced to one. A new and even shorter constitution was 
adopted by the primary assemblies in 1805 – with a turnout of less than 5 per cent – 
which installed a Grand Pensionary as a single-headed government.64 The office 
was manned by the candidate of Napoleon’s choice, the previous Batavian envoy to 
France, Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck. The legislative body, meanwhile, had 
shrunk to 19 members who were first appointed by the Grand Pensionary and who 
would have been later appointed by the executive bodies of the departments, had 
 
59 Art. 30 of the constitution of 1801. 
60 Arts. 49 and 55 of the constitution of 1801. 
61 Arts. 37 and 50 of the constitution of 1801. 
62 Arts. 89 and 90 of the constitution of 1801. 
63 Van Os 1910, p. 71. 
64 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 133. 
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any form of parliamentary immunity beyond the right to be tried by the National 
Court as a forum privilegiatum for all crimes committed in the exercise of their 
functions as well as during the time of the mandate.66 True parliamentary immunity 
would only be reintroduced under the short-lived monarchical Constitution of 1806. 
2.2.2. The Kingdom of 1806 and the French Annexation 
Only one year after the last constitutional overhaul, Napoleon Bonaparte, by then 
‘Emperor of the French’, installed his brother Louis Napoleon as King of the 
Netherlands, thus establishing the Kingdom of Holland.67 The decree of 5 May 1806, 
by which Louis Napoleon accepted kingship, as well as the Constitution of 7 
August of the same year, brought relatively little change in the institutional 
structure of the formerly republican state. The former Grand Pensionary was 
appointed president for life of the legislative body, whose size was doubled to 38 
members (the 19 sitting members retained their mandate, whilst the remaining 19 
members were appointed by the king from a list of persons proposed by the sitting 
members and the provinces).68  
Interestingly, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Holland reintroduced 
parliamentary immunity for ‘Their High Mightinesses’ (Hun Hoog Mogende), as the 
legislative assembly was now called. The immunity was laid down in Article 73, of 
which the relevant parts read as follows:  
The members of the assembly of Their High Mightinesses and of the Council of State 
are never responsible for the advice given by them.  
[…] 
The members of the assembly of Their High Mightinesses, the Ministers of State, the 
members of the Council of State, and the High Officers of State shall at all times stand 
trial before the High National Court for crimes which they may have committed in the 
exercise of their post; as well as for crimes which they may have committed during the 
time for which they held their post; however, having returned to ordinary life, they 
shall stand trial for the latter crimes before their ordinary civil judge.69 
 
65 Ibid. 
66 Art. 80 of the constituton of 1805. 
67 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 133. 
68 Section 4, Arts. 3 and 4 of the decree of 5 May 1806. 
69 The Dutch original as quoted in Van Hasselt 1987, p. 163: 
 ‘De Leden der Vergadering van Hun Hoog Mogende en van den Staatsraad zijn nimmer 
verantwoordelijk voor de door hun uitgebragte advisen. […] 
 De Leden der Vergadering van Hun Hoog Mogende, de Ministers van Staat, de Leden van 
den Staatsraad, en de Hooge Ambtenaren van Staat, zullen voor het Hoog Nationaal 
Geregtshof ten allen tijde te regt staan wegens misdrijven, welke zij in de waarneming van 
hunne Posten mogten hebben begaan; alsmede wegens misdrijven, welke zij mogten hebben 
bedreven, gedurende den tijd dat zij deze Posten bekleeden; doch tot het gewone leven terug 
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In Article 73 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Holland we consequently 
observe the reappearance of absolute non-accountability for the ‘advice’ given by 
members of the legislature. Article 73 did not provide any definition or 
requirements which an utterance of a member of the legislature needed to fulfil in 
order to qualify as advice. It is thus not clear, for instance, whether written words 
were covered and whether an utterance needed to be have occurred in the exercise 
of the mandate in order to fall under non-accountability. In light of judicial 
interpretation of the term ‘advice’ later in the 19th century (see section 2.4.3 below), 
one may however speculate that both must be answered in the positive, namely, 
that non-accountability in the Kingdom of Holland only applied to both oral 
utterances and written words, in parliamentary debate. 
In addition to non-accountability, Article 73 of the Constitution of 1806 
contained the same procedural guarantee which had already been present in the 
two previous constitutions: parliamentarians and certain other office holders could 
only be tried before the highest judicial organ, now called the High National Court. 
The members of the republican National Court remained in office, but Article 72 of 
the new constitution provided that in case of a vacancy, the new member was to be 
elected by the legislature alone, from a list presented by the other members of the 
Court.  
In 1810, after only four years as a vassal monarchy, the Netherlands finally lost 
even nominal independence. By imperial decree of 9 July of that year, the Kingdom 
of Holland was annexed by Napoleon’s Empire and remained an integral part of 
France, ruled by a governor-general, until November 1813. 
2.3. The Kingdom of the Netherlands 1814/15-1848 
2.3.1. ‘Enlightened Absolutism’ and a Weak Parliament 
After the defeat of Napoleon in the Battle of Leipzig in 1813, the northern part of the 
Netherlands regained their independence as a sovereign principality under William 
Frederik of Orange-Nassau, heir to the last stadholder William V. In spring 1814, an 
assembly of notables adopted a new constitution for the United Netherlands.70 It 
provided for a unicameral parliament, now (once again) called the States-General, 
whose 55 members were appointed by the states of the provinces and exercised 
legislative power jointly with the sovereign prince.71  
Just one year later, pursuant to a decision of the Congress of Vienna, the 
northern Netherlands were reunited with Belgium. The incorporation of the 
southern provinces necessitated a few important institutional changes and, 
 
gekeerd, zullen zij wegens laatstgemelde, voor hunnen gewonen Burgerlijken Regter worden 
teregt gesteld’. 
70 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 136. 
71 Arts. 46, 56, 68 and 69 of the constitution of 1814. 
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formally, a new constitution.72 Even though a consultation of notables in the south 
resulted in a rejection of the draft text, it was declared approved on 24 August 1815: 
the sovereign prince, later King, reasoned that many opponents of the draft were in 
fact in favour and only truly opposed to freedom of religion and state-run 
education. However, these points were not debatable since they had been inscribed 
in the constitution at the demand of the great powers at the congress of Vienna.73 
The sovereign prince assumed the title of King William I and despite the many 
changes made since, the Constitution of 1815 can be seen as the founding document 
of the modern Dutch state.  
Van Caenegem characterises the monarchical regime under William I as 
‘enlightened absolutism after the 18th century continental fashion, but tempered by 
the constitution and a thin parliamentary veneer’.74 Indeed, the constitution placed 
the King in a position in which he could pursue an authoritarian style of 
government: the executive was firmly in his hands, assisted by ministers who were 
only accountable to him and by a Council of State whose members he appointed. 
The ‘thin parliamentary veneer’ was added by the now bicameral States-General. 
Though officially representing the people, it was hardly representative by modern 
standards: the First (or upper) Chamber was composed of 40 to 60 members, 
appointed by the King for life ‘out of those who, by evidence of their service to the 
State, by their birth or means, belong to the most notable of the realm’.75 The 110 
members of the Second Chamber were elected by the provincial states in a 
‘complicated system conceived to accentuate their oligarchic, undemocratic 
character and ensure their loyalty to the crown’.76 After all, the members of the 
provincial states were composed of representatives of the provincial nobility, cities 
and the rural estate, who were themselves elected indirectly by the members of the 
respective estates.77  
Although legislative power was exercised jointly by the King and the States-
General, with the right of initiative resting with the monarch and the Second (or 
lower) Chamber, parliamentary opposition was thus kept weak with the help of a 
system of elections and royal appointment which strongly favoured supporters of 
the crown. In addition, the clout of the States-General vis-à-vis the King was severely 
limited by a decennial budget, which did not allow for parliamentary control 
during the budgetary term.78 
 
72 Different opinions can be found in the literature on whether the constitution of 1815 was 
indeed a new one or merely an amendment to that of 1814. See among others Kranenburg 
1958, p. 46. 
73 Cf. Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 137-138. 
74 Van Caenegem 1995, p. 132. 
75 Art. 80 of the constitution of 1815. Van Caenegem argues that the purpose of the newly 
introduced First Chamber was to give a political role to the nobility, which accounted for 
about 90 per cent of the members of the Chamber and which still enjoyed considerable social 
prestige in the southern provinces. Van Caenegem 1995, p. 232. 
76 Van Caenegem 1995, p. 232. 
77 Art. 129 of the constitution of 1815. 
78 Art. 123 of the constitution of 1815. 
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In 1830, fierce opposition by both Catholic conservatives and liberals spurred 
the Belgian revolution and very quickly led to the secession of Belgium from the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands.79 The loss of Belgium was met with relative content by 
the population of the northern provinces, where many appreciated ‘the return to 
their own national cocoon’.80 The King, however, was deeply disappointed. The 
tension created by this dichotomy of feelings between the King and his people 
initiated a process of general alienation between King William I and his people. This 
process also increasingly sparked criticism of the King’s authoritarian ruling style 
and eventually culminated his abdication in 1840, after the Second Chamber had 
rejected the national budget, causing the minister of finance to resign – a first 
augury of ministerial accountability.81  
2.3.2. Inviolability for Crimes in Office: Indirect Freedom of Speech? 
Where the Kingdom of Holland of 1806 had granted its parliamentarians absolute 
non-accountability for their ‘advice’, no similar provision could be found in the 
Constitutions of 1814 and 1815. Conversely, while the Constitution of 1806 did not 
provide for inviolability (members were to be tried by the High National Court, but 
such trials did not have to be authorised by parliament), the States-General of the 
Principality and the Kingdom of the Netherlands had to grant explicit leave for the 
trial of their members and certain other classes of persons for crimes committed ‘in 
the exercise of their functions’. Article 177 of the Constitution of 1815 provided as 
follows:  
The members of the States-General, the heads of the departments of general 
administration [ministers], the members of the Council of State, the King’s 
Commissioners in the province, stand trial before the High Council [supreme court, 
Hoge Raad] for all crimes, committed during the time in which they held their 
functions. For crimes committed in the exercise of said functions, they may never be 
held legally responsible unless explicit leave has been granted to that effect by the 
States-General.82 
 
79 Van Caenegem 1995, p. 234. 
80 Van Caenegem 1995, p. 238. 
81 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 140. 
82 The Dutch original: 
 ‘De leden van de Staten-Generaal, de hoofden der depertementen van algemeen bestuur, de 
leden van de Raad van State, de commissarissen van de koning in de provincien, staan te regt 
voor den hoogen Raad, wegens alle misdrijven, gedurende den tijd hunner functien begaan. 
Wegens misdrijven in het uitoefenen van derzelver functien begaan, worden zij nimmer in 
regten betrokken, dan na dat door de vergadering der Staten-Generaal daartoe uitdrukkelijk 
verlof is verleend’. As reproduced in De Grondwet 1987: met verwijzingen per artikel naar 
overeenkomstige bepalingen van eerdere grondwetten, 12th edition, Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 1994, p. 
185. Apart from the different names of some of the mentioned offices, the corresponding 
provision of the constitution of 1804 is identical. After the constitutional revision of 1840, Art. 
177 was renumbered Art. 175. 
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A close examination of this provision gives rise to several issues with regard to the 
scope and effect of the inviolability it creates.  
First, Article 177 required that, in order to try a member of the States-General 
or holder of one of the mentioned offices, explicit leave had to be obtained from ‘the 
States-General’. Did this mean that both chambers had to authorise the trial 
independently from each other, or possibly in joint session? Alternatively, was each 
chamber responsible for the inviolability of its own members, as is the case in many 
immunity systems today? Article 177 was silent on such procedural details and the 
reason for this is easily found: the wording of Article 177 of the Constitution of 1815 
was left identical to that of Article 104 of the Constitution of 1814. The latter, 
however, provided for a unicameral States-General and therefore made no mention 
of the separate chambers; neither did the Napoleonic Code d’Instruction Criminelle 
which applied in the Netherlands between 1811 and 1838 alongside the Code Pénal, 
which even remained in force until 1886. Only the new Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure which entered into force in 1838 clarified the procedural aspects of 
Article 177 of the Constitution.  
J.R. Thorbecke, the influential politician and constitutionalist who was to play 
a key role in preparing the grand constitutional revision of 1848, explains the details 
of this procedure in his commentary on the constitution. It follows from Article 318-
324 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure that the procurator-general at the Hoge 
Raad first had to apply to the Second Chamber for leave to try one of the designated 
persons for a crime committed in the exercise of his functions. If the Second 
Chamber rejected his request, the member’s inviolability remained intact and no 
trial could take place. However, if the Second Chamber gave its permission to try 
the member of the States-General, this decision had to be confirmed by the First 
Chamber before taking effect. Both chambers had to hear the defendant member or 
officeholder individually before taking a decision. The procedure was to be 
followed in this order, regardless of which office the defendant held or of which 
chamber he was a member.83  
In his commentary, Thorbecke also raises a second question, namely whether 
the second sentence of Article 177 (renumbered 175 by the time of Thorbecke’s 
writing) equips the professional inviolability it creates with an unlimited temporal 
scope: If members of the States-General and office holders ‘may never be held 
legally responsible […]’, does this mean that they may be held responsible as soon 
as they no longer are members or office holders? Thorbecke observes that such a 
reading is perhaps supported by the French version of the article (which was 
equally authoritative before the Belgian secession), in which the word ‘never’ 
(Dutch nimmer) does not appear.84 Still, he concludes that it is probably not correct 
to read a temporal limitation into the inviolability provision laid down in Article 
177, ‘although some doubt remains’.85 Thorbecke does not state any reasons for his 
 
83 Cf. Thorbecke 1843, p. 180-181. 
84 The French text of the second sentence of Art. 177 reads as follows: 
 ‘Pour délits commis dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, ils ne peuvent être poursuivi qu’après 
que les états-généraux ont autorisé la poursuite’. 
85 Thorbecke 1843, p. 188. 
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conclusion, but it may be supported by the fact that the factor which triggers 
inviolability is not the quality of being a member of parliament or holding a high 
office of state per se but the presence of a material link between that quality and the 
alleged criminal act at the time it is committed. This link persists, regardless of 
whether or not the person in question still holds this function at the time of the trial.  
In addition, while in the case of parliamentarians it could be argued that 
inviolability, even if limited to the duration of the mandate, at least serves the 
function of guaranteeing the member’s attendance of parliamentary meetings, this 
is not true for other office holders. The latter can be removed from their post by the 
government at will, which renders inviolability futile as a measure of protection 
against the executive. Hence, it appears logical to follow Thorbecke’s conclusion 
and assume that inviolability was not limited in time. 
A third and perhaps the most interesting issue in the context of Article 177 is 
the question of how ‘crimes committed in the exercise of their functions’ were 
exactly defined. After all, a member was only protected by inviolability – that is, he 
could only be tried with the consent of the chambers – if the alleged criminal act in 
question had indeed been committed in the exercise of his functions. As for criminal 
acts committed independently of those functions, Article 177 only provided for the 
old procedural guarantee of a criminal trial in first instance before the highest court, 
which could, however, proceed without the authorisation of the States-General.86 
Whereas the Napoleonic Code Pénal contained several norms against crimes 
specifically associated with the professional life of public officeholders or civil 
servants (such as bribery), matters become more difficult in case of criminal acts 
which can be committed both ‘privately’ and in the exercise of a public office or 
parliamentary mandate.  
This problem was acknowledged by Thorbecke in his commentary on the 
constitution, where he realises that ‘[l]egislation on the delicta propria or crimes in 
office of members of the States-General is still a wasteland’.87 He does not offer a 
solution to this problem, but sees that that it is of particular relevance with regard to 
potentially criminal utterances of parliamentarians: ‘[d]id the member of the States-
General who, speaking in the Chamber is deemed to have insulted a minister […], 
commit a crime in the exercise of his mandate?’.88 The only argument which speaks 
against a positive answer to that question is that insults, by their very nature, cannot 
constitute an element of proper parliamentary debate and therefore fall outside a 
very narrow understanding of the functions of a member of the States-General.89 
 
86 It should be noted that a first-trial before the Hoge Raad did not necessarily work in favour of 
the defendant, since there was no possibility of appeal against a judgment of the highest 
court. 
87 Thorbecke 1843, p. 188. 
88 Ibid. 
89 This argument is not as far-fetched as it may seem. On the one hand, it is imaginable that 
utterances of certain content are exempt from the protection of parliamentary immunity. The 
German constitution, for instance, provides for absolute non-accountability, but with the 
exception of defamatory insults (Art. 46 of the Basic Law). On the other hand, a similar 
argument was used in the Netherlands in the latter half of the 19th century in order to 
circumvent non-accountability, which by then rendered parliamentarians and members of 
Æ 
 
Parliamentary Immunity in the Netherlands 
 225 
Chapter 5 
Such a narrow interpretation is unlikely, and was so even in the early 19th century, 
precisely because Article 177 did not even purport to guarantee absolute freedom of 
speech, but only required a political judgment of the States-General to precede 
judicial trial, wherever an alleged criminal act was connected to the duties of a 
member of the States-General or officeholder. There is thus reason to assume that 
crimes committed in the form of utterances in parliament were covered by 
inviolability under the Constitutions of 1814 and 1815.  
This view conflicts with some accounts of the history of parliamentary 
immunity found in the literature. These accounts argue that freedom of speech in 
parliament did not exist under the Constitutions of 1814 and 1815. While it had still 
been present in the Constitution of 1806, it had then been bartered for inviolability. 
Consequently, it is argued that, under the Constitutions of 1814 and 1815, members 
of the States-General could be held liable unconditionally for their utterances in the 
States-General.90 However, in light of the considerations above, it may be doubted 
whether this picture is accurate. This doubt is confirmed by several other accounts 
which offer a different assessment, acknowledging that the inviolability laid down 
in Article 177 of the Constitutions of 1814 and 15 also protected members from trial 
for criminal utterances which today are protected by non-accountability.91  
Certainly, it must not be forgotten that the legal nature of non-accountability 
differs from that of inviolability: the former withdraws utterances in parliament 
from the field of application of the criminal law, while the latter does not de-
criminalise them but merely constitutes a procedural bar which inhibits the trial of 
members for such utterances. Nevertheless, provided that the inviolability of a 
member is not lifted, the practical effect is the same. One prominent Dutch 
constitutionalist of the 19th century, J.T. Buijs, has even made the remarkable 
observation that the limited inviolability regime of the Constitutions of 1814 and 
1815 offered a higher level of protection than the absolute inviolability which took its 
place in 1848. Comparing the two systems with regard to their effect on the 
independence of parliament, he wrote:  
Has the independence of the people’s representative really increased after this 
reversion [from inviolability to non-accountability]? It does not seem so. True, in the 
past he was subject to the general law, also for what he said during the meeting. But 
since he could not be prosecuted for any crime committed in the exercise of his 
functions without explicit leave by the States-General, the latter were able to factually 
withdraw him from the general law. The guarantee which was granted thus entailed, 
at least to a certain extent, the other guarantee which was not granted.92 
This leads to the perhaps surprising conclusion that despite the absence of explicit 
non-accountability, the Constitutions of 1814 and 1815 provided for a considerable 
degree of protection which also covered criminalised speech in parliament, along 
 
provincial and municipal assemblies immune for their ‘advice’. This term, it was claimed, did 
not cover insults and strong language.  
90 Cf. Van Os 1910, p. 71; Akkermans 1987, p. 655. 
91 Cf. Van Emden 1857, p. 28-29. 
92 Buijs 1883-1888, p. 537-538. 
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with other offences committed in the exercise of the mandate. It should be noted, 
however, that this protection could be lifted by a majority in both chambers and 
was therefore not absolute. Thorbecke, pleading for non-accountability instead of 
inviolability, also observed that ‘even if [a member] can count on the majority of the 
States-General, the request for leave to put him on trial is already the beginning of a 
criminal charge, from which he is saved, except that it may seem that he owes his 
being saved exclusively to the favour of his fellow members’.93 
2.4. Towards the Constitution of 1848 
In 1840, the year of the abdication of William I, a general constitutional revision 
introduced criminal liability of ministers for breach of the constitution and statute. 
This was laid down in the newly introduced Article 75 of the Constitution, which 
provided as follows:  
The heads of the ministerial departments are responsible for all acts, performed by 
them personally or to whose accomplishment or execution they have contributed, 
through which the constitution or statutes may have been violated or disobeyed. 
Nevertheless, for the time being, the criminal violation of the constitution or statutes 
by ministers remained within the scope of inviolability pursuant to the former 
Article 177 of the Constitution, which had now been renumbered Article 175.  
Moreover, the constitutional revision of 1840 reduced the budgetary term from 
10 to two years and adapted the size of the States-General to the reduced population 
size after the Belgian secession. However, the main lines of the constitutional system 
in which the balance of power tilted strongly towards the King – through the lack of 
political ministerial accountability to parliament and a profoundly undemocratic 
election system – remained unchanged for almost another decade. 
After a series of proposed constitutional amendments after 1840 had failed for 
various reasons, the revolutionary mood which led to upheaval in several states on 
the European continent in 1848 caused William II to agree with an incisive and 
fundamental constitutional overhaul.94 The King appointed a committee under the 
leadership of J.R. Thorbecke to draft a set of far-reaching amendments, which were 
finally adopted on 11 October 1848. Crucially, Thorbecke had already been involved 
in the preparation of earlier proposals for constitutional revision; in particular, he 
had led the committee of nine members of the Second Chamber commonly referred 
to as ‘the Nine Men’ (Dutch: de negenmannen) which proposed a series of far-
reaching amendments in 1844.95  
Probably the most important novelty brought about by the amendment of 1848 
was, finally, the introduction of political ministerial accountability. Article 53 
 
93 Thorbecke 1841, p. 237. 
94 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 142. 
95 These proposals were largely based on Thorbecke’s own ideas, presented in his book 
(Thorbecke 1840). However, in spring 1845, the Second Chamber decided not to adopt the 
proposal of ‘the nine men’.  
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contained the formula according to which ‘the King is inviolable; the ministers are 
responsible’ – which established one of the main roots of the parliamentary system 
by which the Netherlands is still governed today.96 Further, direct elections (under a 
census) were introduced for municipal councils, provincial states and the Second 
Chamber of the States-General. The competences of the latter were also 
strengthened by the right of enquiry and a further shortening of the budgetary 
period to one year. Finally, the members of the First Chamber, previously appointed 
by the monarch at will, were now elected by the provincial states for a term of nine 
years, a third of them to be replaced every three years. 
2.4.1. The Abolition of Inviolability 
With the general overhaul of the constitutional system, the system of parliamentary 
immunity was fundamentally changed from limited inviolability to non-
accountability.  
The loss of inviolability owed to an amendment of the provision which 
regulated the trial of members of the States-General, ministers and other high 
officeholders for crimes in office. Prior to 1848, Article 177 (later Article 175) of the 
Constitution had required that the procurator-general obtained the explicit 
authorisation of both chambers of the States-General before such trials could be 
conducted before the Hoge Raad. While the new constitution did not abolish this 
provision completely, Article 159 now provided the following:  
The members of the States-General, the heads of the ministerial departments, the 
governors-general or the high officeholders endowed with the same power under 
another name in the colonies or possessions of the Kingdom in other parts of the 
world, the members of the Council of State and the Commissioners of the King in the 
provinces stand trial before the High Council Supreme Court [Hoge Raad] for crimes 
committed in office [ambtsmisdrijven], prosecuted either by the King or by the Second 
Chamber.97 
This provision differed from its predecessors in various respects. First, the Hoge 
Raad was no longer designated as the trial court for all criminal acts committed by 
the mentioned persons as had previously been the case, but only for crimes 
 
96 It should be noted, in this respect, that the constitution of 1848 did not introduce the 
parliamentary system of government expressis verbis. While Art. 89 of the constitution of 1848 
obliged ministers to provide either chamber of the States-General with any information they 
might request, the confidence principle or the possibility of a motion of censure was never 
laid down in any constitutional provision but exists as a constitutional convention.  
97 The Dutch original: 
 ‘De leden der Staten-Generaal, de hoofden der ministeriele departementen, de gouverneurs-
generaal of de hooge ambtenaren onder een andere naam met gelijke magt bekleed in de 
kolonien of bezittingen des Rijks in andere werelddeelen, de leden van den Raad van State en 
de commissarissen des Konings in de provincien staan, wegens ambtsmisdrijven, ter 
vervolging hetzij van Koningswege, hetzij vanwege de Tweede Kamer, te regt voor den 
Hoogen Raad’. 
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committed in office.98 The Dutch original now referred to the latter with the word 
ambtsmisdrijven, whereas Article 177 (now Article 175) of the previous constitution 
had still used the cumbersome formula of ‘crimes committed in the exercise of their 
functions’. Most importantly, however, the ‘immunity value’ of Article 159 
decreased significantly compared to that of its predecessor, as both the Second 
Chamber and the King (read: the government) could now unilaterally decide to put 
a parliamentarian or officeholder on trial for crimes in office. This had previously 
required the assent of the States-General in separate decisions of the chambers, both 
of which had to give the defendant the opportunity to be heard. Crucially, the 
Constitutions of 1814 and 1815 had also not allowed the executive to prosecute 
members of parliament and high officeholders for crimes committed in office 
without leave of the States-General, which now became possible pursuant to the last 
sentence of Article 159 of the Constitution of 1848.  
For members of the States-General, this change brought an end to inviolability 
as a means of protection against the possibility of politically motivated prosecution 
instigated by the government, because leave of the States-General was no longer 
required for their prosecution. It could now be ordered either by the chamber or 
directly by the government.  
The criminal responsibility of ministers for violation of the constitution or of 
statute, which had been regulated in a separate constitutional provision (Article 75) 
since the revision of 1840, also fell within the scope of Article 159. The details of 
criminal procedure in case of the prosecution of ministers were left to ordinary 
statute,99 which led to the adoption of the Criminal Ministerial Accountability Act in 
1855 (wet op de strafrechtelijke ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid).  
With several amendments, this Act is still in force today. According to its 
provisions, the Second Chamber may order the procurator-general at the Supreme 
Court to prosecute a minister. However, it may only do so upon a request of at least 
five of its members and after an in-depth examination of the allegations by a 
parliamentary enquiry committee. The order may not be given if the enquiry 
committee comes to the conclusion that there is no reason for indictment, or if no 
decision has been taken within three months after the initial request. Before the 
Second Chamber orders the procurator-general to begin the prosecution of the 
minister before the Supreme Court, it ‘tests the alleged acts against the law, reason, 
morality and the interest of the state’.100 Alternatively, the government may order 
the prosecution without a prior committee enquiry or if the enquiry period of three 
months has lapsed without result, but not if the committee has decided that there is 
 
98 However, the abolition of the forum privilegiatum for ordinary criminal acts only acquired 
practical effect when the States-General made the necessary changes to ordinary legislation in 
1884. Therefore, it was still possible in 1880 that a member of the First Chamber was tried in 
first instance by the Hoge Raad for an ordinary crime. This was the only instance to this day in 
which a member of the States-General stood trial before Dutch Supreme Court in first 
instance. See Van Raalte 1971, p. 179. 
99 See Art. 73(2) of the constitution of 1848. 
100 Art. 18(1) of the Criminal Ministerial Accountability Act in 1855. 
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no reason to indict the minister. Finally, the procurator-general is obliged to follow 
the order by the Second Chamber or the Government to prosecute the minister. 
2.4.2. Inviolability Traded for Non-accountability 
Instead of inviolability, the Constitution of 1848 introduced absolute non-
accountability. At first, the new immunity, laid down in Article 92 of the 
Constitution, only covered the members of the chambers, and not the ministers and 
others:  
The members of the Chambers may not be judicially prosecuted for the advice given 
by them in the assembly.101 
With the introduction of this provision and the abolition of inviolability, the 
constitutional legislator of 1848 had created the immunity system to which the 
Netherlands, in principle, still adheres today, although the personal scope of non-
accountability has later been broadened to cover others speaking in parliament, and 
the wording of the constitutional provision has changed slightly.  
What, however, were the reasons which led the constitutional committee 
around Thorbecke to trade limited inviolability – which, as we have argued, could 
with relatively little effort be construed so as to cover criminalised speech in 
parliament – for absolute non-accountability? This development stands in contrast 
to all incisive changes and development leaps we have observed in the immunity 
systems of the United Kingdom and France, where they were always linked to 
political crisis or (the fear of) imminent threats to parliament. While 1848 was 
certainly a year of widespread political upheaval and general insecurity, the 
members of the Dutch States-General were under no concrete or circumstantial 
pressure to avail themselves of freedom of parliamentary speech. The reason for 
which the Constitution of 1848 traded inviolability for non-accountability must thus 
be found elsewhere. 
It is likely that the main cause for this trade was the urge to adapt the 
immunity system to the changed relationship between parliament and the monarch. 
With the Constitution of 1848, the power balance between the States-General and 
the executive started to tilt towards the former, and in the general wish to 
modernise the system, in line with ‘most newer constitutions’.102 In a much more 
assertive parliament, now equipped with the right of enquiry and the power to 
question and critically comment on government policy, it was only logical that 
members should enjoy freedom of speech. Conversely, inviolability as a means of 
protection against a government that was increasingly subject to parliamentary 
scrutiny was deemed less useful. This view is supported by the fact that the 
inviolability provided by the constitution prior to 1848 had led a non-contentious, 
 
101 The Dutch original:  
 ‘De leden der Kamers zijn niet geregtelijk vervolgbaar wegens de advijzen, door hun in de 
vergadering uitgebragt’.  
102 Thorbecke 1841, p. 238. 
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dormant existence, which led Buijs to conclude that the privilege it had created had 
lost its raison d’être, since: ‘the times are long gone that governments tried to 
maintain themselves by interfering with the freedom of deputies and resorted to 
unjustified judicial prosecution to prevent them from fulfilling their mandate’.103 
In addition, Thorbecke’s personal preference for a Westminster-oriented 
immunity system and his dislike for the vagueness of the Dutch inviolability model 
may have had a decisive impact. With regard to crimes committed in office by 
members of the government, he had already voiced criticism on an inviolability 
system which was at all times conditional on the political will of the majority, as 
well as the expertise and political sensitivity of the procurator-general whose task it 
was to launch criminal proceedings under Article 177 (now Article 175) of the 
Constitution. In Thorbecke’s opinion, criminal law was generally not a good 
instrument in political matters, which notoriously escaped neat legal definition and 
categorisation and required the interference of the procurator-general:  
‘Take the letter of the constitution. Remind yourself of how the simplest and clearest 
articles are subject to argument. What a weak safeguard against criminal liability for 
the highest and most dangerous injustice in the state, if it always depends on the way 
in which the procurator-general understands the law!’.104 [emphasis original]  
Rather, he argued, matters of political sensitivity require an authority ‘with a much 
greater freedom [than that of the criminal judge], a freedom which borders on the 
legislative power itself’.105 
However, it appears that this did not make Thorbecke a proponent of absolute 
and unconditional non-accountability. The proposal for constitutional amendments 
which the ‘Nine Men’ drafted under his aegis in 1844 still contained a non-
accountability provision that rendered members of the States-General immune from 
criminal proceedings for their ‘advice’ in parliament, ‘unless in cases specified by 
statute’.106 According to the explanatory memorandum, this exception was inserted 
for fear that the chambers’ Rules of Procedure could perhaps not offer sufficient 
safeguards against every possibility of abuse.107 Interestingly, when the proposal of 
the ‘Nine Men’ was discussed in committee, it was rejected as unnecessary, as 
experience had shown that no constitutional protection was necessary to safeguard 
free speech in parliament.108 Nevertheless, non-accountability was again included in 
the successful constitutional revision of 1848, and accepted by both chambers 
entirely without debate.  
 
103 Buijs 1883-1888, p. 536. 
104 Thorbecke 1840, p. 184 (original emphasis). 
105 Thorbecke 1840, p. 187. 
106 Thorbecke 1841-1843, p. 239. 
107 Buijs 1883-1888, p. 536. 
108 Ibid. 
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2.4.3. The Disputed Scope of Non-accountability 
Buijs identified two essential characteristics of non-accountability as laid down in 
Article 92 of the Constitution of 1848. First, he argued, the new immunity was not a 
personal privilege but one that was tied to the place and time of the parliamentary 
meeting. Accordingly, its aim was not to protect the member of parliament as a 
person, but to ‘keep the criminal judge out of the States-General’, and to put the 
Rules of Procedure of the chambers in place instead. Second, the material purpose 
of Article 92 was to relieve the parliamentarian of all criminal liability for anything 
he might say in the chamber.109 Even though these characteristics were formulated 
clearly in the explanatory memorandum, they did not appear unequivocally from 
the wording of Article 92. In particular, the word ‘advice’ proved problematic.  
During the second half of the 19th century, a series of judicial rulings showed 
that the wording of the non-accountability provision was susceptible to an 
extremely narrow interpretation by the courts.110 These rulings concerned Article 47 
of the Municipalities Act (Gemeentewet), which granted members of municipal 
councils non-accountability for their ‘vote or opinion’. While ‘opinion’ might even 
seem to be a more comprehensive term than ‘advice’ and in any event does not 
suggest a more restrictive interpretation, the Hoge Raad read it as a ‘statement about 
a pending proposal’. After all, the Court argued, the aim of Article 47 of the 
Municipalities Act was ‘to safeguard the independence and freedom of 
deliberations’, so that ‘the non-accountability of members of the council cannot 
reach further than such utterances as were part of their vote or opinion, expressed 
during the meeting about an object being debated there’.111 In particular, both the 
Hoge Raad and lower courts repeatedly repudiated the opinion that municipal non-
accountability covered insults or defamatory statements. Buijs reports another case 
in which the Advocate General at the Hoge Raad opined that it would be ‘contrary to 
any notion of social order if membership of a representative council would provide 
a carte blanche to insult and defame other members with impunity’. The Court 
concurred with this Opinion.112 The precise scope of the non-accountability of 
members of the States-General ex Article 92 of the Constitution of 1848 was never 
litigated, but the vehemence with which the courts opposed the reading of Article 
47 of the Municipalities Act as providing for absolute non-accountability for 
utterances in council suggests that such a reading would have been rejected even 
more vigorously for the constitutional provision – after all, while an insult may very 
well express an ‘opinion’, it hardly constitutes ‘advice’ in a narrow sense. 
Nevertheless, in light of the aim which the constitutional legislator pursued, 
Buijs was certainly correct in his radical dismissal of the extremely restrictive 
interpretation given to non-accountability by the courts: ‘a more complete 
misconception of any constitutional provision […] is hardly thinkable’.113 Indeed, 
 
109 Ibid. 
110 Elzinga 1986, p. 217, note 12; see also Buijs 1883-1888, p. 540-545. 
111 HR 30 July 1861, Weekblad van het Recht No. 2297. 
112 HR 1 March 1854, as quoted in Buijs 1883-1888, p. 543. 
113 Buijs 1883-1888, p. 539. 
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the reading which the courts gave to Article 92 of the Constitution of 1848 and to the 
non-accountability provisions for provincial and municipal assemblies missed the 
point and purpose of non-accountability, because it meant that judges made the 
decision as to which utterances in parliament deserved protection. The 
consequences of this discretion in cases involving non-accountability for national 
parliamentarians have never been tested in case law and indeed it is not beyond 
doubt that the Supreme Court would have assumed the same discretion in such 
high-profile cases. However, if it had done so, this would have had the paradoxical 
consequence that non-accountability only protected such utterances as were – in the 
eyes of the Court – manifestly not punishable in the first place. This strongly 
reminds us of the United Kingdom, where the differentiation between the power of 
Parliament to determine the content of its privileges and the power of the courts to 
define their boundaries has led to friction and conflict.  
The Dutch constitutional legislator took the case law with regard to the non-
accountability of municipal councils explicitly into account in the constitutional 
revision of 1887. The explanatory memorandum to the amendment of Article 92 
proposed by the government states that:  
[a]ccording to case law of the Hoge Raad concerning article 47 of the Municipalities Act, 
article 92 of the constitution does not provide sufficient safeguards against the 
prosecution of members of the States-General for what they have said in the meeting or 
submitted in writing. The wording must therefore be clarified.114 
As some members of the Second Chamber wished to maintain the term ‘advice’ for 
fear that a broadening of non-accountability would lead to chaos if members could 
with impunity say anything they liked even when not given the floor, the 
government argued that the disciplinary powers of the chambers would suffice to 
maintain order.115 Accordingly, what had become Article 97 after a renumbering in 
the revision of 1887 now provided for non-accountability in the following terms:  
The members of the States-General may not be judicially prosecuted for what they 
have said in the assembly or submitted to it in writing.116 
The phrase ‘what they have said in the assembly’ no longer left any room for a 
restrictive interpretation by the courts. With this wording, the non-accountability of 
Dutch parliamentarians had finally become truly absolute. 
 
114 Handelingen der Staten-Generaal (Bijlagen) 1884-1885 II, p. 17. 
115 Buijs 1883-1888, Vol. III, p. 195. 
116 The Dutch original:  
 ‘De leden der Staten-Generaal zijn niet geregtelijk vervolgbaar voor hetgeen zij in de 
vergadering habben gezegd of aan haar schriftelijk hebben overegelegd’.  
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2.5. More Non-accountability and Less Inviolability: A Negative 
Correlation? 
In exchange for this broadening of the material scope of non-accountability, the 
scope of the provision which governed criminal proceedings in cases of crimes 
committed in office – which can be understood as a trace or remnant of the actual 
inviolability that existed earlier – has been further limited in the constitutional 
revision of 1887. Two small additions were made to the text of Article 159 of the 
Constitution of 1848, now renumbered Article 164. This provision was now also 
merged with former Article 160, pursuant to which the special procedure for crimes 
in office could be applied to offices other than those mentioned. Article 164 
(additions of 1887 in italics) now reads as follows: 
The members of the States-General, the heads of the ministerial departments, the 
governors-general and the high officeholders endowed with the same power under 
another name in the colonies or possessions of the Kingdom in other parts of the 
world, the members of the Council of State and the Commissioners of the King in the 
provinces stand trial, also after having left office, before the High Council for crimes 
committed in office in these capacities, prosecuted either by the King or by the Second 
Chamber. 
Statute may determine that other officeholders and members of high colleges stand 
trial before the High Council for crimes committed in office.117 
The incorporation of the former Article 160 is of no further relevance with regard to 
parliamentary immunity. The addition of the phrase ‘also after having left office’ 
merely made explicit the reading which Thorbecke had already accepted as the 
most logical one 40 years earlier, namely that a member or officeholder would stand 
trial before the Hoge Raad, regardless of whether he still held his mandate or office at 
the time of the trial. 
More interestingly, the addition ‘committed in these capacities’ can be read as 
a real material limitation. This is because the persons to whom Article 164 applied 
may well have held other public offices simultaneously to those specifically 
mentioned there, as was frequently the case in the 19th century. Under Article 159 of 
the Constitution of 1848, crimes committed in the exercise of another office would 
have triggered the legal consequence of standing trial in first and last instance 
before the Hoge Raad. This possibility was now explicitly ruled out, to the effect that 
 
117 Dutch original:  
 ‘De leden der Staten-Generaal, de hoofden der ministeriele departementen, de gouverneurs-
generaal of de hooge ambtenaren onder een andere naam met gelijke magt bekleed in de 
koloniën of bezittingen des Rijks in andere werelddeelen, de leden van den Raad van State en 
de commissarissen des Konings in de provincien staan, wegens ambtsmisdrijven in die 
betrekkingen gepleegd, ook na hunne aftreding ter vervolging hetzij van ‘s Konings wege, hetzij 
vanwege de Tweede Kamer, te regt voor den Hoogen Raad. 
 De wet kan bepalen, dat nog andere ambtenaren en leden van hooge collegien wegens 
ambtsmisdrijven voor den Hoogen Raad te regt staan’. [emphasis added] 
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the required material link had to exist between the alleged criminal act and one of 
the offices specifically mentioned in Article 164.118  
Certainly, these changes were hardly spectacular and, seen individually, 
rather minuscule. However, they illustrate once more the negative correlation 
which seems to have existed between non-accountability and what we may call 
‘rest-inviolability’ throughout the development of the immunity regime during the 
19th century. Whenever one of the two was newly introduced to the constitution or 
its scope increased, the other one disappeared or was substantially reduced in 
scope. For the Dutch immunity regime as a whole, this has resulted in the virtual 
disappearance of inviolability. This is thought-provoking from a comparative 
perspective – in particular if we remind ourselves that the French tradition of 
parliamentary immunity tends to justify the co-existence of non-accountability and 
inviolability by presenting them as complementary sides of the same coin, none of 
which provides parliament with adequate protection without the other.  
In addition, the negative correlation between non-accountability and the 
provisions governing the special criminal procedure for high office holders during 
much of the Netherlands’ constitutional history may constitute a historical 
argument against the interpretation of the current Article 119 of the Constitution as 
a form of inviolability. We will return to this at a later point. 
2.6. Developments during the 20th Century 
At several instances during the early 20th century, the personal scope of non-
accountability was significantly broadened. First, the constitutional revision of 1922, 
in which the non-accountability provision was renumbered Article 98, extended 
non-accountability to the ministers, commissioners of the King,119 and certain civil 
servants appointed by the ministers.120 The constitutional revision of 1948 added the 
secretaries of state.121 The main argument brought forward in support of these 
amendments was that an immunity limited to members of the States-General would 
discriminate between ministers who were members and thus enjoyed non-
accountability and ministers (and civil servants) who were not at the same time 
members of one of the chambers.122 Before the constitutional revision of 1938, the 
parliamentary mandate was not required for, but was compatible with ministerial 
office. After the amendment of 1938, the two were mutually exclusive, while 
ministers and civil servants continued to take part in the debates of the States-
General. Given that, at the same time, there was no separate immunity regime for 
members of the government other than the special procedure for crimes in office 
which no longer amounted to actual immunity, it was thus completely logical to 
extend parliamentary immunity to ministers and high civil servants. However, the 
 
118 See on this Buijs 1883-1888, Vol. III, p. 113-114.  
119 Civil servants appointed by the king whose task it was to support the ministers in debates on 
government bills in the States-General (constitution of 1922, Art. 111). 
120 Art. 95 of the constitution of 1922. 
121 Art. 79 of the constitution of 1948. The former Art. 98 was renumbered Art. 100. 
122 Elzinga 1986, p. 217. 
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extension of non-accountability to members of the government and their support 
staff marks a clear departure from the traditional idea of parliamentary immunity as 
a means of protecting parliamentarians against a potentially hostile executive. 
Rather, the emphasis was now on protecting parliamentary debate as such, 
independently of the capacity in which a person took part in it. Materially, the 
Dutch immunity system was thereby brought in line with that derived from Article 
9 of the English Bill of Rights 1689, which protects ‘debates and proceedings in 
Parliament’ rather than the member as a person.  
During the 1930s, the material scope of (national) parliamentary non-
accountability was clarified by case law of the appeal courts of Amsterdam and 
Arnhem.123 Confronted with this question for the first time on a national level, the 
courts ruled that the prohibition of ‘judicial prosecution’ (niet gerechtelijk vervolgbaar) 
for utterances in parliament did not only bar criminal prosecution but all judicial 
proceedings, including civil lawsuits. It has been argued that this interpretation of 
Article 98 of the Constitution of 1922 constituted a further broadening of non-
accountability, since there had been doubt as to whether civil liability was indeed 
excluded.124 However, it is likely that the reading given to Article 98 by the courts 
was congruent with the initial intentions of the constitutional legislator – and thus 
did not actually add a new facet to the immunity: the possibility of civil liability 
would have defied the purpose of non-accountability.  
During the first two decades of the 20th century, scholarly debate about 
parliamentary immunity still revolved almost exclusively around the question 
whether it was justifiable to grant members of the States-General the freedom to say 
or write whatever they like. Mostly, this question was approached with a moralistic 
undertone. Often, the arguments against non-accountability were based on the 
thought that anything which amounted to criminal insult or defamation could not 
possibly be in the interest of constructive legislative debate and therefore did not 
deserve protection.125 
In the 1930s, however, the Dutch legislature was increasingly confronted with 
political movements on the extreme left and the extreme right of the political 
spectrum. In particular, parliamentarians affiliated with the National Socialist 
Movement (Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging, NSB) used their non-accountability not 
only to insult and defame their political enemies in and outside parliament and to 
taunt the targets of their racist agenda, but also to advocate the Nazi ‘revolution’ 
and the overthrow of the constitutional order.126 This presented the constitutional 
legislator with a new dilemma: how to proceed with parliamentarians who swear 
 
123 Hof Amsterdam, 10 January 1934, NJ 1934, 1453; Hof Arnhem, 18 March 1937, NJ 1937, 367. 
124 Elzinga 1986, p. 217. 
125 See among others the rather polemic analysis of parliamentary immunity of Van Os 1910 and, 
in particular, the preface to his book by H. Krabbe. However, their conservative arguments 
were rebutted by others who first defended a broad reading of the term ‘advice’ in the 
constitution of 1848 and later argued in favour of the new wording in which inviolability was 
cast by the constitution of 1887: See Buijs 1883-1888 and Baron de Vos van Steenwijk 1927, p. 
103-125. 
126 Wijman 1995, p. 7-8. 
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allegiance to the constitution and take cover behind constitutional safeguards aimed 
at the preservation of the democratic order, but who use this protection to sabotage 
and agitate against that very order?  
In 1934, the leader of the liberal party group in the Second Chamber, 
Knottenbelt, aware of the difficulty of amending of the constitution, proposed to 
introduce a provision to the criminal code. By virtue of this, a member of the States-
General could be deprived of his active and passive voting right (which would 
result in the loss of the parliamentary mandate of a sitting member) if he violated, 
for example by seditious utterances in or outside parliament, his oath of allegiance 
to the constitution. Knottenbelt urged the government to propose legislation to that 
effect.127 
The government reacted hesitantly to Knottenbelt’s proposal but established a 
committee, referred to as the ‘Koolen committee’ after its chairman, assigned with 
the task to investigate the necessity and expediency of ‘statutory and other 
measures relating to the membership of representative bodies of persons whose 
efforts are evidently directed at changing the institutions of the state by way of 
unlawful means’.128 The committee found two possible measures, both of which 
would, in its view, not have required an amendment of the constitution.  
The first measure it recommended was the introduction of a possibility to 
sanction members of any representative body on a national, provincial or municipal 
level who ‘in their [official] activities as such or by making use of the power, 
opportunity or means derived from their membership, express their intention to 
change the existing legal order by using or facilitating unlawful means’.129 The 
sanction envisaged by the Koolen committee was forfeiture of membership of the 
representative body in question, to be declared by the department of the Council of 
State (a body with both advisory and judicial functions) which was assigned to deal 
with the resolution of disputes between organs of state.130  
The second recommendation of the Koolen committee aimed at an amendment 
of the criminal code which would introduce the loss of active and passive voting 
rights as a mandatory additional punishment for certain crimes such as sedition and 
lèse-majesté.131 This punishment would have automatically entailed the forfeiture of 
the mandate of a sitting member of any representative body. According to the critics 
of the proposal, this proposed sanction gave rise to serious constitutional concerns, 
as it would have led to the underrepresentation of the revolutionary-minded 
electorate of the member whose mandate was lost.132  
Neither recommendation of the Koolen committee was accepted or processed 
into a legislative proposal by the government, which reasoned that a satisfactory 
 
127 Handelingen van de Staten-Generaal 1933-1934 II, Voorlopig verslag der Rijksbegroting, 
Bijlage A, p. 24-25. 
128 The Koolen committee, officially the ‘Committee on the membership of representative bodies’ 
was established by Royal Decree of 12 February 1934, No. 6.2.  
129 Report of the Committee on the membership of representative bodies 1934, p. 7-8. 
130 Afdeling geschillen van bestuur. 
131 Wijman 1995, p. 10-11. 
132 Ibid. 
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solution could only be reached by an amendment of constitutional immunity.133 
When the government established a new committee in 1936 that was assigned with 
the task to investigate the desirability of constitutional amendments in several areas 
and to make recommendations accordingly, the possibility to introduce measures 
against ‘revolutionary’ members of representative bodies was therefore one of the 
points of attention.134  
The committee subsequently came up with a proposal to amend the 
constitutional non-accountability provision of Article 98. According to the proposed 
amendment, the phrase ‘except for sedition or betrayal of secrets’ was to be added 
to the article which prohibited the judicial prosecution of members for what they 
had said in their chamber or submitted to it in writing.135 The government later took 
over the committee’s proposal without making any changes. In the explanatory 
memorandum, it argued that sedition and betrayal of secrets needed to be 
exempted from the protection of non-accountability because the harm caused by 
these particular forms of criminalised speech could not be prevented or undone by 
any sanction at the disposal of the chairperson. After all a state secret, once betrayed 
to the public, could not be made unheard.136 However, the proposal to change 
Article 98 later failed to achieve the necessary majority in the States-General. 
In addition to an amendment of Article 98, the committee proposed to amend 
Article 86, which stipulated that the term of the mandate of members of the Second 
Chamber was four years and that they could be re-elected. To the existing text, the 
committee proposed to add the following: 
During the term of their mandate, the Council of State may declare the forfeiture of 
their membership, if they express an intention aimed at changing the existing legal 
order by using or facilitating unlawful means.  
Statute shall determine the applicable procedure as well as the consequences of 
forfeiture; the consequences may also concern membership of other representative 
organs mentioned in the constitution. The seat of a member whose mandate has been 
forfeited remains vacant for the remainder of the term.137 
The government agreed with the committee in principle but made one significant 
change to the proposed amendment of Article 86. Instead of leaving the task to 
judge the potentially revolutionary intentions of parliamentarians to the Council of 
State, the amendment bill which was eventually introduced by the government left 
it to the individual chambers of the States-General themselves to declare the 
forfeiture of a member’s mandate with an elevated majority of two thirds. 
When the amendment bill on Article 86 was debated in the Second Chamber, it 
was criticised as being both too vaguely formulated and too limited, because it 
 
133 Wijman 1995, p. 2. 
134 Committee on partial revision of the constitution, unofficially named after its chairman de 
Wilde, established by Royal Decree of 24 January 1936. 
135 Report of the Committee on partial revision of the constitution 1936, p. 36. 
136 Handelingen Staten-Generaal 1935-1936, No. 477, 15, p. 13. 
137 Handelingen Staten-Generaal 1935-1936, No. 477, 18, p. 20. 
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provided for forfeiture of the mandate as the only possible sanction.138 The main 
point of controversy, however, was still the question to which forum the power to 
declare the forfeiture of the parliamentary mandate should be attributed. In 
particular, the argument was put forward that this power should not be left to the 
chamber itself; the potential for abuse of this, in essence, judicial power by political 
actors would be too great, regardless of the supermajority required to deprive a 
member of his mandate.139 Instead, a compromise was adopted which would leave 
the power to declare the forfeiture of the parliamentary mandate to a special body, 
on whose composition the Chamber would, however, have a decisive influence. 
Hence, the proposal to revise Article 86 of the Constitution was amended to read as 
follows:  
The members of the Second Chamber are elected for four years. They stand down at 
the same time and their mandate is renewable. 
During the term of their mandate, their membership can be declared forfeited by 
a body [college] established by statute, if they express an intention aimed at 
changing the existing legal order by using or facilitating unlawful means. 
Statute shall determine the composition of the body mentioned in the second 
paragraph, but each of its members shall be appointed by the King from a list of 
three persons put forward by the Second Chamber. Statute shall further 
determine the applicable procedure as well as the consequences of forfeiture; the 
consequences may also concern membership of other representative organs 
mentioned in the constitution. The seat of a member whose mandate has been 
forfeited remains vacant for the remainder of the term.140 
The final proposal for constitutional revision was adopted in first reading by large 
majorities in both chambers.141 After new elections, however, the amendment failed 
to yield the necessary majority of two thirds in the Second Chamber by a very large 
margin.142  
Consequently, the constitutional revision of 1938 did not bring about a 
limitation of freedom of speech in parliament – neither by means of exempting 
certain content of parliamentary speech from non-accountability nor by introducing 
a sanction for members who agitated against the constitutional system. Even 
though, during a time of increasing political radicalism both in and outside 
parliament, the need to develop legal mechanisms against ‘revolutionary’ agitation 
 
138 For a more detailed account of the arguments exchanged in the Chamber, see Wijman 1995, p. 
15-18. 
139 Kranenburg 1947, p. 327. 
140 Handelingen Staten-Generaal 1936-1937, No. 105, 33, p. 65. 
141 The procedure for constitutional amendment requires that the proposed amendment be 
adopted in first reading by both Chambers according to the ordinary legislative procedure. 
Subsequently, the Chambers are dissolved (usually at the instance of regularly scheduled 
general elections) and both Chambers of the newly elected States-General have to confirm the 
amendment by an elevated majority of two thirds (Art. 198 of the constitution of 1922; Art. 
137 of the constitution of 1983). 
142 60 of 97 votes cast were against the amendment, cf. Wijman 1995, p. 18. 
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was widely perceived, the Dutch parliamentary immunity regime remained 
unchanged.  
While the concerns about anti-democratic currents in Dutch politics – and of 
course about the developments in Germany – were grave and justified, the reason 
why the attempt to limit free speech in parliament failed was a strong and deeply 
rooted belief in the strength and resilience of the parliamentary system. The 
arguments and reservations put forward against constitutional amendments which 
would limit freedom of parliamentary speech and impose sanctions on those who 
use their parliamentary mandate to promote anti-democratic revolution were 
mainly inspired by this belief and the resulting opinion that any such amendment 
would create more problems than it could solve. Much less emphasis was put on 
legal considerations or constitutional theory, according to which uninhibited 
parliamentary debate was crucial to the democratic system and indispensable for 
national will-formation – arguments which have historically played a very 
significant role in upholding parliamentary immunity in other countries and, to a 
large extent, continue to do so. The influential Dutch constitutionalist Kranenburg, 
reflecting on the failed amendments in 1938, phrased the prevailing opinion as 
follows in his standard volume Nederlandsch Staatsrecht:  
In my view, a state with free institutions as ours is in abstracto entitled to take 
measures through which members who use their competences to the detriment of the 
system itself are deprived of the possibility to do so.  
Another question is whether such measure would be expedient here and now? I 
answer this question in the negative, for the following reasons. The place where 
destructive elements are least dangerous is the Dutch parliament. In our parliament we 
are more sensitive to speech which violated the legal order, to revolutionary speech, 
than anywhere else. Nowhere is seditious speech cooled down in an ice-cold bath of 
criticism and irony more quickly than [in the Dutch parliament].143 
It is probably not due to an editorial lapse – or editorial irony – that the very same 
passage can be found in the 6th edition of Nederlandsch Staatsrecht of 1947, now 
published with the German occupation and the collaboration of many of those 
‘destructive elements’ with the Nazis freshly in mind. Rather, the Dutch attitude 
towards freedom of speech in parliament had not changed significantly even after 
the Nazi reign, and was not going to change in the decades to come.  
In 1950, a new committee on general revision of the constitution was 
established.144 This committee, again, occupied itself with the question of how to 
proceed with revolutionary members of parliament and whether to exempt sedition 
and betrayal of secrets from freedom of parliamentary speech. However, in its final 
report of 1954, the committee found that no constitutional amendments should be 
made:  
 
143 Kranenburg 1938, p. 321. 
144 Established by Royal Decree of 17 April 1950, unofficially named commissie van Schaik after its 
chairman. 
 240 
Parliamentary Immunity in the Netherlands 
The committee is of the opinion that it should not take over the proposal, made on the 
occasion of the constitutional revision of 1938, to lift parliamentary immunity as a 
consequence of sedition and betrayal of secrets. It deems the principle of parliamentary 
immunity, which was adopted in England already with the Bill of Rights of 1689 and 
later taken over by all countries with a free parliament, too precious to deviate from it 
without any evident necessity.  
The Chambers must react to seditious speech themselves: the rules of procedure 
contain sufficient disciplinary measures. Also with regard to betrayal of secrets there 
is, in the opinion of the committee, no need to lift parliamentary immunity. Lifting 
would, moreover, have little effect, since a person who is willing to betray a secret will 
usually not do so in the Chamber. If, however, the betrayal takes place outside the 
Chamber, the member can already be prosecuted according to the criminal law. This is 
equally true in case of sedition.145 
Hence, to this date no amendment has been made to the Dutch Constitution which 
would limit the freedom of parliamentary speech, either in the form of a material 
exemption of certain content from that freedom, or in that of sanction – such as 
forfeiture of the mandate – other than those at the disposal of the chairman by 
virtue of the Rules of Procedure.  
The last inconspicuous, yet significant, change in the wording of the 
constitutional immunity provision was made in the constitutional revision of 1983. 
Whereas that provision – Article 107 after the last renumbering of 1972 – had 
previously stipulated that the members of the States-General, ministers and other 
persons mentioned ‘cannot be judicially prosecuted [zijn niet gerechtelijk vervolgbaar] 
for what they have said in the meeting or submitted to it in writing’, this was 
rephrased to read ‘[…] cannot be prosecuted or held legally liable [kunnen niet in 
rechte worden vervolgd of aangesproken] […]’. This is the current text of what is now 
Article 71 of the Dutch Constitution. According to the explanatory memorandum 
with the proposed revision, the purpose of this last, rather tiny, amendment to the 
immunity provision was to express that the immunity did not only free the 
designated persons from criminal, but also from civil liability for their utterances in 
parliament.146 The amendment of 1983 did not, however, constitute a material 
change in the immunity system but only a clarification: as pointed out earlier, it was 
established in case law that immunity also covered civil liability. 
To this date, the amendment of 1983 has marked the last act in the 
development of the Dutch system of parliamentary immunity. Even though in 
recent debates (see part III, section 4) the desire has been expressed to broaden the 
scope of Article 71 or to replace parliamentary immunity with a wider, political 
immunity altogether, actual legislative and constitutional developments in this 
direction do not seem imminent at the moment.  
 
145 Final report of the Committee on general revision of the constitution 1954, p. 163-164. 
146 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1976-1977, No. 14224, 3, p. 7-8. 
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3. The Dutch Immunity System Today 
After having discussed the origins and the historical development of parliamentary 
immunity in the Netherlands, the content of the current immunity system will be 
examined more closely. This will be done in four steps: First, a detailed account will 
be given of the scope of non-accountability under Article 71 of the Dutch 
Constitution. Second, a closer look will be had at the disciplinary powers of the 
States-General to see what means the Chambers and their respective chairpersons 
have at their disposal to regulate parliamentary speech (which by virtue of non-
accountability is exempt from ordinary justice). Third, an assessment of Article 119 
of the Constitution will show whether this provision has an actual or potential 
‘immunity dimension’, that is, whether and under which circumstances the special 
procedure for crimes committed in office can be considered part of the immunity 
system. Lastly, we will review the recent exchange of arguments about the 
adequacy of the limited immunity of Dutch parliamentarians and the question of 
whether it should be broadened into ‘political immunity’. 
3.1. The Scope of Non-accountability ex Article 71 of the Constitution 
‘De leden van de Staten-Generaal, de ministers, de staatssecretarissen en andere 
personen die deelnemen aan de beraadslaging, kunnen niet in rechte worden vervolgd 
of aangesproken voor hetgeen zij in de vergadering van de Staten-Generaal of van 
commissies daaruit hebben gezegd of aan deze schriftelijk hebben voorgelegd’. 
The members of the States-General, the ministers, the secretaries of state and other 
persons who participate in deliberations may not be prosecuted or held liable for what 
they have said in the meetings of the States-General or of committees thereof, or for 
what they have submitted to them in writing. 
If we compare the wording of Article 71 to that of Article 9 of the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689, it becomes apparent that the modern Dutch provision is phrased 
much more clearly: ‘[…] what they have said in the meetings of the States-General 
or in committees thereof, or […] what they have submitted to them in writing’ 
seems unambiguous as compared to ‘proceedings in Parliament’. The same is true 
for ‘may not be prosecuted or held liable’ as compared to ‘ought not to be 
impeached or questioned’. Nevertheless, for a good understanding of the precise 
scope of the Dutch non-accountability system, it is worth paying attention to some 
points regarding the exact interpretation of Article 71.  
In most cases, the wording of Article 71 leaves no doubt as to whether or not a 
given utterance is covered by non-accountability. Usually the case is obvious, as the 
requirements of Article 71 are clear: for instance, a member of the States-General, 
speaking in a TV studio, will not be entitled to non-accountability despite his 
parliamentary mandate, because non-accountability is only effective in the 
parliamentary meeting. In other cases, the situation is less clear. Suppose that a 
member delivers a speech in his chamber which contains criminal utterances, and 
that this member later publishes the text of his speech as an article in a newspaper –  
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may this member be prosecuted? If so, is the situation different in case of a TV 
broadcast of the parliamentary debate or a quotation in the press which is not 
published on the member’s own motion? Does non-accountability extend to the 
testimony of non-members who are merely heard as witnesses in parliamentary 
committees but do not participate in deliberations in a strict sense? To answer these 
questions and others that are similar, it is first of all necessary to note that the 
elements of Article 71 always need to be fulfilled cumulatively, id est, in particular, 
that the temporal, personal and material criteria for non-accountability all have to 
be met in order for Article 71 to take effect.147  
3.1.1. Personal Scope 
3.1.1.1. Members, Ministers, Secretaries of State 
The personal scope of parliamentary non-accountability in the Netherlands is 
unusually broad: it covers not only members of the States-General but also 
ministers, secretaries of state (also referred to as junior-ministers) and ‘other persons 
who participate in deliberations’. With regard to members of the States-General, it is 
clear that non-accountability only covers utterances made by them during the time 
of their mandate. However, as non-accountability is in any case limited to 
utterances made in parliamentary meetings, the precise point in time at which the 
parliamentary mandate begins and ends is not as contentious in the case of the 
Netherlands as, for instance, it is in the case of inviolability in France, where much 
depends on this question.  
The inclusion of ministers and secretaries of state in Article 71 is motivated, on 
the one hand, by the incompatibility of government office with the parliamentary 
mandate, due to which ministers and secretaries of state cannot be members of 
either chamber.148 On the other hand, the Dutch Constitution provides that 
legislative power is exercised by the States-General and the government jointly.149 
To extend the immunity system to members of the government is therefore 
consistent with the logic of the constitution, even if it is at odds with a traditional 
view of parliamentary immunity as a means of protecting the legislature against the 
executive.150  
3.1.1.2. Other Persons 
The inclusion of ‘other persons who participate in deliberations’ in the scope of non-
accountability gives rise to the question who these other persons are and under 
 
147 Nieuwenhuis and Janssens 2011, p. 387. 
148 Art. 57(2) of the Dutch constitution provides that a member of the States-General may not at 
the same time be a minister, secretary of state, member of the Council of State or a member, 
procurator-general or Advocate General of the Supreme Court. 
149 Art. 81 of the Constitution provides that ‘statutes are made jointly by the government and the 
States-General’. 
150 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 572. 
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which circumstances a person is considered to take part in parliamentary 
deliberations. The purpose of including ‘other persons’ in Article 71 was to grant 
non-accountability to non-members who participate in parliamentary debate with 
the permission or upon the invitation of the chambers or one of its members, a 
minister or secretary of state. This may be the case, for instance, where non-
members – such as civil servants – are invited to help explain and defend a 
legislative proposal in support of the initiator or the government. It is for the 
chambers themselves to determine which persons are considered to take part in 
deliberations.151 Persons who merely attend the meetings of a chamber or committee 
either on their own motion or upon an invitation but who are not deemed to take 
part in deliberations are never covered by parliamentary non-accountability for 
what they might say during the meeting.152 
A person who is heard as a witness or expert by one of the chambers or a 
committee does not fall under the category of persons who take part in 
deliberations and, as such, remains legally responsible for his oral and written 
utterances.153 Likewise, persons who provide or contribute to written evidence and 
reports, even where these are commissioned by a chamber or committee, do not 
enjoy non-accountability.  
The latter has been established in one of the very few judicial decisions with 
regard to the immunity of the Dutch national parliament, the Van de Bunt case of 
2002.154 In 1996 the parliamentary enquiry committee on methods of criminal 
investigation (parlementaire enquêtecommissie opsporingsmethoden) submitted its final 
report to the Second Chamber. Attached to the final report were pieces of written 
evidence used by the committee, among which was a study on organised crime in 
the Netherlands. This study had been commissioned by the enquiry committee but 
written by members of an independent research group in their own name. One case 
study in this research described the case of a company which had allegedly engaged 
in money laundering. A lawyer who had been a member of the supervisory board 
of this company at the material time subsequently brought civil proceedings against 
the author of this particular case study. According to the lawyer, the case study had 
been researched without the necessary care and contained false information which 
had caused him material and immaterial damage, since his identity had not been 
properly concealed (the press had found out the lawyer’s name and described him 
as ‘blacklisted by the enquiry committee’). The district court ordered the researcher 
to pay a large sum in damages, and this judgment was later upheld on appeal.  
In cassation, the author of the case study argued that he could not be held 
liable, since he was protected by parliamentary non-accountability under Article 71 
of the Constitution. Alternatively, he claimed ‘derivative immunity’ (afgeleide 
immuniteit), arguing that the non-accountability of the members of the enquiry 
committee would to a large extent become illusory if persons working under 
commission and under the responsibility of the committee could themselves not 
 
151 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1978-1979, No. 14224, 8. 
152 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1979-1980, No. 14224, 14. 
153 Bovend’Eert et al. 2009, p. 115. 
154 Van de Bunt, HR 28 June 2002, NJ 2002, 577. 
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rely on immunity, as this could make it hard for the committee to find experts 
willing to help. The Supreme Court considered that non-accountability is limited in 
two ways: on the one hand, it is limited materially to what persons entitled to non-
accountability have said in, or submitted in writing to, the meetings of the States-
General. On the other hand, it is limited with regard to the persons who are entitled 
to claim non-accountability, either because they are members, ministers or 
secretaries of state, or because they fall under the category of ‘other persons taking 
part in deliberations’. That the final report of the enquiry committee falls under the 
category of what members have submitted to the States-General in writing was 
undisputed, since its primary authors – the members of the enquiry committee – 
were members of the States-General. The question which remained, therefore, was 
whether non-members who had contributed material for this report and who had 
acted on the invitation of the committee, must be deemed to be ‘other persons 
taking part in deliberations’ of the States-General. According to the Court, this is not 
the case. The Court based its view on its interpretation of the term ‘deliberations’ 
(beraadslagingen) in Article 71 of the Constitution:  
It does not follow from the fact that the report of the enquiry committee with all its 
annexes belongs to the documents to which parliamentary immunity applies […] that 
the author of any document attached to the report as an annex […] must be considered 
a person who takes part in the deliberations of the Second Chamber or the 
deliberations of the enquiry committee. After all, the word ‘deliberations’ in article 71 
must be understood as ‘parliamentary debate’, thus the written or oral exchange of 
thoughts and views in a meeting of the Chamber or a committee. Providing assistance 
to the enquiry committee does not entail the right […] to take part in parliamentary 
debate. Also the fact that the applicant’s research was carried out under the 
responsibility of the enquiry committee does not lead to immunity.155  
With regard to the applicant’s claim to ‘derivative immunity’, the Supreme Court 
adopted a relatively narrow view of the purpose of Article 71. With reference to the 
constitutional history of parliamentary immunity in the Netherlands, it held that the 
purpose was ‘to grant the participants of parliamentary deliberations optimal 
freedom of speech without having to fear criminal prosecution or civil liability for 
what they have said’ – and not, for instance, to enable an enquiry committee to fulfil 
its mandate in an optimal way. The Court continued that ‘to safeguard this freedom 
of speech, a derivative immunity for an external expert who has written two partial 
reports on behalf and under the responsibility of the parliamentary enquiry 
committee is not necessary’.156 As far as the applicant’s claim to ‘derivative 
immunity’ contains the argument that the absence of such immunity would hamper 
the effective discharge of the tasks of a parliamentary enquiry committee, the Court 
remarks that, even if that were the case, it would ‘exceed the Court’s duty to 
develop the law [rechtsvormende taak] to extend parliamentary immunity to other 
persons than those mentioned in Article 71 as participants in parliamentary 
 
155 Ibid., para. 4.2. 
156 Ibid., para. 4.3. 
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deliberations’.157 Moreover, the Supreme Court pointed out that parliamentary 
immunity is not the only way in which the applicant could have been protected 
from civil and criminal liability: he would not have incurred any problems if he had 
been consulted by the committee without contributing to the report in his own 
name. Also, if he had been heard by the committee as an expert, he would not have 
run the risk of civil or criminal liability. Article 30 (then Article 24) of the 
Parliamentary Enquiry Act (Wet op de parlementaire enquête) prohibits the use of a 
person’s testimony before a parliamentary enquiry committee as evidence in legal 
proceedings, both against that person himself and against third persons. The Court 
therefore advised that a rule be included in the parliamentary rules of order which 
would allow parliamentarians to be assisted by persons who participate in 
deliberations in their own name. This did not help the applicant in the particular 
case at hand, so the Court also hinted at the possibility that the state could 
compensate him for the damage he had to pay.158 
The Supreme Court’s decision in this case is remarkable in two respects. First, 
because it draws a virtual dividing line between the written utterances which gave 
rise to the lawsuit – the case study written by the applicant and attached to the 
committee report as evidence – and its factual author. Even though the contested 
case study eventually became a part of the report, which undisputedly fell within 
the regime of Article 71, this did not lead to non-accountability for its author. Even 
though it is certainly correct that authorship of the final report of the enquiry 
committee is attributed to the non-accountable members of that committee, it is not 
without a certain aftertaste that the clearly identifiable author of one particular part 
of this report is denied the same non-accountability. This is not to say that the 
Court’s assessment, based on a reasonable definition of ‘deliberations‘ and the 
persons who take part in them according to Article 71, is incorrect. However, it 
highlights an interesting aspect of the question whether parliamentary immunity is 
a personal or an institutional privilege. Throughout this book, we find strong 
evidence for the latter. The Van de Bunt case, however, shows that this distinction is 
not always helpful: if we accept that immunity attaches primarily to parliament as 
an institution, it should follow that ‘parliamentary utterances’ are immune – as is 
confirmed by the fact that the report of the enquiry committee itself did in principle 
fall under non-accountability. In the United Kingdom, it would thus of course have 
constituted a ‘proceeding in Parliament‘. However, the wording of Article 71 of the 
Dutch constitution caused the Dutch Supreme Court not to choose its being 
incorporated in a parliamentary report as the defining factor for the parliamentary 
nature of the relevant case study, but the capacity of its author. In other words, the 
Court opted for a personal criterion. In conclusion, there is a subtle but potentially 
important difference between an immunity for ‘proceedings in Parliament‘ and 
freedom of speech for participants in parliamentary deliberations. It is as a result of 
this difference that the Dutch non-accountability system, even though it is intended 
 
157 Ibid., para. 4.4. 
158 Ibid., para. 4.5. 
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as an institutional privilege, has a much more personal character than the British 
system of privilege. 
The second remarkable aspect of the Van de Bunt case is the immediacy with 
which the Court dismissed the necessity of ‘derivative immunity‘. The Court did 
correctly point out that liability of the defendant could easily have been avoided 
even without granting him non-accountability, for instance by hearing him as an 
expert instead of attaching his case study to the committee report under his own 
name. For the case at hand, this argument is certainly decisive. However, the Court 
also stated that ‘derivative immunity‘ is unnecessary because the purpose of non-
accountability pursuant to Article 71 is actually limited to ‘optimal freedom of 
speech‘ for members and other participants of parliamentary deliberations. But is 
there not some merit to the applicant’s argument – put bluntly – that freedom of 
speech for parliamentarians would be futile if there was nothing to say because 
external experts are reluctant to submit information? The Supreme Court stated that 
extending non-accountability beyond what is dictated by the wording of Article 71 
would exceed its competences; and it could afford to do so because the 
Parliamentary Enquiry Act does provide a feasible alternative way to protect 
experts in enquiries. But this does not solve the underlying systemic issue with 
regard to the purpose and functioning of parliamentary immunity. Nieuwenhuis 
and Janssens, in their book on crimes of utterance, argue that the court’s ruling in 
Van de Bunt is dissatisfactory because ‘in this case the process of establishing the 
truth in parliament is pre-eminently at issue‘.159 Nevertheless, they stop short of the 
conclusion that the Court’s interpretation of Article 71 is flawed and instead argue 
for a practical solution, saying that the protective capacity of the law on 
parliamentary enquiry should be broadened even more, so as to cover cases as the 
one in Van de Bunt.160  
3.1.1.3. Can the State be Held Liable Instead? 
Article 71 of the Dutch Constitution leaves no doubt that members of the States-
General, ministers, secretaries of state and other persons cannot be held personally 
liable for what they have said in parliamentary meetings, and that this non-
accountability does not only cover only criminal but also civil liability. But members 
of the government are also organs of the state. The question therefore arises 
whether persons who incur damage or are otherwise injured as a consequence of 
utterances of members of the government can hold the state liable in lieu of the 
minister or secretary of state personally.  
This question has been at issue in two Dutch cases. In 1986, the case of Harm 
Dost was discussed in the First Chamber during question time. Dost, a drug dealer 
of Dutch nationality, had been sentenced to prison by a German court for drug-
related crimes committed in the Netherlands, where he had already been sentenced 
for the same offences in the past. The Minister, Secretary of State of Hustice, and the 
 
159 Nieuwenhuis and Janssens 2011, p. 388. 
160 Ibid. 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs provided the members of that chamber with information 
which Mr Dost later claimed to be wrong and misleading. He argued that this 
information had disadvantageous consequences for him, because the chamber was 
unable to exercise parliamentary control on the policy of the government (he 
claimed that the government had failed to support him when he stood trial in 
Germany). Legal action against the Ministers and the Secretary of State personally 
was barred due to non-accountability ex Article 71 of the Constitution, so Mr Dost 
sued the Dutch state, among others, for rectification of the truth and an injunction 
which would oblige the government to make good the disadvantages he had 
suffered.161 His claim was based on a restrictive reading of Article 71, which, 
according to the applicant, referred to the ministers and the secretaries of state as 
persons and not as state organs. 
The court first expressed its reluctance to limit the scope of a provision of the 
‘brand new constitution‘ so soon after its adoption. Subsequently, it argued that the 
purpose of Article 71 was that ‘ministers and secretaries of state must be able to 
speak out in the meetings of the States-General without reservation, that is, in the 
knowledge that the lawfulness of their utterances will not be subject to judicial 
control‘.162 According to the court, the reading of Article 71 proposed by the 
applicant would, however, require the courts to test the lawfulness of utterances of 
members of the government in order to reach a conclusion about the liability of the 
state. Therefore, the court concluded that the interpretation of Article 71 proposed 
by the applicant would defy the purpose of non-accountability and is therefore 
wrong.163 Consequently, the state cannot be held liable for wrongful utterances of 
members of the government in parliament.  
In the case Rost van Tonningen of 1993,164 the Dutch Supreme Court considered 
a similar question amongst an entirely different line of argumentation. An anti-
fascist organisation had filed a lawsuit against the state, in which it demanded that 
it be prohibited to publicly state the opinion that the widow of the prominent Dutch 
national socialist parliamentarian and wartime collaborator Rost van Tonningen 
should be entitled to a pension. In parliament, the government had stated that the 
widow’s controversial pension claims were justified. It argued that Article 71 
precluded a prohibition as demanded by the applicants. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court did not base its decision on non-accountability, as could have been expected: 
it held that the government enjoyed freedom of expression by virtue of Article 10 
ECHR and case law of the European Court of Human Rights – a ruling which has 
been criticised as strange and erratic.165 Nevertheless, this case confirms that the 
Dutch judiciary is more than reluctant to hold the state to account for (or to impose 
limits on) utterances of members of the government in parliament. 
 
161 The Hague District Court, 26 February 1987, Kort Geding 1987, No. 134, p. 263 et seq. 
162 Ibid., p. 264-265. 
163 Ibid. 
164 HR 22 January 1993, NJ 1994, 734. 
165 See Wijman 1995, p. 24; Kortmann 1993, p. 333-334. 
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3.1.2. Temporal and Spatial Scope 
3.1.2.1. No Spatial Privilege 
Non-accountability in the Netherlands is not a ‘spatial privilege’. This means that it 
is not limited to a specific geographical location, in the sense that the location at 
which an utterance is made would in itself constitute a criterion for the application 
of Article 71. This is because it follows neither from the Constitution nor from the 
Rules of Procedure of the two chambers that a parliamentary meeting is defined by 
its place – though of course, in practice, meetings are held at the Binnenhof, the 
building which houses the States-General. The location of a chamber of the States-
General or committee meeting does not matter, as long as the utterance in question 
is made at that location during the meeting. Accordingly, it is not entirely correct to 
speak of Dutch non-accountability as a ‘spatial’ or ‘geographical’ privilege, as is 
often done in the Dutch literature.166 Rather, non-accountability is attached to the 
States-General as a body. While this difference is of little importance for the 
practical application of non-accountability, it underlines the logic and institutional 
character of parliamentary immunity. Whether a meeting qualifies as the meeting of 
a parliamentary committee is to be determined by the chambers themselves in their 
respective Rules of Procedure.167 It is clear, however, that meetings of parliamentary 
political groups do not qualify as meetings of a parliamentary committee; neither do 
meetings of a committee which do not consist of members of the States General, 
even when that committee has been established by the States-General or one of its 
chambers.168  
3.1.2.2. Non-accountability for the Duration of the Meeting only 
Non-accountability ex Article 71 of the Constitution is strictly limited to the 
duration of the meetings of either chamber of the States-General or a committee. 
This means that the oral utterances of persons entitled to non-accountability are 
only protected if made while the respective meeting is ongoing, so that anything 
said in the plenary hall or in the meeting place of a committee before the beginning 
or after the conclusion of the respective meeting is not covered by non-
accountability. The logic of parliamentary immunity demands that the words in de 
vergadering in the Dutch original of Article 71 have to be understood as ‘during the 
meeting’ and thus, have to be ascribed a temporal meaning rather than a (merely) 
spatial one: it is only while the meeting of a chamber or a committee is on-going 
that an utterance in parliament has significance for the parliamentary work. 
Therefore, only utterances made during the meeting deserve the protection of non-
accountability.  
 
166 See for instance Bovend’Eert and Kummeling 2010, p. 144. 
167 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1978-1979, No. 14224, 6, p. 10. Rules with regard to committees 
are contained in Chapter VII of the Rules of Procedure of the Second Chamber and in 
Chapter III of the Rules of Procedure of the First Chamber.  
168 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1978-1979, No. 14224, 6, p. 10. 
 249 
Chapter 5 
The above was confirmed at the only instance at which the precise time of an 
utterance in parliament – before or after the conclusion of the meeting – was 
decisive in legal proceedings about the question of whether or not an utterance was 
protected by non-accountability. In 1939, a member of the National Socialist 
Movement, the abovementioned Rost van Tonningen, was expelled from the 
plenary meeting of the Second Chamber for repeated inappropriate statements. 
After the Chairman had subsequently declared the meeting adjourned, another 
member called Rost van Tonningen ‘a traitor’, for which he was later sentenced to a 
fine by the District Court of The Hague. The Court found that the accused member 
was not protected by non-accountability, since the word in question had been 
spoken after the conclusion of the meeting.169  
3.1.3. Material Scope 
3.1.3.1. No Limitations with Regard to the Content of Utterances Covered by Non-
accountability 
Where an utterance is made by a person entitled to non-accountability and in a 
situation in which non-accountability is due (such as in a parliamentary or 
committee meeting), Article 71 of the Constitution does not impose any further 
requirements in order for the immunity to take effect. In particular, there are no 
conditions with regard to the form or content of the utterance in question or the 
precise situation or context in which it is made. Thus, non-accountability applies to 
the content of committee reports, to speeches made from the lectern, but also to 
spontaneous interjections of any kind, whether or not they relate to the issue which 
is currently being discussed in a meeting. This has already been expressed by the 
constitutional legislator of 1887, when he exchanged the opaque term ‘advice‘ for 
‘what they have said in the meeting‘.  
Proof that the comprehensive protection of non-accountability also holds in 
extreme cases of insults which are manifestly unrelated to the subject of 
parliamentary debate was recently confirmed in an Aruban case of 2011170 which 
was decided by the Dutch Supreme Court in final instance.171 The defendant in 
cassation, at the relevant time an Aruban minister, had, in an oral interjection 
during a speech delivered by the applicant in parliament, called the applicant a 
‘paedophile‘ and asked him to ‘explain this to all the children you abused‘.172 These 
words did not have any connection with the issue that was being debated in the 
Aruban parliament at the time. When sued by the applicant, the trial court ordered 
 
169 Ibid., p. 145. 
170 According to the Kingdom Act on Jurisdiction in Cassation (Rijkswet Cassatierechtspraak), the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands functions as the court of cassation for Aruba and the states 
of the former Dutch Antilles. Accordingly, the case law of the Supreme Court with regard to 
parliamentary non-accountability in Aruba is of significance to the Netherlands where it 
concerns a legal question relevant to both countries. 
171 HR 17 June 2011, NJ 2011, No. 450. 
172 Ibid., para. 3.v. 
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the defendant to publish a rectification. On appeal, however, he made a successful 
claim to parliamentary non-accountability, which is laid down in Article III.20 of the 
Aruban constitution in terms identical to Article 71 of the Dutch Constitution. In 
cassation before the Dutch Supreme Court, the applicant argued that (a) non-
accountability in this case constitutes a violation of Article 6 ECHR, since it bars 
access to court for the applicant, and that (b) non-accountability does not apply in 
this case, since the utterances in question were entirely unrelated to the 
parliamentary debate at the time in which they were made.  
With reference to ECtHR case law in A. v. United Kingdom,173 the Supreme 
Court held that non-accountability does not violate Article 6 ECHR, since it is 
necessary to safeguard freedom of opinion in parliament and the separation of 
powers between the legislator and the judiciary.174 With regard to the second 
argument, the Court simply stated that the same reasoning leads to the conclusion 
that a limitation of non-accountability to matters which relate to the actual 
parliamentary debate would constitute an unduly restrictive interpretation of 
Article III.20 of the Aruban constitution.175 The Dutch Supreme Court has thus 
confirmed that parliamentary non-accountability covers all utterances which fall 
within the personal and temporal scope of Article 71, regardless of their content.  
Inviolability, the extra-professional immunity which many states grant their 
parliamentarians, has increasingly been subjected to pressure from the European 
Court of Human Rights, essentially limiting its legitimate scope to matters which 
are at least potentially connected to the parliamentary work of the member in 
question. So far, this has not been the case for non-accountability, even though 
several European countries know systems of non-accountability which exclude 
grave insults from the material scope of the immunity.176 That the material 
absoluteness of non-accountability in the Netherlands remains uncontested is owed 
to the notion of a complete separation of power between the legislator and the 
courts, which the Dutch traditionally hold in high esteem.177 Both the Dutch 
national courts and the ECtHR have thus far observed this strict separation of 
powers with regard to crimes of utterance in parliament.  
3.1.3.2. No Immunity for ‘Private’ Publications, even if Identical to Protected Utterances 
Written utterances of members or other persons entitled to non-accountability are 
protected only if they are submitted to a parliamentary chamber or committee. In 
order to answer the question of whether a published written document falls under 
the material scope of non-accountability, it is therefore decisive whether or not the 
material in question has been published as a parliamentary document – for instance, 
 
173 ECHR 17 December 2002, Appl. No. 35373/97; see Chapter II. 
174 HR 17 June 2011, NJ 2011, No. 450, para. 3.4.2. 
175 Ibid., para. 3.5.2. 
176 See e.g. Art. 46 of the German constitution. 
177 This is also the tenor of the case note by Egbert Dommering on HR 17 June 2011, published 
on the website of the Institute for Information Law (Instituut voor informatierecht, IViR) at the 
University of Amsterdam.  
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in the official parliamentary records or a committee report whose publication is 
commissioned by a chamber of the States-General. Non-accountability is excluded 
for any material published ‘privately’.  
The latter is illustrated by case law of the Supreme Court with regard to non-
accountability on the municipal level.178 A member of the municipal council of 
Dordrecht had delivered a speech at a council meeting. As was later established in 
court, passages of this speech contained insults against citizens of foreign descent 
and encouraged racial hatred and discrimination. Immediately after the meeting, 
the council member handed a written copy of the text of his speech to a local 
journalist. While doing this, he expressed to the journalist his hope for media 
attention. The journalist later quoted the relevant passages in an article, whereupon 
the council member was prosecuted for, and found guilty of, incitement of racial 
hatred, as the courts in first instance and on appeal interpreted the act of handing 
the text of the speech to a journalist as evidence of the intention to see it 
published.179  
Before the Supreme Court, one of the grounds for cassation put forward by the 
applicant was a claim to non-accountability ex Article 22 of the Municipalities Act, 
whose wording is equivalent to that of Article 71 of the Constitution. The Supreme 
Court, however, held that ‘the protection against judicial prosecution offered by 
said provision does not extend to acts other than those mentioned in that provision‘. 
Speaking in the council meeting and submitting written utterances to the council: ‘It 
follows from this that the defendant does not enjoy immunity for the handing over 
of the text of his speech to a person other than the members of the council and 
outside the council meeting‘.180 
This case carries two important consequences for the assessment of the 
material scope of parliamentary non-accountability. First, where a member is not to 
be held accountable for an utterance in the States-General, he cannot ‘export’ that 
non-accountability and rely on it for the same utterance repeated in a non-
parliamentary context. The limitation of non-accountability to parliament thus has 
to be interpreted strictly. Second, in order for a member of a representative organ to 
incur liability for the publication of an utterance during the meeting, this 
publication must be directly attributable to him. This is the reason why the Supreme 
Court attaches some importance to the fact that the council member in this case had 
apparently intended his utterances to be published, and had given the text to the 
journalist for this purpose.181 It is reasonable to assume that, as a prerequisite for 
 
178 As was mentioned briefly in the introduction, members of municipal councils (gemeenteraden) 
and councils of mayor and aldermen also enjoy non-accountability, laid down in Arts. 22 and 
57 of the municipalities act in terms identical to those of Art. 71 of the constitution. 
179 HR 2 April 2002, NJ 2002, 421, para. 3.5. Since factual evidence cannot be reviewed in 
cassation proceedings, the Supreme Court did not question this intention.  
180 Ibid., para. 4.3. 
181 Ibid., para. 3.5. The Supreme Court notes that cassation proceedings do not allow a factual re-
examination of the case, but it recapitulates the evidence on which the court of appeal had 
based its view that the applicant had intended the publication of his speech and comes to the 
conclusion that, in the light of this evidence, the guilty verdict of the court of appeals does 
not display an incorrect interpretation of the law.  
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liability, the courts will have to establish that the member in question actively 
encouraged or facilitated the publication. Accordingly, publication without the 
active support or assistance of the member concerned does not lead to liability, even 
though the member might foresee and welcome publication of his utterance – think 
of live television broadcasts of debates in the Second Chamber, of which the 
members are of course aware. It is logical that this or any other form of publication 
without the active support of the relevant member does not lead to liability, since in 
such a case the member cannot be imputed with any act but that of making the 
utterance for which he is non-accountable in the first place. 
3.1.3.3. All Forms of Legal Action are Barred 
Non-accountability ex Article 71 of the Constitution does not only bar criminal 
prosecution but also civil action. As mentioned previously, the latter is the intended 
meaning of the words ‘prosecuted or held liable‘ (vervolgd of aangesproken) in the text 
of Article 71. It is assumed that these words also cover disciplinary action under 
public law.182 With regard to disciplinary action under private law, however, the 
situation is less clear, and so far no precedent is available which could provide a 
definite answer, although Elzinga and de Lange note in this regard:  
If a member were accused and punished for what he has said in the Chamber 
according to a disciplinary procedure under private law by an interest group or 
political organisation, this would, strictly speaking, fall outside the scope of Article 71. 
However, one may assume that such disciplinary action violates public order and 
could therefore be contested in court as an unlawful encroachment on the rights of 
members of the chambers.183 
Bovend’Eert and Kummeling recount a parliamentary episode during which three 
members of the party group of Lijst Pim Fortuyn, all of them also medical experts, 
wished to abstain from a vote in the Second Chamber on an amendment of a 
Tobacco Act for fear of disciplinary action by the medical disciplinary board 
(medisch tuchtcollege). They had to be reminded that abstentions were not possible, 
(in case of a vote by roll call)184 and that one can never be held liable for what one 
has said in the chamber, nor for the parliamentary vote.185 Even if some doubt 
remains with regard to disciplinary mechanisms under private law, it follows from 
the logic of non-accountability that any form of legal action is prohibited. In all 
likelihood, the bar on legal action pursuant to Article 71 of the Constitution does 
not, therefore, contain any exceptions. 
 
182 Elzinga and De Lange 2006, p. 572. 
183 Ibid. 
184 See Art. 70 of the Rules of Procedure of the Second Chamber. 
185 Bovend’Eert and Kummeling 2010, p. 145; see also Akkermans & Koekkoek 1992, p. 674. 
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3.2. The Disciplinary Powers of the Chambers 
As in most systems of parliamentary immunity and in all three countries discussed 
in this study, non-accountability in the States-General is not tantamount to unlimited 
freedom of speech. Even though, as we have seen, all forms of legal action are 
barred, the parliamentary chambers themselves remain responsible for the 
maintenance of order during debates. To this end, the Rules of Procedure of both 
chambers provide for a range of disciplinary measures which the respective 
chairman has at his disposal to maintain order.186 Decisions taken by the chairman 
in this respect are never open for appeal.187 
First, the chairman can admonish a member who disturbs the order in the 
chamber if that member’s speech contains insults, betrays secrets or expresses 
approval of or incitement to unlawful acts. In such cases, the chairman will first give 
the member in question the opportunity to withdraw the utterances in question. If 
he does so, they are not erased from the record but are marked there as ‘dead’. 
Whether or not an utterance is withdrawn, the chairman may still decide to erase 
the relevant words from the record, but he should do so after consultation with the 
present members of the records committee.188 If a member refuses to withdraw 
certain utterances when asked to do so, continues making such utterances, or 
continuously departs from the subject of the debate, the chairman may order that 
member to stop speaking. As an ultimate measure, the chairman of either chamber 
may expel a member who behaves inappropriately from the meeting altogether, in 
which case that member has to leave the parliamentary building. Until recently, the 
chambers could decide to extend such an expulsion up to a period of one month, 
but this possibility has now been abolished for both chambers.189 
Finally, the chairman of the Second Chamber also has the power to act against 
inappropriate written utterances and prevent their publication: Article 53 of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Second Chamber provides that ’the chairman may 
disregard documents which are unsigned, incomprehensible or insulting’. The 
Rules of Procedure of the First Chamber do not contain a corresponding provision, 
but since the chairman is generally responsible for the conduct of the chamber’s 
business, a similar power may be assumed there also. 
When considering the disciplinary powers of the parliamentary chambers in 
the context of parliamentary immunity, two things should be noted. First, the 
disciplinary measures which the chairman has at his disposal can only avoid and 
prevent damage to a certain extent – it is easy to conceive of situations in which 
 
186 See Arts. 58-62, Rules of Procedure of the Second Chamber and Arts. 94-98, Rules of 
Procedure of the First Chamber. 
187 Franssen and Van Schagen 1990, p. 69. 
188 Franssen and Van Schagen 1990, p. 70. Cancellation does not, however, necessarily prevent 
the publication of such utterances. Withdrawn utterances do not appear on the official record, 
but the media is not obliged to abstain from publishing them. Cf. Bovend’Eert and 
Kummeling 2010, p. 149. 
189 Bovend’Eert and Kummeling 2010, p. 150; see also Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1992-1993, 
No. 22590, 5, p. 69. 
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considerable harm can be done by an utterance in parliament: think, for instance, of 
defamation or betrayal of secrets. By the time that the member in question is 
admonished by the chairman or ordered to stop speaking, the damage is already 
done, regardless of whether or not he withdraws the relevant words. Moreover, the 
chairman is not always able to discern whether a certain utterance is defamatory or 
contains confidential information.  
Second, the disciplinary powers of the Chambers are not a means through 
which injured persons could seek legal recourse, for instance by way of a petition to 
the speaker. They serve the exclusive goal of maintaining order in the States-
General; the Rules of Procedure of the two chambers make no provision for 
retribution (or compensation). Since the disciplinary powers of the chairman do not 
extend to retroactive punishment, they cannot be equated to the application of 
regular criminal law, or be seen as a substitute for it. This differentiates the Dutch 
States-General from Parliament in the United Kingdom, where both Houses are (in 
theory!) equipped with all the powers of an ordinary court of law.  
3.3. The Immunity Dimension of Article 119 of the Constitution 
The members of the States-General, the ministers and the secretaries of state are tried 
for crimes committed in these capacities before the Supreme Court, also after having 
left office. The order to prosecute is given by royal decree or by a decision of the 
Second Chamber. 
This provision, which prescribes a special procedure for crimes committed by the 
designated persons in the exercise of their office or mandate, is highly interesting in 
the context of parliamentary immunity. The historical analysis of the development 
of parliamentary immunity conducted in this chapter and, in particular, the ‘swap’ 
of non-accountability for inviolability in the grand constitutional revision of 1848, 
show that the origins of the current Article 119 are indeed to be found in the system 
of inviolability that once existed for both members of the government and 
parliamentarians in the Netherlands. It is therefore no surprise that Article 119 bears 
a certain resemblance to provisions which regulate the criminal liability of members 
of the government in the constitutions of other countries.190 The existence of such 
special provisions for members of government is normal in countries where 
government office is incompatible with the parliamentary mandate, as it means that 
members of government do not enjoy parliamentary immunity. However, these 
special provisions are not usually mutually applicable to parliamentarians (who 
already enjoy parliamentary immunity) but constitute a separate and often more 
limited immunity regime for the government alone.191 Article 119 of the Dutch 
Constitution does, however, apply to members of the States-General. Even though it 
does not provide for actual immunity, it must be considered in our examination of 
the Dutch parliamentary immunity regime.  
 
190 See e.g. Art. 68-1 of the French constitution and Art. 103 of the Belgian constitution. 
191 For a comparison of a number of such provisions, see Hardt and Eliantonio 2011. 
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3.3.1. A Hypothetical Potential 
To what extent does Article 119 add a second layer of immunity to the protection 
offered by Article 71? At first glance it does not seem to add much, at least if 
measured by the standards of fully-fledged inviolability enjoyed by members of 
parliament in other countries.  
First, prosecution under the procedure of Article 119 may be ordered by the 
Second Chamber of the States-General, but it does not necessarily require its consent, 
since the government may also give the order to prosecute by royal decree. It 
therefore seems as if Article 119 defies at least one of the purposes traditionally 
attributed to parliamentary immunity: to protect members of parliament from 
undue interference exercised by the executive. Article 119 sits uneasily with this 
traditional notion of parliamentary immunity.  
Second, the material scope of Article 119 does not extend beyond such crimes 
specifically defined as ambtsmisdrijven (literally ‘office crimes’), thus crimes 
committed in the exercise of the office or mandate. Criminal acts committed in the 
extra-professional sphere are therefore not covered. Accordingly, Article 119 is 
traditionally categorised as ‘a certain guarantee against too easy interference by the 
judiciary‘192 rather than an actual immunity. 
Nevertheless, in how far Article 119 of the Constitution de facto obstructs the 
course of criminal justice for members of the States-General, that is to say, in how 
far a certain immunity dimension can be read into it, remains to be assessed in a 
closer examination. Whether Article 119 has any practical ‘immunity effect’ 
critically depends on (a) the definition of an ambtsmisdrijf and (b) on whether the 
Second Chamber or the Government are inclined to call the prosecution into action, 
since such prosecution is not possible otherwise.  
The second condition is clearly not fulfilled: to date, there has not been a single 
precedent of the application of the procedure of Article 119; the article has led a 
‘dormant’ existence and has therefore been largely ignored in the literature on 
immunity. In practice, Article 119 does not play any role in the Dutch immunity 
system. However, as recently argued by Remco Nehmelman, the provision might 
bear an interesting hypothetical immunity potential.193 To trace Nehmelman’s 
argumentation, we need to look at the statutory definition of crimes committed in 
office, ambtsmisdrijven.  
3.3.1.1. Crimes Committed in Office (Ambtsmisdrijven) 
In section 2.4.1 of the present chapter, we discussed the Criminal Ministerial 
Accountability Act of 1855 (Wet op de strafrechtelijke ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid). 
According to this act, both the government and the Second Chamber of the States-
General may order the prosecution of ministers for violation of the constitution or 
 
192 See for instance Akkermans 1987, p. 654; the same formula is used in Van Raalte 1971, p. 179 
and Elzinga 1990, p. 211. 
193 Nehmelman 2010b, p. 7-23. 
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statute. While the government may give this order directly to the procurator-
general at the Supreme Court, the Second Chamber must first conduct an intricate 
examination of the alleged violation in a parliamentary enquiry committee. 
According to Article 483(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van 
strafvordering) this procedure remains in force. Pursuant to Article 483(2), the same 
procedure applies to the prosecution of the persons mentioned in Article 76 of the 
Judicial Organisation Act (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie) for crimes committed in 
office (ambtsmisdrijven). The latter article reads as follows:  
1. The Supreme Court takes cognisance in first and last instance of crimes 
committed in office by members of the States-General, the ministers and the 
secretaries of state. 
2. For this purpose, crimes committed in office shall mean punishable acts 
committed under one of the aggravating circumstances described in Article 44 
of the Criminal Code.  
3. In the cases referred to in the first and second paragraph, the Supreme Court 
also takes cognisance of claims to compensation of costs and damage incurred 
by the injured party. 
4. The cases referred to in the first and second paragraph are heard by the 
Supreme Court in a chamber of ten of its members. In case of a tied vote, it 
shall rule in favour of the defendant. 
Thus, the term ambtsmisdrijf does not refer to one or more specific criminal acts. 
Rather, it refers to any criminal act performed under certain additional conditions 
defined in Article 44 of the Criminal Code, which reads as follows: 
If an office holder, by committing a punishable act, violates a special official duty or 
makes use, in committing a punishable act, of power, opportunity or means derived 
from his office, the punishment for this act, with the exception of fines, is increased by 
one third.194 
Read in conjunction, Article 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 76 of the 
Judicial Organisation Act and Article 44 of the Criminal Code present the following 
picture: where a minister, secretary of state or member of either Chamber of the 
States-General is alleged to have committed a criminal act – among which are 
crimes of utterance outside the scope of non-accountability – he will be tried in an 
ordinary court, unless the alleged criminal act has been committed (a) in violation of 
a special official duty, or (b) by making use of power, opportunity or means derived 
from his office or mandate. In such a case, the minister, secretary, or member will be 
tried in first and last instance by the Supreme Court, but only if his prosecution has 
been ordered by the government or the Second Chamber. In the latter case, a 
parliamentary enquiry procedure has to precede the indictment. 
 
194 In our context, it is useful to translate the term ambtenaar as ‘office holder’, rather than ‘civil 
servant’, which is the more common translation.  
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3.3.1.2. Does this Procedure Amount to Inviolability? 
As previously mentioned, the procedure outlined above has never been applied. 
Therefore, answering the question of whether it could potentially be read and 
applied as a form of inviolability for members of the States-General necessarily 
includes a large element of speculation. Clearly, if a criminal act committed by a 
member of the States-General, minister, or secretary of state were to be recognised 
as a crime committed in office under Article 44 of the Criminal Code, the procedure 
of Article 119 of the Constitution in conjunction with the Criminal Ministerial 
Accountability Act would have to be followed. Scenarios involving ordinary 
criminal acts, committed with the help of ‘power, opportunity or means’ derived 
from the parliamentary mandate, are conceivable. Given that, in such a case, the 
prosecution of the member in question could still simply be ordered by the 
government without the intervention of the Second Chamber, this would not, 
however, amount to actual inviolability. Nevertheless, the fact that a member could 
not be prosecuted upon an ordinary criminal complaint or upon the motion of the 
public prosecutor would provide a certain procedural guarantee, considering that 
the government would probably not give the order to prosecute a member of the 
States-General light-heartedly. 
In his thought-provoking analysis, Nehmelman argues that the procedure of 
Article 119 could be of significance in dealing with criminal utterances of members 
of the States-General which are not covered by Article 71. In his view, this could 
concern, for instance, racist comments in the media or non-parliamentary cases of 
hate speech. While such speech acts would not violate any special official duty of 
the parliamentarian in question, he argues that they may well be committed with 
the use of ‘opportunity or means’ derived from the parliamentary mandate, since it 
is the mandate which puts a member of the States-General in a position to 
disseminate his views publicly. According to Nehmelman, a parliamentarian’s 
access to the media and the media’s attention to his views can thus be seen as an 
opportunity derived from the capacity of being a member of parliament.195 
Nehmelman contends that this view is supported by case law of the Dutch Supreme 
Court, in which it was held (with regard to a civil servant) that a ‘crime committed 
in office’ does not require a material link between the tasks of the office and the 
criminal act. It suffices that the office provides the perpetrator with the opportunity 
to commit the criminal act.196  
Still, it is doubtful whether Nehmelman’s interpretation is sufficiently 
sustainable to hold up in court in cases relating to non-parliamentary utterances of 
members of the States-General. After all, it seems outright impossible to prove that 
the opportunity to make a public statement derives exclusively, or to a degree 
sufficient to merit a deviation from ordinary criminal procedure, from a person’s 
public office or parliamentary mandate. Many public figures enjoy considerable 
media attention and have ample opportunity to disseminate their opinion on any 
 
195 Nehmelman 2010b, p. 21. 
196 Nehmelman 2010b, p. 20; see also HR 8 December 1998, NJ 1999, 224. 
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issue in the media without holding any office or mandate. Perhaps even more 
importantly, many public statements of elected politicians receive very little media 
attention where the media are of the opinion that they do not deserve any. In other 
words, not only is media attention equally available to persons without a public 
office or parliamentary mandate, it is also no automatism for persons who do hold 
such an office or mandate. This is too weak a basis for the categorisation of a public 
statement as an ambtsmisdrijf.  
Nehmelman embarks on his analysis of Article 119 with the aim of 
establishing whether inviolability would, in principle, be possible in the 
Netherlands and whether it would fit the existing constitutional framework. He 
does so in light of the demand, voiced recently in public and scholarly debate, that 
politicians should enjoy a higher degree of freedom of speech beyond the 
parliamentary sphere and beyond the limits of Article 71 of the Constitution (see 
section 3.4 below).  
It is easy to admit that such an extension of freedom of speech – and the 
creation of inviolability! – would be the result if, on the one hand, the procedure of 
Article 119 was actually applied in practice and if, on the other hand, it was 
modified in a certain way. For instance, if the consent of a chamber of the States-
General was required and could not be circumvented by the government, this 
would technically equate Article 119 to a classical inviolability provision.197 
Nevertheless, the implementation of this idea is highly unlikely, both with regard to 
the proposed interpretation of the criteria for ambtsmisdrijven and with regard to the 
chances of the necessary amendment to Article 119 of the Constitution actually 
being made. This is the case, first, because the idea of broadening freedom of speech 
for politicians (and parliamentarians in particular) by bringing crimes of utterance 
under the category of crimes in office entails a certain paradox: with the aim of 
creating a greater freedom of speech, criminal speech would be brought within the 
definition of Article 44 of the Criminal Code, which lists aggravating circumstances 
and prescribes a heavier sanction! Even though it is reasonable to assume that the 
procedural obstacles which the categorisation of an act as ambtsmisdrijf carries with 
it would decrease the risk of actual prosecution (and thus have a certain ‘immunity 
effect’), trying to achieve a higher degree of freedom of speech through these means 
would appear to be an unsound legislative trick.  
Second, one has to realise that a broad interpretation of ‘power, opportunity or 
means derived from the office’ (or mandate) would not only lead to higher obstacles 
for the prosecution of politicians for speech crimes, but also for any other criminal 
act potentially facilitated by the mandate. With a little imagination, possibilities for 
the abuse of the parliamentary mandate or ministerial office are abundant.  
Lastly, the adjudication of the question of whether a criminal act has actually 
been committed with the help of ‘power, opportunity or means derived from the 
office’ – which would need to be answered in order to even decide the course of 
criminal procedure – would certainly be problematic. Where a criminal utterance is 
made, for instance, in a televised interview, it is comparatively easy to argue that 
 
197 Nehmelman proposes this in his conclusion. See Nehmelman 2010b, p. 23. 
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the person in question has been interviewed specifically in his capacity of being a 
member of parliament. If, however, the allegedly criminal utterance is made in the 
form of a film like Wilders’s Fitna, which a member of parliament produces 
privately or with the help of others, can the attention the film receives as a 
consequence of the prominence of that member really be interpreted as an 
‘opportunity’ derived from the mandate? Probably not with sufficient certainty.  
In conclusion, the following can be said about Article 119 of the Dutch 
Constitution: First, this article is in some respects similar to inviolability provisions 
which exist in other countries. This is because it is the constitutional remnant of the 
inviolability which existed in the Netherlands prior to 1848 and which declined 
after the introduction of non-accountability. With some interpretative effort, it could 
be construed as an addition to parliamentary immunity, but due to the 
government’s right to order the prosecution of a member, minister, or secretary of 
state for a crime in office without the intervention of parliament, it does not actually 
constitute a form of inviolability. With considerably more interpretative effort and, 
above all, with the help of a constitutional amendment, Article 119 might be 
transformed into an inviolability provision. However, both the likelihood and the 
desirability of such an amendment are highly questionable.  
3.4. Wilders and Beyond: A Case for Broadening Immunity? 
In the Netherlands, as with many other states, parliamentary immunity as a 
constitutional institution has long led a rather quiet, inconspicuous existence.198 
Only recently has it risen to a level of notoriety unheard of since the first half of the 
20th century, when the questionof whether immunity should be limited in order to 
exclude certain utterances of extremist and revolutionary parliamentarians was 
discussed. Today, parliamentary immunity is once again the object of debate, but 
this time, the question is the opposite: does an immunity system which only 
protects parliamentary debate do justice to modern forms of political discourse, or 
should it be broadened? In other words, should parliamentary immunity be replaced 
or supplemented by political immunity?  
The issue of the adequacy of non-accountability ex Article 71 of the 
Constitution has its origin in the case of Geert Wilders, a political populist of the 
extreme right and member of the Second Chamber. On numerous occasions, 
Wilders had agitated against Islam and Muslim immigrants and pursued a political 
agenda with the aim of halting or limiting the immigration of non-western 
individuals into the Netherlands, as well as curtailing the practice of Islam. Among 
others, he had demanded a ban of the Qu’ran, which he compared to Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf and referred to as ‘that fascist book’.199 In August 2007, he had released the 
film Fitna, the tenor of which is equally anti-Islamic. While Wilders has also 
represented his anti-Islamic stance in the Second Chamber, his most contentious 
utterances were made in public speeches, interviews and other publications outside 
 
198 Nehmelman 2011, p. 355. 
199 Wilders 2007. 
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parliament and did therefore not fall under Article 71. The question of how far a 
politician and member of the States-General may go in defending his views in 
public thus had to be answered. 
3.4.1. The Prosecution of Geert Wilders 
Initially, the Dutch prosecution service decided not to charge Wilders for his 
utterances. Although these utterances were potentially offensive, it was argued, 
they had to be understood as contributions to public political debate and were thus 
not punishable. However, following a number of complaints by private persons and 
interest groups, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals reviewed this decision.200 Most 
interesting for the ensuing debate on the necessary scope of freedom of speech for 
politicians was the Court’s analysis of the argument according to which utterances 
made in the context of public debate justify a wider freedom and are therefore not 
punishable. The Court rejected this argument:  
The sole circumstance that the utterances of Wilders as a politician, outside of 
parliament where he enjoys criminal immunity, have been made as part of public 
debate does not, in the opinion of the Court, take away their criminal punishability. 
[…] 
Although the Court is well aware that a politician, also in extra-parliamentary debate, 
must enjoy as much freedom as possible in formulating and disseminating his political 
views, the Court is of the opinion that this freedom does not relieve the politician of his 
responsibility to make contributions to public debate which are acceptable to society. 
The assessment of the manner in which public debate is conducted in terms of content 
does not in itself belong to the tasks of the judiciary. This is different where a 
contribution to public debate is unnecessarily offensive for a group of believers by 
violating their religious dignity, while the contribution also incites to hatred, 
intolerance, enmity and discrimination. Then, the criminal law enters the picture. In 
the past, people, also politicians, have been convicted for less far-reaching utterance 
than those done by Wilders.201 
With this conclusion, and considering that Article 10 of the ECHR allows certain 
justified exceptions to freedom of speech, the Court of Appeals ordered the 
prosecutor’s office to charge Wilders for insult of a group of persons and incitement 
to hatred.  
The trial was held in Amsterdam District Court, which subsequently acquitted 
Wilders of all charges and thereby followed the plea of the prosecutor. The acquittal 
was primarily based on the argument that the utterances in question were directed 
against Islam as an ideology, and not against the followers of that ideology; 
therefore, they did not insult Muslims as a group of persons, even though they 
might find Wilders’ utterances offensive. On the basis of a similar argumentation, 
the Court dismissed the charge of incitement to hatred against Muslims. With 
 
200 Hof Amsterdam, 21 January 2009, LJN: BH0496. 
201 Ibid., para. 12.1.4. 
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regard to the alleged incitement to discrimination on the basis of religion – one of 
the contested utterances contained a demand that no Muslim immigrants be 
allowed into the country – the Court was of the opinion that, even though Wilders 
had definitely proposed to discriminate between Muslims and non-Muslims in 
immigration policy, this was not punishable in a contribution to public debate by a 
politician.202  
3.4.2. Parliamentary vs. Political Immunity 
The two court rulings in Re Wilders illustrate that the core legal issue in this and 
similar cases is actually not the scope of parliamentary immunity. Since the 
allegedly criminal utterances for which Wilders was prosecuted were made 
exclusively outside parliament, it was clear that Article 71 of the Constitution could 
not be used as a defence. Conversely, similar utterances which Wilders has 
repeatedly made in the Second Chamber were not the subject of litigation, since he 
would have undoubtedly been protected by non-accountability, as the Court of 
Appeals has explicitly recognised in its considerations (quoted above).  
The material content of the immunity currently in place – with the possible 
exception of the hypothetical immunity value of Article 119 of the Constitution 
discussed earlier – is uncontested. Rather, the unresolved problem which we 
encounter in the Netherlands is whether politicians enjoy – or should enjoy – a wider 
freedom of speech in public debate than other citizens due to their political role and 
their task of representing (a part of) the public opinion. It is in light of this that we 
should read demands for a broadening of the scope of immunity to cover 
contributions to public debate outside parliament. Before we address such 
demands, however, it is useful to make a brief inventory of the current state of 
freedom of speech for politicians.  
3.4.2.1. Freedom of Speech for Politicians in Public Political Debate 
Do Dutch politicians enjoy a higher degree of freedom of speech in public debate 
than ordinary citizens? A definitive answer to this question is difficult to find in 
Dutch case law. Nieuwenhuis, who has reviewed this body of case law 
comprehensively in an article of 2010,203 finds that the results are inconclusive.  
At times, Dutch judges seem to tend towards a positive answer: in one 
relatively recent case, an accountant sued a member of a municipal council for 
defamation after the latter had made wrongful comments about him in political 
statements contained in a letter to the municipal executive. The council member had 
published that letter on the internet and therefore did not enjoy non-accountability. 
The court was still confronted with a conflict between the right to freedom of speech 
and the right to a good name and reputation. It considered that:  
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‘In European and Dutch case law it is generally accepted that the freedom of opinion, 
certainly that of a politician, usually weighs heavier than the right to protection of a 
person’s honour and good name, even if this rule is not absolute’. [Emphasis added]204 
In this particular case, the court honoured the rule thus formulated and ruled in 
favour of the defendant council member.  
In the same ruling in which the Amsterdam Court of Appeals ordered the 
prosecution of Geert Wilders, the court found that ‘a politician, also in extra-
parliamentary debate, must enjoy as much freedom as possible in formulating and 
disseminating his political views’. However, in that case it attached a greater weight 
to the interest of the persons whose right Wilders had allegedly violated and added 
that ‘this freedom does not relieve the politician of his responsibility to make 
contributions to public debate which are acceptable to society’.205  
Yet, in the case of another Dutch right-wing politician and member of the 
Second Chamber, Hans Janmaat, who had publicly announced (outside parliament) 
that the aim of his party was to ‘abolish multicultural society’, the Dutch Supreme 
Court stated that politicians speaking in public were under an obligation of 
‘restraint and consideration’, particularly in light of the influence which their 
statements have on public opinion.206 In this sense, a person’s capacity as a member 
of parliament can even be interpreted as an extra burden on freedom of speech, 
since the public attention and impact which public utterances of parliamentarians 
are likely to have result in an additional duty of restraint, as we have already 
observed in our analysis on ECtHR case law on the issue of the freedom of 
expression of parliamentarians. In particular, the case Féret v. Belgium207 has 
illustrated that the ECtHR recognises this duty of restraint, especially with regard to 
racist statements and hate speech. On the other hand, Nieuwenhuis cites rulings of 
lower courts in which the judges found that politicians, especially members of 
parliament, must be able to voice their views with the necessary force,208 in 
particular during election campaigns.209  
It is clear that a ‘right’ to poignancy and force in public political statements is 
hard to reconcile with a duty of restraint. As a result, we must find Dutch case law 
somewhat ambiguous as to the precise scope of freedom of speech of politicians in 
public debate.  
This ambiguity is also owed to the influence of ECtHR case law, which is 
directly applicable in the Netherlands’ monist legal system and which Dutch 
national courts frequently use as a point of orientation. We have already seen in 
Chapter II that the body of case law from Strasbourg does not provide an accurate, 
clear delimitation of the degree of freedom of speech enjoyed by politicians outside 
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parliament. It is useful to recall the most important results of this body of case law. 
On the one hand, the ECtHR found, in Castells v. Spain, that:  
‘[w]hile freedom of expression is important for everybody, it is especially so for an 
elected representative of the people. He represents his electorate, draws attention to 
their preoccupations and defends their interests. Accordingly, interferences with the 
freedom of expression of an opposition member of parliament […] call for the closest 
scrutiny on the part of the Court’.210 
On the other hand, the ECtHR seems more ready to accept an interference with a 
politician’s freedom of expression – for example, to accept his criminal conviction – 
where his utterances do not directly relate to political matters (see, for example, 
Keller v. Hungary).211 This does not mean, however, that statements which are 
political in nature or relate to matters of public interest are generally protected. In 
Öllinger v. Austria212 the ECtHR found that the statements which a parliamentarian 
had made but was unable to prove were in fact important for societal debate. 
Nevertheless, the Court held that the limitation of the member’s freedom of 
expression imposed by the Austrian court was not disproportional. Finally, Féret v. 
Belgium has made it amply clear that the political nature or societal relevance of the 
content of an utterance does not automatically merit greater freedom of speech. 
Sensitive topics such as immigration and the integration of foreigners must, in 
particular, be handled with care, especially by politicians. 
In conclusion, the case law of both Dutch national courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights results in a somewhat vague picture of the exact extent of 
the freedom of speech of politicians in public debate. It is clear, on the one hand, 
that the courts generally admit the special position of politicians as representatives 
of the people and recognise their enhanced need for freedom of expression. On the 
other hand, this special position does not rule out legitimate limitations of this 
freedom – it may even cause such limitations where politicians are assumed to have 
a special responsibility when speaking publicly. But whether a limitation is 
legitimate in a specific case, that is, whether a politician may be held legally liable 
for his utterances is hard to determine with certainty. One factor which certainly 
plays an important role is whether the utterances in question are of a political 
nature: if a public statement cannot be attributed to public political debate, it does 
not merit an enhanced freedom of expression. However, this criterion is hardly 
suitable for providing much clarity – after all, as Thomas Mann famously stated 
‘everything is politics’. And even if the courts are willing and able to apply a more 
refined definition of what falls within the category of ‘contributions to public 
political debate’, it is unlikely that this will simplify the adjudication of cases like 
that of Geert Wilders.  
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3.4.2.2. Does Parliamentary Immunity Offer a Solution?  
Even though the courts have generally acknowledged that politicians deserve and 
require a wide freedom of expression even when speaking outside parliament, the 
somewhat blurred picture of this freedom outlined above hinders the conclusion 
that politicians in the Netherlands enjoy special protection. Whilst in France and 
other countries the prosecution of parliamentarians (though not necessarily 
members of the government) for criminal acts committed outside the parliamentary 
sphere can be suspended at the behest of parliament where it deems this desirable, 
no such possibility exists in the Netherlands.  
At the same time, political discourse no longer takes place exclusively in the 
plenary hall of parliament, but increasingly in the public media, where politicians 
have to disseminate and defend their views, proposals and political goals vis-à-vis 
their electorate. In addition, parliamentary debates, now often broadcast live on 
television or the internet, function as a platform for communication with the wider 
public, while actual political decisions are (still) taken in the backrooms of 
parliament, in the quarters of political parties or behind closed doors by the 
government. Under such changed circumstances, it is argued, maintaining the strict 
separation between what is said in and outside of the parliamentary meeting 
appears artificial and anachronistic.  
Consequently, there has been a proposition to broaden the scope of 
parliamentary immunity so as to effect ‘the absolute protection of the spoken word 
of members of the Chambers outside of parliament’.213 Peters has put forward some 
arguments in support of this demand. First, he argues that the nowadays artificial 
separation of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political debate may create 
problems in the adjudication of allegedly criminal extra-parliamentary speech; what 
if, for instance, a parliamentarian makes a potentially discriminatory legislative 
proposal and is later asked for further elaboration on said proposal in an 
interview?214 Second, he makes the teleological argument that, if parliamentary 
immunity has as its goal the protection of free political deliberation, and if such 
deliberation now increasingly takes place beyond the walls of the plenary hall, it 
would be logical to protect extra-parliamentary political speech as much as speech 
is protected in parliament. He adds that this protection should not discriminate 
between contributors to public debate with or without a parliamentary mandate but 
that it should cover any contribution, including non-politicians and the press.215 This 
would of course render trials like that against Geert Wilders impossible and replace 
them, as Peters hopes, with fierce but open public political debate.  
Many Dutch commentators throughout the political spectrum have concluded, 
in the wake of the trial against Wilders, that the criminal courts are not the right 
forum to judge public utterances of politicians,216 and some have also joined Peters’ 
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call for a substantial broadening of parliamentary non-accountability.217 In order to 
discuss such demands from a legal point of view, it is first necessary to separate the 
legal and political issues which are raised by the proposal to broaden non-
accountability. The main political question is whether absolute freedom of 
expression in public political debate is desirable or, respectively, whether and how 
the boundaries between the right to freedom of political expression and other rights 
need to be clarified in the law or redrawn along different lines. This question of 
desirability cannot, of course, be truly answered from a purely legal point of view. 
We can, however, explore the possibility and legal implications of broadening 
parliamentary non-accountability within the existing constitutional framework and 
the nature of the immunity which would result from such an operation.  
Is it legally possible to expand the scope of parliamentary non-accountability 
so as to establish an absolute freedom of political expression for parliamentarians 
outside parliament? It clearly is not. First, the freedom of expression which 
members of the States-General enjoy in the parliamentary meeting is by no means 
absolute: they may neither speak whenever they like, nor, crucially, say what they 
like. Although Article 71 of the Constitution withdraws utterances in parliament 
from the application of criminal law, the parliamentary chambers themselves and 
their chairpersons in particular remain competent to sanction members for their 
utterances, according to the parliamentary Rules of Procedure. Even though it is 
true that little use is currently made of the chairman’s power to sanction,218 the 
existence of this power reflects the logic of all parliamentary immunity: it is not 
meant to confer upon members a carte blanche for licentious speech, but to serve the 
separation of powers and to ensure parliamentary self-government. Outside 
parliament, the chairpersons of the parliamentary chambers are unable to maintain 
order and to sanction – and even if they were able to do so, this would be 
irreconcilable with the separation of powers. Thus, if Article 71 of the Constitution 
was to be amended to read ‘what they have said in political debate’ instead of ‘what 
they have said in the in the meetings of the States-General or of committees thereof’, 
this would clearly defy the institutional logic of parliamentary immunity. Moreover, 
it would certainly not be acceptable under the ECHR: the Court in Strasbourg has 
accepted parliamentary immunity as an exception to access to court (Article 6 
ECHR) only as far as a protected act or utterance is narrowly connected to the 
parliamentary tasks of a member.219 In other words, an institutional link is required.  
Since the extension of parliamentary non-accountability is thus not possible, 
we may ask ourselves whether it would be a feasible alternative to ensure absolute 
freedom of expression for all contributors to public political debate and not only for 
parliamentarians. For instance, a general constitutional right could be created to that 
effect, and an exception of political speech added to all crimes of utterance in the 
 
217 E.g. F. Halsema, former leader of the Green/Left party in the Second Chamber. See ‘Halsema: 
meer parlementaire onschendbaarheid”, in De Volkskrant, 11 January 2011. 
218 Peters 2010, p. 329. 
219 See Chapter II. In Tsalkitzis v. Greece, the Court described its test as follows: ‘la Cour 
recherchera si les actes incriminés étaient liés à l’exercice de fonctions parlementaires stricto 
sensu afin de conclure sur la proportionnalité ou non de la mesure mise en cause’. (para. 47). 
 266 
Parliamentary Immunity in the Netherlands 
criminal code. This would create a new form of political immunity, quite 
independent of the institution of parliament.  
However, would absolute freedom even of potentially discriminatory, anti-
democratic or insulting political speech – and we may allow ourselves to question 
this desirability – solve any problems? It does not appear so. On the contrary, 
absolute political immunity would entail insurmountable conflicts of fundamental 
rights, since it would place freedom of speech above such rights as privacy and non-
discrimination, on the sole condition that an utterance is of a political nature or 
contributes to public debate. This way, the new immunity would first fail the strict 
test of the ECtHR if it were claimed by persons whose utterances can be attributed 
to the state, such as ministers speaking on behalf of the government. Without the 
possibility of justifying the immunity on the basis of the institutional needs of 
parliament and the separation of powers, it would violate Article 6 of the 
Convention. 
Further, problems would not only arise in relation to the ECHR but also to 
other international obligations. For example, the Netherlands has ratified the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Racial Discrimination (ICERD). 
As opposed to other states (such as Belgium), it has not made a reservation against 
(parts of) Article 4 of this Convention, which requires the state parties amongst 
others to impose a criminal sanction on ‘[…] all dissemination of ideas based on 
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of 
violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another 
colour or ethnic origin […]’. Absolute freedom of speech in political debate would 
prevent the criminal prosecution of racist utterances and thereby undoubtedly 
violate this provision. 
Finally, even if a system of comprehensive political non-accountability were 
introduced, the courts would still face the almost impossible task of defining 
‘political speech’ and to distinguish it, for instance, from non-political criminal hate-
speech. 
In conclusion, whether a broadening of freedom of speech – either that of 
politicians or that of all persons – is desirable is ultimately a decision which must be 
left to political discourse. However, the above clearly shows that neither the option 
of extending parliamentary non-accountability to wider public debate nor that of 
introducing a genuine political immunity is in fact legally feasible. This is a result, 
on the one hand, of the necessarily institutional character of parliamentary 
immunity and, on the other hand, of international obligations.  
4. Conclusion 
In the present chapter, we have tried to compose a comprehensive picture of the 
origins and the historical development of parliamentary immunity in the 
Netherlands as well as its current material state and recent debate within its context. 
In the introduction to this chapter, we asked a number of questions: is there any 
evidence for the hypothesis that the comparative narrowness and limitation of the 
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Dutch immunity system finds its origin in a lack of historic conflict between 
parliament and the executive? What is the precise content, scope and meaning of the 
immunity provisions? Is parliamentary immunity in the Netherlands really as 
limited as it appears compared to the immunity systems of other countries, or does 
the system at least contain a potential for inviolability? And finally, how does the 
proposal to expand parliamentary non-accountability to political immunity in the 
wake of the Wilders case have to be understood and assessed from a legal point of 
view? 
With regard to the first issue, it would be too much of an abbreviation of 
history to present the comparative lack of conflict as the only reason for the limited 
nature of Dutch parliamentary immunity, but it is certainly one of the reasons. As 
opposed to France and the United Kingdom, the struggle between the legislature 
and the executive which has led to the appearance of parliamentary immunity there 
did not take place – or at least not with comparable ferocity and impact – in the 
Netherlands, either during the Republic of the United Netherlands and the Batavian 
Republic or during the Kingdom of the 19th century. Consequently, parliamentary 
immunity as a defensive device against a hostile executive has never become a 
hard-wired component of the constitutional structure of the Dutch state, even 
though it has existed in some form during all the different eras of the Dutch state. 
Parliamentary immunity has never been treated as a sacrosanct constitutional item 
akin to parliamentary privilege in the United Kingdom and which classical 
constitutional theory appears to identify in the French immunity system.  
Another cause for the limited nature of immunity and the hesitation of the 
Dutch to adopt a broader system can be found in Dutch constitutional culture. The 
Dutch image of parliamentary immunity has historically ranged between that of an 
institution which can be useful if handled with care and that of an objectionable and 
potentially dangerous privilege, with the capacity to facilitate licentious speech and 
other moral transgressions. This is illustrated in constitutional practice by the 
alternation of non-accountability and inviolability during the 19th century – while 
French theory traditionally sees both layers of immunity as necessarily 
complementary, the drafters of the Dutch constitutions apparently considered their 
coexistence excessive. Only non-accountability has taken root as an important 
element of parliamentarianism in the Netherlands: even in times of increasing 
political radicalism which threatened the legal order as a whole, the constitutional 
legislator could not agree on plans to adopt exemptions from non-accountability or 
to otherwise punish members of parliament and other representative bodies who 
promoted a revolutionary agenda. After the demise of Nazism, any such 
amendments were deemed to be unnecessary. 
What is the precise scope of parliamentary immunity in the Netherlands and 
how limited is it in reality? Essentially, the Dutch immunity system is limited to 
non-accountability for words spoken in, or documents submitted to, the two 
chambers or their committees. It applies to members of the two chambers, ministers, 
secretaries of state and other persons taking part in parliamentary deliberations. 
Article 71 prescribes a number of conditions for the application of non-
accountability which have to be interpreted restrictively: oral utterances are only 
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protected if they are made by an eligible person at the place of the meeting and 
while the meeting is ongoing. Written utterances are protected if they are submitted 
by an eligible person to (a body of) parliament or published by it in the form of an 
official publication. Private publications of any kind, even if they are literal 
repetitions or copies of parliamentary speech or documents, are not covered. 
However, where non-accountability does apply, there are no limitations with regard 
to the content of oral or written utterances. In particular, it is not necessary for non-
accountability that the utterances in question relate to the subject currently debated 
in the meeting. ‘Persons taking part in deliberations’ are only persons who actually 
participate in parliamentary discussion. Persons who merely provide information, 
such as witnesses or experts, never enjoy non-accountability, regardless of whether 
their input has been commissioned by parliament or whether they submit materials 
on their own motion. There is also no ‘derivative immunity’: if experts or 
researchers contribute material to an official report of a parliamentary committee in 
their own name, they remain fully liable for the content of that material. 
Nevertheless, where a person is heard as a witness or expert by a parliamentary 
enquiry committee, he cannot be liable. This follows from Article 30 of the 
Parliamentary Enquiry Act (Wet op de parlementaire enquête). 
There is no inviolability in the Dutch immunity system. It has been argued that 
it would be possible to classify certain punishable acts and, in particular, utterances 
of parliamentarians, ministers or secretaries of state as crimes committed in office 
(ambtsmisdrijven) and thereby bring them within the range of Article 119 of the 
Constitution. However, this does not seem to be a realistic option. In order to 
qualify as an ambtsmisdrijf, it would have to be established that the crime has been 
committed by making use of power, opportunity or means derived from the office 
or mandate. Especially with regard to criminal utterances published in the media, it 
is inconceivable how it could be asserted with sufficient certainty that the attention 
of the media, and access to it, was actually derived from the office or mandate. 
Further, the procedure of Article 119 has never been applied and the article is 
regarded as a ‘dormant’ provision. Hence, even if it were legally realistic to do so, it 
is doubtful whether the hypothetical possibility to use the procedural obstacle 
created by it as a form of (or a substitute for) inviolability will ever be put to 
practice. 
Outside parliament, members of the chambers – and politicians in general – 
are not protected by any form of immunity. With reference to the ECHR and 
Strasbourg case law, the courts do sometimes recognise, however, that elected 
representatives of the people must enjoy as wide a freedom of expression as 
possible. Therefore, limitations of that right require the closest scrutiny and are not 
accepted easily; accordingly, the conviction of parliamentarians for crimes of 
utterance is unlikely, as illustrated by the case of Geert Wilders. Nonetheless, the 
precise position of politicians with regard to their freedom of expression in public 
debate is not entirely lucid. In particular, it is not clearly foreseeable when the 
courts will be inclined to distinguish between politicians and ‘ordinary’ citizens in 
the assessment of alleged crimes of utterance. In the wake of the trial of Geert 
Wilders, this has caused some to demand that the scope of parliamentary non-
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accountability be broadened to cover all contributions to public debate, whether in 
or outside parliament. We have shown that such a measure is legally impossible, 
since it fails to take into account the fact that parliamentary immunity is only 
justified – in light of national constitutional principles but also vis-à-vis the ECHR – 
by its institutional character. Extra-parliamentary non-accountability would lack 
this necessary justificatory link with the institution of parliament.  
The same would be true in case of the introduction of an even wider political 
immunity which covers members of parliament and other citizens alike and 
generally protects political speech and contributions to public debate. Such 
immunity would place freedom of speech above other fundamental rights and 
would therefore be manifestly at odds with the ECHR and other international 
instruments by which the Netherlands is bound, such as the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Racial Discrimination (ICERD). It would also 
impose on the courts the difficult task of defining ‘political’ speech and thus 
deciding whether a certain utterance is covered by immunity. Since the courts 
would inevitably have to take this difficult decision, it is questionable whether the 
introduction of political immunity would even reach its aim of withdrawing 
political debate in its entirety from the application of (criminal) law. Even if political 
debate in the Netherlands should come to the conclusion that greater freedom of 
speech – for politicians or for all – is in principle desirable, our analysis shows that 
both broadening parliamentary non-accountability and introducing a form of 
political immunity would be highly problematic from a legal point of view. 
Nevertheless, the debate about the desirability of a political immunity brings 
to light an interesting new facet of our hypothesis that immunity regimes have a 
tendency to evolve in a ‘functional’ direction. It is clear that, in the Netherlands, this 
functional approach would not require a reduction in the scope of the Dutch 
immunity system, since the latter does not feature inviolability. Instead, it is argued 
that the existing non-accountability ex Article 71 of the Constitution no longer does 
justice to the functions of a modern parliamentarian, whose task it is to address 
matters of general concern in public, not only in parliamentary debates. Thus, as in 
the Dutch case, the ‘evolutionary pressure’ on the system of parliamentary 
immunity demands an adaptation of this system to a functional reality. As opposed 
to the United Kingdom and France, however, this adaptation would result in an 
expansion of the very limited immunity which Dutch parliamentarians enjoy today. 
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COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
This study has provided us with a thorough and comprehensive picture of the 
systems of parliamentary immunity of the UK, France and the Netherlands, as well 
as the European Parliament. Moreover, we have examined the approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights towards immunity in its case law. This analysis 
enables us to compare the different systems with the aim of establishing and 
explaining differences and commonalities as well as possible parallel trends and 
developments. This brings us to a better understanding of parliamentary immunity 
as a concept. In addition, we can now identify common norms and principles which 
apply to all (European) systems of parliamentary immunity. Together with national 
constitutional rules, they constitute a legal framework for the assessment of 
practical and political issues surrounding parliamentary immunity. 
1. Smallest Common Denominators 
Before we proceed to the findings of this study in more detail, we should recall a 
number of basic properties of parliamentary immunity which we have encountered 
in the three systems that have been the object of this study, and which also exist 
beyond (as evidenced by our analysis of the European dimension of parliamentary 
immunity) this.  
First of all, there are two different categories of parliamentary immunity, 
which are usually referred to as non-accountability and inviolability. The former is 
often used as a synonym for freedom of speech in parliament. More accurately, it 
denotes immunity for activities which are an inherent part of the work of 
parliament. As such, non-accountability covers oral and written contributions to 
parliamentary debates and in committees, but also the parliamentary vote. The 
words ‘in parliament’ are slightly misleading, since they hint at a spatial notion of 
parliament – the building. This is wrong: for example, statements made at the 
Binnenhof, the building which accommodates the Dutch States-General, are only 
covered by non-accountability if made by a person entitled to the immunity and if 
made in the course of parliamentary deliberations.  
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Although there are exceptions, non-accountability usually has two distinct 
properties which set it apart from inviolability: first, it is absolute. This means that it 
bars any form of legal action apart from internal measures of parliamentary 
discipline, and that it cannot be lifted or waived. Second, non-accountability usually 
applies perpetually, to the effect that legal action is barred for all time, even after the 
mandate of the parliamentarian in question has ended. 
The term ‘inviolability’ denotes immunity which applies to extra-professional 
acts – acts which are not part of, or not connected closely enough, to parliamentary 
activity. The material scope of this immunity differs greatly between systems. In 
some, it is entirely absent. In others, it merely prohibits the arrest of members of 
parliament (usually with the exception of an arrest flagrante delicto). Sometimes, it 
prohibits all forms of legal action and even investigative measures against members 
of parliament.  
Inviolability is usually limited in two ways: first, it can be lifted by parliament 
or one of its organs upon request. Second, it is of a temporary nature and ends with 
the end of the parliamentary mandate, so that the arrest, prosecution or other 
proceedings barred by inviolability can take place as soon as the person in question 
is no longer a member of parliament, also if these proceedings are related to 
criminal acts committed during the time of the mandate.  
Across a large majority of legal systems in the world, including those 
examined in this study, there is a consensus that non-accountability is indispensable 
to parliamentarianism and, thereby, to a democratic state. Apart from very few 
exceptions, all states which have a (national) parliament do provide for non-
accountability – at least on paper. This is not true for inviolability, which is not 
ubiquitous, and usually absent in common law legal systems modelled after 
Westminster Parliament.  
Along with the distinction between non-accountability and inviolability, a 
second basic property of parliamentary immunity which can be found in our three 
case studies and across Europe is that it is an institutional and not a personal 
privilege. Of course, members of parliament, as persons, are the immediate 
beneficiaries of immunity. They are the ones who may not be arrested or 
prosecuted. Nevertheless, it is a common feature of immunity systems that 
parliamentarians are deemed to enjoy immunity as a proxy for the institution to 
which they belong. It is parliament as an institution which deserves protection, not 
the member as a person.  
2. Lessons from History 
2.1. A Summary of the Historical Origins of Parliamentary Immunity 
At first glance, the systems of parliamentary immunity of the United Kingdom (or, 
at the relevant time, England), France and the Netherlands emerged in very 
different historical contexts and through different processes.  
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The first known appearance of the concept of privilege in England lies in the 
mists of the early medieval Anglo-Norman era which began after the Norman 
conquest in 1066: the members of the King’s Council, or Curia Regis – the advisors of 
the King and members of the royal family – enjoyed the right of free passage and 
freedom from molestation under the king’s peace (pax regis). This is the origin of the 
privilege of freedom from arrest, which therefore can be said to have existed well 
before parliament itself had reached a clear institutional form. Hence, freedom from 
arrest can be categorised as a ‘pre-parliamentary privilege’ rather than a 
parliamentary one. This gives it an exceptional character in comparison with the 
other British privileges and the immunities of the Dutch and French parliaments, 
which do not predate the modern institutional form of these assemblies but 
developed alongside them. The British privilege of freedom from arrest must be 
understood as a right of free passage for members of parliament, intended to 
guarantee their attendance of parliamentary meetings. It never covered arrest in 
criminal matters and therefore did not constitute an exception to the criminal law. 
Therefore, even though the privilege of freedom from arrest has never formally 
been repealed, it has been all but obsolete ever since the practice of imprisonment in 
civil matters (in particular, for debt) has been abolished.  
The other privileges of the English parliament, most notably the privilege of 
freedom of speech and proceedings in Parliament, developed much later, as 
parliament gradually asserted its position and power vis-à-vis the monarch and 
developed from a mere advisory body into an institution which exercised de facto 
sovereignty. It is assumed that freedom of speech in the Commons has existed as a 
matter of vague tradition after the two Houses of Parliament had split in 1341. Only 
in the 16th century did it begin to appear regularly in the Speaker’s petition, by 
which the Commons sought to obtain their privileges from the monarch, but 
freedom of speech was not always granted and the king regularly tried to inhibit 
debate which did not please him (or her: Queen Elizabeth I made several attempts 
to interfere with free debate in the Commons). The privilege finally became legally 
solid with the adoption of the Bill of Rights of 1689 after the English Civil War, 
when Westminster Parliament had finally consolidated its dominant position vis-à-
vis the monarch.  
Medieval France, before the emergence of the absolute monarchy, was a feudal 
state like England after the Norman conquest. It had a similar concept to the king’s 
peace as existed there in the Anglo-Norman era. It included a right of free passage 
for members of the Curia Regis and the royal household. However, the 
constitutional and institutional development of France took a very different route, 
which did not lead to the emergence of an assertive parliament and limited powers 
of the monarch, but instead to absolutism. As a result, no real form of parliamentary 
immunity can be said to have existed in France prior to 1789. Members of the états 
généraux, a representative body which had evolved out of the ancient Curia Regis, 
were considered to be advisors of the King and as such enjoyed limited and 
temporary immunity from trial. Under absolutism, however, this immunity lacked 
the essential characteristic of protecting members of the états against the King 
himself, who stood above the law.  
 274 
Comparative Conclusions 
The French immunity system did not evolve gradually but was created by the 
National Assembly in the early days of the French Revolution as an immediate 
reaction to the threat of violent reprisals by the King. With the King’s soldiers 
reportedly lining up outside the assembly hall, the National Assembly adopted the 
first immunity decree on 23 June 1789, which established freedom of speech in 
parliament. It declared the prosecution, search, arrest or detention of an Assembly 
member on the basis of his proposition, opinion or speech in the Assembly an act of 
treason. Almost exactly a year later, on 26 June 1790, the National Assembly passed 
a second immunity decree which prohibited the arrest of a member without 
authorisation by the assembly, except flagrante delicto. Like the first decree, the 
second one was a reaction to circumstance: a member of the Assembly had been 
arrested for counter-revolutionary activity.  
Whether the National Assembly actually intended to create two different 
forms of immunity or whether the second decree was merely intended to clarify the 
meaning of the first is open to debate. In effect, however, the two decrees created a 
two-tier immunity system: a first layer of immunity protected the members of the 
National Assembly from any form of legal action based on their utterances in the 
Assembly (non-accountability), while a second layer prohibited their arrest for any 
reason, unless with prior authorisation by the Assembly. Even though French 
constitutional history has been extremely volatile since the Revolution – since 1789, 
France has danced a ‘waltz’ of 13 to 15 constitutions, depending on how one defines 
the term. This two-tier system has remained the model of the French immunity 
regime until today and is clearly recognisable in Article 26 of the current French 
Constitution. 
In the Netherlands, the first historical antecedents of parliamentary immunity 
can be found in two acts of the provincial States of Holland during the Dutch 
Republic. In 1588, following an incident in which the delegate of one city had been 
detained in another, the States of Holland adopted the acte van vrijwaring (act of 
guarantee) which granted the deputies of the cities of Holland the right of free 
passage (freedom from arrest) on their way to and from the meetings of the States. 
Nearly one century later, during one of the two periods of stadholderless 
government, the States of Holland passed the acte van indemniteit (act of indemnity) 
which provided that a member or his heirs should be compensated if they would 
suffer damages by reason of their political stance against the return of the 
stadholder. These two acts must not be understood as forming a cohesive immunity 
regime. Rather, they were both passed as immediate reactions to actual events or 
perceived future threats.  
It is difficult to equate the provincial States and the States-General of the 
republican era with a parliament in the modern sense of the term. Both institutions 
exercised legislative as well as executive functions and were not confronted with a 
competing monarchical government. Hence, the immunity acts of the States of 
Holland did not aim to preserve the Assembly’s power or independence which was 
already secure. Rather, the first act was meant to secure the attendance of the 
members of the States, while the second act was intended to protect the members of 
the assembly from their own successors, should the political mood swing back in 
favour of stadholder government.  
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During the ‘French period’ (1795-1814) – the time of the Batavian Republic, the 
satellite Kingdom of Holland and the French annexation – the entire Dutch state 
was modelled after that of the French hegemonial power. This entailed, first, the 
transplantation of the extremely elaborate immunity system of the French 
Constitution of year III into the Dutch constitutional order and, later, the complete 
abolition of parliamentary immunity after Napoleon had taken power in France. 
After the re-establishment of the Dutch monarchy, the Netherlands first adopted a 
system of inviolability, however without explicitly recognising freedom of speech in 
parliament. The Constitution of 1848, which is the basis of the modern constitution, 
essentially abolished inviolability (apart from a marginal rest) and put absolute 
freedom of speech in parliament in its place. 
2.2. Freedom of Speech as the Epitome of Parliamentarianism 
The above juxtaposition of the origins of immunity shows that it is hardly possible 
to speak comprehensively of the emergence of immunity systems: freedom from 
arrest and freedom of speech made their first appearances separately. At least in 
England and France, the right of free passage for members of the medieval curiae 
existed centuries before free speech became an issue.1 However, it would be an 
anachronism to treat this right as a form of parliamentary immunity, of which it 
became a part much later. In this respect, it is more interesting to look at freedom of 
speech. The respective time at which this form of immunity appeared reveals its 
close connection with the institutional evolution of parliaments, their self-image and 
the circumstances in which they operated. Freedom of speech was only asserted 
once parliaments or their members found themselves under threat in relation to 
their political opinion. In England, this was the case as soon as parliament became 
more than a mere advisory body. After the feudal lords had secured Magna Carta 
from the King, and certainly after the Commons had become a separate House, 
Parliament had begun to emancipate itself from its limited advisory role. As a 
result, it regularly found itself in opposition to the King – a potentially life-
threatening situation, as early case law proves.  
In our examination of the French immunity system, we have described how 
the immunity decree of 23 June 1789 was an attempt to protect the members of the 
National Assembly from reprisals by the King. Under absolutism, the pre-
revolutionary états généraux still functioned as an advisory or auxiliary organ; they 
posed no threat to the monarch, who was free to ignore the advice of the états – or 
not to convene them at all. After the Third Estate had declared itself the National 
Assembly, this new body stood in open opposition to the King – it had assumed the 
capacity to form a will on behalf of the nation and thus rejected both the concept of 
absolutism and that of an imperative mandate. This new position necessitated free 
speech in the National Assembly, both in terms of the Assembly’s self-conception 
 
1 The same was probably true in all medieval feudal states, thus also in the Netherlands. Since 
the Netherlands did not exist as a political entity at the time, the the pre-republican period 
was left out of consideration for the analysis of the history of Dutch parliamentary immunity. 
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and on a more mundane, practical level, where the members of the Assembly had to 
fear physical reprisals from the King. Hence, despite all differences as regards the 
point in time and the speed at which freedom of speech in parliament emerged in 
England and in France, the two factors which caused its occurrence are the same: a 
shift in parliamentary self-conception from a mere advisory body to an independent 
organ of state in potential opposition to the king and, as a result thereof, the factual 
necessity for protection.  
Even though the Dutch situation is more complicated, the pattern is similar: 
the Act on indemnity was geared specifically to indemnify members of the States of 
Holland who might suffer damage by reason of their opposition to the stadholder 
government. The Act only related to utterances that displayed an anti-stadholder 
attitude – apparently, other utterances were not deemed dangerous. The fact that 
freedom of speech during the Dutch Republic remained limited to this rather 
incidental act instead of developing into a permanent and more comprehensive 
immunity is certainly owed to the absence of a potentially hostile organ – such as a 
monarch – competing with the States for supreme power. That non-accountability 
remained – at least formally – absent from the Dutch Constitution after the end of 
the French period, and the establishment of the Principality and Kingdom of the 
Netherlands (1814 and 1815) also fits this picture. As the historian van Caenegem 
has put it, the Kingdom of William I was governed under a system of ‘enlightened 
absolutism’, covered by ‘a thin parliamentary veneer’. The Members of the upper 
chamber of the States-General were appointed by the King, those of the lower 
chamber elected under a system which almost guaranteed a continuous royalist 
majority. It is easily conceivable that, under these conditions, the States-General 
neither bred the assertive and independent self-conception which we have 
identified as a pre-requisite for the emergence of a system of non-accountability, nor 
produced the situation of factual danger which had necessitated the insistence on 
freedom of speech in late medieval England and revolutionary France.  
As a matter of historical fact it seems trite that freedom of expression in 
parliament is only needed, asserted and granted when controversial parliamentary 
debate actually takes place. However, the emergence of non-accountability in 
England, France and the Netherlands which we have examined in this book can also 
be read, conversely, as compelling historical evidence that controversial 
parliamentary debate requires absolute freedom of expression. It is therefore true 
that free speech is the epitome of parliamentarianism. Today, this is rightfully 
accepted as an axiomatic justification of non-accountability, even where it 
constitutes a limitation of the rights of third parties.  
2.3. Inviolability as a Secondary Immunity 
The history of parliamentary immunity in all three countries that have been studied 
shows that non-accountability has played an important part in the development of 
modern parliamentarianism. It was used to secure free speech in parliament, which 
is universally accepted as a logical prerequisite for the exercise of the constitutional 
tasks of a modern parliament – legislation, representation of the people and, as the 
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case may be, control of the government. Hence, non-accountability rules are a 
ubiquitous feature of national constitutional law. Freedom of parliamentary debate 
appears to constitute a ‘minimum immunity’, a smallest common denominator 
among European immunity systems. In short, non-accountability is indispensable. 
This is not the case for inviolability, the extra-professional immunity which protects 
members of parliament from arrest – and sometimes from criminal prosecution or 
even civil legal action – on the basis of their acts outside the immediate context of the 
parliamentary mandate. What distinguishes inviolability from non-accountability is 
the lack of a material link between parliament as an institution and the act for which 
a member is to be arrested, prosecuted, or sued.  
Two things can be learned from circumstantial historical evidence with regard 
to inviolability. First, viewed from a comparative angle this extra-professional 
immunity has never been as entrenched in national immunity regimes as non-
accountability has. It is a feature of the French or continental tradition of 
parliamentary immunity and therefore has found its way into many immunity 
systems in Europe. But even among systems of the continental legal tradition it is 
not ubiquitous – apparently, parliaments were well able to flourish without it.  
Second, when we juxtapose developments in the British, French and Dutch 
systems of parliamentary immunity over the last 150 years, we can observe that 
inviolability is generally on the decline: in the United Kingdom, the privilege of 
freedom from arrest never prevented the application of the criminal law. However, 
in the 19th century, when imprisonment in civil matters was still possible, this 
privilege certainly had an inviolability effect in that it rendered parliamentarians 
immune from legal action for matters entirely unrelated to their parliamentary 
mandate. While this inviolability was not abolished by an amendment of the 
privilege itself, but rather marginalised by ending the practice of imprisonment in 
civil matters, this has nevertheless had the practical effect of bringing an end to 
inviolability in the Westminster system of privileges.  
In the Netherlands, the inviolability that existed in the first half of the 19th 
century was traded against non-accountability in the Constitution of 1848. Since 
then, freedom of speech in parliament has been the only form of parliamentary 
immunity in the Netherlands. A constitutional remnant of the inviolability which 
existed in the Netherlands prior to 1848 can be found Article 119 of the Dutch 
Constitution, which provides for a special criminal procedure for crimes committed 
in office (ambtsmisdrijven). However, this procedure does not amount to immunity 
and has never been applied in practice. 
In France, whose immunity system has always provided for greater 
inviolability than those of the two other countries studied, the demise of 
inviolability is most recent and most clearly visible. The Constitution of 1946 (the 
Fourth Republic) still provided for freedom from arrest, prosecution and 
investigative measures for the entire duration of the parliamentary mandate, unless 
authorised by the relevant chamber of parliament. The Constitution of 1958 
maintained the material scope of inviolability, but limited its temporal scope to the 
parliamentary session. Members of parliament therefore only enjoyed inviolability 
for up to six months per year. Finally, the constitutional amendment of 1995 limited 
the material scope of inviolability to freedom from arrest, while the prosecution of 
 278 
Comparative Conclusions 
members of parliament and investigative measures which did not affect their 
physical liberty have been allowed ever since.  
Clearly, the abolition of inviolability in the UK and the Netherlands and its 
severe limitation in France occurred at very different points in times and for 
different reasons; they are unrelated to each other and too widely interspersed to 
speak of a common trend. They do, however, fit the general tendency towards a 
concept of immunity geared to a narrow and institutional understanding of the 
functions of the parliamentary mandate which one finds in all three national 
systems, and also on the European level (see section 4 below). In any event, the fact 
that inviolability is not only far less common than non-accountability, but that it is 
also – slowly – disappearing, allows us to conclude that it is indeed a secondary 
form of immunity which cannot be justified as easily as non-accountability.  
3. Theory and Parliamentary Immunity 
The historical comparison above has shown that the immediate reasons for which 
parliamentary immunity provisions had first been adopted were essentially 
circumstantial. Nevertheless, at least in the UK and France, constitutional theory has 
always played a very important part in their justification. In the following, we will 
first recapitulate the relationship between constitutional theory and parliamentary 
immunity and subsequently try to identify the effects of this relationship.  
3.1. The Justification of Parliamentary Immunity in Constitutional 
Theory 
For the United Kingdom, the starting point for understanding the relationship 
between parliamentary privilege and the constitutional system is the concept of 
Parliament as a court. As was explained at the beginning of our British case study, 
Parliament, the government and the courts all evolved gradually out of the ancient 
Curia Regis. The latter had previously exercised legislative, executive and judicial 
functions without distinction as to when it was doing what. It can be said that much 
of the constitutional structure of the United Kingdom is owed to the common 
ancestry which all main government institutions except the monarch himself share 
in what we can call a medieval institutional amoeba, the Curia Regis. This is true, in 
particular, for the closely interrelated concepts of parliamentary sovereignty and the 
High Court of Parliament: as Parliament is at the same time the institution which – 
formally together with the monarch – produces statutory law and the highest court, 
its decisions (Acts of Parliament) bind all other courts, while it cannot be bound 
itself. Accordingly, the law of Parliament has been described as a legal system in its 
own right, entirely separate from the law of the land.  
It is a logical consequence of this construction that Parliament is exclusively 
competent to govern its own affairs. This is the theoretical basis of British 
parliamentary privilege. Even though Parliament and the courts have always 
quarrelled over the precise extent of the area of exclusive cognisance and the 
question of what exactly counts as an internal affair of Parliament, the rough 
contours of parliamentary privilege can easily be deduced even without reference to 
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Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, or to case law. It is obvious that parliamentary 
debate itself forms the sacrosanct core of parliamentary activity and is thus 
immune. Conversely, criminal acts are not privileged, as they are unrelated to 
parliamentary business. Hence, members of Westminster Parliament do not enjoy 
inviolability. Finally, it follows from the fact that Parliament makes law, and 
dispenses justice only by collective acts, that parliamentary privilege belongs to 
Parliament as an institution and not to individual members.  
French constitutionalists have encased the two-tier immunity system of non-
accountability and inviolability in an entirely different theoretical framework, 
which is not clearly substantiated by the text of the constitution. The starting point 
here is the doctrine of national sovereignty and representation which was discussed 
in Chapter IV. According to this doctrine, sovereignty belongs to the abstract, 
indivisible and eternal nation. The nation itself cannot exercise sovereignty and 
form a will of its own. Meanwhile, the actual, living people are able to form a will 
but cannot exercise sovereignty because this would mean to single out one 
component of the nation, which, however, is by definition ‘indivisible’. It is at this 
point that the classical dogma of national sovereignty most clearly contrasts with 
the text of the constitution of the Fifth Republic, which states in Article 3 that 
‘national sovereignty belongs to the people’ – an impossible thought under the 
theoretical framework devised by Carré de Malberg. Since neither the abstract 
nation nor the people can exercise sovereignty, national will-formation must take 
place in parliament, which is composed of members equipped with a representative 
mandate. In classical French constitutional theory, representation has a specific 
meaning: the mandate of a true representative is entirely free; he cannot be bound 
by instructions (which would amount to an imperative mandate). It follows that the 
representative decides autonomously in lieu of the mandate-giver. In order to 
facilitate representation, parliament must be absolutely independent. Traditionally, 
it has therefore been held that parliamentary immunity serves the purpose of 
securing this independence and that both non-accountability and inviolability are 
necessary to achieve it. This view is based on the argument that absolute freedom of 
speech in parliament is only meaningful if parliamentarians cannot otherwise be 
influenced (for example by the threat of instrumental criminal prosecution for 
unrelated matters) or even prevented from attending parliament by being arrested. 
However, we have seen in Chapter IV that recent doctrine – in particular the work 
of Guérin-Bargues – has called for an augmentation of the justification of 
inviolability by more practical reasons. While the theoretical framework as such has 
so far not been rebutted, this demand reflects the status of inviolability as a 
‘secondary’ immunity which is harder to justify than non-accountability. The claim 
that freedom of speech is meaningless if not accompanied by further-reaching 
inviolability seems tempting, but it cannot be upheld on the basis of theoretical 
considerations alone. Other arguments, such as the lack of independence of the 
public prosecution service from the executive, are probably more compelling. 
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In the Netherlands, parliamentary immunity is not supported by a similarly 
elaborate theoretical scaffold and has, as far as we can see, never been subject to 
much theoretical debate. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that, since the 
beginning of the modern Dutch state in 1814, and certainly since its ‘structural 
completion’ in 1848, the existence and power of parliament itself did not have to be 
defended or justified. As we have seen in Chapter V, parliamentary immunity has 
led a quiet, almost dormant existence since it became an element of the Dutch 
Constitution. It can only be guessed that the lack of an existential struggle at the 
beginning of Dutch parliamentarianism was also the reason why both the States-
General itself and Dutch legal authors have traditionally shown little enthusiasm for 
broad parliamentary immunity. Perhaps most importantly, there is but very little in 
the very limited Dutch immunity system which requires extensive justification. 
3.2. Constitutional Theory has a Conservative Effect 
What does the above teach us about the significance of constitutional theory in 
relation to parliamentary immunity? The most essential lesson to be learned from a 
juxtaposition of the theoretical constructions which have been invoked in support of 
British parliamentary privilege and the French immunity system is that they have a 
significant conservative effect. In the case of France, Guérin-Bargues has pointed out 
that the classical concept of representation (and, by implication, of national 
sovereignty) after Carré de Malberg has long dominated all doctrinal thinking about 
parliamentary immunity. This had the effect that a justification based on abstract 
concepts and legal fictions has been given preference over a practical reassessment 
of the necessity of inviolability. This is particularly dissatisfactory because the 
doctrine of national sovereignty is not only a highly abstract concept; it is not even 
supported by the text of the current French Constitution, nor by constitutional 
practice. Based on our comparative findings which do not support a vital necessity 
of inviolability for the proper functioning of a parliament, inviolability does indeed 
stand on much weaker justificatory ground than non-accountability.  
In the case of the United Kingdom, a similar conservative effect can be seen in 
case law prior to Pepper v. Hart (1993), where it was decided that the courts may use 
parliamentary proceedings in order to establish the intention of the legislator. Even 
though the exact borderline between the area of Parliament’s exclusive cognisance 
and the law of the lands have at times been slightly shifted, the courts had for a very 
long time been hesitant to create such inroads into the territory of the High Court of 
Parliament, even where this would clearly have appeared reasonable on the basis of 
a purely factual assessment, unaffected by abstract doctrinal considerations. For 
example, without a rather dogmatic, very strict notion of exclusive cognisance, the 
case of R v. Graham-Campbell ex parte Herbert (1935) would in all likelihood have 
been decided differently: in Graham-Campbell it was held that the sale of liquor 
without a licence in the House of Commons bar constituted an internal matter of 
Parliament and could thus not be reviewed by the courts.  
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Both in the UK and in France, these conservative effects of a traditional 
doctrinal foundation of parliamentary immunity are only slowly and gradually 
permeated by practical concerns, not least under pressure by public opinion. This 
could be observed in the wake of the British parliamentary expenses scandal of 
2009. The subsequent Supreme Court judgment in R v. Chaytor and the 
government’s resolution to put parliamentary privilege on a clear statutory basis in 
the near future mark the gradual but steady departure from traditional concepts of 
parliamentary privilege. 
4. The State of Material Immunity and Developments 
4.1. Parliamentary Immunity in the UK, France and the Netherlands: 
Material Similarities and Differences 
4.1.1. Non-accountability 
In all three systems examined in this study, the material function of parliamentary 
immunity is essentially identical. Its purpose is to protect parliament from undue 
external influence and to facilitate the exercise of its constitutional tasks. In 
accordance with this identical purpose, all three systems have many essential 
aspects in common.  
They share the ubiquitous common denominator of most immunity systems in 
the world: freedom of speech in parliament. In France and the Netherlands, this 
takes the form of non-accountability for written and oral utterances in 
parliamentary debate (including in committees) and the parliamentary vote. In the 
United Kingdom, freedom of speech falls under the privilege established by Article 
9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, which protects ‘proceedings in Parliament’ and thus has 
a similar effect. In all three systems, the protection of freedom of speech is generally 
absolute and perpetual and, unlike German non-accountability which does not 
cover defamatory insults, none of the three provides for any exception with regard 
to the content of speech in parliament, even though the French National Assembly 
has recognised a certain devoir de réserve, or duty of restraint, which its members 
have to observe in their parliamentary utterances.  
Even though the basic characteristics of non-accountability are the same in all 
three systems, some of its aspects differ between the three systems. A first difference 
can be observed in its personal scope. In the French system, non-accountability is 
strictly limited to members of parliament. It excludes other persons who might 
speak in parliament but are not members. Ministers, for instance, are therefore not 
covered by non-accountability; their office is incompatible with the parliamentary 
mandate (however, the criminal liability of members of the French government is 
subject to a separate set of constitutional rules). 
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In the Netherlands, non-accountability also applies to members of the 
government and to other persons who take part in parliamentary deliberations, but 
not, for instance, to persons who are merely heard as a witness in a parliamentary 
committee.2 In the UK, parliamentary privilege ex Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 
protects ‘proceedings in Parliament’. This makes a difference as regards the 
personal scope of non-accountability, since the decisive criterion is not a personal 
but a material one: it does not matter whether a person making a statement is a 
member of parliament, but whether the statement has been made as part of 
parliamentary proceedings. Accordingly, any person who takes part in such 
proceedings may be covered by privilege. As opposed to the Netherlands, this may, 
for instance, include witnesses.  
A second set of differences can be found in the material scope of non-
accountability. The relevant provision in Article 26(1) of the French Constitution 
and its British counterpart in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights both reach slightly 
beyond utterances in parliamentary debate. French non-accountability extends to 
opinions expressed in the exercise of a member’s functions. Utterances outside of an 
actual debate may be thus be covered by non-accountability, for instance where a 
member expresses an opinion on a parliamentary mission (but not, according to 
case law, on a government-sponsored mission). It should be noted, however, that 
the phrase ‘within the exercise of his functions’ has been given an even more 
restrictive interpretation in French case law than it has received from the CJEU, 
which has interpreted the identical provision in Article 8 of Protocol no. 7 to the 
Treaties as meaning that the opinion expressed should have a ‘clear and obvious 
connection’ with the member’s parliamentary work. The British phrase ‘proceedings 
in Parliament’ has never been fully defined. It has been interpreted narrowly, most 
recently in R v. Chaytor, but nevertheless proceedings probably cover more than 
only parliamentary debate and internal documents. For instance, letters of 
complaint which a parliamentarian had written to a non-parliamentary institution 
on behalf of his constituents have been held to be proceedings in Parliament. 
Finally, the material scope of the Dutch non-accountability provision in Article 71 of 
the Constitution is the narrowest of the three. Only oral utterances made during the 
parliamentary meeting or documents submitted to it are covered.  
Third, French and Dutch non-accountability applies absolutely and cannot be 
lifted by parliament or renounced by an individual member. Section 13 of the 
British Defamation Act 1996, however, has created an exception to the absolute 
nature of non-accountability. It offers individual members of Parliament the 
possibility of a waiver of privilege to allow parliamentary proceedings to be taken 
into account in a defamation suit.  
Finally, an important difference exists between the British privilege of freedom 
of speech and non-accountability in France and the Netherlands concerning the type 
of legal action which is barred by non-accountability. While non-accountability in 
France and the Netherlands merely prohibits legal action against a parliamentarian 
 
2 However, witnesses in parliamentary inquiry procedures are protected from liability under 
the provisions of the parliamentary inquiry act (Wet op de parlementaire enquête). 
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based on his utterances in parliament, British proceedings may not be ‘impeached 
or questioned’. Before the House of Lords decided Pepper v. Hart in 1993, this was 
interpreted as a general prohibition of any reference to parliamentary proceedings 
in court. In Pepper, the Lords held that consulting proceedings for the purposes of 
establishing the intended meaning of legislation was permissible. Any use which 
could amount to challenging proceedings remains prohibited; this also includes 
their use as evidence (because this might require the courts to question their truth). 
However, it is to be expected that future legislation on privilege will allow the use 
of parliamentary proceedings as evidence in criminal cases.  
4.1.2. Inviolability 
Of the three immunity systems we have examined, only the French one can be said 
to provide for inviolability. Article 26(2) of the French Constitution prohibits the 
arrest or other measures of a criminal or correctional nature which restrict the 
liberty of a member of parliament, save flagrante delicto. Deprivation of liberty for 
reasons other than criminal or correctional reasons (such as quarantine or detention 
for mental health reasons) remains possible. Further, the bureau of either chamber 
may lift a member’s inviolability upon request. Pursuant to Article 26(2) the plenary 
Chambers have the right to demand the suspension of the detention or prosecution 
of a member for the duration of the parliamentary session. In comparison to the UK 
and the Netherlands, the French inviolability system appears to be quite broad, 
especially when considering that there is no requirement of any material link 
between the alleged criminal behaviour of a member and his parliamentary work. 
However, until relatively recently, French inviolability also barred criminal 
prosecution and measures of investigation, such as searches or wiretapping, against 
a parliamentarian. This has been abolished as a result of a the constitutional 
amendment of 1995, thus significantly reducing the scope of inviolability.  
In the UK, as mentioned previously, freedom from civil arrest exists formally 
but arrests in civil matters have been abolished since the 19th century. Hence, apart 
from very few and marginal exceptions, this privilege no longer has a practical 
effect. 
As for the Netherlands, it has been argued that Article 119 of the Dutch 
Constitution bears a certain ‘inviolability potential’. This article provides that 
members of the government and parliamentarians are to be tried by the Supreme 
Court for crimes committed in office; the order to prosecute must be given by the 
government or the Second Chamber of the States-General. The fact that the order to 
prosecute may not only be given by the Second Chamber but also by the executive 
distinguishes Article 119 from genuine inviolability provisions; after all, one of the 
objectives of parliamentary immunity is to protect parliaments from the executive. 
Further, the potential of Article 119 to have any substantial inviolability effect 
depends on the recognition of a criminal act as an ambtsmisdrijf (crime in office), 
which we have shown to be utterly unlikely. The term ambtsmisdrijf does not refer to 
one or more specific acts. Rather, it denotes any criminal act committed under the 
aggravating circumstances listed in Article 44 of the Criminal Code, thus either in 
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violation of a special official duty or by making use of ‘power, opportunity or 
means derived from the office’ or mandate. It has been proposed that the procedure 
of Article 119 could be applied to criminal utterances – such as hate speech – by 
parliamentarians in the public media because the media attention which 
parliamentarians receive by virtue of their mandate can be interpreted as an 
‘opportunity’ within the meaning of the Criminal Code. It must strongly be doubted 
whether this is indeed a possible use of Article 119 of the Constitution. After all, it is 
impossible to prove that a certain statement of a person, published through the 
media, has only become possible as a result of that person’s capacity of being a 
member of parliament. Many public figures enjoy a degree of media attention 
which equals or exceeds that received by parliamentarians. Conversely, many 
public statements made by parliamentarians escape public attention, often due to a 
lack of media interest. In other words, media attention is not a natural attribute of 
the parliamentary mandate. Consequently, the fact that an MP is able to make a 
racist statement in a televised interview is not sufficient to categorise that statement 
as an ambtsmisdrijf. Article 119 is therefore not suited to create a form of inviolability 
for public utterances of parliamentarians. This is not to say that there is no possible 
use for Article 119 at all. Crimes by parliamentarians which would necessitate the 
application of Article 119 are not inconceivable; this would probably be the case, for 
instance, if a parliamentarian were to leak secret information which is available 
exclusively to members of a parliamentary committee. Crucially, the use of Article 
119 as an inviolability provision would also require the willingness of the courts to 
apply this provision, which has led a ‘dormant’ existence to this date. There is no 
evidence that such a will exists. We can therefore safely state that the Dutch 
immunity regime, like the British one, does not provide for inviolability.  
Among the three case studies, the French inviolability regime thus constitutes 
an exception. It should, however, be noted that inviolability by no means appears to 
be exceptional in a larger reference group; most states on the European continent 
and many others in the world (usually those without a British colonial history) 
grant their parliamentarians freedom from arrest or an even broader form of 
inviolability which protects them from criminal and civil action for the duration of 
the parliamentary mandate. 
4.1.3. The Case of the Netherlands: Towards Political Immunity? 
We have seen that Dutch parliamentarians are not protected by any form of 
immunity with regard to their acts and utterances outside parliament. However, it 
is sometimes argued – and recognised by the Dutch courts with reference to ECtHR 
case law – that elected parliamentarians must be given as wide a freedom of 
expression as possible. Hence, limitations of that right must not be accepted easily. 
The conviction of members of parliament for speech crimes is therefore unlikely, as 
illustrated by the case of Geert Wilders.  
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Nonetheless, if, and the extent to which, Dutch politicians (and 
parliamentarians in particular) can really be said to enjoy greater freedom of speech 
than ordinary citizens cannot be determined with certainty. In particular, it is not 
clearly foreseeable in which cases the courts will be inclined to distinguish between 
politicians and other citizens in the assessment of alleged crimes of utterance. This 
question, and with it the system of parliamentary immunity, received an unusually 
high degree of public attention. Some have argued that the scope of parliamentary 
non-accountability must be broadened to cover all contributions to public debate, 
whether they are made in or outside parliament. Our analysis has shown that such a 
measure is legally impossible insofar as parliamentary immunity is considered an 
institutional privilege, which is clearly the case in the Netherlands. In the light of 
national constitutional principles, but also vis-à-vis the ECHR, parliamentary 
immunity is justified by its institutional character. Extra-parliamentary non-
accountability would lack this necessary justificatory link with the institution of 
parliament. 
The same would be true in case of the introduction of an even wider political 
immunity which covers members of parliament and other citizens alike, and 
generally protects political speech and contributions to public debate. Such an 
immunity would place freedom of speech above other fundamental rights and 
would therefore be manifestly at odds with the ECHR and other international 
instruments by which the Netherlands is bound, such as the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Racial Discrimination (ICERD). It would also 
impose on the courts the difficult task of defining ‘political’ speech and thus 
deciding whether a certain utterance is covered by immunity. Since the courts 
would inevitably have to take this difficult decision, it is questionable whether the 
introduction of political immunity would even reach its aim of withdrawing 
political debate in its entirety from the application of the (criminal) law. Even if 
political discourse in the Netherlands should come to the conclusion that greater 
freedom of speech – for politicians or for all – is in principle desirable, our analysis 
shows that both broadening parliamentary non-accountability and introducing a 
form of political immunity would be highly problematic from a legal point of view. 
4.2. The Immunity of the European Parliament 
The immunity system which protects the European Parliament also consists of non-
accountability and inviolability. Article 8 of Protocol no. 7 provides for absolute 
non-accountability, while Article 9 of that Protocol provides for a combination of 
the immunity regimes of the Member States and consequently a broad ‘European 
immunity’. Which system applies in a given case depends on whether the MEP 
facing legal action has committed the act to which the action relates at home or in 
another Member State. This system is discriminatory, as not all Member States grant 
their parliamentarians inviolability: an MEP from a Member State without 
inviolability can potentially be prosecuted in his home Member State for an act 
which would be covered by inviolability in another. The European Parliament tries 
to remedy this discriminatory effect by making use of its discretionary power to 
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waive or assert immunity. However, in the (as of yet) hypothetical scenario that this 
power is applied to grant MEPs inviolability even where it does not exist under the 
material rules of the Member State concerned, this would give rise to legal 
problems. Even though it cannot be ruled out that the European Parliament would, 
in such a case, attempt to ‘create’ inviolability by asserting it, it is highly unlikely 
that this would be accepted in court, either on a Member State level or before the 
CJEU. 
4.3. ECtHR and CJEU: A Functional Approach Towards Parliamentary 
Immunity 
We have shown in Chapter II that the European Court of Human Rights has 
adopted a functional approach towards parliamentary immunity. This means that it 
regards immunity as legitimate and ‘necessary in a democratic society’ as long as 
the act or utterance to which a legal action against a parliamentarian relates is 
materially connected to the core functions of the parliamentary mandate. The 
definition of these functions is relatively narrow and, above all, based on an 
institutional view of parliament and its members. It is assumed that the primary 
task of a parliamentarian is to take part in the ‘corporate’ activity of parliament, that 
is, to take part in plenary debates, to deliberate in committees and to vote on 
legislation. Other activities, which are equally part of the work of a member of 
parliament but do not immediately relate to the institution of parliament – such as 
campaigning for elections or participating in political debate outside parliament – 
do not fall within this definition of functions of the parliamentary mandate. 
It cannot be determined whether the ECtHR, in adopting this approach, has 
been fully aware of the very different consequences it has, respectively, for the 
legitimacy of non-accountability and inviolability. In its case law, the ECtHR 
usually does not treat non-accountability and inviolability as separate forms of 
immunity. Instead, it usually refers summarily to ‘parliamentary immunity’. Upon a 
closer look, however, it becomes clear that the Court’s functional approach has the 
effect that inviolability is in principle dismissed as an illegitimate violation of the 
right of access to court, while non-accountability is accepted. Non-accountability 
relates mainly to what is spoken or written in parliament, or very closely connected 
to actual parliamentary activity. According to the Court in Strasbourg, to protect 
this is necessary in a democratic society. However, the further removed an act or 
utterance is from the activity of parliament as an institution, the less likely it is that 
the limitation of the rights of third persons by the operation of immunity is 
acceptable. It follows that inviolability, which is by definition an extra-professional 
immunity, is in principle problematic and will be deemed to violate the ECHR 
unless there are additional reasons for its legitimacy.  
The above approach is clearly visible in ECtHR case law. In A v. the UK, the 
leading case to which we already referred at the very beginning of this book, a 
citizen wished to sue a member of the British Parliament for defamation after he 
had disclosed her name and address, and made injurious comments about her in a 
parliamentary speech. The ECtHR was of the opinion that, however grievous for the 
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applicant, freedom of speech in parliament was of paramount value in a democratic 
society. It therefore upheld non-accountability (parliamentary privilege ex Article 9 
of the Bill of Rights 1689) as a legitimate limitation of the right of access to court. 
However, in a series of decisions starting with Cordova v. Italy, the Court held that 
non-accountability did not constitute a legitimate limitation of the rights ex Article 6 
of the Convention where the insulting statements at issue had been made outside 
parliament and did not bear a sufficiently close connection with parliamentary 
activity. Pursuing its functional approach further, the Court has consistently 
deemed inviolability – immunity protecting parliamentarians from legal action for 
crimes committed in the extra-professional sphere – as incompatible with the 
Convention. This was the case in Tsalkitzis v. Greece, where the alleged criminal acts 
in question (blackmail and corruption) had taken place before the perpetrator’s 
election to parliament, and in Syngelidis v. Greece, where inviolability prevented the 
ex-husband of a parliamentarian from bringing legal action against his former 
spouse in an entirely private matter of child custody. It follows from consistent 
ECtHR case law, concerning the legitimacy of parliamentary immunity as a 
limitation of the right of access to court, that narrow non-accountability – freedom 
of speech – is considered legitimate, whereas any further-reaching immunity will 
only be accepted if merited by additional reasons, for example, if it can be 
established that legal proceedings against parliamentarians are politically 
motivated.  
When dealing with the immunity system of the European Parliament, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has taken a similar approach, at least 
with regard to non-accountability pursuant to Article 8 of Protocol no. 7 to the 
Treaty on European Union, which protects members from legal action in respect of 
opinions expressed ‘in the performance of their duties’. In its decision in Aldo 
Patriciello (2011), the CJEU ruled that, in order to be protected by non-accountability, 
an opinion expressed by a member of the EP must bear a ‘clear and obvious’ 
connection with the parliamentary functions of that member. It does not suffice, 
therefore, that the opinion is of a political nature. Though CJEU case law on the 
matter is entirely scarce – there is none with regard to inviolability – this suggests 
that the approach of the Court of Justice follows that of the ECtHR.  
4.4. Do National Systems Develop in a ‘Functional’ Direction? 
We have raised the hypothesis that national systems of parliamentary immunity in 
Europe are generally developing towards a model which satisfies the functional 
criterion of the ECtHR. In concrete terms, this means that inviolability, where it 
exists, is gradually reduced to a minimum or even abolished, while non-
accountability is applied restrictively with regard to extra-parliamentary utterances 
without a manifest connection to actual parliamentary activity.  
Recent developments in two of the three systems we have examined show 
evidence in support of this hypothesis. In the United Kingdom, both parliamentary 
committees and the Supreme Court have recently given an increasingly narrow 
interpretation to ‘proceedings in Parliament’; the concept now hardly reaches 
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beyond written and oral utterances in or closely related to actual debate. Statutory 
legislation which will clearly define privilege and allow the use of ‘proceedings’ as 
evidence in criminal lawsuits also seems to be imminent. Beginning from the last 
decade of the previous century, a clear and lasting tendency to rationalise the 
system of British parliamentary privilege can be observed – to cut it back to what is 
strictly necessary to protect free deliberations in Westminster Parliament.  
In France, the trend is less evident but still present: the constitutional 
amendment of 1995 has abolished the prohibition of criminal proceedings against 
parliamentarians without authorisation, the explicit aim being to limit inviolability 
‘to the guarantees strictly necessary for the exercise of the parliamentary mandate’. 
Non-accountability for utterances outside actual debates in parliament has been 
given a narrow interpretation in case law; it does not apply where a member of 
parliament is speaking in a personal capacity without a parliamentary assignment 
(for example in a televised interview, even though he is merely repeating what has 
been said or written in parliament earlier) or on a mission sponsored by the 
executive. 
The Dutch immunity system, which does not provide for inviolability, is 
already consistent with the functional criterion of the ECtHR, it has even been 
found by some to be too narrow to protect the work of a modern parliamentarian 
whose task as a representative of the people includes engaging in controversial 
public debate. It is highly unlikely that the limited level of immunity which exists in 
the Netherlands will be reduced even further – certainly not due to pressure from 
Strasbourg. But perhaps the Netherlands is approaching functionality from the 
other end of the immunity scale? If political majorities and the courts were to agree 
that the functions which come with the parliamentary mandate are not confined to 
actual parliamentary debates, this could eventually lead to a redefinition of the 
narrow, institution-based view of the mandate which has brought about the 
European functional model of parliamentary immunity. It would mean to accept 
that the tasks of a modern parliamentarian necessarily include extra-parliamentary 
activities – in particular, political statements outside parliament – which deserve a 
degree of protection. It is possible to interpret Dutch judicial practice in this way: as 
the case of Geert Wilders amply illustrates, the courts are utterly reluctant to convict 
politicians of crimes of utterance, even where the letter of the criminal law would 
suggest – or possibly demand – a conviction. 
Certainly, based on an examination of only the most recent developments in 
only three systems, we are unable to really confirm the hypothesis of a slow-moving 
European consensus with regard to the acceptable and necessary scope of 
parliamentary immunity. Nevertheless, after our analysis of three national systems, 
the immunity regime of the European Parliament, and the relevant case law of the 
ECtHR, we are certainly in a position to suggest the existence of a trend: there are 
no signs of a development towards more immunity than fits the functional model. 
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